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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an exercise in applied political philosophy. It addresses the moral 
justifiability of secession within the wider context of liberal political thought by 
critically examining divergent accounts of how liberalism may justify a moral right for 
groups to secede from their parent State. Adopting an inter -disciplinary approach, 
existing theories of a normative right to secede are examined, both in a purely 
analytical context, and in relation to the contemporary secessionist dispute in the 
Indian-held State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
This analysis focuses on, but is not limited to, the three theories which currently 
dominate discussion of how Iiberalism may justify a normative right to secede. 
Building upon the prior work of other scholars, contemporary theories of secession are 
contrasted with one another and related to other, associated concepts in political 
theory. This process of critical engagement emphasises factors which extend beyond 
the three theories under consideration to both liberal -based theories of secession in 
general, and also to other, related topics in political theory. Included within this 
discussion are issues such as the notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty, and the 
question of special, group -specific rights for national minorities other than a right of 
independent Statehood. 
The thesis deals primarily with material of a highly analytical nature. However, while 
it does not directly seek to examine the reasons behind the violence in Kashmir, the 
thesis does provide a detailed historical account of that violence, as well as a 
description of contemporary Kashmíri political and social life, which may be useful for 
a more empirical study of the Kashmir dispute and other, similar conflicts. Similarly, 
because any eventual solution to the conflict in Kashmir and others like it will not only 
have to take account of the conflicting demands of the various protagonists, but also 
arrive at some determination regarding their legitimacy, consideration of the moral 
V 
justifiability of secession highlights factors which are likely to extend beyond the 
narrow confines of political theory. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the defining features of the international political landscape over the last fifty 
years has been the enormous increase in the number of secessionist movements. 
Events such as the decline of European colonialism and the fall of Communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe have initiated a process of political fragmentation which continues 
to threaten the stability and prosperity of States and whole regions. Previously 
dormant national identities and cultural groups have suddenly reasserted themselves 
and demanded that they be afforded their own independent polity, often resorting to a 
campaign of violence when what they see as their rightful political inheritance is 
denied them by their parent State. In addition to raising important strategic, socio- 
political and legal issues, this growth in secessionist -inspired political violence has 
also raised fundamental philosophical questions concerning the justice of existing 
international boundaries and the right to political self -determination. 
Until recently political theorists discussed secession in connection to other, related 
issues such as nationalism and largely ignored the need for a normative theory of 
secession that tells us which, if any, groups (or individuals) possess a right to secede. 
Whereas the right of States to demand obedience from their subjects, and of citizens to 
disobey their State, were frequently the subject of scholarly debate, the right of the 
State to maintain its territorial integrity, and of its subjects to remove a portion of that 
territory, were not so frequently discussed. Rather, the composition of the State was 
usually taken as given, and discussions concerning the nature and extent of the State's 
authority over its subjects were conducted in a manner that mostly disregarded 
questions regarding the unity of the State itself. 
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Recently, however, a growing body of philosophical literature on the subject of 
secession has begun to emerge with different theorists developing divergent accounts 
of the justification for, and scope of, a right to secede within the general framework of 
liberal political theory. Nonetheless, while a normative right to secede is an 
increasingly popular topic of discussion amongst political theorists with several 
volumes of essays on the topic published quite recently, the debate is still very much in 
its infancy with new theories still emerging and existing theories being re- interpreted 
and clarified. More importantly, while numerous theorists have, in the process of 
developing their own theory and defending it from objection, critically engaged with 
other, rival theories, there is no full -length, comprehensive study of the three dominant 
types of theory and their comparative advantages and disadvantages. Similarly, while 
the issue of a moral right to secede is often raised in relation to other topical 
discussions in political theory - particularly the question of how liberalism should 
respond to demands by minority groups for special, group -specific rights - most 
theorists have typically concentrated on either one question or the other. 
Consequently, while numerous liberal theorists have developed often quite detailed 
theories of secession, the linkages between secession and other, associated issues in 
liberal political theory - especially the minority rights debate - remain largely 
unexplored. 
This thesis seeks to address these outstanding issues by critically evaluating the three 
types of theory which currently dominate discussion of a normative right to secede. 
The intention is not to formulate a new theory of secession or to supplant the work of 
others. Rather, the goal is to contribute to the debate by building upon existing 
theories through a process of critical engagement with them. In addition to examining 
each theory's relative merits and weaknesses, a less developed but nonetheless 
important aim is also to contextualise the question of how liberalism should respond to 
secessionist demands within a wider theoretical framework that also includes the 
related issues of: (a) how liberalism should respond to demands by minority groups for 
special, group -specific rights; and (b) what significance a liberal theory of secession 
should attach to issues of territory and territorial sovereignty. 
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This process of critical engagement will consist of two phases. In the first phase - 
which includes this, introductory chapter plus Chapters Two, Three and Four - the 
three theories under consideration will be introduced and subjected to critical 
evaluation. This process will begin by first clarifying the theory in question, 
comparing it to the other two, rival theories here under consideration, and then 
critically engaging with the theory in order to determine whether it can provide a 
satisfactory liberal account of a moral right to secede. In the second phase - which 
comprises Chapters Five and Six - this analytical study will be complemented by an 
empirical case -study where the critical insights contained in the previous chapters will 
be applied to a real -life, contemporary secessionist dispute. The findings of this 
investigation will then be summarised in a final, seventh chapter which will tie 
together the preceding claims and then relate these to the overall aims of the thesis. 
It is important to remember that while the theories here under consideration are 
conducted at a high level of theoretical abstraction and sophistication, they nonetheless 
have as their aim the normative assessment, and eventual resolution, of disputes that 
are very much a part of the real world. Thus, while the inclusion of an empirical case 
study may be something of an unusual approach - at least as far as some political 
theorists are concerned - given the type of material here under consideration it is 
nonetheless an entirely appropriate one. The secessionist dispute that has been chosen 
as the case -study is the contemporary conflict in the Indian-held State of Jammu and 
Kashmir.' While almost any secessionist conflict would suffice, the case of Kashmir 
is particularly appropriate because: (a) it contains both variants of the demand to 
secede (i.e. the demand to form an independent State and the demand to join another, 
pre- existing State); and (b) the issues raised by the various protagonists to the Kashmir 
dispute exemplify the three theories considered by this thesis. 
The aim of the thesis is, then, to advance the debate on a normative right of secession 
by critically engaging with, and saying something substantive about, the three leading 
normative theories of secession with an empirical case -study employed as illustrative 
material to this end. The reasons for restricting the scope of the thesis to include only 
these three types of normative theory will be discussed later. For now the important 
1 Which henceforth shall simply be referred to as `Kashmir.' 
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point to note is that the goal of the thesis is not to articulate a satisfactory account of a 
moral right to secede. Rather, the more modest goal is simply the comparative 
assessment of the three leading types of normative theories of secession through a 
process of critical engagement with them. 
Similarly, it must also be emphasised that the purpose of including the case -study on 
Kashmir is neither to analyse, nor normatively evaluate, claimed rights to secede in 
Kashmir. The thesis does not seek to examine the reasons behind the political violence 
in Kashmir or the moral justifiability of Kashmir's political independence from India.22 
Rather, the focus is a much narrower one that includes only the comparative merits of 
the three leading normative theories of secession. The purpose of including the case - 
study on Kashmir is to illustrate and probe, or `test out', the theoretical analysis with 
empirical evidence by confronting each theory with a real -life secessionist dispute, and 
examining how the claims made in the preceding theoretical investigation stand up 
when subjected to empirical scrutiny. A less- developed, but nonetheless important, 
aim is to determine what broader lessons might be learned from the case of Kashmir 
for the normative theorisation of secession, by taking some of the claims made in the 
case of Kashmir and examining how a liberal theory of secession should respond to 
these. 
1.2 WHAT IS SECESSION? 
A. Defining Secession 
Before the three types of normative theory can be introduced it is first necessary to 
clarify certain key issues, terms and concepts. These factors will be of significant 
importance throughout the ensuing analysis and their clarification here should, at the 
very least, remove the possibility of confusion at a later stage. Following this 
discussion the three types of theory to be considered in this thesis will be briefly 
introduced and related back to the preceding theoretical analysis. 
2 Although this is not to say that the issues raised in the thesis may not be relevant to such undertakings. 
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A normative theory of secession is one which tells us which groups, types of groups, 
or individuals, possess a right to secede, in what circumstances and why. However, we 
cannot determine who has, or should have, a right to secede until we know exactly what 
it is to grant such a right. For this reason it is important to clarify the notion of 
secession and what it means to possess a right to secede. Amongst those theorists who 
have addressed the issue of a right to secede there is general agreement upon what 
secession is. Rather, most of the disagreement concerns who, if anyone, possesses a 
right to secede and why. Thus, the following definition of the term `secession' is, for 
the most part, consistent with that offered by other theorists. 
Every State claims to possess authority - the right to demand obedience with its 
directives, to coerce those who do not willingly obey and to punish those who disobey. 
A State's authority may be either legitimate or illegitimate. To say that a State's 
authority is legitimate is to say that, subject to certain constraints, the State is justified 
in possessing and exercising its authority. A State's authority is contained within a 
geographically defined region known as a territory over which the State is then said to 
possess sovereignty.3 Secessionists, or separatists, seek to exclude themselves from 
the authority of the State by redrawing the State's territorial boundaries so as to exclude 
the territory that they occupy from the State's sovereignty.4 
Secession is, therefore, a form of refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the State's 
claim to authority - it is a bid for independence from the State through the 
appropriation of its territory. However, unlike the revolutionary who seeks either to 
dissolve the State or to completely take it over, the secessionist need not deny the 
State's authority as such - only its authority over him/her, the members of his/her 
group, and the territory that they occupy.5 In most cases demands for secession are 
demands for both independence from the existing State, and sovereignty for the new 
State that the secessionists intend to create. However, secession, ex hypothesi, need not 
3 The significance of territory and territorial sovereignty to a normative theory of secession will be 
discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
4 See Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.10. 
5 Buchanan, p.10. 
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mean the creation of a new State, as the secessionists may wish to leave one State in 
order to become a part of another State.6 
B. What is a Right? 
The second, more contentious, issue concerns the nature of rights. It should first be 
noted that this thesis will be concerned with a moral right to secede. Thus, unless 
otherwise stated, the terms `a right to secede' and `a right of secession' will refer 
exclusively to a moral right. On occasion other forms of the right to secede - in 
particular a legal or constitutional right - will be discussed, but only in so far as these 
are relevant to a moral right of secession. This is not to say that these other forms of a 
right to secede are of any less importance than a moral right. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis the discussion has been narrowed to include only a moral right of 
secession. Not only does this allow a more thorough examination of the issues raised 
by such a right, but the theoretical literature which with the thesis is concerned deals 
primarily with the issue of a moral, rather than a legal or constitutional, right to secede. 
Rights, and moral rights in particular, are, of course, the subject of enormous 
controversy amongst philosophers.7 Not surprisingly most writers on secession have 
largely sought to avoid this controversy by offering a relatively simple account of what 
it means to possess a right to secede, and concentrated instead upon the 
non/justifiability of that right in particular circumstances. On the one hand, the absence 
of any serious discussion of rights within the secession debate is quite understandable. 
One should be able to say something of substantive importance on the moral 
justifiability of secession without first having to resolve the question of moral rights to 
the satisfaction of moral and political philosophers. 
On the other hand, however, one's conception of what a right is, what function rights 
are supposed to serve, what entities are capable of possessing rights and why, may to a 
significant degree determine whether or not one is inclined to endorse a particular 
6 In which case the demand to secede is referred to as irredentism. This point is particularly important in 
the case of Kashmir, as amongst those seeking the State's secession there is a divergence of opinion 
regarding whether Kashmir should secede in order to become an independent State, or to join Pakistan. 
7 Buchanan admits as much himself. See Buchanan, p.27. 
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group's right to secede in specific circumstances. Hence, one cannot sensibly discuss 
the issue of a right to secede without first saying something about the nature of rights. 
The intention here is not to construct and defend against objection a comprehensive 
theory of rights. Such an undertaking would not only be beyond the scope of the thesis 
but would, at the very least, be a thesis in itself. Rather, along with other commentators 
in the secession debate, the notion of what rights are and what it is to possess a right 
will be specified only in general terms in order to avoid possible confusion at a later 
stage. 
Many theorists conceive of a right to secede as a Hohfeldian liberty right that gives 
rise only to negative duties upon the parent State and others to not interfere in a group's 
secession. A Hohfeldian liberty right is defined simply as the absence of a duty, i.e. to 
say that an agent (X) has a liberty right to perform a particular action (Y) is merely to 
say that X has no duty to refrain from Y -ing.8 Under this account if a group (G) has a 
right to secede from a State (S) this means simply that: (a) G has no duty to refrain from 
seceding from S; and (b) S (and others) have only a negative duty to not interfere in G's 
seceding.' Such an account, however, ignores the fact that in seceding from S, G takes 
not only territory from S, but also investments which S has made both in that territory 
(e.g, by building, maintaining and improving roads, buildings and industries) and its 
inhabitants (e.g. through educating and training them).1° 
We can of course question the moral significance of this fact with respect to the 
question of justifying a right to secede. Just because, in seceding from S, G would be 
removing a portion of S's territory and investments, it does not necessarily follow that 
G would be unjustified in seceding from S. Buchanan, for example, claims that S's 
8 See Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923). 
Also see Joel Feinberg, Social Philosphy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp.56 -57; and Arthur 
L. Corbin, `Legal Analysis and Terminology', Yale Law Journal, Vol.29, 1919, pp.163 -73. 
9 This seems to be the position adopted by Buchanan who claims that if G has a right to secede from S 
this means simply that G's secession from S would be morally permissible and G has an enforceable 
moral claim against S and others only to not impede its secession (Buchanan, p.27). Similarly, while 
Margalit and Raz admit that there may be other, additional duties arising from a right of secession 
(including a duty of the part of the parent State to aid the secessionist group in exercising the right) they 
agree with Buchanan that the main duty is to not impede the seceding group's secession. See Avishai 
Margalit and Joseph Raz, `National Self- Determination', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 9, 1990, 
pp.460 -61. 
to On this point see Buchanan, p.I05. 
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material loss as a result of G's secession from it establishes only that G has a duty to 
offer fair compensation to S, not that G's secession from it would be unjustified.11 
Furthermore, as Buchanan also points out, not only do citizens frequently have little say 
over the investments which their State chooses to make in them and their region, but 
they are frequently unfree to refuse such investments.l2 
Regardless of the validity of such claims, however, the fact remains that to say that G 
has a right to secede from S cannot simply mean: (a) that S has only a negative duty to 
not interfere with G's seceding from it, but, by definition, must also mean; (b) that S 
has a positive duty to give G a proportion of its territory and at least some of the assets 
contained within it. Whether or not G then has a duty to compensate S for this loss is 
another matter. However, any subsequent compensation (or lack thereof) does not alter 
the fact that if S has a negative duty to not impede G's secession from it then, ex 
hypothesi, S must also have a positive duty to give G a proportion of its territory and 
assets. Hence the right to secede cannot simply be a straight forward Hohfeldian liberty 
right, but must also be a Hohfeldian claim right that imposes positive duties upon the 
parent State from which the group is seceding.13 
This point has important consequences for a normative theory of secession. Requiring 
an agent to perform an action will typically impose a greater hardship upon that agent 
than the simple requirement that the agent refrain from interfering in the performance 
of actions by other agents. Therefore to claim that others merely have a negative duty 
to refrain from acting in a particular way, is in most cases to assume a substantially 
lesser burden of justification than to claim that others have a positive duty to act in a 
particular way. Yet, in the case of secession it is evident that the parent State cannot 
merely have a negative duty to refrain from interfering in a sub -group's secession but, 
by definition, must also have a positive duty to transfer to that sub -group a proportion 
of its territory and the wealth contained within that territory. Consequently, if the right 
11 Buchanan, p.I05. 
12 Buchanan, p.105. 
13 A Hohfeldiam claim right is distinct from a liberty right. Unlike a liberty right, a claim right is 
necessarily the grounds of other peoples' positive duties towards the right -holder. Therefore a claim right 
is both: (a) a claim to performance of action against other agents; and (b) a claim against others of 
recognition and enforcement. In the case of secession the `other agent' is the State from which the group 
in question is seceding. 
Introduction 9 
to secede is interpreted as bestowing an enforceable moral claim upon the right -holder 
any right to secede will require substantial justification and the class of right -holders 
may admit relatively few members. 
For this reason the thesis will adopt a substantially weaker conception of what it is to 
possess a right to secede that entails a lesser burden of justification. Under this 
conception, to say that G `possesses a right' to secede from S is simply shorthand for 
saying that G's secession from S in those circumstances would be morally justified, or 
morally permissible, and, thus, would not be morally wrong. It is not also to say that G 
therefore has an enforceable moral claim against S to allow it to secede by giving G a 
proportion of its territory and wealth. In other words, the weight of moral reasoning 
supports G's secession from S without necessarily generating a correlative duty upon S 
to allow G to secede from it. 
To emphasise: one may be morally justified in performing a given action without 
having an enforceable moral claim against others with respect to that action. For 
example, I may be morally justified in borrowing my neighbour's lawn -mower without 
my neighbour being under a correlative duty to lend it to me. While we would not be 
inclined to regard my borrowing my neighbour's lawn -mower as morally wrong, it is 
equally true that we would not be inclined to argue that my neighbour has a moral duty 
to lend it to me, or that I have an enforceable moral claim against my neighbour for the 
use of his lawn- mower. 
Other theorists may favour a stronger conception of rights where, for example, to say 
that G possesses a right to secede from S is, ceteris parabis, to say that G possesses an 
enforceable moral claim against S to allow it to secede and, therefore, to give to G a 
proportion of its territory and assets. However, it is not the intention of this thesis to 
settle such disputes. Rather, the main concern will be to demonstrate under what 
conditions a group's secession would be morally justified.14 
14 Compare with Buchanan, p.27. 
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1.3 THE ISSUE OF PERMISSIBILITY 
A. Introduction 
Normative theories of secession are often categorised according to their permissiveness 
with some theories being more permissive than other theories. Consider, for example, 
the theory of Allen Buchanan, which will be discussed in more detail later. Buchanan 
claims that a group's interest in preserving its culture is generally not of sufficient moral 
importance to justify a right of secession (unless that group meets a number of stringent 
criteria - many of which, by Buchanan's own admission, would be inapplicable to most 
groups).15 Margalit and Raz, on the other hand, argue that where political independence 
would be beneficial to the cultural well -being of a group then that group consequently 
possesses a right to secede, providing that in doing so they do not harm the fundamental 
interests of the parent State or violate the basic rights of their inhabitants.16 
Thus, whereas Buchanan emphasises the State's right to maintain the existing borders 
of its territorial sovereignty over a group's right to preserve its culture, the opposite is 
true of Margalit and Raz. Hence, with respect to the interest of cultural preservation, 
because fewer groups will qualify for a right to secede under Buchanan's theory than 
under that of Margalit and Raz, Margalit and Raz's theory is said to be more permissive 
than that of Buchanan.17 Permissiveness is, then, a comparative term. The more 
permissive a theory of secession, the greater the weight attached by that theory to the 
right of sub- groups to change the boundaries of a State's territorial sovereignty relative 
to the State's right to maintain those boundaries. Thus, theories that are less permissive 
than other, rival; theories admit comparatively fewer members to the class of holders of 
a right to secede and consequently justify relatively fewer instances of secession over 
time. 
15 Buchanan, p.61. 
16 See Margalit and Raz, pp.448ff. 
17 Buchanan, of course, does argue that there are other, more compelling reasons for granting a right to 
secede than cultural preservation. These additional reasons will be investigated in detail later in the 
thesis. 
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B. A Continuum of Permissibility 
Within the existing body of normative literature on secession we may distinguish a 
number of different positions concerning the question of how permissive a theory of 
secession should be. At one extreme is what Buchanan terms the absolutist 
interpretation of territorial integrity, where the State's interest in preserving its 
territorial integrity is supreme and there is no right to secede, i.e. secession is never a 
justified form of action.18 Arguments in favour of an absolutist interpretation of 
territorial integrity are generally based upon the claim that the negative consequences 
produced by a sub- group's secession - or, as is more often the case, the probability that 
they might be produced - morally outweigh any right that the sub -group may have to 
political self -determination. Additionally, it is also claimed that breakaway States tend 
to be sociologically and ethnically homogenous, and that this lack of internal plurality 
tends to undermine democracy.19 
At the other extreme lies the claim that the State's interest in preserving its territorial 
integrity is always overridden by a group's interest in political self -determination, i.e. 
secession is always a justified course of action and, a fortiori, attempts by the State to 
resist secession are never justified. Theorists who favour an absolute right of secession 
generally place overriding emphasis upon what will be termed the principle of voluntary 
political association, which states that the only legitimate political associations are 
those which are based upon the free consent of all moral agents within the association. 
Where this consent is withdrawn, or was never given in the first place, any attempt to 
stop the dissenting party seceding would violate the requirement that the association be 
a voluntary one and hence be illegitimate. 
Because States not infrequently behave in an immoral manner, and secession may on 
occasion be an effective means of remedying a condition of State -perpetrated injustice, 
many theorists are loathe to grant the State an absolute right to maintain its territorial 
integrity and so reject the absolutist interpretation of territorial integrity. On the other 
18 Allen Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.26, No.1, 1997, p.50 
19 In support of this latter claim it is pointed out that many newly created States are frequently no more 
democratic than the State from which they seceded. See, for example, Amitai Etzioní, The Evils of Self - 
Determination', Foreign Policy, 89, 1992. This claim will be addressed in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
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hand, however, it is equally true that.a group's secession is likely to affect important and 
diverse interests of many people; not just the interests of the members of the group 
doing the seceding or, for that matter, the interests of the parent State. Thus, most 
theorists also agree that the right to secede should not be absolute and that there should 
be conditions placed upon its exercise. Consequently, between the absolutist 
interpretation of territorial integrity and an absolute right to secede, there exists a 
continuum of permissiveness where varying degrees of emphasis are placed upon both 
the right to secede and the right of States to maintain their territorial integrity.20 Hence 
theorists such as Buchanan maintain both that: (a) the State possesses a legitimate right 
to maintain its territorial integrity; and also (b) that there are certain conditions under 
which a State and its claim to territorial sovereignty is illegitimate with respect to a 
particular group, and consequently this group possesses a right to secede and should be 
permitted to do so. 
The problem now is to specify exactly what these conditions are so that we may 
determine whether or not a given group in a particular situation possesses a right to 
secede. These conditions may be stated both positively (e.g. a group must perceive itself 
as having a separate culture /tradition) or negatively (e.g. a group's secession must not 
infringe the rights of others living in the territory).21 However, in both cases the effect 
of these conditions, or provisos, is the same, i.e. they restrict the scope of the right's 
application to only those groups which are capable of satisfying them. Whether or not 
these same conditions will apply to other groups, and if so what sort of groups, how 
many, and in what circumstances, will depend upon what these conditions are. 
Therefore the same conditions which justify the possession of a right to secede will also 
determine that right's degree of permissiveness, or scope of application.22 
20 See Brilmayer who discusses, albeit briefly, the problem of determining how much moral weight we 
should attach to preserving the `status quo.' Lea Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self Determination: A 
Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.16, No.1, January 1991, p.199. 
2t Kai Nielsen, `Secession: The Case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.10, No.1, 1993, 
p.30. 
22 Notice-, however, that even if there is general agreement concerning what these conditions are, there 
may remain disagreement as to whether or not they have in fact been met in any particular case. Refer R. 
E. Ewin, Can There Be a Right to Secede ?', Philosophy, Vol.70, 1995, p.349. Also see R. E. Ewin, 
`Peoples and Secession', Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.11, No.2, 1994. 
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Amongst those theories that claim that secession may be a justifiable form of action, a 
distinction is often made between `permissive' theories which contain a presumption in 
favour of secession, and less -permissive' theories which contain a presumption in 
favour of maintaining the status quo 23 Examples of permissive theories of secession 
are those of David Gauthier 24 Harry Beran25 and Christopher Wellman.26 All three 
theorists base their account of the right to secede upon the liberal- democratic principle 
of voluntary political association outlined earlier,27 but place restrictions upon the 
right's exercise. Thus, for all three theorists there is a presumption in favour of a right 
of secession that may on occasion be defeated, but only where it can be adequately 
demonstrated that exercise of the right would violate the rights of others and/or produce 
certain overriding negative consequences. Conversely, theorists who subscribe to the 
less -permissive view, such as Buchanan and Birch,28 emphasise that the seceding group 
is taking a portion of the State's territory and claim that for this a strong justification is 
required.29 Hence, there is a presumption in favour of maintaining the existing 
boundaries of a State's territorial sovereignty that is defeated in only the most unusual 
circumstances and, consequently, while there may in certain circumstances exist a right 
of secession, it is a right that applies to few groups over time. 
23 Theories of secession are frequently categorised according to their degree of permissibility (i.e. how 
many members are admitted to the class of holders of the right relative to other, competing theories). See, 
for example, Percy, B. Lehning, `Theories of Secession: An Introduction' in Theories of Secession, ed. 
Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998). Also see Buchanan (1997). 
24 David Gauthier, `Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.24, No. 
3, September 1994. 
25 Beran has been a prolific writer on the issue of a normative theory of secession, some examples of his 
work include the following: `A Liberal Theory of Secession', Political Studies, Vol.32, No.1, 1984. The 
Consent Theory of Political Obligation (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987); `Self -Determination: A 
Philosophical Perspective' in Self -Determination in the Commonwealth, ed. W. J. A. Macartney 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1988); `More Theory of Secession; A Response to Birch', 
Political Studies, Vol.36, No.2, 1988; `Border Disputes and the Right of National Self -Determination', 
History of European Ideas, Vol.16, No.4 -6, 1993; `The Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' 
in Nations, Cultures and Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994); 'A 
Demcocratic Theory of Political Self -Determination for a New World Order' in Theories of Secession, ed. 
Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998). 
26 Christopher H. Wellman, `A Defence of Secession and Political Self -Determination', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995. 
27 See below. 
28 See, for example, Buchanan (1991). Also see, Anthony, H. Birch, `Another Liberal Theory of 
Secession', Political Studies, Vol.32, No.4, 1984. 
29 The proper role of territory in a normative theory of secession, and the requirement that secessionists 
must establish legitimate title to the territory the seek to remove from the State will be examined later in 
this thesis. 
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C. Introducing the Three Types of Secession 
Following the 1991 publication of Allen Buchanan's influential work Secession, a 
considerable body of theoretical literature has emerged on the issue of a normative right 
to secede and the conditions under which such a right may, or may not, exist. As was 
noted earlier, these competing theories have frequently been categorised according to 
their relative degree of permissiveness into the two opposing camps of `permissive' and 
'less -permissive' theories. More recently, however, a trichotomy has emerged based, 
not upon how many instances a given theory may justify, but, rather, upon what pre- 
requisite conditions the theory requires would -be secessionists to fulfil in order to 
possess a right of secession. These three rival theories - within which, as we shall soon 
discover, there are further sub -divisions - may be summarised as follows: 
1. Nationalist theories claim that individuals may be categorised into separate groups 
known as `nations' and.that these nations are the sole legitimate holders of any right 
to secede. 
2. Just Cause or Remedial Right theories grant a right of secession to groups that are 
the victim of certain injustices for which secession is deemed to be an appropriate 
remedy of last resort. 
3. Plebiscitary Right, or Liberal -Democratic, theories are based upon the principle of 
voluntary political association and claim that any territorial majority which 
expresses a desire to secede should, subject to certain side constraints, be permitted 
to do so. 
Typically, Liberal -Democratic (LD) theories are characterised as being the most 
permissive of the three types of theory followed by Nationalist and Just Cause (JC) 
theories in that order. Because, under the LD model, a group possesses a right to 
secede wherever secession is desired by a majority of the group's members, the LD 
theory is generally regarded as more permissive than the other two types of theory. 
Nationalist theories of secession, on the other hand, are usuaIIy regarded as being less 
permissive than LD theories simply because there are fewer possible nations in the 
world than there are democratically self -defined groups, depending upon how the term 
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`a nation' is defined. Finally, because JC theories typically require would -be 
secessionists to be the victim of a serious injustice for which secession is deemed to be 
an appropriate remedy of last resort, they are usually interpreted as the least permissive 
of the three types of theory. 
Later this ranking of the three types of secession theory will be questioned and the 
claim made that there is nothing inherent to any of the three types of theory that 
necessarily renders it less or more permissive than the other, rival, types of theory. For 
example, depending upon what injustices it regards as sufficient to justify a right of 
secession, a JC theory may be relatively more or less permissive than, say, a 
Nationalist theory based upon a strict definition of nationhood which comparatively 
few groups would be capable of satisfying. This, however, is not to say that the notion 
of permissiveness is therefore redundant. Indeed, numerous theorists appeal to the 
notion of permissiveness in various contexts in order to bolster the claim that their 
theory is superior to other, rival theories. 
However, not only is categorising theories according to their degree of permissiveness 
misleading, but permissiveness is only one variable by which different theories of 
secession may be classified. Moreover, simply ranking different theories according to 
their permissiveness, and lumping different theories into the same class because they 
would justify a similar number of secessions over time, overlooks fundamental 
differences that may exist between these different theories in terms of what sorts of 
groups they grant a right of secession to, in what circumstances and why. Thus, 
because the trichotomy between Nationalist, JC and LD theories captures more of the 
fundamental elements of a theory than the simple permissive /less -permissive 
distinction introduced above, it is, at least in my view, a much more satisfactory means 
of distinguishing between different theories of secession and hence is the method of 
classification that this thesis will adopt. 
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2 
NATIONALIST THEORIES OF 
SECESSION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the first type of secession theory - 
Nationalist theories - which claim that there is a right to secede and that this right is 
possessed exclusively by certain sociological entities known as nations. Because the 
ensuing analysis deals with a wide range of material which covers a number of different 
and complicated issues, it will first be useful to set out the structure and general themes 
of the chapter. This should not only clarify the overall aims of the chapter, but also 
ensure that the significance of the numerous points made below to these aims is 
immediately apparent. 
The chapter will begin by briefly outlining the rival Liberal- Democratic (LD) theory of 
secession. While the LD theory of secession will be addressed in detail in Chapter 
Four, because the principles upon which it is premised are also relevant to Nationalist 
theories of secession, it will be useful here to briefly introduce the LD theory and its 
underlying liberal rationale. The chapter will then investigate the difficulties associated 
with defining the nation. If, as the Nationalist theory suggests, nations are the only 
legitimate holders of a right of secession then a satisfactory definition of the nation 
must be found which is capable of both distinguishing the nation from other, similar 
social groups and different nations from one another. 
The first question is, then, `What is the nation ?' The chapter will consider the two 
approaches to this question which currently dominate the contemporary normative 
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literature on nationalism. The first approach is to appeal to certain objective criteria 
such as a common language, culture, ethnicity and history. This, however, raises the 
difficulty of how to distinguish between, for example, two dialects of the same 
language and two different languages. Similar threshold problems also exist with the 
second approach which is based upon subjective criteria and which, like the objective 
approach, will also be rejected because of a tendency to bestow conflicting rights and 
an inability to successfully single out nations from other sociological groups or 
different nations from one another. 
The second question is, even if a satisfactory definition of the nation is forthcoming, 
`Why should nations, and only nations, be the holders of a right to secede ?' The final 
task of the chapter will therefore be to critically assess arguments given in support of 
the claim that nations should be the exclusive holders of a right of secession. These 
arguments will be divided into two different types: (a) those that claim that the State 
may be more democratic or better able to overcome coordination problems endemic in 
the provision of certain collective goods, if the individuals that populate it are drawn 
from a single national community; and (b) those that claim that individuals can only 
flourish if the national communities of which they are a constituent component also 
flourish and that this requires that, wherever practicable, nations be granted their own 
State. 
The former claim will be rejected because of an inability to establish that the nation is 
the only, or the best, form of community required for democratic government, or that it 
is uniquely able to overcome coordination problems in the provision of public goods. 
Similarly, the latter assertion will also be rejected by claiming that even if continued 
membership in, and the flourishing of, certain cultural groups is a prerequisite to 
individual freedom and well- being, there is no reason to believe that the nation is the 
only, or the best, example of such a group or that the welfare of such groups may not be 
adequately protected by less- extreme measures than full political independence. 
Consequently, even if the nation can be successfully distinguished from other, similar 
entities it nonetheless remains entirely arbitrary to single out nations as the sole bearer 
of a right to secede. 
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2.2 THE LIBERAL- DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
While a three -way distinction between Nationalist, Just Cause and LD theories is 
superior to simply categorising different theories according to the single variable of 
permissiveness, this is not to say that there are not also some difficulties in 
distinguishing between these three types of theory and then dealing with each 
separately. For example, many of the considerations relevant to one type of theory are 
also to varying degrees relevant to one, or both, of the two alternative theories. Thus, 
while these three types of theory are, indeed, distinct from one another in important 
respects, they also share many similarities. 
A good example of this inter -relatedness is the claim, considered in Section 2.5 of this 
chapter, that we should be concerned about nations and granting them a right of 
secession because nationalism is not only consistent with liberalism, but is required by 
it. While issues pertaining to the LD theory will be dealt with in Chapter Four, because 
some of these same issues are also pertinent to Nationalist theories it will be helpful to 
here introduce the LD theory and the individualistic moral ontology which underlies it. 
Not only may this enable us to better understand Nationalist theories by having 
something to compare them to, but it will also allow us to critically evaluate those 
elements of the Nationalist theory premised upon liberal axioms but which are best 
dealt with in detail elsewhere. 
B. What is the Liberal Democratic Theory of Secession? 
The LD theory of secession may be simply defined as the claim that any territorial 
majority which expresses a desire to secede should, subject to certain side constraints, 
be permitted to do so. The theory begins with the liberal claim that individuals are the 
ultimate unit of moral worth and, thus, what we should really be concerned with is 
individual well -being.' This individualistic moral ontology is then combined with a 
thesis of moral egalitarianism which states that all individuals are of equal moral worth 
' See, for example, Brian Barry, `Nationalism Versus Liberalism', Nations and Nationality, Vol.2, No.3, 
1996, p.432. 
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and, therefore, that each individual has equal rights and entitlements.2 For the liberal, 
there are two preconditions for leading a good Iife: (a) individuals must be free to lead 
their lives `from the inside' (i.e. in accordance with their own beliefs about what gives 
value to life);3 and (b) individuals must be free to question those beliefs, to examine 
them in light of new experiences and information, and to revise them if they prove 
unworthy of continued allegiance. 
The former consideration - that individuals are autonomous moral entities that occupy 
a position of moral dominion regarding their own affairs - proscribes other individuals 
and agencies such as the government externally imposing values upon the individual 
and forcing individuals to live their lives `from the outside.'4 Hence, liberalism grants 
the individual certain fundamental rights which proscribe such interference, allowing 
individuals to Iead their lives as they see fit without fear of punishment and 
discrimination. The latter consideration - that individuals be free to question their 
beliefs, to acquire an awareness of alternative conceptions of the good life and critically 
evaluate such views - explains the liberal concern for education and rights to freedom 
of association and expression.5 
While Iiberals generally agree that the State has a role to play in ensuring an 
environment conducive to each individual's pursuit of their own conception of the good 
life, there is some disagreement as to exactly how far the State should go in providing 
such an environment. Such disagreements aside, it is evident that both laissez faire 
(neo- )classical liberals and interventionist welfare liberals face a problem in justifying a 
coercive institution such as the State. By issuing directives that require or proscribe the 
performance of certain actions, using the threat of sanctions to ensure compliance with 
those directives and punishing those who disobey, the State restricts the value which 
2 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
p.140. 
3 See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural. Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.80 -81 and Kymlicka (1989), pp.9 -13. 
4 See Allen Buchanan, 'Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', Ethics, Vol.99, No.4, 
1989,p.854. 
5 See Kymlicka (1995), p.81. Also see Harry Brighouse, `Against Nationalism' in Rethinking 
Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 1996), 
p.372. 
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liberalism seeks to protect - i.e. individual liberty.6 Moreover, if the individual stands 
in a position of complete moral dominion over him/herself such that no second party is 
justified in coercing him/her (providing his /her actions do not harm others), then it 
seems that existing States must illegitimately interfere in the lives of their subjects.? As 
Wellman notes: "... it seems problematic that liberalism understands the individual to 
occupy a position of moral dominion regarding her affairs and yet simultaneously 
insists that the state is justified in encroaching upon this dominion "8 
One response to this difficulty has been to premise the legitimacy of the State upon the 
consent of its citizens. Because, under the consent theory, the obligation which agents 
have to obey the State is a self -assumed one, it is argued that the theory successfully 
reconciles the value of individual freedom with the State's exercise of coercive 
authority. A corollary of the consent theory of political obligation is the principle of 
voluntary political association which states that if each individual enjoys moral 
dominion regarding themselves such that only their consent is sufficient to determine 
membership of a political union, then individuals have the right to associate politically 
with whomever they choose to associate with, and the only just political divisions are 
those which reflect the willingness of people to live together.9 An analogy is often 
made with marriage where "I may have the right to marry the woman of my choice who 
also chooses me, but not the woman of my choice who rejects me. "10 Moreover, 
because any such association must be mutually desired by all parties if it is to possess 
any normative weight, where an individual expresses a desire to leave a particular 
association then any attempt to halt their departure would be contrary to the 
requirement that all associations be voluntary and hence, by definition, be illegitimate. 
To continue the marriage analogy: secession is simply the political equivalent of no- 
fault divorce. 
6 Christopher H. Wellman, 'A Defence of Secession and Political Self- Determination', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995, p.150. 
7 See, for example, Wellman, p,I55. 
8 Wellman, p.150. 
9 Michael Freeman, `The Priority of Function Over Structure: A New Approach to Secession' in Theories 
of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.19 -20. 
10 David Gauthier, `Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.24, No. 
3, September 1994, pp.360 -61. 
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Finally, if only the individual's consent is sufficient to determine membership of a 
political association, then this suggests that each individual has the right to secede 
unilaterally from any State to which they have not consented (or from which they have 
withdrawn their consent).1' However, most LD theorists deny this suggestion and 
instead include a majoritarian thesis where a geographical region possesses a right to 
secede if a (substantial) majority of its members favour secession. Additionally, the 
right is then often subordinated to considerations of stability and viability by the 
inclusion of certain conditions which would -be secessionists must first fulfil if they are 
to possess a right to secede.12 
2.3 IDENTIFYING THE NATION 
A. Introduction 
The LD theory outlined above bases the right to secede on the right of individuals to 
associate politically with whomever they choose to associate with, and through the 
incorporation of a majoritarian thesis then grants a right of secession to democratically 
self -defined groups. Other theorists have criticised the LD theory by claiming that it is 
inconsistent to claim that the right to secede is an individual right, and that the right is 
granted to, and exercised by, only democratically self -defined groups of individuals.13 
These are issues that will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. For the 
moment it will be sufficient simply to note that the LD theory understands secession as 
a collectively exercised individual right and not a group right.14 In contrast, Nationalist 
11 For theorists who support such a position see Hans -Hermann Hoppe, `Small is Beautiful and Efficient: 
The Case for Secession', Telos, No.107, 1996, and The Western State as Paradigm', Society, Vol.35, 
No.5, 1998; Donald Livingstone, The Very Idea of Secession' Society, Vol.35, No.5, 1998; Murray N. 
Rothbard, `Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation -State' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David 
Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998); and Clyde N. Wilson, `Secession: The Last 
Bulwark of Our Liberties' State' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998). 
12 e.g. the seceding unit be sufficiently large to assume the basic responsibilities of an independent State 
and it must not occupy an area which is culturally, militarily or economically essential to the parent State. 
See Harry Beran, `A Democratic Theory of Political Self -Determination for a New World Order' in 
Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.36 -42. 
13 See, for example, Allen Buchanan, `Self -Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law' in The 
Morality of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), p.315; Richard T. De George, The Myth of the Right of Collective Self- Determination' in Issues of 
Self- Determination, ed. William Twining (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), p.2; and Lea 
Brilmayer, Justifying International Acts (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p.77. 
14 Scott Boykin, 'The Ethics of Secession' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed.. David Gordon (New 
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theories of secession grant a right of secession exclusively to certain groups of 
individuals known as nations rather than to the individual constituent members of these 
nations.15 
If, as the Nationalist model claims, the right to secede is a group, not an individual, 
right then, given that individuals may be categorised into an almost limitless number of 
groups by all manner of criteria (e.g. race, gender, height, shared tastes /preferences 
etc.), a Nationalist theory of secession must first specify a set of criteria which not only 
distinguishes different nations from one another, but which also distinguishes nations 
from other, similar social conglomerates who do not possess such a right. Secondly, 
assuming that a satisfactory definition of nationhood is forthcoming, it must then be 
shown why nations, and only nations, should possess a right to independent Statehood. 
B. Objective Criteria of Nationhood 
Numerous theorists have suggested various criteria to distinguish the nation from 
other similar social entities and to differentiate between different nations. One such 
approach has been to define a nation in terms of certain objective criteria, and claim 
that where a group of individuals share some or all of these features then they may 
consequently said to form a nation and, hence, be eligible for the right to secede and 
create their own State.16 By far the most common examples of such objective criteria, 
and therefore the ones that will be considered here, are: a common language; history; 
ethnicity; and culture. In contrast, other theorists reject a purely objective definition of 
nationhood as being too problematic. Instead they prefer a subjective definition of 
nationhood where a group becomes a nation when membership of the nation is a 
constituent component of each individual member's personal identity.17 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p.70. 
15 See Beran, p.32. 
16 On the contrast between objective and subjective criteria of nationhood see, for example, Stanley G. 
French and Storrs McCall, `Nation, State, Sovereignty, Self -Determination, The Popular Will and the 
Right to Secession. Notes Toward the Elucidation of these Notions in the Context of the Debate 
Concerning Canada's Future' in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, ed. Stanley G. French 
(Montreal: Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), p.63; and Michael Freeman, `Nationalism, 
Liberalism and Democracy' in Nations, Cultures and Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.83. 
17 For an exposition of the subjective approach see, for example, Daniel Philpott, ln Defence of Self - 
Determination', Ethics, Vol.105, 1995, pp.365 -66; and David Copp, `Do Nations Have the Right of Self- 
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As theorists such as Philpott and French point out, however, a purely objective 
account is incapable of providing a satisfactorily definition nationhood. To begin with, 
linguistic, cultural, historical and ethnic distinctiveness, rather than being binary 
features18 are in fact matters of degree. This makes it difficult to determine exactly 
where to draw the threshold between, for example, two dialects of the same language 
and two separate languages.19 For example, there is very little difference between the 
English spoken in (the north of) the United States and that spoken in most parts of 
Canada. The differences are, however, more noticeable, when comparing American 
English with, say, Australian English - although we would for the most part still be 
inclined to refer to both as being the same language. If, however, we were to compare 
American or Australian English with, say, Pidgin English spoken in Papua New 
Guinea,20 then most people would probably conclude that Pidgin English is a separate 
language from American/Australian English. 
The question is, however, at exactly what point do these differences reach a sufficient 
level where we can justifiably say that we are no longer dealing with two dialects of the 
same language but, rather, two separate languages? The same problem also pertains to 
the other three criteria, for example, "[t]he histories of many groups exhibit frequent 
discontinuities, infusions of new cultural elements from outside, and alternating degrees 
of assimilation to and separation from other groups. "21 Once again, at what point does 
the infusion of new cultural elements, create a new history rather than simply modify an 
existing history? So the first problem with an objective definition of nationhood 
concerns the practical implementation of the definition - i.e. how we can coherently 
apply the criteria to distinguish between separate languages, histories etc. and, thus, 
separate nations.22 
Determination ?' in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, ed. Stanley G. French (Montreal: 
Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), pp.72 -74. 
18 i.e. all -or- nothing. 
19 The example is from Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter 
to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.49. Also see, Allen Buchanan, `Secession 
and Nationalism' in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and 
Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993). 
20 Which differs considerably from both languages and would be largely unintelligible to speakers of 
American and Australian English. 
21 Buchanan (1991), p.49. 
22 There is also the added difficulty that, at least with respect to the criterion of a common history, the 
objective definition of nationhood seems to have gotten things backward, i.e. rather than appealing to a 
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Furthermore, it is clear that the groups identified as nations under such an account are 
likely to conflict with our pre -theoretical intuitions as to what a nation is. Take the 
criterion of a common Ianguage: while English is spoken in England, Canada, the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand - albeit with some subtle, and perhaps not so 
subtle, variations - we would not be inclined to say that these five States therefore 
constituted the same nation. Indeed, just as a defining feature of what it is to be a New 
Zealander is that one is not an Australian, the same may be said of Canadian national 
identity with respect to the United States.23 The same is true of a common culture and 
ethnicity. Just as many Canadians and Americans share the same language, they often 
also share the same culture and ethnic background, yet they still remain two distinct 
nations in their and most other peoples' minds. 
Indeed, linguistically and culturally residents of the northern United States - 
particularly residents of, say, Washington State and Vermont - arguably have more in 
common with the people of Canada than with those in the southern regions of the 
United States, yet most North Americans would not regard this as sufficient reason to 
thus describe themselves as being Canadian rather than American and vice versa.24 
Moreover, just as people who share the same language and culture may be members of 
different nations, so may a single nation be constituted by people with divergent 
linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The language and culture of the people of Paris are 
different from that of the people of the region of Carcasonne, yet both groups of people 
are commonly taken to be members of the same nation of France.25 
Furthermore, many groups which we tend to think of as nations, while perhaps being 
relatively culturally, Iinguistically and even historically homogenous are, nonetheless, 
common history to identify a people, we can recognise the history of a people only after we have first 
identified who the people are. For example: "...we can know the history of the English only if we already 
know (at least in rough and ready terms) who the English are." See R. E. Ewin, `Peoples and Secession', 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.11, No.2, 1994, p.228. 
23 Try telling a New Zealander that they share the same national identity as Australians (because they 
speak the same language), and 1 suspect that the negative response elicited will generally be similar to that 
of a Canadian being informed that they belong to the same nation as Americans. On this point see Ewin, 
p.228. 
24 The same point is made by Miller with respect to Austrians and Germans. See David Miller, On 
Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.22. 
2s The example is borrowed from Copp, p.72. 
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often ethnically diverse.26 This is especially true of immigrant societies. No matter 
how much immigrants assimilate to the majority culture and language they will remain 
unable to alter their ethnicity,27 in which case, if ethnicity is a criterion of nationhood, 
there can be no American or Australian nation.28 The same problem also exists with 
respect to the criteria of a common culture, language and history. Because many 
immigrants to varying degrees retain the culture, language and historical traditions of 
their former homeland, making such features criteria of nationhood will effectively 
disqualify them from national membership in their new land. This, however, seems 
counter- intuitive. Rather, we want to say that despite their ethnic differences, people 
can be members of the same nation, e.g. just as an individual of Asian descent may be 
an American, so too may a Black, Hispanic or European. Indeed, the success of 
immigrant societies such as the United States is in many ways dependent upon their 
ability to construct and promulgate a supra -national identity that transcends the ethnic, 
religious. linguistic and cultural differences exhibited by their citizenry. 
C. Subjective Criteria of Nationhood 
Most theorists, realising the difficulties associated with a purely objective definition of 
nationhood, instead propose a subjective definition with the result that nations do not 
exist independently of the beliefs which people have about them 29 Subjective 
definitions of nationhood generally take one of two forms. The first of these discards 
objective criteria altogether and conceives of the nation as a wholly self -defining group, 
i.e. a group of individuals become a nation simply by conceiving of themselves as 
26 See David George, 'The Ethics of National Self -Determination' in Nations, Cultures and Markets, eds. 
Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.79. 
27 On the non -voluntary, exclusive nature of ethnicity and its inappropriateness as a moral basis for the 
State see, Brian Barry, 'Self -Government Revisited' in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. David Miller 
and Larry Siedentop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p.134; Percy, B. Lehning, 'Theories of Secession: 
An Introduction' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.9 -10; 
Freeman, pp.17 -19; Alexis Heraclides, 'Secession, Self -Determination and Nonintervention', Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.45, No.2, 1992, pp.409 -410; Asborn Eide, 'In Search of Constructive 
Alternatives to Secession' in Modern Law of Self -Determination, ed. Christian Tomuschat (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp.143 -44; and Thomas Pogge, 'Group Rights and Ethnicity' in Nomos 39: 
Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York: New York University Press, 
1997). 
28 Barry (1983), pp.138 -40. 
29 On the role of peoples' beliefs in the determination of a nation see, for example, Paul Gilbert, 
`Communities Real and Imagined: Good and Bad Cases for National Secession' in Theories of Secession, 
ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998). 
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such.30 This is not to say that the members of the nation may not share certain 
objective features such as a common language and culture - after all it is only natural 
that one would identify and wish to associate with those with whom one shares such 
things in common - merely that such factors are not the source of the group's identity 
as a nation.31 So while the presence of certain objective features may cause the 
members of a group to identify with one another and thus develop a sense of national 
solidarity, it is this sense of solidarity - not the presence of the objective criteria - 
which bestows the status of nationhood, and hence the ability to possess a right to 
secede.32 
Conversely, other theorists argue that subjective criteria are a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition of nationhood, i.e. an occasional group of individuals lacking any 
shared characteristics cannot turn itself into a nation merely by the power of its own 
will.33 An example of this definition of nationhood is that of Yael Tamir who argues 
that a group of individuals constitute a nation when they: (a) exhibit a sufficient number 
of shared objective characteristics such as a common culture, history, language etc; and 
(b) are conscious of their distinctiveness and are bound together by a sense of solidarity 
which this consciousness creates.34 Similarly, Margalit and Raz identify a combination 
30 On subjective criteria of nationality see, for example, French and McCall, p.63; Philpott, pp.365 -66; 
and Barry (1983), pp.139 -40. 
31 Freeman (1994), p.83. 
32 See Harry Beran The Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' in Nations, Cultures and 
Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.48; and J. S. Mill, 
`Considerations on Representative Government' in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, 
ed. H. Acton (London: J. M. Dent, 1972). 
33 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.66. 
34 Tamir, p.66. Tamir does not specify what counts as a `sufficient' number of shared, objective 
characteristics although she seems to believe that these objective characteristics are much less important 
than the subjective criterion of a shared self- awareness or distinctiveness in what it is to be a nation. 
Indeed, as Tamir admits, some groups which we are inclined to think of as nations cannot be defined on 
the basis of objective criteria (e.g. the Jewish nation). See Tamir, pp.65 -66. The importance of subjective 
criteria in the definition of nationhood is also emphasised by Beran who, while dismissing the claim that a 
right of secession should be possessed by nations, argues that in order to constitute a nation individuals 
must not only possess certain distinguishing features such as race, language and religion, but also be 
aware of their distinctiveness. See Harry Beran, 'Border Disputes and the Right of National Self - 
Determination', History of European Ideas, Vol.16, No.4 -6, 1993, p.480. For other theorists who 
combine objective and subjective criteria to define a nation (or `a people') see Keith Dowding, `Secession 
and Isolation' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.81; Simon 
Caney, `National Self- Determination and National Secession: Individualistic and Communitarian 
Approaches' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.152; David 
Miller, On Nationality', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.2, No.3, 1996, p.413; and `In Defence of 
Nationality' in Nations, Cultures and Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1994), pp.19 -20. 
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of objective and subjective criteria: (a) the group must have a common character and 
culture; (b) people growing up among members of the group should acquire the group 
culture, and be marked by its character; (c) membership in the group should be a matter 
of informal acknowledgment of belonging by other members of the group; (d) 
membership in the group must be important to one's self -identification; (e) membership 
must be a matter of belonging, not achievement, and will usually be determined by non- 
voluntary criteria; and (f) the group should not be a small face -to -face group in which 
most members personally know most other members, rather mutual recognition should 
be secured by the possession of general characterístícs.35 
On the one hand, a subjective definition of nationhood seems to have some advantages 
over a purely objective approach. As was noted above, one of the problems with a 
purely objective definition of nationhood is its tendency to lump together groups who 
speak the same language, practice the same culture and so forth as one nation, whereas 
intuitively we often want to say that these groups constitute separate nations despite 
having such things in common. By including subjective notions of solidarity, 
identification and a sense of belonging there is no longer any difficulty in claiming, for 
example, that Australia and New Zealand, despite their numerous linguistic, cultural 
and historical similarities, are nonetheless two separate nations.36 Furthermore, the 
definition also makes sense of the claim that a group may, for example, be ethnically 
diverse and yet still constitute a single nation. Thus, despite the fact that many 
Australians come from very different historical and ethnic backgrounds, they may 
nonetheless identify with one another as Australians creating a common identity which 
enables us to coherently describe Australia and its inhabitants as a single nation. 
Subjective criteria may also be employed to distinguish the nation from other, 
arbitrary groupings of individuals to whom we might not be inclined to grant the sort of 
rights which we may want on occasion to grant to nations. The point is related to what 
is often termed the Pandora's Box' objection to group- differentiated rights. Put simply 
the objection claims that if we are to grant special rights (including the right to self - 
government) to certain groups such as indigenous peoples then, given that people can 
35 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, 'National Self -Determination', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 
9, 1990, pp.443 -47. 
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be categorised into an almost limitless number of groups by all manner of criteria, we 
should also grant similar right to other groups such as the fiction- reading public or the 
Tottenham Football Club supporters.37 Yet most people would baulk at the suggestion 
that these other groups should be afforded rights of self -government, not least of all 
because of the consequences such a move would produce. 
Subjective criteria - particularly the role that one's membership of the group plays in 
one's sense of self -identification and self -definition - are often appealed to in order to 
distinguish the nation from, say, the fiction -reading public and other similar groups.38 
In this manner subjective criteria may, at least in some cases, effectively overcome the 
objection that granting special, group -specific rights to nations also commits us to 
granting the same rights to other, less- deserving collections of individuals.39 Note, 
however, that even if membership of a nation is a constitutive component of one's 
sense of self -identity and self -definition in a manner that membership of other groups 
such as the fiction- reading public is not, the question still remains why nations should 
be singled out as the exclusive holder of special rights.40 
36 Because the inhabitants of both countries identify themselves as such. 
37 The examples are borrowed from Margalit and Raz, p.443. 
38 See Margalit and Raz, pp.445 -46. 
39 
e.g. Hiss argues that those groups who qualify for special, group rights are distinguished by the fact 
that their members explain who they are by reference to their membership in the group and that the group 
has a distinct existence apart from its members - i.e. the group is not reducible to its individual members 
(Owen Fliss, `Groups and the Equal Protection Clause', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 107, 1976). 
Similarly, McDonald and Young make a distinction between: (a) aggregates which are 
analytical /numerical constructs according to any number of equally arbitrary attributes that do not exist 
independently of our thinking about them, e.g. left- handed hockey goal keepers; (b) voluntary 
associations in which membership does not define one's identity in the sense that being a member of a 
social group does and to which an individualistic, contractarian approach is relevant, e.g. clubs, teams 
etc.; and, finally (c) social groups which are based upon the internal recognition of some commonality 
and whose sense of history and understanding of social relations and modes of reasoning, are at least 
partly constituted by their group identity. Needless to say, only social groups are deemed to qualify as 
candidates for group- differentiated rights. See Michael McDonald, `Collective Rights and Tyranny' 
University of Ottawa Quarterly, 56, 1986; and Iris Marion Young, `Polity and Group Difference: A 
Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', Ethics, Vol.99, No.2, 1989, pp.260 -67. 
40 Note, also, that these same functions of contributing to an individual's sense of self -identity and self - 
definition may, arguably, also be ascribed to other groupings in addition to nations (e.g. families and 
religious groups) to whom we may not want to grant special rights. So even if the nation does perform 
these functions this may still be insufficient to adequately distinguish it from other groups -a point to 
which 1 shall return to at some length in the final section of this chapter. See, for example, Copp, pp.73- 
74; and Juha Raikka, `On National Self- Determination: Some Problems of Walzer's Definition of Nation' 
in Issues of Self -Determination, ed. William Twining (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), p.22. 
Nationalist Theories of Secession 29 
On the one hand, then, the incorporation of subjective notions of identification, 
belonging and solidarity appear to make for a much more satisfactory definition of what 
a nation is, in comparison to the purely objective definition of nationhood outlined 
above. On the other hand, however, problems remain with a subjective approach. 
First, given that nationhood is a pre -requisite to possession of a right to secede, simply 
saying that a group constitutes a nation when the members of the group conceive 
themselves as such may still generate morally counter -intuitive results. 
Consider, for example, two separate, identifiable groups - Turkish guest workers in 
Germany and inhabitants of the Baltic State of Lithuania. The subjective account 
asserts that if both groups conceive of themselves as a nation, acknowledge one another 
as members of the same group and /or identify themselves in terms of their membership 
of the group, then both have the right to secede and their claims are, once again, on a 
moral par with one another. But this is counter -intuitive: Turkish guest workers in 
Germany may have much to complain about, but whilst their complaints might be 
legitimate and their culture distinct from that of the people surrounding them, we would 
intuitively deny that such people possessed a right to secede, much less a right morally 
on a par with people such as Lithuanians or black Africans fighting colonial powers.41 
Second, identification with, and sympathy for, others is neither a necessary, exclusive, 
constant nor a binary feature, i.e. individuals may feel no affiliation with any existing 
national group, identify to varying degrees with two or more existing nations, and/or 
change their national affiliations over time either to another national group or simply to 
no such group at all. Beginning with the claim that there are some individuals who 
have no attachment to any existing nation: it is claimed that in a world such as our own, 
increasingly porous borders and high levels of population mobility combine with 
advances in technology to render many of our formative influences global in nature.42 
These are the so- called `cosmopolitans' - individuals who see themselves as belonging 
to a global culture and who feel no special need to be rooted in any one particular 
culture, nor associate with any one particular nation. 
41 Lea Brilmayer, `Secession and Self Determination: A Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol. l6, No.1, January 1991, p.188 and p.191. 
42 See Jeremy Waldron. 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative' in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.103. 
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Indeed, clearly many individuals - particularly those in more well developed countries 
- are becoming increasingly globally orientated and less attached to one particular 
national identity or culture. This is not to deny that much of humankind still identifies 
itself in terms of national affiliation and membership of a nation (however the term is 
defined) therefore remains a fundamental element - or, more accurately, one of the 
fundamental elements - of their personal identity. However - irrespective of whether 
or not this national parochialism is a good thing, or should be abandoned in favour of a 
universal, non -exclusive global identity43 - just because a considerable number of 
individuals continue to identify themselves in terms of their nationality, it does not 
follow from this that: the nation is the only (or even the primary) source of their 
identification; that they identify with only one, single nation (see below); or that nations 
should therefore be granted a right of secession to establish their own nation -State. 
Admitting that nations are important to the self -identity and self -definition of (many) 
individuals does not thereby establish that (only) the nation has a right to secede. 
The second point - that sympathies for others is not an exclusive feature - signifies 
that individuals may identify with two or more national groups at the same time, and is 
related to the fact that individuals may change their national affiliations over time. 
Consider, for example, the case of first (and even latter) generation immigrants who 
may, to varying degrees, continue to feel some bond with their former home country 
while at the same time also identifying themselves as nationals of their new land. 
Additionally, indigenous peoples may to varying degrees identify themselves as Maori, 
Aboriginal and Sioux while at the same time also identifying as New Zealanders, 
Australians and Americans respectively. However, if individuals can belong to more 
than one nation, then this raises the possibility that nations may overlap and one nation 
may include others, in which case (given that nationhood is a prerequisite to possession 
of a right to secede) the theory may bestow conflicting rights, e.g. the Maori may 
exercise the right to choose independence from New Zealand, whereas New Zealanders 
may exercise it to determine that New Zealand not be divided 44 
43 For a critique of Waldron's cosmopolitan thesis see, for example, Kymlicka (1995), p.85; and Kai 
Nielsen, `Liberal Nationalism and Secession' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret 
Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.109. 
44 See Beran's discussion of Margalit and Raz. Beran (1993), p.481. 
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Moreover, identification with others, a sense of belonging and the group solidarity that 
these create are all matters of degree. The members of some groups may identify with 
one another to a significant degree and, consequently, regard their membership of the 
group as fundamental to their sense of who they are and exhibit a high level of group 
solidarity. Other groups, however, may be much less cohesive and their members may 
identify with one another to a much reduced degree. The question is: given that 
solidarity is a necessary condition of what it is to be a nation, how much solidarity must 
a group exhibit in order for it to earn the status of being a nation? At precisely what 
point does the solidarity between the members of a group reach a sufficient level where 
we can say that the group has satisfied the necessary conditions of nationhood ?45 As 
Beran has noted: 
The sympathies people have for others tend to be a matter of degree, not of all or nothing. The 
people of the city of Leuven may have stronger sympathies for their fellow townspeople than for 
other Flemish. The Flemish may have stronger sympathies for other Flemish than for Walloons and 
the Belgians may have stronger sympathies for their fellow Belgians than for Europeans... The 
nation cannot be the group which has the highest degree of mutual sympathies because this would 
not even be the people of Leuven but individual families.46 
One possible answer may be to think of nationhood, not as an all -or- nothing feature, 
but rather a matter of degree. This is the solution proposed by Copp who argues that a 
group may be more of a nation as more of its members identify to a greater degree with 
the same history and tradition, and accept others as members of the group.47 Moreover, 
nations may be distinguished from other social entities such as families by a desire of 
the members of the nation to associate politically with one another in a State of their 
own. According to Copp, a group becomes more of a nation as: (a) more of its 
members desire that a political entity be formed that possesses the attributes of a State; 
and (b) "...geographical and territorial factors are such that it would be more feasible to 
create, or to continue, a State comprising to a greater degree all and only the members 
of the group as citizens. "48 
45 Note that this is exactly the same threshold problem encountered above with the objective criteria of 
linguistic, historical, cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. 
46 Beran (1993), p.482. 
47 See Copp, p.74. 
48 See Copp, p.75. 
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If, however, nationhood is both a prerequisite to possessing a right of secession and a 
matter of degree then there are two possible conclusions: either (a) a given group must 
exhibit a certain degree of nationhood in order to qualify for a right to secede; or (b) the 
right to secede is also a matter of degree, and thus the greater the degree of nationhood 
which a group exhibits the stronger their right to secede. The first option returns us to 
the threshold problem identified above, i.e. at exactly what point does a group exhibit a 
sufficient level of nationhood where we can therefore say that the group qualifies for a 
right to secede? Conversely, the second option is problematic, not only because it too 
raises the same threshold problem, but because we tend to think of rights as being 
binary features, not matters of degree (e.g. an agent either possess a right to freedom of 
speech or they do not). 
This is not to say that a right cannot have limitations placed upon its exercise (e.g. the 
right to freedom of speech does not include the right to defame others), nor on occasion 
be overridden by other, more morally important considerations (e.g. in times of national 
emergency such as war one may loose or have restrictions placed upon the right to 
freedom of speech). But such things are to do with what it is to possess the right to 
freedom of speech, not the degree to which one possesses the right. Furthermore, 
including the desire for self -government as a criterion of nationhood is also 
problematic. Again, as Beran has noted: "[t]he people of Leuven desire and have self - 
government, their city council, but this does not [according to most peoples' 
understanding] make them a nation. "49 
2.4 WHY SHOULD THE STATE BE A NATION? 
A. Introduction 
Even if we put the question of what the nation is to one side, there remains the 
additional question of why nations should be the holders of a right to secede. Why 
should the mere fact that a group of people live a certain way, speak the same language, 
49 Beran (1993), p.483. 
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inhabit the same territory and/or conceive of themselves as a nation confer the right to 
institutionalise these common practices within the political framework of a State ?50 
Some theorists have claimed that there can be no question of trying to give rationally 
compelling reasons for people to have national attachments and allegiances. The fact is 
that people do have such attachments and allegiances and we should try to build a 
political philosophy which incorporates them.51 But even if national identities are 
predominant, it doesn't follow from this that they therefore should be, that a 
predominant national identity is normatively required by political philosophy, or that 
nations should therefore be granted rights to political self- determination.52 Just as 
nation is the predominant identity for nationalists, so gender is for feminists and class 
for Marxists.53 So why, instead of creating nation -States, should we not, for example, 
draw political boundaries around economic classes, religious groups or sexes and create 
economy- States, religion- States or gender -States? What is it about the nation which 
means that it alone should be the main determinant in the drawing of political 
boundaries? 
A second, equally unsatisfactory response is the claim that, unlike other types of group 
identity, national identity connects a group of people (i.e. the nation) to a geographical 
place - i.e. nation must have a homeland, The argument, then, is that while ethnic or 
religious identities may well have sacred sites, places of origin and so forth, in contrast 
to national identity, "...it is not an essential part of having the identity that you should 
permanently occupy the place. "54 Furthermore, it is also claimed that because the 
State, by definition, must exercise its authority over a specified geographical area this 
50 Copp, p.65. 
51 Miller (1994), p.16. This also seems to be the view of Nielsen who argues that we should simply 
accept that a basic human need is the need to belong to a group and an individual's identity is determined 
by, and only makes sense in the context of, the identity of the group to which that individual belongs. See 
Kai Nielsen, `Secession: The Case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vo1.10, No.1, 1993, p.30, 
p.31 -32. Also see Kymlicka who believes that because national groups are here to stay we have no choice 
but to accommodate them (Kymlicka (1995), pp.185 -86). 
52 See Freeman (1994), p.89, 
53 Freeman (1994), p.88 -91. 
54 Miller (1994), p.20. 
Nationalist Theories of Secession 34 
territorial aspect of nationalism makes nations ideally suited to serve as the basis of 
States." 
While it is important not to pre -empt discussion of the issues of territory and the 
territorial delineation of political authority in subsequent chapters of this thesis, it is 
evident that in its present form the above argument is, at the very least, incomplete. 
Even if the members of a nation have some sort of psychological (some, such as the 
French nationalist Maurice Barres,56 might even say metaphysical) connection to a 
particular piece of territory, it is unclear what normative significance should be attached 
to such sentiments. Why does the fact that a group of people feel a particular 
attachment to a particular piece of territory therefore generate a right for that group to 
exclusive sovereignty over that territory? 
It is tempting to say that, given that we have to divide the world up territorially into 
separate sovereign States, and that nations feel some sort of attachment to certain pieces 
of land and are often already resident on them, a good way of dividing the world into 
political units might therefore be to draw political boundaries around nations. 
However, things aren't quite as simple as this. Frequently the same piece of land is 
coveted by two or more nations,57 and nationalism does not contain within itself the 
means by which these conflicts may be resolved.58 Indeed, nationalism often creates 
and /or exacerbates such conflicts. Furthermore, membership of national communities 
is usually not inclusive nor exclusive within any given territorial unit, i.e. many national 
communities are geographically dispersed and share territory with others whom they 
regard as outsiders, or who regard themselves as outsiders.59 Therefore, because 
nations generally don't break down into neat territorial packages, drawing political 
boundaries around national groups isn't the tidy solution which some might make it out 
to be. 
55 See Miller (1994), p.20. 
56 See, for example, Maurice Barres, L 'Ame Francaise et la Guerre: L'Union Sacree (Paris: Emile Paul, 
1915), 
57 e.g. as is the case with the Israelis and the Palestinians over the West Bank. 
58 See Omar Dahbour, The Nation -State as a Political Community: A Critique of the Communitarian 
Argument for National Self -Determination' in Rethinking Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and M. 
Seymour (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996), pp.334 -36. 
59 Onara O'Neill, `Justice and Boundaries' in Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, 
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In this and the following section numerous arguments which attempt to demonstrate 
that national and political boundaries should, wherever possible, coincide will be 
critically assessed. These arguments may be divided into two distinct approaches, the 
first of which begins with the State as a political entity that promotes and protects 
morally important interests, and then attempts to demonstrate that the State would be 
more viable as an institution, and its functions better discharged, when the society that 
it regulates is a single nation. In contrast, the second approach is based upon a claim 
that membership of a nation is of fundamental importance to individuals,60 and if the 
nation is to prosper then it must possess the control over its resources and destiny that 
only full political independence can provide.61 Hence, whereas the former approach 
claims that the State should be a nation, the latter claims that the nation should be a 
State. 
The former claim that the State is more viable as an institution and its functions better 
discharged when its citizens are members of the same national community, is premised 
upon the bonds that are said to exist between members of a nation. It is claimed that 
where a group of individuals are drawn from the same nation, the mutual trust and 
group solidarity that exists between those individuals either would not exist, or would 
exist to a quantitatively and/or qualitatively lesser degree, were these individuals drawn 
from two or more national groups. Thus, there is a strong causal connection between 
national similarity and mutual trust. Suppose, however, that we accept the claim that 
mutual trust and solidarity exists within national groups but not across them - which is 
itself a questionable claim.ó2 Not only may there be other forms of community in 
addition to the nation which exhibit a higher degree of mutual trust and solidarity, but 
there is also the additional question of why this means that national and political 
boundaries should therefore coincide. In the discussion that follows two arguments 
ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p.73. 
60 And, a fortiori, the welfare of the individual cannot be divorced from the welfare of the nation of which 
they are a member. 
61 On the differences between these two approaches see Miller (1995), pp.82ff. 
62 See for example Dahbour and Barry who claim that there is no necessary connection between nations 
(which are defined by reference to ethnicity and kinship) and solidarity (which is the satisfaction of 
peoples' welfare, interests and needs). See Dahbour, p.337; and Barry (1983), p.135. 
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based upon the writings of David Miller which attempt to address these issues will be 
critically evaluated.63 
B. The Nationalist Democratic Argument 
Miller's first argument, which will be termed the Nationalist Democratic Argument 
(NDA), claims that there is a necessary connection between national homogeneity and 
democratic government.64 Miller gives two reasons in support of this claim. First, 
claims Miller, States require citizens to trust one another if they are to function as 
democracies, i.e. citizens must be prepared to moderate their claims in the hope that 
they can find a common ground on which policy decisions may be made. For example, 
if I am to abandon a position about which I feel passionately in order to reach a 
workable compromise, then I will expect others to reciprocate either now or in the 
future.65 Second, Miller argues that where a political community is comprised of two 
or more national groups, the mutual antipathies and hostilities between these groups are 
likely to be stronger than any suspicion or jealousy of the government, and so there will 
be no common interest in containing the power of government. Each group will have 
63 It should, perhaps, also be pointed out that in addition to these two `instrumental' arguments, Miller 
also offers an 'intrinsic' defence of nations as ethical communities based upon a defence of ethical 
particularism. Put simply, Miller's argument is that members of a nation have special moral obligations to 
one another which they do not have to individuals who are members of other nations - much in the same 
way that I have special moral obligations to members of my family which I do not have to other 
individuals who are not members of my family (Miller (1995), Chap 3). Other theorists have, however, 
questioned this defence of nations. For example, Moore argues that the intrinsic and instrumental 
justifications tend to pull in opposite directions - especially in so far as a normative theory of secession is 
concerned. See Margaret Moore, `Miller's Ode to National Homogeneity', Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol.2, No.3, 1996. On the other hand Barry suggests that the special moral obligations which one owes to 
one's co- nationals are the result of some moral relationship other than nationalism but which is more -or- 
less co- extensive with a shared national identity. See Barry (1996), p.431. Moreover, even if, as Miller 
suggests, we owe special obligations to our co- nationals which we do not owe to others, the same may be 
said of other morally significant groupings such as families, clubs, religious groups and so forth. Nations 
may, as Miller suggests, be ethical communities but they are not the only example of such a community, 
and so this 'fact' on its own is insufficient to single out the nation as the sole candidate for a right to 
secede -a point which shall be investigated at length later in this chapter. 
64 Miller's analysis in many ways both reflects, and builds upon that of other thinkers including J. S. Mill, 
pp.363 -64; and Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (London: Methuen, 
1948). Both Mill and Barker believed that a nation -State is best able to sustain free institutions. Similarly 
Ackerman seems to suggest that in order to engage in fruitful dialogue citizens must agree upon the 
principle of their discourse and share some sort of social and cultural background. See B. A. Ackerman, 
Social Justice in a Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.72. Also see Tamir's brief 
but informative discussion of Mill and Ackerman (Tamir, pp.128 -29). 
65 Miller (1995), pp.96 -98. 
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an interest in capturing and maintaining control of government, and even increasing its 
powers, in order to improve its position vis -à -vis the other national group(s).66 
Within the secession debate we may distinguish two common responses to the NDA. 
First, it is claimed that much of the available empirical evidence suggests that there is 
no necessary connection between national homogeneity and democratic government. 
For example, the twelve non -Baltic republics are no more democratic than the former 
Soviet Union which they replaced, despite now being more nationally homogeneous.67 
Similarly, one may also point to immigrant societies such as the United States, Canada 
and Australia which exhibit high levels of pluralism but are nonetheless thriving liberal 
democracies. Indeed, the fact that members of the diasporas in these countries have 
generally chosen established democratic norms to articulate their community's interests 
and concerns may arguably have strengthened, rather than undermined, the institution 
of democracy in these States. 
Second, it is also pointed out that because many national groups not only place no 
value upon democratic rights and procedures, but their illiberal and undemocratic 
attitudes and behaviours are a part of what makes them distinct nations in the first 
place, increasing a State's degree of national homogeneity will not necessarily ensure 
that that State is a democratic one. The fact that one's life is lived within a political 
unit populated and governed solely by one's fellow nationals, is no guarantee that one 
will be governed in a democratic manner and enjoy the individual rights associated with 
liberal- democratic government.68 A fully self -governing, homogenous nation -State 
may still be a tyranny.69 
These objections, both of which appear to make valid points, together suggest that 
national homogeneity is not a sufficient condition for democratic government. 
However, Miller's argument, at least as I understand it, seems to be that national 
homogeneity is a necessary condition for democratic government, i.e. if a State is to be 
governed democratically then it must be nationally homogenous, although the fact that 
66 Miller (1995), p.98. 
67 Amitai Etzioni, `The Evils of Self -Determination', Foreign Policy, 89, 1992, pp.23 -24. 
68 See Thomas Pogge, `Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', Ethics, Vol.103, No.1, 1992, p.75. 
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a given State is nationally homogenous does not necessarily mean that it will therefore 
be democratic. In other words, national homogeneity is a prerequisite for democratic 
government not a cause or guarantee of it. Miller explains: 
...to the extent that we aspire to form a [deliberative] democracy in which all citizens are at some 
level involved in discussion of public issues, we must look to the conditions under which citizens can 
respect one another's good faith in search for grounds of agreement. Among large aggregates of 
people, only a common nationality can provide the sense of solidarity that makes this possible. 
Sharing a national identity does not, of course, mean holding similar political views; but it does mean 
being committed to finding terms under which fellow- nationals can agree to live together.7° 
Miller explicitly rejects the claim that complete national homogeneity is a pre- 
requisite to democratic government.71 This appears to be a sensible assertion as not 
only does such a claim appear implausible, but it would also render democratic 
government an ideal largely unattainable in the real world. This is because, as was 
noted above, many national communities are geographically dispersed and share 
territory with others whom they regard as outsiders, or who regard themselves as 
outsiders.72 Short of either creating a series of discontiguous enclaves or instigating a 
programme of so- called `ethnic cleansing', complete national homogeneity within a 
single State will generally prove to be elusive.73 If we eliminate both of these options 
from consideration - the former because, at least in some cases, it may be impractical74 
and the latter because it is morally impermissible - then it seems that even after any re- 
drawing of political boundaries to match national ones, the vast majority of States will 
69 Compare with George, p.73; and Philpott, p.372. 
70 Miller (1995), p.98. 
71 Miller (1995), p.98. 
72 O'Neill, p.73. 
73 See, for example, Freeman (1998), p.22. Assuming, of course, that we accept as given the 
conventional territorial delineation of political authority where a State's authority is exercised over a 
specified geographical area (an assumption which Miller also appears to accept). 
74 In a recent article Barry Smith points out that numerous existing States are geographically non- 
contiguous and thus have a part of their territory surrounded by the territory of another State. See Barry 
Smith, `The Cognitive Geometry of War' in Current Issues in Political Philosophy, ed. Peter Koller and 
Klaus Puhl (Vienna: Hölder- Pichler -Tempsky, 1997). Typically, however, the examples of non- 
contiguous regions cited by Smith constitute a relatively small proportion of the State's overall territory 
and, thus, demonstrate that a State may tolerate a certain degree of territorial disjointedness without 
suffering any notable negative affects. However, because the degree of territorial dis- contiguity required 
to achieve total national homogeneity is in many cases likely to be much higher than that exhibited by the 
States mentioned by Smith, it is far from certain that such a policy would not, at the very least, pose 
serious problems for the effective functioning of States. 
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continue to exhibit some degree of national pluralism and, hence, will remain unable to 
satisfy the necessary pre- conditions for democratic governance. 
Presumably, then, Miller's claim is that there is a positive relationship between 
national homogeneity and democratic government, i.e. the more nationally homogenous 
a given State is the greater the degree to which the necessary pre- conditions for 
democratic government will be met. Thus, by re- drawing political boundaries in a 
manner that maximises a State's degree of national homogeneity, we will thereby 
maximise the mutual trust and solidarity amongst that State's population which 
democracy requires in order to function effectively. 
Buchanan, while dismissive of the claim that the nation should be accorded the degree 
of importance which theorists such as Miller want to grant it, seems to agree that in 
order to function effectively democracy requires a `minimal community' whose 
members have "...enough in common to be able to engage in meaningful participation 
in rational, principled political decision -making. "75 Where this minimal community is 
lacking, then unabridgeably disjoint values and ways of conceptualising the social 
world will prevent individuals from together articulating even a minimal good that is 
common to both groups.76 Thus, despite the fact that both groups may have an equally 
strong commitment to democracy such that, were they each to have their own State then 
these States would both be properly functioning democracies, where they inhabit the 
same State their widely divergent values and ways of seeing the world preclude that 
State from being democratic. Given that these differences are unlikely to be diminished 
over time by members of the two groups interacting with one another then, ceteris 
paribus, Buchanan concludes that these two groups should each be granted their own 
State to reflect the fact that there are two political communities not just one.77 
Suppose we agree that democratic government requires the sort of minimal 
community described by both Miller and Buchanan, i.e. in order for a State to be 
democratic its citizens must first enjoy a substantial degree of mutual trust, and have 
75 Allen Buchanan, `Democracy and Secession' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. 
Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.23. 
76 Buchanan (1998), pp.23 -24. 
77 Buchanan (1998), p.24. 
Nationalist Theories of Secession 40 
enough in common with one another to be able to engage in rational dialogue and to 
articulate a mutually beneficial conception of the common good. Even if we accept this 
claim as valid, the empirical evidence is not wholly supportive of Miller's claim that 
multi -national States are incapable of constituting such a community. Numerous States 
are thriving liberal democracies despite - some may say because of - the fact that they 
include a plurality of national groups. New Zealand, for example, in addition to the 
dominant European, or Pakeha, majority, also includes a significant indigenous 
population in the form of the Maori which would likely qualify as a distinct nation on 
both the objective and subjective definitions of the term given above. Similarly, 
Canada, in addition to a plurality of distinct indigenous groups such as the Innuit, also 
contains a territorially concentrated, secession- inclined, culturally and linguistically 
distinct minority in the form of the Quebecois. Yet, despite their multi -national status, 
both New Zealand and Canada nonetheless fulfil the liberal democratic idea1.78 
Miller's response to counter -examples such as New Zealand and Canada is to claim 
that a common sentiment of nationality can co -exist with linguistic and other cultural 
differences, and to draw a distinction between multi- communalism and multi - 
nationali.sm.79 Countries such as New Zealand, Canada, Belgium and Switzerland, 
claims Miller, are not multi -national but, rather, multi -communal (i.e. through the 
promulgation of an encompassing, supra -national identity that embodies the divergent 
cultures and historical traditions of their various constituent sub -national communities, 
they have managed to create a trans -communal sense of national identity).80 Thus, 
while the citizens of these States may possess a strong communal consciousness with 
respect to their particular linguistic or cultural community, overlying this is an even 
stronger sense of patriotism and commitment to the larger, State.81 In the case of 
Switzerland, for example, Miller notes that: 
78 Miller acknowledges that Quebec apparently qualifies as a separate nation (or is likely to). See Miller 
(1995), p.95. 
79 Miller (1995), p.98. 
80 Miller acknowledges as much, noting that "...American national identity has ceased to have any marked 
ethnic content: ethnic groups naturally think of themselves as having hyphenated identities (Irish - 
American, Asian -American, etc.) which is possible only where the second term carries a meaning that 
transcends ethnic differences," Miller (1995), p.136. 
81 Jay Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis (Westport: Greenwood, 1983), pp. 188 -92. 
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...a national identity was quite deliberately fostered in the course of the nineteenth century, a process 
bearing all the usual hallmarks of nation -building - myths of origin, the resurrection of national 
heroes like William Tell, and so forth - with the result today that the Swiss share a common national 
identity as Swiss over and above their separate linguistic, religious and cantonal identities.82 
Miller, along with Margalit and Raz, rejects majoritarian LD theories of secession as 
question- begging, i.e. trying to solve issues of self - government through democratic 
means simply begs the question of what the relevant democratic unit is - a question 
which cannot, itself, he democratically answered.83 As an alternative to the LD model 
these three theorists propose that issues of self-government be decided by drawing 
political boundaries around nations rather than self -defining democratic groups. If, 
however, this alternative theory is to avoid the same `question -begging' objection that 
is apparently fatal to LD theories, then nations must be separate from the political 
processes of group- identity formation, and have their source(s) in some form of pre - 
political experience.84 On the other hand, however, Miller also wants to claim that 
States such as Switzerland are not hostile to the thesis that national homogeneity is a 
necessary condition for democratic government because they have created a national 
identity through political processes. 
This places Miller in something of a dilemma: if we adopt a Naturalist or 
Primordialist85 account of nationalism where nations are pre -political entities, then the 
Swiss and others can 't, as Miller suggests, have created a national identity to match the 
boundaries of their State. Rather, there must have been a pre -existing Swiss national 
identity prior to the Swiss State. In other words Miller's objection to the counter- 
examples of States such as Canada and New Zealand to the NDA won't hold - they 
cannot have created a national identity because national identities, by definition, exist 
prior to political community. 
82 Miller (1995), pp.94 -95. 
83 See Miller (1995), pp.111 -12; and Margalit and Raz, p.455. 
84 See Dahbour, pp.328 -29. 
85 See, for example, Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); and 
John Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982). 
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Alternatively, Miller may adopt a ModernistS6 account of nationalism which instead 
sees national identities as formed contingently through particular political occurrences 
(i.e. our national identity is constituted by choosing to see ourselves in certain ways, not 
by accepting or giving into a pre -given identity87). This will allow Miller to deal 
effectively with the counter -examples of States such as New Zealand and Canada to the 
NDA by claiming that they are multi -communal rather than multi -national. However, it 
does so at the price of both blurring the sharp distinction between nation and State 
which is so important to Miller's theory, and running headlong into the `question - 
begging' objection that led to the rejection of LD theories in the first place. Put simply, 
we can't, as Miller suggests we do, begin with an account of nations in order to 
determine what kinds of political institutions and boundaries are justifiable, when those 
same institutions and boundaries will to a significant degree determine what nations 
exist in the first place.88 In summary: either Miller concedes the political nature of 
national identities - thereby forfeiting the claim of nations to self- determination89 - or 
he maintains that nations exist prior to, and independent of political community, in 
which case he still has to explain why the examples of Canada and New Zealand are 
not hostile to the NDA. 
Furthermore, given that all sorts of different national groups can, and do, share a 
commitment to democracy, suppose two or more distinct nationalities, each of whom 
share an equal commitment to democratic government and have similar (or at least not 
widely divergent) values and ways of looking at the world, are combined together in a 
single State. Why should this State be any less democratic than a series of independent 
States each populated by a separate national group? Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, 
this seems to be exactly what has occurred in States such as New Zealand and Canada 
which are both multi- national and democratic. 
B6 See, for example, Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1989); Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982); William McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Hugh Seton -Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London: Methuen, 1977); and Walker Connor, 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
87 Dahbour, p.328. 
88 See Chandran Kukathas, Nationalism and Nationality[forthcoming], Chap 10; and Dahbour, pp.327ff. 
89 Dahbour, p.330. 
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Miller's response is to claim that where two nations inhabit the same State, their 
divergent interests combined with mutual antipathy and mistrust, will undermine each 
group's commitment to democracy by creating an incentive to capture and misuse the 
power of government for its own benefit. However, rather than weakening democratic 
government social pluralism may actually strengthen it, i.e. a pluralistic array of groups 
within a single State may serve to keep the government and its allies in check, as each 
group will have an interest in ensuring that no other group captures the government and 
misuses its power to further its own group -specific interests.90 
Moreover, while Miller may well be correct in asserting that nationality provides the 
minimal community required by democracy, it does not follow from this that the nation 
is the only, nor the best, example of such a community. Sentiments of mutual trust and 
consensus regarding important values and ways of-conceptualising the social world may 
also be exhibited by, say, religious communities and life -style groups to at least the 
same degree as they are by nations. Here, however, Miller may reply that the nation is 
defined as the form of community that displays a sufficient degree of inter -personal 
trust of the sort necessary for effective liberal- democratic governance. Thus, if, say, the 
members of a religious community exhibited a sufficient degree of mutual trust to 
function effectively as a liberal democracy then they would qualify as a nation and, a 
fortiori, a right of secession. 
This would be an effective means of countering the objection that nations are not the 
only means of securing the conditions necessary to the flourishing of liberal- democratic 
institutions and practices. However, it would also be to: (a) abandon the objective and 
subjective hybrid definition of nationality preferred by Miller; and (b) extend the status 
of nationhood - and, thus, a right of secession - to a variety of overlapping groups such 
as religious communities, voluntary associations, social movements and lifestyle 
collectivities that may otherwise be excluded under a subjective /objective definition. 
Consequently, because individuals may belong to more than one group capable of 
functioning as a democracy - e.g. a religious community may contain members from 
90 For theorists who believe that divisions between national groups and their desire for an internal life of 
their own may serve as a check against the abuse of State power see Lord Acton, `Nationalism' in The 
History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), pp.285- 
90; Alfred Zimmerman, Nationality and Government (London: Chatto and Windus, I 918); and Kelvin 
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one or more voluntary associations - such an approach would not only fail to 
distinguish between different holders of a right to secede, it may also bestow conflicting 
rights. To continue the previous example: members of the voluntary association may 
choose political independence whereas others in the religious community may opt to 
remain within the parent State. To attempt to avoid this dilemma by simply granting a 
right of independent Statehood to any group capable of enduring as a liberal democracy 
and whose members want to secede - e.g. members of the voluntary group may secede 
to create a new State while other members of the religious community may remain 
within their parent State - is to render the Nationalist theory indistinguishable from the 
LD theory. 
In conclusion: taken together these arguments demonstrate that the NDA is, at best, 
incomplete. At the very least, proponents of the NDA such as Miller seem to have 
some extra work to do. Not only must they adequately explain counter -examples such 
as New Zealand and Canada which tend to suggest that States can be both democratic 
and multi -national, but the question still remains why the nation is the only or the best 
example of the type of community required by democracy. 
C. The Co- operative Effort and Distributive Justice Argument 
Miller's second argument for why nations should have an exclusive right of secession 
concerns the political consequences of solidarity and cultural homogeneity, and is 
premised upon the claim that States are more likely to function effectively when they 
`embrace'91 a single national community. Briefly, Miller's argument is that "...a viable 
political community requires mutual trust, trust depends on communal ties and 
nationality is uniquely appropriate here as a form of common identity. "92 The 
argument is made in relation to both the provision of certain collective goods /benefits 
Knight, `Miller's Silence on Bureaucracy', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.2, No.3, 1996, p.438. 
91 The phraseology is Miller's (Miller, (1995), p.90). 
92 David Miller, `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence' in Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical 
Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p.143. Also see David Miller, `In What Sense 
Must Socialism be Communitarian' in Socialism, ed. Ellen F. Paul and Fred Miller (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p.60. 
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and schemes of re- distributive justice, both of which are taken to produce a state of 
affairs that is superior to that which would obtain in their absence.93 
There are two, inter -related claims here: (a) that the ties of community present within 
a nation are an instrumentally effective means of overcoming collective action 
problems endemic in the provision of certain collective goods; and (b) that the bond 
that exists between individuals who share a common nationality provides the requisite 
sense of mutual obligation that is essential if schemes of re- distributive justice are to 
function effectively, or at all. Both claims are teleological, i.e. there is nothing 
inherently valuable in nations, rather, they are an instrumentally effective means of 
providing the sociological conditions which the successful operation of these two types 
of schemes require 94 
Beginning with the former claim: Miller gives two examples where the voluntary 
contributions of individuals to a certain scheme produces an important benefit, with the 
result that the state of affairs produced under that cooperative scheme is judged to be 
superior to the state of affairs that would obtain were the benefit not produced at all 95 
Difficulties arise, however, when we consider that contributing to the scheme will 
usually have costs associated with it. Moreover, claims Miller, in order for people to 
contribute and accept the costs that this will impose upon them, they must first 'trust' 
other individuals to reciprocate and contribute themselves.96 Hence, the absence or 
diminishment of this trust will have a correspondingly negative effect upon the level of 
contributions to the scheme, with the result that the benefit will not be produced to 
93 One could, of course, question the social utility of such practices and the institutions which have grown 
up around them. The policy of re- distributing wealth to less well -off members of society in what has 
come to be known as the `Welfare State' is a particularly contentious issue. For present purposes, 
however, such issues may be put to one side so that the question of whether or not there is a positive 
relationship between the nation (and national homogeneity) and these practices of wealth re- distribution 
may be more fully explored. 
94 As Miller states: "...national identities...perform such valuable functions that our attitude, as 
philosophers, should be one of acquiescence if not positive endorsement." Miller, In Defence of 
Nationality', p.22. 
95 The role of mutual trust in creating a strong and stable State is also stressed by Barry who argues that a 
culturally homogenous State makes the provision of public goods more feasible and their funding from tax 
revenues more equitable due to the similar tastes of individuals. See Barry (1983), pp.144 -45. 
96 i.e. this trust is a necessary, not merely a sufficient, condition for contribution to the scheme. Miller 
(1995), p.91. 
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quantitatively and/or qualitatively the same degree (if at all) thus resulting in a sub- 
optimal state of affairs. 
Miller's first example of such a scheme concerns the provision of a clean and healthy 
environment. While the State can intervene directly in order to produce such an 
environment (e.g. by fining polluters), in general it will have to rely upon the voluntary 
compliance of citizens with certain rules that it proposes (e.g. not to litter in public 
places). However, because adhering to these rules will often impose costs upon 
individuals, Miller argues that in order to accept any such cost people must first be 
relatively confident that others will reciprocate by also adhering to the rules. The same 
is true, claims Miller, of a scheme of special grants or concessions to particular groups 
within the population (e.g. financial support to an industry severely disadvantaged by 
changes in the terms of trade). These dispensations are "...made on the understanding 
that other sections of the community would qualify for similar favourable treatment in 
the event that they too faced new and unforeseen difficulties. "97 Therefore a necessary 
pre -condition for the successful operation of such a scheme is a degree of confidence 
that the group to which you are now granting aid will give you its reciprocal assistance 
when it is your turn to ask for it.98 
Secondly, Miller considers schemes of social justice which involve the redistribution 
of wealth to those who, on their own, are unable to provide adequately for their needs. 
It is possible, indeed quite likely, that because of their relatively disadvantaged status, 
many of the people who benefit from such re- distributive practices will never be in a 
position to themselves contribute to the well -being of others. So the issue here is not so 
much `trust' as it was above but, rather, a feeling of empathy that leads individuals to 
recognise certain obligations of redistributive justice to one another.99 Once again, to 
97 Miller (1995), p.91. 
98 Note, however, that Miller restricts his discussion of collective action problems in the provision of 
certain collective goods and services to those that obtain within a State's boundaries. In contrast, as 
Caney has recently pointed out, some of the most pressing collective action problems arise with global 
issues (e.g. environmental pollution). Moreover, "...giving nations statehood will clearly produce more 
states than would exist in a world in which some states are multinational. And the more actors there are, 
the more difficult it will be to secure international agreement. Consequently, granting nations self - 
government would worsen the prospects of solving some collective action problems." See Simon Caney, 
'Self -Government and Secession: The Case of Nations', Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.5, No.4, 
1997, p.357. 
99 Miller (1995), p.93. 
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the degree that this sense of obligation is lacking the scheme will suffer a 
corresponding loss of support with the result that a sub -optimal state of affairs will 
obtain. Thus, the second problem for the State is to mobilise its citizens to fulfil duties 
to other citizens, particularly duties of social justice based upon practices of 
redistribution from which they are unlikely to benefit directly. 00 
Miller concludes that in order to overcome these two difficulties the citizens of a State 
must constitute a community. In other words, they must feel themselves to share a 
common identity that carries with it a shared loyalty101 - both to one another and to the 
community as a whole - that increases each member's confidence that other members 
will reciprocate their own cooperative behaviour. Additionally, the sense of solidarity 
and common destiny that occur as a result of this shared identity must then generate a 
sense of social duty to act for the common good of the community and to assist other 
members who are in need. The problem for the State is how to create and maintain 
such a community, when the large size and geographical distribution of its citizenry 
will in most cases mean that it cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies 
on kinship or face -to -face interaction.102 
At this point it is claimed that because the attributes of community are already present 
within the nation, where the State and the nation are co- extensive the requirements of 
community will therefore be met to a higher degree than were the State's citizens drawn 
from a number of distinct national groups. Thus, because nation -States are better able 
to fulfil the requirements of distributive justice and provide collective goods that 
require the voluntary cooperation of individuals for their production, as far as is 
possible State boundaries should be re -drawn to match national boundaries. 
Conversely, in those States lacking a common national identity (e.g. Nigeria or 
Pakistan) which are little more than umbrella organisations that hold together a number 
of different ethnic or national groups, politics at best takes the form of group bargaining 
loo Miller, `In Defence of Nationality', pp.21 -22. 
101 Miller, `The Nation- State: A Modest Defence', p.142. 
102 Miller, `In Defence of Nationality', p.22, 
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and compromise, i.e. mutual trust and a sense of obligation exist within each national 
group but not across them.1o3 
D. Responses to the Co- operative Effort and Distributive Justice Argument 
A common response to this line of argument has been to claim that there is reason to 
doubt whether nationalism facilitates programmes of re- distributive justice, i.e. there is 
nothing in nationalism that necessarily mandates a commitment to social or economic 
justice and many nationalisms place no emphasis upon such things.164 Indeed, 
privileged minorities have often appealed to nationalism to counter -act the distributive 
impulse and persuade the worse -off to moderate their demands.105 As Buchanan points 
out: 
...nationalism (rather than some varieties of it) has no particular penchant for distributive justice...it 
has in fact often been used to block redistribution, and...the political unity nationalism achieves can 
be and often is used for quite different and in some cases downright evil purposes...106 
At best, however, this demonstrates merely that the fact that one lives in a State 
populated and governed exclusively by the members of one's own national group, is no 
guarantee that one will enjoy the benefits provided by a programme of re- distributive 
justice. While undeniably correct, this establishes only that national homogeneity is not 
a sufficient condition for the creation and maintenance of programmes of re- distributive 
justice. Miller's argument, on the other hand, seems to be that national homogeneity is 
necessary, not a sufficient, condition for such programmes.107 So while these claims 
may well be correct, they also seem to be irrelevant to Miller's analysis. 
As in the case of the NDA, it is also claimed that much of the available empirical 
evidence appears to contradict Miller's claim that nationally homogenous States are 
103 Miller (1995), pp.92 -93. 
104 On this point see Dahbour, p.338. 
105 See Brighouse, p.392; and Allen Buchanan, `What's So Special About Nations ?' in Rethinking 
Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996), 
p.306. 
106 Buchanan (1996), p.306. 
107 See, for example, Miller (1995), p.91. 
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better able to meet the requirements of distributive justice. Once again, multi -national 
States such as Canada, Belgium and Switzerland all, to varying degrees, sustain 
effective systems of public welfare. Furthermore, as Brighouse points out: "[t]he most 
assimilationist national identity in the world, that of the `American,' dominates the 
culture of a country which has, among advanced industrialised nations, singularly failed 
to establish robust economically egalitarian institutions. "108 
To these objections Miller gives two responses: (a) Belgium, Canada and Switzerland 
work as they do partly because they are not simply multi -national, but have cultivated 
common national identities alongside communal ones, and partly because they have 
developed institutions (federalism, de- centralization) to ensure that each community 
has its interests protected against incursions by the rest;109 and (b) as far as social 
justice is concerned, it is not only the `strength' 11° of a national identity that matters, 
but also its character (i.e. the extent to which the nation conceives of itself along 
solidaristic or individualistic lines). Where, as in the case of the United States, the 
identity of the nation is conceived of in individualistic terms, practices of wealth re- 
distribution are less likely to be viewed as legitimate. 
Miller's former response has already been dealt with above in relation to the NDA, 
while the latter response only serves to narrow the scope of the type of national 
identities which provide the requisite form of community for schemes of re- distributive 
justice (i.e. national homogeneity is not enough, rather, the nation must be of a specific, 
non -individualistic character). Moreover, in addition to these two replies to Miller's 
counter- argument, there is also the additional question of whether there may be other 
forms of community in addition to the nation (e.g. religious or economic communities) 
which fulfil the requirements of community to a higher degree then does the nation. 
108 Brighouse, p.391. In support of this claim Brighouse quotes Andrew Shapiro, We're Number One 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1992); Edward N. Wolff, Top Heavy: A Study of the Increasing Inequality of 
Wealth in America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995); and Nancy Folbre, The New Field Guide 
to the U.S. Economy (New York: The New Press, 1995). Brighouse claims that the successful 
establishment and maintenance of welfare States is largely dependent upon the creation of class (as 
opposed to national) solidarities and the ability to build class coalitions through the design of policy, and 
it is open question whether a common national identity facilitates the establishment of these coalitions 
(Brighouse, p.391). 
109 Miller (1995), pp.94 -96. 
110 Miller's use of the term `strength' here appears to refer to the degree to which a national identity is 
adhered to by a State's population and/or the degree of national homogeneity exhibited by a State. 
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Trust, as Miller suggests, may well be important in overcoming collective action 
problems, but what reason is there to suppose that nationality is the only or the best 
form of such trust? 111 
Anticipating this objection Miller claims that nations are different from other, 
alternative forms of community because they are `encompassing' 112 communities. 
Moreover, the encompassing character of the nation not only makes it distinct from 
other forms of community, but also superior to them as a basis for political society. A 
similar argument is made by Nielsen who claims that the nation provides a uniquely 
suitable basis for political communities because of its ability to `encompass' other 
forms of identity by integrating and providing a context of choice in which they may 
operate.' 13 Miller, on the other hand, seems to have in mind something different when 
he describes nations as `encompassing communities.' For Miller the encompassing 
nature of nations stems from an aspiration to "...draw in everyone who inhabits a 
particular territory. "114 Thus, in contrast to other forms of community which tend to 
define themselves exclusively, Miller believes that national identity has a malleable 
character that enables it to embrace the entire population of a particular territory.115 
Indeed, argues Miller, nationalism becomes self -defeating if it is not accommodating as 
it would be `perverse' for a nation seeking self -determination to exclude others with 
whom it shares a particular territory:116 
Suppose we are members of a national community forming the dominant group in the territory we 
aspire to control, but that we share it with a minority group who have much in common with us, but 
who differ in one respect - religion, say. Unless our religion is crucial to our identity [and Miller 
believes that with most nations no single feature is likely to be crucial]...we have good reason to de- 
emphasize this feature, and to stress instead, as a basis of unity, those cultural traits that we already 
111 This point is also made by Dahbour and Caney (Dahbour, p.318; Caney (1997), p.357), 
112 See Miller (1995), p.92 and `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence', p.143. The term is borrowed 
from Margalit and Raz. 
113 See Nielsen (1998). This claim will be returned to shortly. 
114 See Miller (1995), p.92 and `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence', p.143. 
115 As an example of an alternative, more rigid type of community, Miller gives the example of religious 
communities which require adherence to a particular religious doctrine. See Miller (1995), p.92, `The 
Nation -State: A Modest Defence', p.143; and `In Defence of Nationality', p.25. 
116 See Miller (1995), p.92, and `The Nation- State: A Modest Defence', p.143. 
Nationalist Theories of Secession 51 
share with the minority. To the extent that we succeed in doing so, we can form a territorial 
community ín whose self -determination we can all share. From this springs mutual trust.117 
The idea, then, is apparently to create a new national identity that includes everyone 
within the State's sphere of territorial sovereignty by re- shaping the identity of the 
dominant nation. Moreover, to the extent that the majority nation is able to de- 
emphasise those elements of its identity which set it apart from the national minorities 
which with it shares a certain territory, the requirements of community will be met. 
Groups such as the Albanian Kosovars and the Rwandan Tutsis, however, may have 
some problems accepting Miller's example as indicative of the treatment usually meted 
out to national minorities in multi -national States. Indeed, Miller's example is very 
much a best -case scenario, where the larger, more powerful majority decides to `do the 
decent thing' and accommodate the smaller, weaker minority. Yet, as many national 
minorities will affirm, accommodation and reconciliation are not always the norm in 
multi -national States. Rather than going out of its way to try and accommodate 
outsiders with whom it shares a particular territory, the dominant nation may instead 
simply reason that instead of changing its identity to match that of the minority, the 
onus of change is upon the minority. To use Miller's example: rather than de- 
emphasising the feature of religion, the majority nation may simply insist that members 
of the minority convert to its religion. Moreover, to the extent that a minority is 
unprepared to change its identity to match that of the majority, the majority may choose 
to exclude the minority - either by simply neglecting them, or through more extreme 
measures such as repression or expulsion.118 
117 Miller (1995), p.92. 
1 18 Of course, as Caney points out, the fact that some nations aim to repress those who are not members 
of their community fails to establish that all nations are therefore tyrannical. See Caney (1997), p.364. 
Undoubtedly Caney is correct - not all nationalist leaders are budding Milosevics or Zhirinovskys. Note, 
however, that this fact is insufficient to save Miller's characterisation of nations as uniquely encompassing 
communities. Yes, many national groups are accommodating towards outsiders and will not seek to 
oppress or expel them as Milosevic has done to the Albanian Kosovars and the Rwandan Hutus to the 
Tutsis. However, the existence of liberal, accommodating nationalisms does not demonstrate that 
nationalism is necessarily an encompassing form of community (it is equally true that it may be 
unencompassing), nor does it show that nationalism is any more encompassing than other, alternative 
forms of community. 
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In fact Miller does admit, not only that some groups may prefer to exclude rather than 
accommodate national minorities,119 but that in other cases the aspiration to 
accommodate national minorities may simply not be achievable because of fundamental 
differences between its and the majority's identity.120 For example, claims Miller, both 
groups may include as part of their historical self -understanding, their separation from, 
and antagonism towards, the other.121 Alternatively, they may each take a different 
religion as a constitutive component of their national identity.122 Nevertheless, it is 
clear that Miller is working with a very benign, conciliatory form of nationalism.123 
Unfortunately, however, many national identities are not nearly so obliging towards 
outsiders and instead include a belief that they are superior to others in a way that 
justifies overriding their rights.124 
Therefore, even if nationalism can be accommodating towards outsiders, it is equally 
true that it is often extremely exclusive and unaccommodating. Moreover, there is 
nothing in Miller's analysis which establishes that the nation exhibits a greater tendency 
to accommodate non -members than other, rival forms of community. So even if we 
accept Miller' s claim that a viable political community requires the sort of mutual trust 
and inter -personal sense of duty that only communal ties can provide, Miller fails to 
establish that the nation is necessarily superior to other, alternative forms of community 
in the provision of these ties.125 
119 Miller, `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence', p.1.43. 
120 Miller (1995), p.92, 'The Nation- State: A Modest Defence', p.143, and 'In Defence of Nationality', 
p.27. 
121 See Miller, 'The Nation- State: A Modest Defence', p.156. Also see David Miller, `Secession and the 
Principle of Nationality' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.66 and p.72. 
122 Miller, `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence', p.156. N.B. Miller's use of religion as an example of 
an irreconcilable difference in this context appears rather odd, given that in the passage quoted above and 
elsewhere (see Miller (1998), p.71) he explicitly claims that two groups may adhere to different religions 
but yet nonetheless share the same national identity. 
123 See Buchanan (1996), p.306. 
124 See Brighouse, p.388. 
12s Also note that Miller's description of nations as encompassing communities conflicts with an 
additional argument he makes for the re- drawing political boundaries to match national ones, premised 
upon the claim that national cultures can only be adequately protected within nation States. Put simply, 
Miller argues that because national cultures are made up of elements which have a very public dimension 
(e.g. the architecture of public buildings, the content of education, the character of television and film etc) 
this means that they must be subject to State control because the actions of economically self -interested 
individuals will often be insufficient to ensure that these elements express and reproduce the nation's 
culture. Moreover, the State must be a nation -State because where a State exercises its authority over two 
Nationalist Theories of Secession 53 
2.5 WHY SHOULD THE NATION BE A STATE? 
A. Introduction 
The next task is to consider the claim that political boundaries should be re -drawn to 
match national ones because the welfare of nations requires that they possess the control 
over their resources and destiny that only full political independence can provide. The 
argument is distinct from the two previous arguments in two important respects. First, 
the issue is not the benefits that nations and national homogeneity may bestow upon the 
State but, rather, the benefits that Statehood may bestow upon the nation.126 Second, 
the two previous arguments pitted nationalism against liberalism by claiming that if a 
political community is to be both democratic and viable then it cannot be based solely 
upon the liberal principle of voluntary association (i.e. a social contract between 
rational, self -interested fails to establish the minimal trust and sense of obligation 
necessary for democratic government, the provision of collective goods and programs of 
re- distributive justice).127 Conversely, the following argument claims that nationalism 
is not only consistent with liberalism, but is actually required by it. 
B. The Nation as a Context of Choice and a Constitutive Component of Individual 
Identity 
In looking at the alleged connection between liberalism and the claim that nations 
should have a right to independent Statehood, a good place to start is with Kymlicka's 
theory of minority rights which, for reasons explained above, will be dealt with in 
or more national groups, the dominant group will have an incentive to impose its culture on the weaker 
groups and any measures adopted to preserve the national identity of one group will usually he resisted by 
adherents of the other(s) -a claim which has already been questioned above. But Miller can't have it 
both ways: on one hand he claims that nationalism becomes self -defeating if the dominant nation in a 
multi -national State does not alter its identity to accommodate its minorities, then on the other hand he 
claims that the majority has an incentive not to accommodate minorities but, rather, to impose its identity 
on them. If in fact the nation is the uniquely encompassing form of community that Miller suggests it is, 
then why should national minorities in general be any less secure in a multi -national State than in a State 
of their own? Conversely, if the dominant nation has an incentive to impose its identity upon minority 
groups then it seems that nationalism is not the uniquely encompassing form of community Miller claims 
it to be - in which case it must be something else that makes the nation superior to other forms of 
community as a basis for political society. See Miller (1995), pp.86 -88. 
126 And, afortiori, why nations are important in the first place. 
127 See Dahbour, pp.316 -18. 
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greater detail in Chapter Four.128 It will be remembered that according to liberalism in 
order to live the good life individuals must possess two fundamental freedoms: (a) the 
freedom to lead their lives 'from the inside' according to their own beliefs about what 
gives value to life; and (b) the freedom to question these beliefs and where necessary 
revise them. Kymlicka claims that an individual's interests, goals and characteristics 
are not independent of his /her social context, but are rather the result of socialisation 
processes. Thus, in deciding how we are to live our lives we do not start de novo but, 
rather, select from an available choice of options that are determined by our cultural 
heritage.129 Moreover, alternative ways of life only have meaning to us because our 
culture identifies them as having significance.130 "Put simply, freedom involves 
making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides 
these options, but also makes them meaningful to us. "131 Kymlicka explains further: 
People make choices about the social practices around them, based on their beliefs about the value of 
these practices... And to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter 
of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture. 132 
Therefore Kymlicka believes that while individual well -being is dependent upon the 
ability of individuals to make free choices about how to live their lives, this freedom is 
itself dependent upon cultural structures which both furnish the individual with 
examples of alternative ways of life and give meaning to them.133 For this reason 
Kymlicka concludes that cultural membership is, in Rawlsian terms, a primary good 
and liberalism necessarily involves a concern with cultural structures because of their 
instrumental connection to individual choice.134 The claim that individual well -being is 
128 Note that Kymlicka is concerned, not with ethnic groups who want to secede and create their own 
State, but rather with those who wish for greater recognition of their ethnic identity by the modification of 
the laws and institutions of the larger society of which they are apart, in order to make them more 
accommodating to cultural differences. See Kymlicka (1995), p.11. The question is: are the same 
considerations which Kymlicka believes are capable of generating minority rights, also capable of 
justifying a right to secede? 
129 Kymlicka (1989), pp.14 -19. 
130 Kymlicka (1989), pp.164 -65. 
131 Kymlicka (1995), p.83. 
132 Kymlicka (1995), p.83. 
133 On this point also see Paul Gilbert, `Communities Real and Imagined: Good and Bad Cases for 
National Secession' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.216 
134 Kymlicka (1989), pp.165 -66. 
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defined in terms of certain ends which are themselves culturally determined is repeated 
by Margalit and Raz:135 
Individual well -being depends on the successful pursuit of worthwhile goals and relationships. 
Goals and relationships are culturally determined. Being social animals means not merely that the 
means for the satisfaction of people's goals are more readily available within society. More crucially 
it means that these goals themselves are...the creatures of society, the products of culture. Family 
relations, all other social relations between people, careers, leisure activities, the arts, sciences, and 
other obvious products of "high culture" are the fruits of society. 136 
Thus, membership of cultural, or `encompassing' groups such as the nation137 is 
important, even vital,138 to individual well- being, as it greatly affects one's 
opportunities and one's ability to engage in the relationships and pursuits marked by the 
culture. Where a nation is decaying, or where it is persecuted or discriminated against 
"...the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less 
attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful. "139 
To this Margalit and Raz add a second claim that membership of a national culture is 
important in one's self -identity, affecting how others perceive and respond to us, which 
in turn fashions our self -identity. Consequently, where a nation is not generally 
respected, or is the victim of persecution, then the dignity and self -respect of its 
members will suffer as a result.140 Nielsen seems to agree when he claims that the 
nation "...pervade[s] the whole range of an individual's major life activities and 
135 While there are important differences between Kymlicka and Margalit and Raz, all three theorists 
share the belief that liberalism's emphasis upon the moral primacy of the individual supports the 
conclusion that nations have special rights, including rights of self -government. On this point see 
Buchanan (1996), p.299. 
136 Margalit and Raz, p.448. 
137 Various theorists use different terms to refer to these cultural communities which, for reasons of 
brevity and to avoid any possible conclusion shall henceforth simply be referred to as nations. Note that 
this is not to say that the nation is the only example of such a cultural community. Indeed, one of the main 
concerns of this chapter is to demonstrate that because there may be various forms of community in 
addition to the nation capable of determining an individual's identity and goals, it is wrong to single out 
the nation for special treatment. 
138 Margalit and Raz, pp.449. 
139 Margalit and Raz, p.449. Also see Caney who agrees with Margalit and Raz's analysis (Caney 
(1997), p.362). 
140 Margalit and Raz, pp.447 -49. Also see Tamir, p.73. 
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functions as an indispensable source of self -identification and self -definition. "141 Thus, 
for most people, there is a place where "...one feels most at home, a place that one 
longs for after a long absence, and there is, in that particular culture, for many people, a 
reasonably definite answer - more accurately an important part of an answer - to the 
question, `Who am I ? "' Once again, where a national culture and the various social 
structures and institutions which accompany it suffer harm or is absent altogether, 
people will have no secure sense of who they are and so will be unable to flourish./42 
Moreover, it is also claimed that the primary good of cultural membership refers 
specifically to the culture in which one was born and raised, i.e. respecting peoples' 
own cultural membership and facilitating their transition to other, alternative cultures 
are not equally legitimate options. Because people are bound in an important way to 
their own cultural community we can't just transplant them from one culture into 
another, as moving between cultures is an option that is both rare and costly to 
individuals - particularly where the differences between cultures is vast.143 Thus, 
cosmopolitans such as Waldron are simply mistaken when they assert that there is no 
need for individuals to have access to a complete culture or to maintain membership of 
their original culture.144 
Finally, it is claimed that national cultures tend to have an invariably public character. 
Kymlicka, for example, claims that because national cultures do not involve just shared 
beliefs and values, but are embodied in institutions and practices such as schools, 
media, the economy and government, they therefore encompass both private and public 
spheres.145 Moreover, it is this public dimension of national identity that enables the 
nation to provide its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities - social, educational, religious, recreational and economic.146 
141 Nielsen (1998), p.110. 
142 See Nielsen (1998), pp.109 -110; and Tamir, pp.71 -73. 
143 Kymlicka (1995), p.86 and pp.175 -77. Also see Nielsen (1998), p.109. 
144 For other theorists who, like Waldron, question whether the interest of cultural membership is 
necessarily specific to one's original culture of birth and upbringing see Buchanan (1996), p.299; and 
Michael Hartney, `Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights' in The Rights of Minority Cultures, 
ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.206. 
145 Kymlicka (1995), p.76. 
146 While Kymlicka's concern is here with what he terms `societal cultures' he later claims that societal 
cultures tend to be national cultures. Kymlicka (1995), p.80. 
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Similarly, Tamir claims that in order to prosper a nation needs a public sphere, i.e. 
individuals must be given the opportunity to express their national identity both 
privately and publicly:147 
The existence of a shared public space is a necessary condition for ensuring the preservation of a 
nation as a vital and active community. The ability to enjoy the liveliness of public life is one of the 
major benefits that accrue from living among one's own people. Only then can the "individual feel 
that he lives in a community which enables him to express in public and develop without repression 
those aspects of his personality which are bound up with his sense of identity as a member of his 
community." 148 
The public nature of a national culture creates problems, however, when we consider 
that the State by its very nature cannot be culturally neutral. In deciding the language of 
public schooling, internal boundaries, State symbols, the dates of national holidays and 
so forth the government of a multi -national State unavoidably promotes certain cultural 
identities - invariably that of the majority - and thereby disadvantages others.149 The 
viability of a national minority's culture may be further undermined by the economic 
and political decisions made by the majority, e.g. the minority may be outbid or 
outvoted on resources and policies that are crucial to the survival of their culture. 
Because these disadvantages cannot be redressed simply by granting all the State's 
citizens common rights such as the freedom to associate with others in the pursuit of 
common cultural practices, it is claimed that national minorities need special, group - 
specific rights to alleviate their vulnerability to majority decisions. While these rights 
may impose restrictions upon members of the larger society, this sacrifice is assumed to 
be far less than that which would be imposed upon members of national minorities if 
such rights did not exist.150 
147 See Tamir, pp.8 -9, pp.53 -54, pp.73 -74 and p.86. Also see Neil MacCormick. `Is Nationalism 
Philosophically Credible ?' in Issues of Self-Determination, ed. William Twining (Aberdeen; Aberdeen 
University Press, 1991). 
148 Tamir, pp.73 -74. The quote is from Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p.207. 
149 i.e. a State's politics reflects the design of its culture. 
150 Kymlicka (1995), pp.107 -11; Tamir, pp.145 -50; L. W. Pye and S. Verba, Political Culture and 
Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.4 -7; and C. Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p.311. 
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C. Who Gets Rights: The Nation as Only One of Many Forms of Community 
Many of the above claims will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four. For the 
moment, however, suppose we accept the claim that membership in one's culture of 
birth and upbringing is a primary good in the sense described, and that the disadvantage 
cultural minorities face in ensuring their continued survival can only be remedied by 
granting them a measure of political self -determination. Two issues remain unresolved. 
First, political self-determination admits of many degrees with full Statehood at the 
very extreme end of the spectrum, and it is unclear why a lesser degree of political self - 
determination (e.g. powers of veto, territorial autonomy and guaranteed representation 
in central institutions) is not sufficient to guarantee the continued survival and 
flourishing of national minorities.151 Second, the nation is but one example of a 
cultural community, so it also has to be shown why nations alone should be singled out 
as the exclusive holder of a right to secede. 
Much of the philosophical literature on group- specific rights is restricted to two main 
issues: (a) whether or not we really need a theory of group specific rights; and (b) 
whether such rights are consistent with liberalism' s individualistic moral ontology. 
Discussion of the first issue revolves around the question of whether the interests of 
groups are reducible to the interests of their individual members (the so- called 
Reductionist Thesís)152 and whether or not there are certain types of valuable goods in 
which individuals have a strong interest, but to which only groups can coherently claim 
a right. 153 In contrast, discussion of the second issue is centred around the sorts of 
claims discussed above regarding liberalism's commitment to individual autonomy and 
151 On this point see, for example, Wayne Norman, `The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of 
Secessionist Politics' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p.36; Buchanan (1997), p.306; Philpott, p.362; and Allen Buchanan, 
'The Right to Self- Determination: Analytical and Moral Foundations', Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol.8, No.2, 1991, p.47. 
152 On the Reductionist Thesis see, for example: Michael McDonald, 'Should Communities Have Rights? 
Reflections on Liberal Individualism', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol.4, No.2, 1991; 
Margalit and Raz, pp.459 -50; Leslie Green, `Associative Obligations and the State' in Law and the 
Community. The End of Individualism ?, ed. Allan C. Hutchinson and Leslie J. M. Green (Ontario: 
Carswell, 1989); and 'Two Views of Collective Rights', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 
Vol.4, No.2, 1991; Hartney, pp.206ff. On the relevancy of the Reductionist Thesis to group -differentiated 
rights see Kymlicka (1995), pp.45 -47. 
153 On the issue of whether or not there are certain goods to which only groups can coherently claim a 
right see, for example: Denise Reaume, `Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods', University of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vo1.38, 1988; Darlene M. Johnston, `Native Rights as Collective Rights: A 
Question of Group Self -Preservation' in The Rights of Monority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: 
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freedom and whether these require us to grant rights to groups as well as individuals. 
While these are clearly important and relevant issues there is, however, another equally 
valid but perhaps somewhat under -stated, criticism of the nationalist theory. The 
objection is articulated most coherently by Buchanan154 who questions why, even if an 
individual's interests are bound up with the flourishing of their cultural group and the 
best protection that can be afforded these interests is that the group be self -governing, 
nations should be singled out as the only example of a cultural group.155 
Buchanan's objection is based upon a thesis of Dynamic Pluralism which claims that 
a society is comprised of numerous groups and individuals with various life -projects or 
conceptions of the good. For example, "[s]ome [may] think of themselves first as 
fathers or mothers or members of a family, and second as Swiss, or Americans, or 
Blacks, or Hispanics, or Christians. For others their primary self -identification is 
religious or political -ideological. "156 Moreover, not only may individuals change their 
allegiances but they may have multiple allegiances to different groups with no single 
predominant allegiance or identity. Thus, not all individuals will attach overriding 
priority to the same identity and for others no one identity may be more important or 
fundamental to their sense of who they are. This variation, claims Buchanan, will be 
particularly pronounced in liberal societies where, with their high levels of individual 
freedom of association and expression, individuals will continuously revise their 
conceptions of the good life and new groups will come and go.157 The crucial point 
remains that: 
...in pluralistic societies nationality will be only one source of identification and allegiance among 
others, and for some people it will be of little or no importance relative to other sources of 
identification and allegiance, whether these are cultural or occupational or religious or political or 
familia1,158 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Hartney, pp.203ff; Boykin, p.70; and Buchanan (1989). 
154 Similar points to those raised by Buchanan are, however, made by other theorists_ See, for example, 
George, p.78; and Knight, p.439. 
155 Buchanan (1996), pp.301 -2. 
156 Buchanan (1996), p.294. 
157 Buchanan (1996), pp.293 -94. 
158 Buchanan (1996), p.294. A similar point is made by George who claims that because nations are not 
the only entities that are constitutive of individual identity, it is wrong to prioritise the nation as the sole 
candidate for independent Statehood as it falsely assumes that the identity of the nation is reducible to the 
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On the basis of this thesis of Dynamic Pluralism, Buchanan then lists a number of 
objections to singling out nations as the sole holders of a right of self -government: (a) it 
is based upon a false ontology which has nations as the only or the predominant source 
of individual self -identification and allegiance; (b) it ignores the fact that for many 
people nationality is not so important and that whatever importance nationality now 
possesses may decrease over time;159 (c) it violates the principle of equal respect for 
persons by devaluing alternative forms of identification and allegiance by showing less 
respect for those individuals whose identities and allegiances they are;160 and (d) 
granting the nation rights of self -government facilitates the domination of nationality 
over these other sources of allegiance and identification.161 
The important issue here, however, is not whether nationalist theories of secession 
violate liberalism's principle of equal respect for persons by prioritising the nation over 
and above other, additional forms of identity and allegiance - although this is not to say 
that Buchanan may not have a valid point here. Rather, the central issue is that if 
nations are to be singled out as the exclusive bearers of a right to secede then it must be 
shown why nations alone, amongst all the various forms of community, warrant such 
special treatment. To grant a right of secession to nations, while denying the same right 
to other groups, is morally arbitrary unless the nation can somehow be differentiated 
from these other groups as possessing a property which makes it uniquely suitable as 
the sole holder of a right of secession. 
Moreover, the claim that membership of a cultural community such as the nation is a 
prerequisite to individual well -being and autonomy, even if true, cannot perform this 
function because the nation is only one example of such a community. While 
personal interests of its members, such that respect for persons requires respect for the nation before any 
other community. Additionally, these various factors of personal identity may conflict, e.g. if I identify as 
a Buddhist rather than a Thai, then respect for me as a person requires respecting my religion rather than 
my nation. So respect for persons does not necessarily require respect for the nation of which they are a 
member (George, pp.76 -78). 
159 i.e. even if nationality is the predominant source of self -identification and allegiance in a given 
society, there is no guarantee that it will retain this pre- eminent status. Buchanan (1996), p.296. 
160 Buchanan (1996), p.294. 
161 Buchanan (1996), p.295. Thus, argues Buchanan, granting nations exclusive rights of political self - 
government not only violates the liberal principle of equal respect for persons, but also hampers 
individuals' efforts to change their conceptions of the good by disadvantaging other, alternative sources of 
identification and allegiance that might become important for individuals were nations not given such 
privileged status (Buchanan (1996), p.297). 
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individuals may look to their membership of a nation for their sense of self -identity and 
to provide them with various options from which to choose and to give meaning to 
these options, they may also look to other, alternative forms of community or a 
combination of different forms of community to perform these same functions. In 
summary: because one's sense of self -identification and self -definition may be 
determined by one's membership of other communities aside from, or in addition to, 
the nation, membership of a nation, and the continuing vitality of that nation, are not 
necessary conditions for individual flourishing. Therefore if we are going to grant 
nations rights to self -government because of their instrumental connection to individual 
well -being and autonomy we must, if we are to avoid a charge of moral arbitrariness, 
also grant it to other forms of community which perform the same functions as the 
nation. 
D. Nielsen's Objection: The Nation as an `Encompassing' Form of Community 
In response to the above objection Nielsen claims that nationality is distinct from other 
forms of identity because it encompasses and integrates them. This is not to say that 
national identity is morally primary or superior to other allegiances and identities, 
simply that these other identities require the encompassing culture that goes with 
nationality.162 Thus, while one's interests and roles may be much more important to 
one than one's nationality, for each of these things nationality provides the context of 
choice and the integrating structure and so is prior to them.l63 
Being a good musician, being a gentle lover, being politically committed, being a kind and caring 
person, being a good Catholic, being a dedicated teacher, being an active member of one's local 
community, being a talented dry -fly fisherman, and a myriad of other things may be more important 
to one, sometimes vastly more important to one, than one's nationality, but for most of these things at 
least, one's nationality provides the context of choice for these things and the integrating structure 
for them. t64 
Thus, claims Nielsen, the claim is not that nationality provides the primary source of 
self -identification for people or that nations are morally primary. Rather, the position 
162 Nielsen (1998), pp.126 -27. 
163 Nielsen (1998), pp.124 -25. 
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of privilege afforded to nations is `strategically instrumental' - i.e. a reflection of the 
fact that only the nation provides a meaningful context of choice without which 
individual autonomy is impossible.165 Nielsen concludes that: 
What is so special about nations, among the various groups, that entitles them to political self - 
government and to a presumption, everything else being equal, to statehood, is that they, in contrast 
to the other groups, are encompassing (integrating) cultures, located historically on a territory which 
the people making up the nation regard as their homeland or, if they are in diaspora, aspire to make 
their homeland and furthermore, and distinctly, that they are of sufficient size and sufficient 
infrastructure to be able to carry out the functions of a state... Such groups are (a) capable of self - 
government and (b) should, everything else being equal, be self -governing because that alone 
provides a thoroughly secure meaningful cultural context of choice which, in turn, is necessary for 
autonomy and human flourishing. No other group meets both conditions (a) and (b).166 
However, Nielsen's argument here appears to be somewhat misguided. As was noted 
above, the aspiration for self -government is extremely problematic as a criterion of 
nationhood.167 Moreover, Nielsen's first condition that a group be capable of self - 
government (i.e. `that they are of sufficient size and sufficient infrastructure to be able 
to carry out the functions of a State') does not apply exclusively to nations. The same 
could also be said of, say, many ethnic, linguistic, religious, lifestyle, interest and 
economic groups. Furthermore, as Nielsen himself later admits, many of the groups 
which we think of as nations are frequently too small, poor and/or geographically 
dispersed to be able to form viable, independent States.168 Therefore the criterion of 
political viability cannot distinguish the nation from other forms of community. 
Nielsen's second condition that self -government alone can provide a `thoroughly 
meaningful cultural context for individual choice' returns us to the question of why a 
lesser degree of self -government than full Statehood is not sufficient to guarantee a 
nation's well- being. Nielsen claims that national minorities are only secure when they 
164 Nielsen (1998), pp.124 -25. 
165 Nielsen (1998), p.126. 
166 Nielsen (1998), p.I27. 
167 See, for example, Beran (1993), p.483. 
168 See Nielsen (1998), p.127. On this same point also see Freeman (1998), p.22; Linda Bishai, `Altered 
States: Secession and the Problems of Liberal Theory' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 04-5; and Kymlicka (1995), p.186. 
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gain the degree of control over the conditions of their existence offered by independent 
Statehood, i.e. anything less than full political independence entails a fragile and 
insecure existence.169 In addition to extreme examples such as the former Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia which demonstrate the precarious existence of national 
minorities in multi- national States, those multi -national States that are secure 
constitutional democracies such as Switzerland, only work well because they devolve 
almost all power and control to their various sub -national groups.17° 
But if, as in the case of Switzerland, the survival of a nation's culture can be ensured 
by a lesser degree of political independence than full Statehood, what reason is there to 
automatically assume that the cultural survival of nations requires that they be afforded 
their own State? Nielsen's response seems to be that the degree of political 
independence enjoyed by national minorities in countries such as Switzerland is so 
great that they are practically independent States anyway, so why not `go the whole 
hog' and just give them their own State. However, given that the degree of political 
independence enjoyed by national minorities in countries such as Switzerland already 
approximates that of full independence, then not only may any benefits produced by 
granting these a marginal increase of political self -government be negligible, but they 
may be outweighed by the economic costs sustained in setting up and maintaining a 
nation- State. 
Moreover, it is questionable just how much physical and cultural security independent 
Statehood really can offer a national minority.171 Where a territorially concentrated 
national minority is suffering serious and sustained discrimination at the hands of a 
hostile majority, simply drawing a political boundary around the minority and declaring 
it an independent State will not make it invulnerable to the hostile actions of the parent 
State, and may simply elevate the conflict to an international level. As the German 
invasion of Poland in 1939 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 demonstrate, the 
169 See Nielsen (1993), p.32 and (1998), p.110. This same point is repeated by Margalit and Raz who 
claim that national minorities that do not enjoy self -government are frequently the victims of persecution, 
discrimination and neglect and that multi- national States have historically proven to be ineffective in 
protecting and enhancing the social identities of their constituent national groups. See Margalit and Raz, 
p.457. 
170 Nielsen (1993), pp.32 -33. 
171 On this point see, for example, Lee Buchheit, `The Logic of Secession', Nations and Nationalism, 
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vulnerability of small States to their larger, more powerful neighbours may be just as 
great as that of a national minority within a multi -national State. 
What then, about cultural security? In defence of the claim that independent 
Statehood furthers the cultural security of nations it is claimed, firstly, that "[ m]embers 
of a nation are more concerned than outsiders to further their own culture. 
Consequently, politicians in a nation -state will have a greater incentive to promote that 
nation's culture than would politicians in a multinational state in which that nation is a 
minority. "172 Secondly, as was noted above, the public institutions and practices of a 
multi -national State will generally reflect the culture of the dominant majority, thus 
restricting the opportunity for members of the national minority to promote and express 
their culture. While such discrimination may be alleviated to some degree by granting 
national minorities Kymlicka -style group- specific rights against the majority, giving a 
national minority its own, nation -State would provide an even greater degree of cultural 
expression and promotion for national minorities by ensuring that their culture was 
embodied in public institutions and practices. Members of a national minority may be 
able to achieve some degree of cultural expression in a multi -national State, but this 
does not show that they could not acquire even greater cultural expression were they to 
live in their own nation -state. 
However, while giving a nation its own State may increase the opportunities for 
members of that nation to express and promote their own national culture, it does not 
follow that their national culture will therefore be preserved. In order to take its place 
in the international community the citizens of a nation -State must interact with 
members of other national cultures and this interaction is likely to produce cultural 
change.173 For instance, if a nation -State is to trade with other States and reap the 
economic benefits that such trade provides, then it must adopt certain standardised 
business practices, open its markets to foreign goods, reorientate its economy to that of 
the global marketplace, enable access to the latest information through the global media 
Vo! .2, No.3, 1996, p.81 1. 
172 Caney(1997), p.362. 
173 See Michael Walzer, 'The New Tribalism', Dissent, Vol.39, 1992, p.168; and Buchanan `Secession', 
pp.62 -63. 
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network, allow its citizens to travel abroad while also enabling those of other nations to 
enter its own borders and so forth. 
This is not to say that the nation -State may not retain some elements of its traditional 
culture, e.g. the Japanese are still Japanese just as the Russians are still Russian and the 
French still French. Despite the fact that all three States are members of the 
international political and economic community there are still pronounced cultural 
differences between them. Yet it is equally true that many of the cultural influences in 
these countries are increasingly global in nature and that their political boundaries have 
offered little, if any, protection against these influences. The only way of escaping 
these cultural influences is complete isolation,174 which is not only increasingly 
impractical for both economic and technological reasons, but comes with a hefty price 
tag attached to it. Does anyone really recommend following the example of North 
Korea for the sake of cultural preservation? 
Finally, even if, as Nielsen suggests in his second condition, self -government alone 
can provide a secure cultural context of choice, this does not establish that the nation is 
the only example of a cultural context of choice, so why should the nation be singled 
out for special protection ?175 Nielsen's response to this objection is to say that national 
identity performs an integrating function by encompassing other forms of identity. Yet, 
as Buchanan in anticipation of exactly this objection has noted, nations are not the only 
encompassing groups; i.e. the same integrating and encompassing functions Nielsen 
ascribes to the nation may be performed by, say, religious communities. Thus, for 
some people "...their religion may serve as both their primary source of self - 
identification and a way to integrate and render coherent their other 
identifications... "176 In fact, many people find it easier to move from one nation to 
another than to change religions. Nielsen, however, appears to reject the assertion that 
other forms of identity, particularly that of religion, may perform the same 
encompassing and integrating functions as nationality. 
174 See Dowding, pp.84 -87. 
175 Buchanan (1996), p.302. 
176 Buchanan ( 1996), p.297. 
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It is not that this sense of nationality...necessarily, or even typically, provides the primary source of 
self -identification for everyone. For some their religion will do that, integrating and rendering 
coherent their identifications and the like. But...religion, in the forms that it takes, in its very 
possibility of arising and being sustainable, requires even more encompassing cultural structures, 
structures that go with nationality, e.g....we worship in a particular way, in a particular language, and 
with a whole battery of other practices.' 77 
Nielsen's analysis here is, at best, rather ambiguous. On the one hand he seems to 
admit that other forms of community in addition to nationalism (in this case religion) 
can perform encompassing and integrating functions, i.e. nationalism is not the only 
encompassing form of identity. On the other hand, however, Nielsen also seems to 
think that these additional forms of community presuppose the cultural structures that 
accompany nationality - particularly language - with the result that they are themselves 
encompassed by nationality, i.e. nationalism is a supra- encompassing form of self - 
identification and self -definition. 
This, however, seems false. To begin with, language may well be important to the 
establishment and continued vitality of religious practices and institutions, but then the 
same is true of national institutions as well. Just as religious worship is conducted in a 
particular language so too is national rhetoric. Indeed, as Nielsen later admits, language 
cannot equal nation for if it did France and Quebec, for example, would be the same 
nation (see above). And while Nielsen may be correct when he says that language is 
very closely related with an encompassing culture (pace Wittgenstein),178 this does not 
mean that the only encompassing culture is the nation. Furthermore, while the practices 
and institutions that together constitute a religious community, and which are a source 
of self- identification and self- definition for adherents to that religion, may have their 
roots in other cultural structures the same may also be true of the nation. Indeed, 
religion is itself an important component of many national identities, e.g. Islam is a 
major component of the national identity of Iran and Saudi Arabia while Judaism is 
central to Israeli national identity. So why, if religion is both anterior to, and a 
constitutive component of, numerous national identities, should we necessarily assume 
that national identity encompasses religious identity rather than vice -versa? 
177 Nielsen (1998), p.126. 
178 See Nielsen (1998), p.124. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
The Nationalist theory of secession claims both that there is a right to secede (i.e. 
secession may be a morally justified form of action) and that nations are the exclusive 
holders of such a right. Thus, the theory must satisfactorily address two questions: 
`What are nations ?' and `Why should nations, and only nations, be granted a right of 
secession ?' To successfully demonstrate how nations may be distinguished from other, 
similar social entities and one another is not also to demonstrate that nations are the 
exclusive holders of rights - never mind a right of secession. Similarly, to demonstrate 
that there may exist a right of secession without somehow particularising that right 
exclusively to nations will not, on its own, successfully demonstrate that nations, and 
only nations, may possess and exercise that right. 
With respect to the former question of identifying the nation it was pointed out that 
there are two primary approaches to this issue in the extant literature on the subject. 
The first defines nations according to certain objective criteria, the four most common 
of which are a common language, culture, ethnicity and history. However, because 
linguistic, cultural, ethnic and historical distinctiveness are all matters of degree, all 
four criteria suffer from the conceptual difficulty of identifying a threshold of 
distinctiveness without being completely arbitrary in where they draw the Iine between, 
for example, two dialects of the same language and two different languages. There is 
also the difficulty that, even if this threshold problem may be overcome, the groups 
identified as nations under such criteria are unlikely to match those which we think of 
as nations or which typically claim a right of secession. 
Not surprisingly, then, most theories of nationalism instead incorporate a subjective 
definition of nationhood. However, while a subjective account may have certain 
advantages over a purely objective analysis it too suffers from the same threshold 
problem as the objective account outlined above. Moreover, because under a subjective 
account individuals may belong to more than one nation, if nationhood is a prerequisite 
for possession of rights - including the right to secede - there is a danger that the theory 
may bestow conflicting rights. In other words, serious difficulties remain with a 
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subjective definition of nationalism - difficulties which must first be ironed out if the 
Nationalist theory of secession is to be taken seriously. 
Putting the question of what a nation is to one side, there is the additional difficulty of 
demonstrating why nations should be the exclusive bearers of rights, particularly a right 
to secede. Miller's claim that there is a necessary connection between national 
homogeneity on the one hand, and democratic government on the other, is 
unconvincing because he fails to establish that the nation is the only or the best form of 
community required for democratic government. Similarly, with respect to MilIer's 
claim that national homogeneity enables a State to overcome coordination problems 
endemic in the provision of certain collective goods, Miller's defence of the nation as a 
uniquely accommodating form of identity is insufficient to establish that the nation is 
the only or the best source of the type of community required by such schemes. 
Finally, the claim that individual well -being is dependent upon the flourishing of 
certain cultural groups was found to be insufficient to demonstrate that nations are the 
exclusive holders of a right of secession. Not only may a lesser degree of political self - 
determination than independent Statehood be sufficient to guarantee the flourishing of 
such groups, but there is no reason to suppose that the nation is the only or the best 
example of such a cultural group. Moreover Nielsen's characterisation of the nation as 
a uniquely encompassing cultural group is insufficient to overcome a charge of moral 
arbitrariness in singling out nations as the sole bearers of a right of secession because 
other, additional forms of community may perform the same encompassing functions as 
the nation. Therefore, even if continued membership in, and the flourishing of, one's 
culture of birth and upbringing is a prerequisite to individual freedom and well -being 
(which is itself a contestable claim), there is no reason to believe that the nation is the 
only, or the best, example of such a culture. Until nationalist theorists such as Miller 
and Nielsen can satisfactorily address these concerns - presuming that they in fact can 
- it is entirely arbitrary to single out the nation as the sole bearer of a right to secede 
and we would do well to look at other, alternative theories of secession to see if they 
fare any better. 
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JUST CAUSE THEORIES OF 
SECESSION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A. What is a Just Cause Theory of Secession? 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (a) as in the case of Nationalist theories, to 
argue against a second, alternative type of secession theory known as `Just Cause' (JC) 
theories; and (b) to clarify certain issues raised by JC theories regarding territory and 
the notion of territorial sovereignty and examine their relevance to justifying a right of 
secession in general. Before we can critically assess JC theories, however, it is first 
necessary to set out exactly what a JC theory is. The chapter therefore begins by 
defining JC theories of secession and looking at how JC theories differ from the other 
two types of secession theory. Following this the theory of Allen Buchanan - perhaps 
the most well known JC theorist - will be introduced, and the aims and structure of the 
chapter further clarified. 
Put simply, JC theorists argue that a State exercises legitimate authority over a 
territory and its citizens' as long as it treats the inhabitants of that territory justly .2 In 
other words, in order to possess a right to secede a group must first demonstrate that it 
is the victim of an injustice for which secession is an appropriate remedy (of last 
The notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty and the relationship between a State's authority over its 
subjects and its territory (if any) will be addressed shortly. 
2 Wayne Norman, The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics' in National Self -
Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.41 -42. 
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resort).3 Thus, whereas, ceteris paribus, Nationalist theories of secession grant a right 
of secession to groups which qualify as nations, and Liberal -Democratic (LD) theories 
to groups which contain a majority of members who have expressed a desire to secede, 
JC theories require a group to first be a victim of a particular (type of) injustice if they 
are to possess a right of secession. 
The most notable proponent of JC theories is Allen Buchanan who, with the possible 
exception of Beran, has also been the most prolific contemporary writer on the issue of 
a right to secede. Indeed, in many respects it was Buchanan who, in his 1991 book 
entitled Secession,4 initiated the current scholarly debate on a nonnative right to secede. 
The importance of his numerous contributions to the normative literature on secession 
is underscored by the fact that, in many respects, it has been Buchanan who has set the 
debate's agenda. Whereas in Section 2.5 of the previous chapter Buchanan and his 
thesis of Dynamic Pluralism were defended from objection, in this chapter it will be 
argued that Buchanan's defence of JC theories - though imaginative and thought - 
provoking - leaves something to be desired and fails to demonstrate that JC theories are 
superior to the other two rival types of theory. 
B. Buchanan's Theory of Secession 
Because Buchanan's is by far the dominant JC theory, and no treatment of a moral 
right to secede would be complete without a discussion of his work, the ensuing 
discussion will focus upon Buchanan's theory. The JC theory claims that a State 
exercises legitimate authority over its territory and its citizens providing it meets 
certain minimal standards of justice in the treatment of its citizens. This distinction 
between the State's authority over its subjects and its territory is an important one for 
Buchanan, who bases the right to secede upon the notion of legitimate territorial 
sovereignty. Buchanan claims that because secession is only intelligible in terms of the 
appropriation of land and the wealth contained upon/within that land, "[t]he moral 
relevance of this loss will depend upon who has legitimate title to the wealth in 
3 See, for example, Margaret Moore, `Introduction: Self -Determination Principle and the Ethics of 
Secession' in National Self-Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p.5. 
4 Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
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question. "5 Thus, simply demonstrating that the State does not possess legitimate 
authority over a group of individuals is not sufficient to justify the secession of that 
group. To show that a group of individuals no longer have an obligation to obey the 
State does not also demonstrate that they therefore have a right to take a portion of that 
State's territory.6 
Moreover, claims Buchanan, in order for secession to be justified the seceding group 
must demonstrate, not only that the State does not possess legitimate sovereignty over 
the territory in question, but also that they do,7 I term this consideration the 
territoriality constraint. The first condition of the territoriality constraint may be 
fulfilled in two ways: either (a) the State never exercised legitimate sovereignty over 
the territory; or (b) while the State at one time exercised legitimate sovereignty over the 
territory it has now lost it. Note, also, that Buchanan conceives of Iegitimate territorial 
sovereignty as being both a binary feature (i.e. a party either possesses legitimate 
sovereignty over a particular geographical region or it does not) and an exclusive 
feature (i.e. only one party can possess it at any one time, e.g. to say that the State is the 
legitimate owner of a territory is also to say that a secessionist group, and everyone 
else, is not). 
This, however, does not mean that legitimate territorial sovereignty, or legitimate 
title,8 denotes ownership by the State of its territory. Indeed, Buchanan rejects the 
notion that the State possesses a property right in its territory, claiming instead that 
Quebec (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991). 
5 Buchanan, p.12 [emphasis added]. 
6 Buchanan writes: "Clearly, the fact that the government has lost its legitimacy due to perpetration of 
injustices does not in itself imply that the secessionists have a valid claim to the land and other goods in 
the seceding area." Buchanan, p.12. This in turn raises the question of the relationship between territory 
(and State sovereignty over territory) to private ownership of land. The more immediate concern, 
however, is the role of legitimate territorial sovereignty in the justification of a right to secede and it is this 
issue that the following discussion of territory in Section 3.2 will focus upon. While clearly a relevant 
concern, the wider issue of private land ownership is one that must be left for elsewhere. 
7 Refer Buchanan, p.1 13. Of course, given the exclusive nature of legitimate territorial sovereignty, to 
demonstrate the latter condition is to also demonstrate the former - i.e. if the secessionists can show that 
they do possess legitimate sovereignty over a given territory then, a fortiori, this is to also show that the 
State (and everyone else) does not. Note, however, that the reverse is not true -to merely demonstrate 
that the State does not possess legitimate sovereignty over a territory is not to also demonstrate that the 
secessionists do possess legitimate sovereignty over that territory. This point is of considerable 
significance for Buchanan's analysis. 
8 Buchanan uses the two terms inter -changeably. 
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..the relationship between the state and its territory is not the same as that between a 
person and the land which is her private property. "9 Rather, Buchanan conceives of the 
State as an agent acting on behalf of the people, which is authorised by the people to 
perform certain protective functions on their behalf. Hence, instead of signifying a 
private property right ascribed to the State, territorial sovereignty instead signifies a 
complex relationship among the State (i.e. the agent), the people (i.e. the principal) and 
the territory, with the State acting on the principal's behalf to preserve the territory. For 
Buchanan, territorial sovereignty is "...simply the authority to control borders...and to 
administer within those borders laws designed to protect property rights and other 
rights of citizens, including future citizens who will come to exist. "10 
The issue now is to determine the conditions under which a secessionist group can 
fulfil the territoriality constraint. Buchanan investigates what he terms the reasons, or 
arguments, which a group may have for seceding in order to determine which, if any, 
"...are of such moral weight as to ground a right to secede "11 and identifies three such 
arguments: (a) discriminatory redistribution; (b) the need for self-preservation; and (c) 
rectificatory justice. These three arguments, and some common objections to them, 
may be summarised as follows. 
The Argument from Discriminatory Redistribution (ADR) is based upon a situation 
where the parent State is the perpetrator of certain forms of injustice against a particular 
group (which may or may not involve considerations of discriminatory redistribution)'2 
and through failing to carry out its function as a trustee of the people, loses its territorial 
sovereignty (at least with respect to the area in which the victims of the injustice 
reside). Buchanan attaches a number of conditions which a group must fulfil in order 
to possess a right to secede under such circumstances: (a) secession must be the only 
9 Buchanan, p.108. Indeed, equating legitimate territorial sovereignty with legitimate ownership would 
succeed only in changing the question to `What is ownership and under what conditions is ownership of 
territory it /legitimate ?' Furthermore, because most conceptions of ownership are based upon the notion of 
individual ownership, any such theory would be likely to contain numerous conceptual difficulties relating 
to how an institution (such as the State) or a group of people (such the Kashmiris), rather than an 
identifiable individual could be said to collectively possess a property right. 
10 Buchanan, p.109. 
11 Buchanan, p.29. 
12 See Buchanan, p. 112. 
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way of remedying the condition of injustice; (b) the injustice must be serious; and (c) 
the injustice must be selective towards the people of the seceding region.13 
Objections to the ADR are generally premised upon considerations of social and 
economic justice and the concern that the partitioning of territory may result in gross 
economic inequalities. Dowding, for example, argues that the ADR would justify the 
exit of wealthy regions or groups from a State thus leaving the poorer inhabitants of 
that State worse off. In other words, secession flows from naked self -interest not social 
justice.14 Additionally, it is also pointed out that there is a difficulty in determining 
exactly what counts as exploitation. Most States contain a group of people poorer than 
the rest of the State's inhabitants, yet generally these people do not see themselves as 
victims of (institutionalised) economic injustice.'' Moreover, the remedy for such 
situations may be better economic management, not secession.16 
Buchanan's second argument - the Argument from the Need for Self-Preservation 
(ANSP) - concerns a situation where a group faces a lethal threat by an aggressor, such 
that the group's continued survival is in serious danger and secession is the only way to 
eliminate this threat. Buchanan identifies two variants of this principle. The former 
variant concerns a situation where the aggressor is the State from which the group 
wishes to secede, whereas the latter variant is based upon a scenario where the 
aggressor is a third party.17 Buchanan then claims that in the former case the State's 
territorial sovereignty is invalidated or outweighed by the need of the group to preserve 
their existence, whereas in the latter case the group's need to preserve themselves 
generates a valid claim of territorial sovereignty where none previously existed.18 
13 Buchanan, p.112. 
14 Keith Dowding, 'Secession and Isolation' in Theories ofSecession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), pp.78 -79. 
15 Daniel Philpott, in Defense of Self -Determination', Ethics, Vol.105, 1995, p.377. 
16 Cass R. Sunstein, `Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe. 
Constitutionalism and Secession' in Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris 
Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.31 -33. 
17 Buchanan draws an analogy with the common law defence of necessity, where property rights may be 
infringed if doing so is necessary to avert some great evil - e.g. "...1 may trespass on your land to prevent 
a serious crime." See Buchanan, pp.65 -66. 
18 Buchanan offers the example of Jews in Poland who, facing a lethal threat from the invading Nazis, 
decided to set up a Jewish sanctuary State on what was previously territory under the sovereignty of the 
Polish State. Buchanan claims that in this case the need of the Jews to defend themselves, coupled with 
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Objections to Buchanan's ANSP include the claims that secession is not an option 
available to geographically dispersed groups 19 and where one group is hell -bent upon 
destroying another, granting the victimised group independent Statehood may simply 
succeed in elevating the conflict to an international level?° Another objection is based 
upon the claim that while many groups share a history of suffering, it would be 
unreasonable to claim that they are therefore entitled to their own State, e.g. 
homosexuals and certain religious sects have at times been the victims of brutal 
persecution but we would not, for this reason, be inclined to create a Quaker or lesbian 
State.21 The solution in such cases, it is argued, is to remove the threat - not to grant 
the victim a separate State.22 Finally, it is also claimed that if a group cannot escape 
the injustices perpetrated against it by its parent State, then this simply generates a 
limited term dominion until the threat of injustice is removed rather than full, indefinite 
territorial sovereignty.23 
Finally, in the Argument from Rectflcatory Justice (ARJ), Buchanan considers the 
case of so- called `captive communities' such as the Baltic States which were forcibly 
annexed by Nazi Germany and then the former Soviet Union. Here Buchanan claims 
that "...a [geographical] region has the right to secede if it was unjustly incorporated 
into the larger unit from which its members wish to separate. "24 `Unjust incorporation' 
is defined by Buchanan in terms of the annexation of the seceding region by either the 
existing State or by some earlier State that is the `ancestor' of the currently existing 
State.25 In both cases the State acquires the territory through forcible seizure against 
the fact that the Polish State was unable to meet its obligations to defend its citizenry, voided Poland's 
territorial sovereignty over the seceding region. See Buchanan, pp,66 -67. 
19 Once again, however, note the real world examples provided by Barry Smith of geographically non- 
contiguous States which have a part of their territory surrounded by the territory of another State. See 
Barry Smith, The Cognitive Geometry of War' in Current Issues in Political Philosophy, ed. Peter Koller 
and Klaus Puhl (Vienna: Hölder- Pichler -Tempsky, 1997). 
20 Linda Bishai, 'Altered States: Secession and the Problems of Liberal Theory' in Theories of Secession, 
ed. Percy B. l.ehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.97. Also refer to the previous chapter where it was 
pointed out that simply granting a group independent Statehood may, on its own, be an ineffective means 
of ensuring the physical and cultural security of that group. 
71 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.82 -83. 
22 Sunstein, p.27. 
23 Maurice Rickard, `Buchanan, Allen, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to 
Lithuania and Quebec', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.71, No.4, 1993, p.503. 
24 Buchanan, p.67 [emphasis added]. 
25 Similarly Brilmayer claims that a region is unjustly incorporated into a State either (a) through 
conquest by the State from which the group wishes to secede, or (b) through having been unjustly joined 
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the will of its inhabitants and secession is viewed simply as the re- appropriation of 
stolen property by the legitimate owner.26 If the territory was unjustly taken from the 
secessionists, then this demonstrates that the State lacks legitimate title and that they 
(i.e. the secessionists) do have legitimate títle.27 In other cases, claims Buchanan, 
where the group seeking to secede are not the same people who possessed legitimate 
sovereignty over the territory at the time of its unjust seizure, the secessionists must 
establish a link between the original group and themselves in order to demonstrate that 
legitimate territorial sovereignty has been transferred to them.28 
Objections to the ARJ include a claim of reductio ad absurdum based upon the 
problem of how far back in time we should go with respect to instances of unjust 
territorial acquisition. Because world history is resplendent with instances of the unjust 
taking of territory, general adoption of the ARJ would appear to result in the almost 
limitless dismemberment of States and, consequently, enormous disruption and 
turmoi1.29 Buchanan's solution to this problem is to suggest a moral .statute of 
limitations.30 The problem with such an approach, however, is to determine exactly 
where to set the temporal threshold without being completely arbitrary.3 t For example, 
how can we justifiably say that a group whose land was wrongfully taken from them in, 
say, 1820 would be justified in seceding, but a similar group whose land was also 
wrongfully taken from them under similar circumstances in 1819 would not? 
Buchanan, while recognising this as a problem, is largely silent on how it might be 
resolved.32 
with that State by a third State with no stake in the current dispute. As an example of the second case 
Brilmayer cites "...the European colonial powers, who fixed colonial borders to suit their own 
convenience, and then left these borders intact when their empires receded." See Lea Brilmayer, 
`Secession and Self Determination: A Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale Journal of International Law, 
Vol.16, No.1, January 1991, p.190. 
26 Note, however, that Buchanan's analogy with stolen property is problematic in view of his rejection of 
the assertion that the State possesses a property right in its territory. See Bishai, pp.97 -98. 
27 Buchanan, p.110. 
28 Buchanan, p.68. 
29 See, for example, Sunstein, p.34. 
30 i.e. a temporal boundary which places a limit as to how far back in time secessionists may go in order 
to justify their demands. See Buchanan, p.88. 
31 It will be remembered from the previous chapter that it was exactly this problem which led Buchanan 
to reject objective criteria of nationhood. Refer Buchanan, p.49. 
32 Although he does suggest that the boundary must be greater than one human lifetime from the present, 
as if it were not then it would ignore the fact that persons now living had been wronged and that redress 
Just Cause Theories of Secession 76 
This temporal problem points to another, related difficulty: namely that the intuition 
behind the ARJ (i.e. the return of stolen property) may be lost or diminished over time. 
Latvia, for example, was forcibly incorporated into the former Soviet Union after the 
Second World War along with the other Baltic States of Lithuania and Estonia. We 
might, on the basis of this fact, therefore conclude that Latvia has a right to secede from 
the former Soviet Union (as in fact it already has done). But what if, since its forcible 
incorporation, the number of Russians living in Latvia came to outnumber the number 
of Latvians living in Latvia ?33 These Russians have rights too and it is unlikely that 
they would support the idea of an independent Latvian State. The same problem is also 
evident in the case of Han Chinese who have migrated to Tibet, and in the case of many 
indigenous peoples who had their land unjustly taken from them by colonial settlers and 
who are now a small minority in their original land. 
C. The Structure of this Chapter 
Clearly Buchanan's emphasis upon the importance of territory and legitimate 
sovereignty over it raises some important issues regarding the question of a right to 
secede. Thus, the first task of this chapter will be to investigate just how important 
territory and the notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty are to understanding what 
secession is, and to the normative evaluation of secessionist claims. Having addressed 
the issue of territory, the second task of the chapter will be to investigate Buchanan's 
claim that JC theories of secession - or, more accurately, his version of a JC theory - 
are necessarily superior to LD and Nationalist theories of secession. Buchanan believes 
that JC theories are superior to these other types of theory because they score better 
with respect to three criteria which he claims should be used to determine a theory's 
degree of satisfactoriness. These three criteria will be examined in detail as will 
Buchanan's claim that they support his conclusion that JC theories are superior to other, 
rival theories of secession. 
could still be made to them (Buchanan, p.89). Also see Allen Buchanan, `Self -Determination, Secession, 
and the Rule of Law' in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p.311. 
33 See Michael Walzer, `The New Tribalism', Dissent, Vol.39, 1992, p.167. Also see Bishai, pp,97 -98; 
and Jeremy Waldron, `Superseding Historical Injustice', Ethics, Vol.103, No.1, 1992. 
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Of course, even if Buchanan is right - and JC theories are superior to Nationalist and 
LD theories of secession - the question remains why, given that there may be all sorts 
of different types of JC theory that take different injustices as grounds for a right to 
secede, Buchanan's is necessarily the superior alternative. In other words, what is it 
about the three types of injustices listed above that makes Buchanan's theory superior 
to other, alternative JC theories premised upon different injustices? Hence, the third 
and final task of the chapter will be to address the superiority of Buchanan's version of 
a JC theory with respect to other, competing JC theories and, indeed, whether or not JC 
theories really are a distinct type of secession theory. 
3.2 THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY 
A. Introduction 
Much of what Buchanan has to say about territory, legitimate sovereignty over it and 
the importance of these to justifying a right to secede, is premised upon the analysis of 
the legal scholar Lea Brilmayer.34 Brilmayer rejects what she terms the `standard 
account' of secession which portrays secessionist disputes as a clash between the two 
opposing principles of: (a) the self -determination of peoples; and (b) the right of 
existing States to maintain their territorial integrity. Because the standard account sees 
the difference between proponents and opponents of secession simply in terms of the 
relative priority which they accord these apparently competing values within specific 
contexts,35 Brilmayer claims it ignores the territorial dimension of secession, and 
consequently provides an inadequate descriptive and normative account of secessionist 
disputes.36 
34 In this chapter I will be mostly concerned with Brilmayer's 1991 article in the Yale Journal of 
International Law. Elsewhere Brilmayer has focused upon Liberal- Democratic theories of secession and 
the particularisation problems which. she believes these theories face in relation to the issue of territory 
and the territorial delineation of political sovereignty. See Lea Brilmayer Justifying International Acts 
(New York; Cornell University Press, 1989) and `Consent, Contract and Territory', Minnesota Law 
Review, Vol.74, No.1, 1989. These issues will be addressed later in the thesis. 
35 Brilmayer (1991), pp.I77 -83. The same point is also made by McGarry and Moore who claim that 
secession is mostly about contested territorial claims - emphasis upon the nationality of group 
membership fails to acknowledge the territorial dimension of many national conflicts. John McGarry and 
Margaret Moore, The Problems with Partition', Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol.16, No.2, 1997, 
p.267. 
36 See Brilmayer(1991), p.179 and pp.194 -95. 
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Brilmayer believes that the territorial dimension of secession is important for two 
reasons. First, it distinguishes secession from other, associated concepts in political 
theory such as revolution and emigration. Whereas refugees seek to leave the State 
geographically, secessionists seek to leave the State without physically leaving for 
another location.37 Similarly, whereas the revolutionary seeks to overthrow or make 
fundamental constitutional, economic or socio- political changes within the existing 
State, the secessionist simply seeks to restrict the State's jurisdiction so that it does not 
include his /her own group and the territory that they occupy.38 Second, "...without a 
normatively sound claim to territory, [political] self -determination arguments do not 
form a plausible basis for secession. "39 Thus, claims Brilmayer, because secession is 
only intelligible in terms of the taking of territory, any given act of secession can 
neither be understood, nor normatively evaluated, without reference to legitimate 
territorial sovereignty. To be persuasive a claim of secession must contain a valid 
territorial claim.40 
Brilmayer also points out that if a sub -group within a State is suffering at the hands of 
the dominant majority of that State, secession is not the only remedy available to that 
group - the group may either emigrate to a more hospitable State (assuming that one is 
available) or they may attempt to secure better treatment by their current government. 
This is not to say that maltreatment of groups which lack a territorial base is justified. 
Rather, the concern is simply to point out that by attempting to remedy a condition of 
State -perpetrated injustice through secession, a group necessarily assumes a greater 
burden of justification than it otherwise would by, say, attempting to emigrate or 
change the government's policies. To summarise: "[w]hen a group seeks to secede, it 
is claiming a right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into 
why it is entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land 
- or to no land at all. "41 
37 Brilmayer (1991), pp.187-188. 
38 Buchanan (1991), pp.l0ff. 
39 Brilmayer (1991), p.192. 
40 Brilmayer (1991), p.179. 
4 
1 Brilmayer (1991), p.201. 
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In contrast, other theorists have attached very little, if any, importance to territory as a 
determinant in a group's moral right to secede. The most common reason given for 
doing so is the claim that territory is, and should be, only an issue in as much as people 
who live under the same government must necessarily live together.42 In other words, 
the fact that the right to secede is exercised over a territory merely reflects the territorial 
organisation of our political world and that the State is therefore a territorially defined 
political entity.43 Additionally, the point is also made that because this system of 
territorially bounded States arose by a process of political and military struggles, the 
territorial holdings of most existing States were generally attained through conquest and 
other nefarious means. Thus, because most States attained their territory through 
morally questionable means, it is difficult to see how they could have any moral right to 
that territory in the first place.44 
B. Alternatives to the Territorial State 
A corollary of the debate over the importance of territory to secession and a normative 
theory of secession is the question of whether alternative, non -territorial definitions of 
political sovereignty might not be preferable. Bishai, for example, claims that the 
whole problem with secession and the violence that usually accompanies it is due 
precisely to this link between political sovereignty and territory. Put simply, Bishai 
claims that territorial control as the modern form of political sovereignty, has created a 
perceived need amongst minority groups for secession as a solution to repressive 
42 Philpott, pp.370 -71. 
43 See Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz `National Self- Determination' in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.458; Paul Gilbert, `Prolegomena 
to an Ethics of Secession' in Morality and International Relations, ed. Moorhead Wright (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1996), p.54; Simon Caney, `National Self- Determination and National Secession: Individualistic 
and Communitarian Approaches' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 
1998), pp.152 -53; and Philpott, pp.370 -71. To say that the State is a territorially defined entity is simply 
to say that the individuals who constitute the citizens of the State interact within a bounded geographical 
frontier, and recognise that the procedures which specify their de facto rights operate only within that 
bounded frontier, and outside the frontier either different or no procedures operate. See Terrence Moore, 
`The Moral Standing of States' in The Territorial Rights of Nations and Peoples, John R. Jacobson (ed.) 
(Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p.216. Also see Rickard who argues that a right to secede cannot 
be limited by obligations of distributive justice to the resources that can unilaterally be withdrawn from a 
State, as these obligations can only apply in a strong sense between members of the same political 
community, and the question of secession is precisely whether or not a group belongs to a larger political 
community (Rickard, p.503). 
44 See Jeffrey Reiman, Can Nations Have Moral Rights to Territory' in The Territorial Rights of Nations 
and Peoples, ed. John R. Jacobson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p.I64. 
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government.45 Moreover, by removing the lifeblood and defining characteristic of the 
modern State (i.e. its territory) secession not only threatens to weaken the State both 
politically and economically, but also to re -define its very meaning and identity 46 The 
solution to this, claims Bishai, is to separate sovereignty from territory and thus shift 
the debate from conflicts about territory - which is fixed and, thus, absolute - to 
sovereignty and its various features which are contingent and flexible.47 Thus, what we 
need is a system of differentiated and overlapping citizenship that allows for 
simultaneous citizenship.48 
Winfield, on the other hand, is of the opposite view and claims that a national territory 
is a necessary pre- condition for domestic justice - self -government requires some space 
within which its constitutive political and non -political activities can operate and this 
`space' must, by definition, be a territorial one.49 Similarly, Walzer argues that the link 
between people and land is not only a crucial feature of national identity, but for all 
practical purposes political society must be organised territorially as many critical 
issues of distributive justice are best resolved within geographical units (e.g. welfare, 
education and social life). Furthermore, claims Walzer, solutions where individuals are 
free to move around politically, carrying their political affiliations with them just as 
individuals carry their religious affiliation in a secular State, simply won't work as the 
45 Bishai, p.95. 
46 Hence the reason why States often respond to secessionist demands in a repressive and brutal fashion. 
Bishai, p.94. 
47 Bishai, pp.I07 -8. 
48 Some theorists have compared such a form of government to the Millet system of the Ottoman empire. 
See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 156 -58; 
Jay Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis (Westport: Greenwood, 1983); Vernon Van Dyke, 
Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (Westport: Greenwood, 1985), pp.74 -75; and Patrick 
Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
p.29. 
49 Richard Dien Winfield, 'Territorial Rights' in The Territorial Rights of Nations and Peoples, ed. John 
R. Jacobson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p.205. Jennings notes that people may feel a certain 
security in recognised, geographical frontiers which furnish the State with a recognised setting for its 
sovereign powers and those of other, similar entities beyond those frontiers. R. Y. Jennings, The 
Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963), p.2. A 
similar point is made by Buccheit who claims that the intensive social networks and exchange of goods 
and services required by a community pre- suppose a physical (i.e. territorial) base. See Lee Buccheit, 
`The Logic of Secession', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.2, No.3, 1996. Also see K. Deutsch, 
Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: 
Technology Press, 1953), pp.15 -80. 
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national communities that are preserved under such arrangements came into being and 
were sustained on the basis of geographical co- existence in the first place.5° 
C. How Important is Territory to Understanding What Secessionists Want? 
Before continuing on any further we should note that even if we accept, for whatever 
reason(s), the claim that the State must be a territorial entity, this does nothing to 
resolve the question of how large or what kind of territory any existing or would -be 
State requires. Indeed, it may even allow for the possibility of a nomadic State whose 
geographical borders are not fixed, but change over time. Establishing that a State 
needs a territory doesn't, in itself, demonstrate that this territory must remain constant 
over time.5t 
It is not the intention of this chapter to argue for or against the present territorial 
delineation of political sovereignty, not least of all because to do so would require an 
analysis greater than that which could be sustained within the allotted pages of this 
thesis. This is not to say that the issue of the non -territorial definition of political 
sovereignty is not an important or relevant concern. Clearly it is. However, the key 
issue as far as this thesis is concerned is whether or not a valid territorial claim is a 
necessary pre- condition for a right to secede. Thus, the following discussion wiII focus 
upon the significance of territorial sovereignty to the normative evaluation of existing 
secessionist movements, and the question of whether an alternative to the present 
territorial delineation of political sovereignty would be preferable will be put to one 
side. The intention is to demonstrate that while contemporary secessionist movements 
50 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p.44. Also see Lea Brilmayer, 
'Justifying International Acts', pp.71 -72; and Steven Grosby, 'Territoriality: The Transcendental 
Primordial Feature of Modem Societies', Nations and Nationalism, Vol. I, No.2, 1995, pp.146 -47. This 
apparent link between people and territory is often traced back to a historical change in the self - 
identification of individuals from medieval and pre -medieval times when peoples' primary identities were 
based upon the social group (e.g. clan or tribe) to which they belonged. In such times territory could, and 
usually was, understood only in terms of social relations and the juxtaposition of social groups. 
Gradually, however, there was a transference of identity from the group to its territory. Thus, where once 
a socially cohesive group defined its territory, in time the politically bounded territory came to define the 
people, leading the English historian Maine to remark: "England was once the country in which 
Englishmen lived: Englishmen are now the people who inhabit England." Sir Henry Sumner Maine, 
Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1966), p.74. On this point 
also see David B. Knight, 'Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and 
Regionalism', Annals of the American Association of Geographers, Vol.72, 1982, pp.516 -17; and Bishai, 
pp. 106-7. 
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do, indeed, contain a territorial claim, it does not follow from this that secessionist 
demands should therefore be normatively evaluated by reference to the notion of 
legitimate territorial sovereignty, or that there is anything to be gained by the inclusion 
of such a notion within the secession debate. 
As was noted above, one claim is that territory is only relevant to the normative 
evaluation of secessionist movements because of the territorial organisation of our 
political world. Hence, when a group demands to secede it is merely making a political 
demand for political sovereignty, that then becomes a territorial claim because the 
degree of political sovereignty that the group in question desires is only attainable 
through independent Statehood - and the State, by definition, is a territorial entity. In 
other words, the claim to territory is merely an accidental by- product of the fact that the 
State is defined territorially. Replace the contemporary territorial delineation of 
political sovereignty with a non -territorial alternative and the issue of territory will 
necessarily be removed from the secession debate. 
If, however, the claim that territory was not an issue for secessionists were true - and 
secession really was a purely political phenomenon - then it would follow that a 
secessionist group would be happy with any territory, anywhere, in which to set up a 
State.52 Yet this is clearly not the case as for most, if not all, separatist groups the 
demand to secede is territory-specific. In other words, what contemporary secessionist 
movements desire is not a territory in which they may set up their own State but, rather, 
this particular territory. The Palestinians, for example, do not just want a Palestinian 
State, but a Palestinian State in Palestine, just as the Kashmiris want a Kashmiri State 
in Kashmir and the East Timorese an East Timorese State in East Timor.53 To ignore 
this fact is to fundamentally misunderstand what it is that these groups are demanding. 
In summary: the fact that the State is a territorially defined entity may compel groups 
51 Winfield, p.205. 
52 Providing of course that the territory's location and natural resources were sufficient to sustain a 
reasonable standard of living. 
53 Jacob T. Levy, 'Blood and Soil, Place or Property: Liberalism, Land and Ethnicity', Presentation at a 
Current Research Workshop at the Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University, 1998. Also 
note the failure of attempts after the Second World War to convince Jews that they might like to establish 
a Jewish State somewhere other than in Palestine. 
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seeking to establish their own State to lay claim to a territory, but it doesn't explain 
why they claim this or that particular territory. 
Of course, some territories could not support an independent State and would be out 
of the question because of their location and/or lack of natural resources. We could 
not, for example, reasonably expect the Kashmiris to accept an offer to set up a 
Kashmiri State in, say, the barren wilderness of Australia's Simpson Desert or on the 
Antarctic ice flows. On the other hand, however, if Kashmiris were offered a portion 
of, say, the east coast of the United States in which to set up a sovereign, independent 
State of Kashmir then they would presumably also reject the offer. This is despite the 
fact that the east coast of the United States is considerably richer in natural resources 
than Kashmir and that, in the long -term, this would off -set any costs incurred by 
migrating there. Such factors are, I suspect, largely irrelevant to the Kashmiris and 
other groups like them. Rather, what they want is an independent, sovereign State in 
Kashmir. 
The fact that groups such as the Kashmiris claim a specific territory in which to set up 
an independent State, even at the cost of refusing other alternative territories capable of 
providing them with a higher standard of living, indicates that territory is important to 
understanding what a group wants when it demands the right to secede. On the other 
hand, however, for reasons explained below it does not follow from this that the 
justifiability of a group's desire for secession should be dependent upon that group 
successfully demonstrating that it has so- called `legitimate sovereignty' over the 
territory that it covets. Put simply, as far as the issue of a moral right of secession is 
concerned, the notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty is a red herring that, if 
anything, only succeeds in needlessly confusing matters and complicating the debate 
over a right to secede. 
D. The Normative Importance of Territory to Secession 
Above it was pointed out that in many respects Buchanan's account of the importance 
of legitimate territorial sovereignty is premised upon the analysis of Brilmayer. Note, 
however, that while Buchanan agrees with Brilmayer that a sound justification for 
secession must include a valid territorial claim, the two disagree over how such a claim 
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may be successfully established. Whereas Brilmayer claims that a legitimate territorial 
claim exists if, and only if, the territory in question was wrongly taken from the 
secessionists at some time in the past, Buchanan believes that secession may also be 
justified in situations where it is the only available remedy for conditions of distributive 
injustice or possible extermination.54 Thus, while there is agreement that in order to 
possess a right to secede a group must first have legitimate sovereignty over (or valid 
title to) the territory which they covet, there remains disagreement over how one might 
establish such sovereignty or title. 
This disagreement is indicative of the fact that making a valid territorial claim a 
necessary pre- condition for the possession of a moral right to secede simply succeeds in 
changing the question from `Under what conditions does a group possess a moral right 
to secede ?' to 'Under what conditions does a group possess legitimate territorial 
sovereignty?' Thus, disputes over the conditions under which a group possesses a 
moral right to secede, are simply transformed into disputes over the nature of legitimate 
territorial sovereignty and the conditions under which a group possesses it.55 
Furthermore, the notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty does not contain within 
itself the means by which such disagreement may be resolved, Le. making legitimate 
sovereignty over territory a necessary pre- condition for a right to secede neither tells us 
what legitimate territorial sovereignty is, nor how a group may acquire or lose it. 
Consider, for example, the theory of David Gauthier which, as a fairly standard 
example of a LD theory of secession, claims that if most of the people inhabiting a 
particular region wish to secede and establish their own separate State then, subject to 
certain side constraints, they should be permitted to do so.56 To claim that Gauthier's 
theory is unsatisfactory because it does not require would -be secessionists to possess 
legitimate sovereignty over the territory which they intend to remove from the State's 
control, is simply to beg the question of what the group would have to do to acquire 
such sovereignty in the first place. 
54 See Buchanan (1991), p.23. 
55 i.e. making a valid territorial claim a necessary pre- condition to the possession of a moral right of 
secession simply succeeds in shifting the disagreement from when a group has a moral right to secede, to 
when a group has legitimate sovereignty over a given territory. 
56 See David Gauthier, `Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.24, 
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Just as the requirement that a group be the victim of an injustice if it is to possess a 
right to secede does not, in itself, tell us exactly which injustices are sufficient to 
generate such a right, so simply making legitimate title to a territory a necessary pre- 
condition for a right to secede fails to specify the conditions under which such title 
exists.57 Hence, Gauthier may simply claim that by demonstrating that a majority of a 
territory's residents desire to secede (e.g. by holding a plebiscite on the issue) one has 
also shown that they possess legitimate sovereignty over that territory. There is nothing 
intrinsic to the notion of legitimate territorial sovereignty which establishes that this 
majoritarian definition of territorial sovereignty is any better, nor any worse, than other, 
rival definitions. Thus, to do as Buchanan does, and make a distinction between the 
State's authority over its subjects and its authority over its territory - and on the basis of 
this distinction argue that the territorial claim is crucial because the secessionists are 
taking territory that belongs to the State - is meaningless without an accompanying 
theory of legitimate territorial sovereignty. 
Buchanan's response to this difficulty is to offer an agent/trustee model of territorial 
sovereignty where the State does not possess a direct property right in its territory but, 
rather, merely acts as the agent of the people who are the principal in the political unit. 
However, this agent /trustee model of territorial sovereignty raises more questions than it 
answers. To claim that the State is merely the agent of the people and that it administers 
the peoples' territory on their behalf, is to beg the question of, not only who the 
principal in such a relationship is,58 but also what the terms of this agent /trustee 
agreement are. Buchanan claims that the agreement can only be voided or overridden in 
the three situations of a lethal threat, discriminatory re- distribution and rectificatory 
justice. However, there is nothing inherent to an agent /trustee model of territorial 
sovereignty that stipulates that these three, and only these three, reasons are sufficient to 
generate a legitimate claim to territorial sovereignty. 
No. 3, September 1994, p.369. 
57 Also see Kymlicka who questions why should we start from the assumption that the State already 
possesses legitimate title to its territory and, hence, that the burden of justification therefore falls upon the 
secessionists rather than the State of which they are a constituent component. Will Kymlicka, `Buchanan, 
Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec', Political 
Theory, Vol.20, No.3, 1992, p.532. 
58 i.e. all the people in the State or just a sub -section of them? 
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More importantly, Buchanan's account leaves it unclear as to whether: (a) the authority 
which the State exercises over its territory, by virtue of being the agent of the people 
who live in that territory, then gives rise to authority over the people in that territory; or 
(b) whether the State's claim to authority over its subjects is additional to its authority 
over their territory - in which case where does it come from ?59 Indeed, if, as Buchanan 
suggests, the people are the principal in the political unit and the State merely their 
agent, then it is unclear why we even need a distinction between the State's authority 
over its citizens and the territory that they occupy, As Beran has noted, if the State is 
merely the agent of the people then the primary right to the territory of the State must 
belong to the people, not the State. In which case, why can't "...part of the people sack 
the agent and appoint a new one, independent from the previous agent, in its part of the 
territory ? "6o 
3.3 MINIMAL REALISM 
A. Introduction 
Putting aside the question of legitimate territorial sovereignty as a pre- condition for 
the possession of a right to secede, the main question as far as Buchanan and this 
chapter are concerned is `Why are JC theories of secession necessarily superior to 
other, alternative theories ?' Buchanan, of course, thinks that JC theories - or, more 
precisely, his version of a JC theory - is, indeed, superior to other rival theories and in 
an influential and widely publicised article61 has set out a number of reasons why this is 
so. The purpose of this and the two following sections is to critically examine these 
claims. 
59 
I am indebted to Conal Smith for making this point clear to me. 
60 Harry Beran, The Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' in Nations, Cultures and 
,Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.61. Also see Scott Boykin, 
'The Ethics of Secession' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. D. Gordon (New Jersey: Transaction, 
1998), p.76. 
61 See Allen Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vo1.26, No.1, 1997. The 
same article has since re- appeared, albeit in a slightly re- worked format, entitled 'The International 
institutional Dimension of Secession' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: 
Routledge, 1998). Also see Allen Buchanan, `Democracy and Secession' in National Self -Determination 
and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) where the same ideas 
find re- expression. 
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Buchanan's defence of JC theories begins with a distinction between what he sees as 
two very different normative questions about secession: 
L "Under what conditions does a group have a moral right to secede, independently of 
any questions of institutional morality, and in particular apart from any 
consideration of international legal institutions and their relationship to moral 
principles ? "62 
2. "Under what conditions should a group be recognized as having a right to secede as 
a matter of institutional morality, including a morally defensible system of 
international law ? "63 
Buchanan explains further that while both are ethical questions, the former is "...posed 
in an institutional vacuum and, even if answerable, may tell us little about what 
institutional responses are (ethically) appropriate. The second is a question about how 
international institutions, and especially international legal institutions, ought 
(ethically) to respond to secession. "64 Thus, institutional moral reasoning evaluates 
political principles in terms of the institutions that they would justify while taking into 
consideration the effects of these institutions in society. Conversely, non -institutional 
moral reasoning takes certain basic principles such as freedom of association and 
claims that if we are to accept these principles then we must accept the principles of 
secession that are their corollaries 65 
Buchanan expresses a preference for institutional moral reasoning which he defends 
by claiming that secession crises tend to have international consequences that require 
international responses. Furthermore, "[i]f these international responses are to be 
consistent and morally progressive, they must build upon and contribute to the 
development of more effective and morally defensible international institutions, 
62 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.31 -32. 
63 Buchanan (1991), p.32. 
64 Buchanan (1991), p.32. 
6D Wayne Norman, 'The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics' in National Self - 
Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.44 -45. 
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including the foremost of these, the international legal system. "66 Moreover, claims 
Buchanan, when we think about the morality of secession in a procedural context, we 
will discover that JC theories are the superior alternative. 
Clearly this distinction between institutional and non -institutional moral reasoning is 
both an important and contentious one which, in many respects, Buchanan appears to 
take for granted. The main question, however, as far as Buchanan and this thesis are 
concerned, is whether this model of institutional reasoning supports Buchanan's 
conclusion that JC theories are superior to other, rival theories.67 The purpose of the 
ensuing discussion is to demonstrate that Buchanan's case for the superiority of JC 
theories is inconclusive. First, however, it is necessary to define certain terms 
employed by Buchanan and clear up some areas of confusion.68 
66 Buchanan (1991), p.33. 
67 Wayne Norman has recently offered what is perhaps the most thorough defence of a preference for 
institutional reasoning as far as a right of secession is concerned. Norman claims that some issues are so 
bound up with the apparatus and nature of the state that they cannot be thought through with criteria that 
ignore this wider institutional context (Norman, pp.47 -50). Other writers such as Nielsen and Miller have, 
however, raised serious doubts about the subordination of non -institutional reasoning, or so- called ideal 
theory to institutional reasoning, or real theory. For example, Nielsen points out that if we are to 
institutionalise a certain principle, or rule, then we will need a theory prior to the existing institutional 
structure that tells us what that principle or rule is, and why it is justified and hence should be 
institutionalised in the first place. Moreover, to begin with existing institutions in order to determine 
whether or not there exists a right of secession - and thus assume the limits of the institutionally possible 
right from the start - is also to legitimise the injustices and imperfections that characterise those 
institutions and the world as a whole. See Kai Nielsen, 'Liberalism, Nationalism and Secession' in 
National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p.129. Furthermore, even if the issue of a given group's secession is to be decided in accordance 
with certain procedures, we still need an `ideal' theory which tells us in broad terms when secession is 
unjustified and thus guides us in our thinking about secessionist claims. See David Miller, `Secession and 
the Principle of Nationality' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.64, Indeed, procedural mechanisms for settling secessionist 
disputes are likely themselves to be based upon certain `background claims' about why that particular 
procedure is appropriate in those circumstances (Nielsen, p.131; and Miller, p.64). Finally, even if 
institutions in the real world can only approximate certain ideal principles, we still need to identify what 
these ideal principles are in order to determine how real institutions may be amended so that they mirror 
as closely as is possible what is set out in the ideal theory. One would, for example, be hard pressed to 
identify an existing State which is a perfect instantiation of an ideal liberal democracy, but this does not 
mean that the liberal democratic ideal and the theory upon which it is based should therefore be done 
away with (Nielsen, p.131; and Miller, p.64). 
68 While many of these terms refer to theories and concepts already introduced in this and the previous 
chapter under different labels, in order to avoid any possible confusion Buchanan's terminology will be 
employed for the remainder of the current chapter. 
Just Cause Theories of Secession 89 
Buchanan draws a distinction between two different types of normative theory of 
secession, the first of which he terms Remedial Right Only (RRO) theories.69 RRO 
theories correspond to what until now have been termed JC theories and, thus, assert 
that a group has a right to secede if, and only if, it is the victim of certain specified 
injustices. The second type of normative theory identified by Buchanan are Primary 
Right (PR) theories which, conversely, assert that certain groups can have a right to 
secede that is not "...derived from the violation of other, independently characterizable 
rights. "70 
PR theories are then divided up into two different types: (a) Ascriptive Group theories 
which claim that only those groups whose memberships are defined in terms of 
characteristics that exist independently of any actual political association that the 
members of the group may have forged may possess a right to secede;71 and (b) 
Associative Group theories that focus instead on the voluntary political choice of (a 
majority of) the members of a group and their decision to form their own independent 
political unit.72 Clearly, Ascriptive Group theories refer to what have thus -far been 
termed Nationalist theories of secession, whereas Associative Group theories refer to 
LD theories of secession. Buchanan's aim is to demonstrate that RRO theories are 
superior to their two theoretical competitors, particularly Associative Group, or LD, 
theories of secession.73 
Having stipulated that the right to secede should be understood as an institutional 
right, Buchanan then identifies three criteria for "...the comparative assessment of 
69 See Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.34ff. 
70 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', p.39. In other words, secession is not limited to being a means of 
remedying an injustice. Refer, Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', pp.34 -35. 
71 e.g. shared language, culture, history and sense of being a nation. Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', 
p.38. 
72 i.e. the right to secede is an instance of the right of political association and any group, no matter how 
heterogenous, may possess a right to secede. Buchanan (1997), pp.38 -39. 
73 Elsewhere Buchanan also uses the label `Plebiscitory Right' to refer to this same type of theory. Refer 
Allen Buchanan, 'Democracy and Secession.' Buchanan's main target is the theory of Christopher 
Wellman. Christopher H. Wellman, `A Defence of Secession and Political Self -Determination', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995. However, most, if not all, of the criticisms he levels 
against Wellman are applicable to other Associative Group theorists such as Beran and Gauthier. 
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competing proposals for how international law ought to understand the right to 
secede... "74 which he claims demonstrate the superiority of RRO theories: 
1. Minimal Realism: Does the theory have a good prospect of eventually being 
adopted through the processes by which international law is made ?75 
2. Avoidance of Perverse Incentives: Does the theory create perverse incentives, i.e. 
encourage behaviour which undermines morally sound principles of international 
law or morality?76 
3. Moral/Legal Consistency: Is the theory consistent with the more morally acceptable 
principles of existing international law ?77 
74 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.41. 
75 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.42. 
76 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.43 -44. 
77 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.42. Note that Buchanan also identifies a fourth criterion of 
Moral Accessibility (i.e. is the theory based upon moral principles which are not group specific but rather 
have broad cross -cultural appeal ?) but is less certain that RRO theories have any significant advantage as 
far as it is concerned. For reasons of brevity the remaining three criteria which Buchanan believes clearly 
do demonstrate the superiority of RRO theories will be focussed upon. Another, additional argument 
considered by Buchanan in favour of RRO theories is based upon a consequentialist analysis concerning 
the harmful consequences of taking an action which, ceteris paribus, when considered in isolation would 
be justified and then, on the basis of this moral fact, creating a rule that says that all such actions in the 
same or similar circumstances would also be justified. In order to illustrate the argument Buchanan gives 
a common example from the field of bioethics where a physician is considering whether or not to 
administer a lethal injection to a patient in a permanent vegetative state. Considered in isolation - i.e. in 
terms of act -consequentialist -type case -by -case reasoning - Buchanan argues that we might conclude that 
the physician would be justified in administering the injection. This, however, does not mean that we 
should generalise our decision by making a rule that allows physicians to exercise their judgement as to 
whether they should administer lethal injections to patients in a permanent vegetative state. This is 
because creation of a rule that legitimised acts of active, non -voluntary euthanasia would have certain 
knock -on effects that would be prohibitively negative, e.g. it might encourage doctors to kill in situations 
unlike that described above (perhaps where the patient, unbeknown to the doctor, actually stood a good 
chance of recovery - an argument from epistemic fallibility); it might encourage individuals to engage in 
other acts that have bad consequences; and it might discourage certain people from undertaking a medical 
career or undermine the doctor -patient relationship. Thus, argues Buchanan, general recognition of a right 
to secede - i.e. the institutionalisation of such a right - might create certain harms that make the official 
recognition of such a right prohibitively costly (Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.57 -59). 
Buchanan's argument here is a fascinating one that raises many complex issues which are worthy of more 
lengthy treatment than the present project allows. Briefly, however, it is worth pointing out that 
Buchanan's analysis is ambiguous in the sense that it is unclear whether he believes that the initial, one -off 
case would be justified or not. Presumably, however, Buchanan would allow the initial case of doctor - 
assisted suicide as being justified for, if it were not, then what possible reason could there be for creating a 
rule that institutionalised such a practice? if, indeed, this is the case, then it seems that there are clear 
resonances of the act versus rule consequentialist debate which may be relevant here. This in turn may 
also indicate where consideration of this particular component of Buchanan's case against RRO theories, 
needs to be linked into a larger project detailing the assessment of an action's moral status and the weight 
attached to an action's consequences within that assessment. Reluctantly, pressures of space require that 
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B. The Problems with a State -Based Legal Order 
Beginning with the criterion of Minimal Realism, Buchanan argues that because a PR 
theory places `greater emphasis' upon the right of groups to secede, States will 
therefore be less likely to incorporate it into international law: 
Primary Right theories are not likely to be adopted by the makers of international law because 
they authorize the dismemberment of states even when those states are perfectly performing 
what are generally recognized as the legitimating functions of states. Thus Primary Right 
Theories represent a direct and profound threat to the territorial integrity of states - even just 
states. Because Remedial Right Only Theories advance a much more restricted right to secede, 
they are less of a threat to the territorial integrity of existing states; hence, other things being 
equal, they are more likely to be incorporated into international law.78 
Perhaps, at this stage, it would be worthwhile to briefly examine exactly what existing 
international law does have to say on the issue of secession. Most secessionist 
movements aim to establish their own, independent State. According to Article One of 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States a State is legally 
defined as having: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; 
and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other States.79 Elsewhere international 
law allows for the creation of new States as a result of: (a) the granting of 
independence; (b) the dissolution of an empire or federation; (c) the merger of two or 
more political units; (d) partition; or (e) independence.80 
On the other hand, however, existing international law is largely silent on the issue of 
secession, i.e. it neither condemns secession nor provides for any right to secede.81 
further comment on this matter be left for elsewhere. 
78 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.45. 
79 See Asbjorn Eide, `In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession' in Modern Law of Self- 
Determination, ed. Christian Tomuschat (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp.139 -40; and James 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1979), p.36. 
80 Alexis Heraclides, `Secession, Self- Determination and Non -Intervention', Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol.45, No.2, 1992, p.403. 
81 i.e. secession is neither legal nor illegal under international law. It is true that articles 1(2) and 55 of 
the United Nations Charter list the `self -determination of peoples' as one of the UN's goals. Moreover the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, G. A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.16 at 66, 67 U.N. Doc.A /4684 1960), 
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (adopted Dec.16, 1966, art.1, 
para. I, 997 U.N.T.S. 171, 173) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted Dec.16, 1966, art.l, para.l, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5) state that all peoples have the right to self- 
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While the United Nations (UN) Security Council has characterised certain secessions as 
being illegal (e.g. those of Katanga and Rhodesia) this does not indicate the existence 
of any legal rules prohibiting secession.82 Indeed, international law has tended to be 
heavily biased towards the status quo and to `let sleeping dogs lie.'83 Notwithstanding 
the recent `watering down' of the inviolability of a State's territorial sovereignty - 
especially with respect to the enforcement of human rights (e.g. in cases such as the 
Iraqi Kurds and the Albanian Kosovars) - international legal principles generally 
recognise as valid a State's right to its de facto territorial holdings however it has come 
by them.84 In the few situations where international law has recognised a State created 
by secession, it has usually done so only after that State's creation was very much a fait 
accompli. As Jennings notes, the main method for a nascent State to establish legal 
title to the territory that it covets remains actual possession.85 
The conservative nature of international legal institutions and their bias towards the 
territorial integrity of existing States forms the basis of one of the main objections to 
Buchanan's criterion of minimal realism and, indeed, institutional reasoning in general. 
The objection states that while States remain the basic actors in the international legal 
order the stability of existing States is not merely in the interests of all States, but also 
in the interests of the international legal order as a whole. A State -based legal order 
cannot contain a rule that leads to the destruction of most States,86 as organisations 
such as the UN would be placed in an awkward position if they were to: (a) condone 
threats to the territorial integrity of their member States;87 and /or (b) interpret the right 
of self -determination in such a way as to invite or justify attacks upon the territorial 
integrity of their own members.88 Similarly, at the domestic level, most multi -national 
determination and, by virtue of that right, they should be free to freely determine their political status and 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The problem is, however, that the term `peoples' 
is not adequately defined and, as we shall shortly see, has historically only been taken to apply in the case 
of anti -colonial movements and their struggle for independence. 
82 Crawford, pp 266 -68. 
ß3 Jennings, p.70. 
84 And despite the fact that most of the world's international borders have been established by conquest 
and other nefarious means. Reiman, pp.168 -7I. 
85 Jennings, p.86. 
86 Dietrich Murswiek, `The Issue of a Right of Secession Reconsidered' in Modern Law of Self 
Determination, ed. Christian Tomuschat (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p.36. 
$7 Heraclides, p.402. 
88 David B. Knight, `Territory and People or People and Territory? Thoughts on Postcolonial Self- 
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States are governed by majority groups that have no interest in sanctioning institutional 
mechanisms that would facilitate a sub -unit's secession. In summary: because 
international and domestic law is both made and enforced by States that have an 
interest in never sanctioning any institution that could encourage their dismemberment, 
the fact that governments will not enact secession procedures, or would behave 
perversely if they were enacted, does not prove that these procedures are unfair or 
unjust.89 
Buchanan's response to this counter -argument is to claim that it falsely assumes that 
States have no morally legitimate interest in resisting dismemberment. Rather, argues 
Buchanan, States do have a morally legitimate interest in resisting secessionist 
movements and preserving their territorial integrity, as doing so promotes the two 
following morally important goals.9° 
1. The Physical Protection of Individuals and the Preservation of Their Rights: Each 
individual's rights and physical security depend upon the effective enforcement of a 
legal order, and effective enforcement requires effective jurisdiction which in turn 
requires "...a clearly bounded territory that is recognised to be the domain of an 
identified political authority. "91 
...observance of the principle of territorial integrity facilitates the functioning of a legal order 
and the creation of the benefits that only a legal order can bring. Compliance with the principle 
of territorial integrity, then, does not merely serve the self -interest of states in ensuring their own 
survival; it furthers the most basic morally legitimate interests of the individuals and groups that 
states are empowered to serve, their interest in the preservation of their rights, the security of 
their persons, and the stability of their expectations.92 
Determination', International Political Science Review, Vol.6, No.2, 1985, p.261; and Eide, pp.147 -48. 
Indeed, as alluded to above, the UN position has generally been that it is legitimate for people subjected 
to colonial rule to seek self -determination, but not for a people who form a minority within a national 
territory to seek it. In other words, the principle of self -determination is taken to justify the independence 
of colonial territories, but a sub -section of the people who compose this new State cannot claim the same 
right of self -determination in order to secede and create a third State. See Anna Michalska, `Rights of 
Peoples to Self- Determination in International Law' in Issues of Self-Determination, ed. William Twining 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991), p.82; and Brilmayer (1991), pp.182 -83. 
89 See Norman, p.45. 
90 See Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.46. 
91 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.46 -47. 
92 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', [emphasis added], p.47. 
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2. Political Participation Incentive Structure: This argument may be broken down 
into two, inter -related claims: (a) maintenance of a State's territorial integrity 
creates stability and this stability is necessary to ensure individual political 
participation; and (b) "...where exit is too easy, there is little incentive for voice - 
for sincere and constructive criticism and, more generally, for committed and 
conscientious political participation. "93 For example, "...if a minority could escape 
the authority of laws whose enactment it did not support by unilaterally redrawing 
political boundaries, it would have little incentive to submit to the majority's will, 
or to reason with the majority to change its mind. "94 Moreover, even if a group 
does not exercise its right to secede, it may still undermine the democratic process 
by using its possession of this right as a strategic bargaining tool and threatening to 
secede unless it gets its own way, in which case the right to secede becomes an 
effective minority veto.95 
C. The Physical Protection of Individuals and the Preservation of Their Rights 
Beginning with the former claim, Buchanan's argument may be summarised as 
follows: (a) the realisation by individuals of fundamental moral values requires a 
certain moral environment;96 (b) political authority exercised by the State is a necessary 
means of providing such an environment;97 finally, (c) "[elven if political authority 
strictly speaking is exercised only over persons, not land, the effective exercise of 
93 Buchanan, 
'Theories of Secession', p.48. Also see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
94 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', p.48. 
95 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.48. There is also the associated claim that if a group assents to 
be governed democratically then they cannot justifiably back out of that agreement once they find 
themselves in a minority and a decision goes against them. The right to voice one's dissent without fear 
of retribution negates a need for the right to secede. See Anthony H. Birch, `Another Liberal Theory of 
Secession', Political Studies, Vol.32, No.4, 1984. The problem, however, with such an argument is that it 
means that one generation's consent may bind all subsequent generations in an irrevocable contract. See 
Harry Beran, `A Liberal Theory of Secession', Political Studies, Vol.32, No.1, 1984, p.25 and More 
Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch', Political Studies, Vol.36, No.2, 1988. It is also claimed that 
it is undemocratic to enable the interests and wishes of the majority - who oppose secession - to be 
overridden by a secessionist minority. See D. Goldstick, `The National Right to Self -Determination' in 
Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, ed. Stanley G. French (Montreal: Canadian Philosophical 
Association, 1979), p.137. 
96 i.e. a state of affairs characterised by order, stability and security of person. 
97 i.e. only the State (through the selective use of its associated legal machinery) is able to alter human 
behaviour so as to eliminate those forms of anti -social individual action which are antithetical to a moral 
environment. 
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political authority over persons depends, ultimately upon the establishment and 
maintenance of jurisdiction in the territorial sense... Furthermore, if an effective legal 
order is to be possible, both the boundaries that define the jurisdiction and the identified 
political authority whose jurisdiction it is must persist over time."98 
Even if we accept Buchanan's claim that the realisation by individuals of fundamental 
moral values requires a certain moral environment, why should we accept.that the State 
is a necessary means of producing that environment? There may be institutions other 
than the State (which employ measures other than legal sanctions) that are at least 
equally effective as the State in the provision of a moral environment. One may, for 
example, conceive of a State -less society which, though it lacks a legal and political 
system, is still able to produce a stable moral environment through the promulgation of 
certain religious teachings that proscribe anti -social behaviour.99 Allowing that the 
State is, or may be, an effective means of producing a moral environment100 does not 
demonstrate that it is the only, or the best means of doing so. 
Moreover, why should the State's ability to provide a moral environment require the 
maintenance of its territorial integrity? If G secedes from S then of course the scope of 
S's effective exercise of authority no longer includes G. The whole point of secession 
is, after all, to remove the seceding region from the effective authority of the parent 
State. However, it does not follow from this that G's secession will necessarily have a 
deleterious affect upon S's exercise of authority (and hence ability to provide a moral 
environment) within its remaining territory. Indeed, through the removal of a restive 
and rebellious sub -region secession may actually have a beneficial affect upon the 
State's exercise of authority in its remaining regions. Secessionist conflicts and the 
counter -insurgency strategies employed by States to combat them, typically prove to be 
a major drain on a State's resources and often lead to the State behaving in a less liberal 
way towards its citizens, than it would in other circumstances. Allowing a restive sub- 
group to secede may in some situations therefore free -up a considerable amount of 
98 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', p.47. 
99 See, for example, Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
100 i.e. the moral environment produced by the State is superior to that which would result in a state of 
nature (a State -less environment). 
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resources and manpower that may be put to more constructive use in the remainder 
State, while also encouraging the State to behave in a more liberal fashion. 
Most importantly, if we accept Buchanan's argument that the legitimacy of the State's 
interest in maintaining its territorial sovereignty is justified teleologically by reference 
to its ability to secure a moral environment, then any group whose secession would 
result in a state of affairs which was instrumentally superior in the provision of a moral 
environment must consequently possess a right to secede.101 Therefore, it is difficult to 
see how Buchanan can consistently claim that the right of the State to maintain its 
territorial integrity is justified teleologically, while at the same time arguing that a 
group possesses a right to secede only where it has been the victim of the three 
injustices he specifies. What reason is there to suppose that the only instances of 
secession which will result in an overall gain in efficiency in the provision of a moral 
environment, are those in which the seceding group has been the victim of these three 
injustices? 
D. Political Participation Incentive Structures 
Buchanan's second argument in support of the claim that States have a morally 
legitimate interest in preserving their territorial integrity is based upon a claim that if it 
is too easy for a group to secede from a State, then this will undermine the democratic 
processes within that State. The argument contains two inter- related claims, both of 
which aim to demonstrate that adherence to the principle of the territorial integrity of 
existing States helps to support the `integrity' of individual political participation 
within democratic States.102 The first claim states that the principle of territorial 
integrity contributes to the stability of both the effective jurisdiction of the laws created 
by a State's political processes, and the membership of that State - both of which are 
prerequisites to individuals `investing' themselves in participating in the political 
processes of a State.103 The second claim states that a right to secede may serve as an 
t 01 Wellman points out that under a teleological justification of the State, S possesses a right to secede 
from R where "...not only would S be able to perform more efficiently the function of government 
separate from R, but R -S would also experience greater efficiency (or at least no appreciable decrease in 
efficiency)." See Wellman, pp.t57 -58. 
102 See, for example, Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.49. 
103 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', pp.47 -48. 
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effective minority veto and undermine the democratic process by giving small, 
minority groups a disproportionate degree of political influence. 
Beginning with the former claim, Buchanan writes: 
...the ability of representative institutions to approximate the ideal of deliberative democracy, 
in which citizens strive together in the ongoing articulation of a conception of the public 
interest, also depends, in part, upon stable control over a definite territory, and thereby the 
effective exercise of political authority over those within it. This stability is essential if it is to 
be reasonable for citizens to invest themselves in cultivating and practicing the demanding 
virtues of deliberative democracy.104 
Elsewhere Buchanan claims: 
Where the principle of territorial integrity is supported, citizens can generally proceed on the 
assumption that they and their children and perhaps their children's children will be subject to 
laws that are made through the same processes to which they are now subject - and whose 
quality they can influence by the character of their participation,105 
Buchanan appears to be saying that each individual's political participation is aimed 
towards a certain end - i.e. influencing the content of the laws to which they are 
subject and the political processes through which those laws are made.106 In other 
words, people engage in political activities, not because they find doing so intrinsically 
enjoyable, but because it is an instrumentally effective means of altering the State's 
policies. Therefore, given that engaging in these political activities will frequently 
require a not insubstantial investment in terms of time and resources, political 
participation remains a rational course of action only as long as there is a reasonable 
probability that it will achieve these aims. 
Moreover, where there is a continual threat of secession people will no longer have an 
incentive to participate in the political processes. To put it rather crudely, if I cannot 
be certain that I will continue to live under the authority of a particular government, 
104 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', pp.48-49. 
105 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.47 -48. 
106 See Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.47 -48. 
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then I have no incentive to attempt to alter the policies of that government. Moreover, 
because democratic government (which is taken to be a good thing) is founded upon 
the principle of the political participation of individual citizens, anything that 
quantitatively or qualitatively reduces that participation necessarily harms democratic 
institutions. Consequently, Buchanan concludes that adherence to the principle of the 
territorial integrity of existing States strengthens the institution of democratic 
government by ensuring continued participation in existing political processes. 
Furthermore, because a RRO theory places substantially greater emphasis upon the 
principle of territorial integrity than a PR theory it is therefore a superior theory. 
In response to Buchanan's analysis there are five points to be made. First, if the goal 
is to democratise States by providing an incentive for people to participate in 
established political processes, secession may be an instrumentally effective means of 
securing such an outcome. Where a State contains a dominant majority group and one 
or more permanent minorities, then the majority may have no interest in engaging in 
principled dialogue with members of the minority groups and may instead simply 
disregard their interests and views. As Buchanan admits, people participate in political 
processes with an end in mind; they expect to gain something from their participation 
for themselves and /or their community. However, if members of minority groups 
know in advance that their participation in a State's democratic institutions will yield 
no concrete results due to their being consistently ignored or out -voted, then they will 
have little incentive to engage in such participation. 
Buchanan rejects PR theories of secession because he believes they give groups a 
disproportionate degree of political influence in the democratic process -a point which 
will be addressed shortly. The other side of the coin, however, is that a right to secede 
may be an effective means of addressing situations of minority neglect and ensuring 
that the majority treats minority groups justly and equitably. Given that a minority's 
secession would, at the very least, inconvenience the dominant majority, by issuing a 
credible threat of secession a minority may be able to force the majority to take its 
interests and views (more) seriously. Thus, by ensuring that the political participation 
of minority groups will not be in vain, a right of secession may actually serve to 
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increase political participation in democratic States by giving members of minority 
groups the necessary incentive to invest themselves in such participation.107 
Second, even if people are aware that at some time in the future either they, or the 
inhabitants of another region within their State, may secede, these people will still have 
immediate economic, political and social interests which may be furthered through 
participation in established democratic institutions. Not only is (the threat of) 
secession unlikely to eliminate or diminish these interests and the vigour which with 
they are pursued, but it may actually increase it by bringing certain issues to the fore. 
In Canada, for example, the continuing question of Quebec's secession has stimulated, 
rather than diminished, political debate both within Quebec and the remainder of 
Canada on a variety of issues raised by Quebec's possible secession. If the concern is 
merely to increase levels of political participation, then an emotionally charged topic 
such as secession may be just the tonic for lacklustre democracies which continue to 
witness increasing voter apathy. 
Third, it is not immediately obvious why individual political participation in a State 
should require a considerable degree of stability in the membership of that State.108 
Secession is not the only means by which a State's membership may be altered. 
Indeed, the membership of most contemporary States - both democratic and non- 
democratic - is in a continual state of flux due to the ceaseless emigration of existing 
citizens to other States and, of course, the immigration of new citizens from foreign 
States. There is, to my knowledge, no evidence to suggest that such factors necessarily 
have any adverse effect upon levels of political participation. 
Fourth, not all instances of secession may be equal in the harm that they do to levels of 
political participation. In other words, just because a RRO theory may (or may not) 
107 On this point see Harry Beran, `A Democratic Theory of Political Self- Determination for a New 
World Order' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.54; David 
Gordon, `Introduction' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998), p.x; Steven Yates, `When is Political Divorce Justified ?' in Secession, State and 
Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), pp.38ff; Boykin, p.75; and 
Robert W. McGee, `The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution', 
Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.26, No.2, 1992, p.463. A similar point may also be made 
with respect to the importance of allowing individuals a right of emigration. See, for example, Jeremy 
Shearmur, Hayek and After (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.204 -6. 
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justify a lesser number of secessions than a PR theory, it does not necessarily follow 
from this that a RRO theory will do less damage to the institution of democratic 
government. At one point Buchanan attempts to justify the emphasis which a RRO 
theory places upon maintaining the territorial integrity of existing States by claiming 
that "...the majority of secessions have resulted in considerable violence, with attendant 
large -scale violations of human rights and massive destruction of resources... "109 
Furthermore, claims Buchanan, "...when an ethnic minority secedes, the result is often 
that another ethnic group becomes a minority within the new state and all too often the 
formerly persecuted become the persecutors. "11° Thus, the condition of injustice which 
led to a group's secession in the first place may simply be replicated, and indeed 
magnified, within the boundaries of the new State created by secession. Buchanan 
claims that because his theory contains restrictions upon the right to secede which those 
of Wellman, Gauthier and Beran do not, it is better able to accommodate these 
concerns) t 1 
Requiring serious grievances as a condition for legitimate secession creates a significant hurdle 
that reflects the gravity of state -breaking in our world and the fact that secession often does 
perpetuate and sometimes exacerbate the ethnic conflicts that give rise to it.112 
Buchanan's argument here is rather vague, but he seems to be saying that: (a) history 
has demonstrated that secession will often produce substantial harm, and we should 
attempt to minimise this harm because of its inherently deleterious affect upon human 
well- being; (b) the greater the number of secessions the greater degree of harm likely to 
be produced; therefore (c) because his theory will justify a lesser number of secessions 
than other theories, it will both qualitatively and quantitatively produce less harm and is 
therefore a superior theory. 
However, just because a theory justifies fewer instances of secession than another, 
rival theory, it does not follow from this that it will therefore produce less aggregate 
108 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.48. 
109 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.44 -45. 
110 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.45. 
111 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.44 -45. 
112 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.45. 
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harm. Indeed, where a group is the victim of the sorts of serious injustices envisaged 
by Buchanan, then relations between that group and the inhabitants of the rest of the 
State are more likely to be characterised by the mistrust and enmity113 that often leads 
to violence and other associated social ills. This is not to say that groups which are the 
victims of State -perpetrated injustice should not have a right to secede; even where a 
group's secession does produce a considerable degree of harm this may still be less 
than that which would otherwise be produced by maintaining the political union)14 
However, if our goal is simply to maximise harm prevention then we should pay 
attention, not only to the number of instances of secession which a theory would 
justify, but also the types of situation(s) in which it would justify secession. 
Fifth, and finally, if Buchanan is correct to suggest that secession, or the threat of 
secession, necessarily has a negative effect upon levels of popular political 
participation then, because under a RRO theory secession would still be a justified 
action for some groups, the adoption of a RRO theory would still produce some 
damage to democracy and for this reason would be a sub -optimal course of action. If 
Buchanan's analysis is correct, then the only truly satisfactory theory of secession can 
be that under which there is no right to secede. 
E. The Right to Secede as a Minority Veto 
The second part of Buchanan's second argument in favour of the claim that States 
have a morally legitimate interest in preserving their territorial integrity is premised 
upon the claim that where exit from a State is too easy then "...if a minority could 
escape the authority of laws whose enactment it did not support by unilaterally 
redrawing political boundaries, it would have little incentive to submit to the 
113 Particularly where this condition of injustice has existed for some time. 
114 For an example of the opposite scenario see Rickard who claims that a possible argument for resisting 
secession not considered by Buchanan is based upon the need to prevent foreseeable war or oppression in 
the new political community - i.e. the only way for a group to prevent full scale civil war between 
competing factions within that group is to maintain their subjection to the greater coercive power of the 
original State (e.g. the former Yugoslavia). In other words, even if the parent State discriminates against a 
sub -group this may be preferable to the greater evil of civil war. See Maurice Rickard, `Buchanan, Allen, 
Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec', Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol.71, No.4, 1993, p.503. 
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majority's will, or to reason with the majority to change its mind. "115 Moreover, 
claims Buchanan, "...in order to subvert democratic processes it is not even necessary 
that a group actually exit when the majority decision goes against it. All that may be 
needed is to issue a credible threat of exit, which can serve as a de facto minority 
veto. "116 
The same argument appears in a substantially more developed form in an article by 
the legal scholar Cass Sunstein.117 Arguing against a constitutional right to secede,118 
Sunstein claims that allowing minority groups a right to secede will encourage 
strategic behaviour on the part of those groups, thus making the exit of a sub -unit from 
the nation a relevant factor in every important decision:119 
A constitutional system that recognizes and is prepared to respect the right to secede will find 
its very existence at issue in every case in which a subunit's interests are seriously at stake. In 
practice, that threat could act as a prohibition [i.e. a veto] on any national decision adverse to 
the subunit's interests.120 
Thus, Sunstein believes that the (constitutional) recognition of a right to secede would 
give groups - particularly those groups that possess resources which are indispensable 
to the parent State121 a disproportionate amount of political influence. Consequently 
these groups could veto policies which are contrary to their own interests but which, on 
balance, might be justified. For example: 
A tobacco growing subunit equipped with the right to secede might be able to veto a decision to 
raise taxes on (say) cigarettes even if that decision would further the nation's long -term interest. 
115 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.48. 
116 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', p.48 [emphasis added]. 
117 Cass R. Sunstein, 'Constitutionalism and Secession', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.58, 
1991. 
118 Sunstein acknowledges that on occasion a group's secession may be fully justified as a matter of 
political morality, but is concerned to demonstrate that the existence of these moral claims "... provides 
insufficient reason for constitutional recognition of the right to secede." See Sunstein (1991), p.670 and 
pp.634 -35. 
I I9 Sunstein (1991), p.648. 
120 Sunstein (1991), p.649. 
121 Sunstein (1991), p.650. 
Just Cause Theories of Secession 103 
Similar considerations apply to the decision to enter into war, to enact environmental regulation 
or to increase or decrease aid to agriculture. 122 
We should note, however, that both of the above claims require the option to secede 
to be both available (i.e. practically possible) and attractive (i.e. in the group's long 
term interests). In many cases secession will not be an available option as, whether for 
economic, political or social /demographic reasons, a group may simply not be capable 
of forming a viable, independent State (or, for that matter, joining another pre- existing, 
independent State). Moreover, even if secession is an available option a group may 
nonetheless decide to remain within its parent State if doing so maximises the group's 
interests. Because of the severe costs it may impose upon a group, secession may be 
an available yet unattractive option, Where secession is unavailable or unattractive a 
group wiII have no choice but to attempt to further its interests within the established 
political processes of its parent State, and consequently any threat by the group to 
secede will not be credible and the objection simply becomes irrelevant: 
...if the existence of the nation confers mutual benefits - an assumed precondition for its 
continuation - then subunits will rarely threaten to secede even if constitutionally authorized to 
do so, and the threat will rarely be credible even if made. The costs of secession will usually be 
at least as large for the subunit as for the nation. On this view, recognition of a right to secede 
would never or rarely have the adverse effects claimed for it. A well functioning nation simply 
will not face serious secession threats; subunits will invoke the right only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances. 123 
Sunstein, however, remains sceptical about such counter -arguments, claiming that not 
only in some circumstances will secession further the (economic) interests of the 
seceding region but, even where it will not, inflamed sentiments and emotions may 
override technocratic rationality leading a group to secede despite the fact that doing so 
is against its long -term interests:124 
The most that one can do here is to point to the often large emotional attachments to subunits, 
the possibility of financial gains from strategic behaviour, the familiar frailties of human nature, 
122 Sunstein (1991), p.649. 
123 Sunstein (1991), p.652. 
124 Sunstein (1991), pp.653-54. 
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the rational and irrational factors that can make subunits press secession claims, and the 
potentially debilitating effects of such claims on subunit and national processes of self - 
govemment.125 
The claim, then, is that certain emotional, even atavistic, factors - which may 
themselves be cynically manipulated by political elites - may on occasion lead the 
inhabitants of a region to demand a right to secede, despite the fact that secession 
would not be in their overall best interests. Thus, the fact that a group's best interests 
would be served by remaining in political union with its parent State does not mean 
that any threat by that group is not credible and, ultimately, would not be acted 
upon. t 26 
One response to this line of argument has simply been to claim that most rights can be 
abused, and the solution to such abuse is not to refuse to recognise rights but, rather, to 
specify the conditions of their proper exercise.127 Another response128 might simply be 
for the parent State to call the group's bluff and let them go. Indeed, where a 
recalcitrant minority is continuously acting -up and using the threat of secession in an 
attempt to extract all sorts of unfair advantages, such behaviour might be effectively 
discouraged by a threat from a majority to secede from them. 
The most popular solution to the problem of so- called `vanity' secessions has, 
however, been the erection of certain procedural barriers, or hurdles, which a group 
must first overcome before it can exercise its right of secession. Norman, for example, 
suggests a series of referenda over a specified time period of perhaps two or three years, 
each of which must be won by the secessionists if they are to possess a right of 
secession. This 'cooling off period' between referenda would, claims Norman, allow 
for more rational, principled debate on the issue - particularly in cases where, for 
example, a group demands the right to secede due to temporary outrage over a political 
125 Sunstein (1991), p.654. 
126 For a rejection of these claims see Beran (1984), p.30. 
127 Michael Freeman, `The Priority of Function Over Structure: A New Approach to Secession', Theories 
of Secession, Percy B. Lehning (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.23. 
128 Which to my knowledge has yet to be seriously considered by contributors to the secession debate. 
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event.129 Moreover, it would also force a significant delay between issuing a threat of 
secession and that threat being acted upon, thus undermining at least some of the 
strategic advantage which a sub -group may derive by issuing a threat to secede. 
One can imagine where, if a sub -group threatened to initiate secessionist procedures 
immediately unless it got its own way, then this might cause the parent State to baulk 
and give in to the group's demands. However, if the sub -group had to wait a significant 
period of time between issuing a threat to secede and acting upon that threat, then the 
threat loses much of its `bite' and the State will be less likely to take the threat 
seriously. States are typically more concerned with policy matters that demand their 
immediate attention and which pay dividends immediately or in the short-term, rather 
than being preoccupied with what might happen two or three years down the track. A 
delayed threat of secession, while still having some influence over political decision - 
making, is unlikely to have the impact of an immediate threat to secede. The threat to 
walk out in two years time is substantially weaker than a threat to walk out tomorrow, 
next week or even next month. 
More importantly, however, note that Buchanan, eager to avoid the charge that the risk 
of strategic bargaining provides a justification for ruling out a right of secession 
altogether, adopts a similar strategy to Norman. In a 1993 paper that precedes his 1997 
defence of RRO theories against PR theories on the grounds of strategic bargaining 
Buchanan writes: 
Consideration of [the risk that a group's threat to secede might function as a minority veto over the 
majority's decisions]...might lead one to conclude that the only adequate way to protect democracy is 
to refuse to acknowledge a right to secede. However, as we have seen, there can be compelling 
justifications for secession under certain conditions. Accordingly, a more appropriate response than 
denying the right to secede is to devise constitutional mechanisms or processes of international law 
that give some weight to legitimate interests in secession and to the equally legitimate interest in 
preserving the integrity of majority rule (and in political stability). The most obvious way 
to...minimize the risk of strategic bargaining with the threat of secession [is] by erecting inconvenient 
but surmountable procedural hurdles to secession.130 
129 Norman, p.54. 
130 A. Buchanan, `Secession and Nationalism' in .4 Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp.594 -95. Also see Daniel 
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As an example of such procedural hurdles Buchanan considers the requirement that 
more than a simple majority of voters support secession and the levying special exit 
costs -a ` secession tax.' However, what constitutes a so- called `legitimate interest in', 
or `compelling reason for', secession is a matter of opinion. Whereas Buchanan would 
claim that there are only three such interests or reasons (i.e. a lethal threat, 
discriminatory re- distribution and rectificatory justice) ascriptive and associative PR 
theorists would claim that being a nation in a multi- national State, or a majority of a 
group's members favouring secession, also count as legitimate reasons for secession. 
The question is, if, as Buchanan suggests, these procedural hurdles are sufficient to 
effectively deal with the problem of strategic bargaining as far as RRO theories are 
concerned, then why aren't they equally capable of doing the same for PR theories? 
To point out that a RRO theory may justify more instances of secession than a PR 
theory does not explain why, if procedural hurdles are sufficient to overcome the 
problem of strategic bargaining for RRO, they cannot perform the same function with 
respect to PR theories. 
Finally, suppose Buchanan and Sunstein are correct: PR theories create an opportunity 
for groups to wield a disproportionate amount of power relative to other groups in a 
polity, and thus extract certain benefits and advantages which they would otherwise not 
be able to. It need not follow that this is a sufficient reason to therefore reject PR 
theories as, not only may the existence of a right to secede be a necessary inducement to 
persuade sub -units to enter the State in the first place,131 but, as was noted above, it 
may serve as an effective check against the majority disregarding the interests and 
wishes of minority groups and treating those groups unjustly) 322 Thus, any injustices 
produced by the adoption of a PR theory of secession may conceivably be more than 
compensated for by the injustices which such a theory prevents.133 
Philpott, `Self -Determination in Practice' in National Self- Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret 
Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.96 -7. 
131 See Sunstein (1991), p.653; and Philpott (1998), p.96 
132 Beran, (1998), p.54. 
133 As Boykin points out: "The fact that a majority wishes to impose its position on a recalcitrant minority 
does not morally privilege the majority. Here again, the right to secede appears as a way to limit public 
power, and since anyone could expect to be in the minority at some point, anyone could reasonably reject 
restrictions on the right to secede which impose high costs on those wishing to escape a majority hostile to 
their interests." Boykin, p.75. 
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3.4 THE AVOIDANCE OF PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
A. Introduction 
Buchanan claims that the incorporation of PR theories into international law would 
"...encourage States to act in ways that would prevent groups from becoming claimants 
to the right to secede, and this might lead to the perpetration of injustices. "134 This is 
in contrast with RRO theories which Buchanan believes would create only a laudable 
incentive for States not to violate their citizens' primary right not to be treated unjustly. 
Buchanan explains: 
States [under a Remedial Right Only Theory] ...would have an incentive to improve their 
records concerning the relevant injustices in order to reap the protection from dismemberment 
that they would enjoy as legitimate, rights -respecting states... In contrast, a regime of 
international law that recognized a right to secede in the absence of any injustices would 
encourage even just states to act in ways that would prevent groups from becoming claimants to 
the right to secede, and this might lead to the perpetration of injustices. For example, according 
to Wellman's version of Primary Right Theory, any group that becomes capable of having a 
functioning State of its own in the territory it occupies is a potential subject of the right to 
secede. Clearly any state that seeks to avoid its own dissolution would have an incentive to 
implement policies designed to prevent groups from becoming prosperous enough and 
politically well -organized enough to satisfy this condition... In short, Wellman's version of 
Primary Right Theory gives the state incentives for fostering economic and political 
dependency. I35 
B. The Importance of Avoiding Perverse Incentives 
On one hand, the issue of perverse incentives appears to be an important one, as 
clearly we do not want to encourage the performance of actions which would result in a 
morally sub -optimal state of affairs. On the other hand, however, in many respects 
perverse incentives appear to be somewhat unavoidable whenever the interests of two 
parties conflict and one party is given a right against the other. Moreover, it is far from 
134 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.52. 
13 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.52. Note also, that Buchanan appears to have overlooked the 
possibility that by encouraging this dependency the State may incur certain costs (e.g. economic 
stagnation, civil unrest, international disapprobation etc). Moreover, these costs may, on occasion, 
outweigh those that would be produced as a result of the sub -group's secession, in which case the rational 
course of action based upon a simple analysis of the benefits /costs to the parent State may actually direct 
that State to allow the sub -group to secede. 
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obvious why the existence of such an incentive should necessarily provide a conclusive 
reason against granting the right in question. 
For example, an important tool for keeping governments accountable in liberal - 
democratic societies is the right of citizens to obtain information from the government 
about its activities and policies. The right is not an unlimited right. Some information 
will, quite correctly, be deemed too sensitive to publicise and consequently remain 
secret.136 In most cases, however, unless there is an overriding reason to the contrary, 
citizens have a right to access information in the government's possession. Clearly, 
however, the government's interests will not always be served by the exercise of such a 
right, e.g. the government may be embarrassed by oversights and blunders which it has 
made, thus damaging its reputation and chances of re- election.137 Hence, to the extent 
that the release of certain information would not be in its best interests, the government 
has a perverse incentive to conceal that information by attempting to thwart the public's 
exercise of its right to access i038 
The methods employed by governments in attempting to hide such information may 
range from the relatively trivial139 to the more serious and morally censurable.l4o Most 
people, however, would not be inclined to therefore argue that citizens do not, and 
should not, have a right to access government information - particularly information 
which may embarrass the government. Indeed, in many respects it would seem that the 
whole point of the right is to publicise precisely that information which the government 
would prefer to conceal and which, therefore, produces an incentive for it to act 
immorally.14I 
136 
e.g. for reasons of national security the government may refuse to release details about the 
specifications of its latest weaponry. 
137 Indeed, as we shall soon see, it is precisely for the reason that the government's best interests may be 
served by not releasing certain information, that citizens are taken to have a right of access to it. 
138 Despite the fact that information and its release fails to fulfil the criteria which would normally justify 
the government restricting access to it. 
139 e.g. simply lying and denying that any such information exists. 
140 
e.g. `leaning' on people to destroy the information or doing nasty things to people who have 
inadvertently come into possession of such information - the stuff of which Hollywood movies are made. 
141 The point should also be made that because an incentive operates by offering a reward for the 
performance of a particular course of action, the incentive simply makes the performance of that action 
more attractive in comparison to other, alternative available actions - it does not make that action 
necessary. One may, for a variety of reasons, fail to do that which one has an incentive to do. 
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Similarly, Buchanan's theory of secession is itself not immune from claims of 
perverse incentives. For example, Buchanan claims that while a group possesses a right 
to secede if, and only if, it satisfies one or more of the three arguments identified by 
him above,142 it must also secure 'just terms of secession.'143 Buchanan's just terms of 
secession are a collection of conditions which govern the post- secession actions of the 
new State, proscribing certain actions and making other actions mandatory, e.g. the new 
State must: (a) meet minimal standards of justice especially with respect to the human 
rights of its citizens;144 (b) arrive at a fair division of the national debt and other 
national assets /obligations; and (c) arrange for the continuation, renegotiation or 
termination of existing treaty obligations.145 
It is fairly obvious what Buchanan is after here. Indeed, the notion that considerations 
of justice and fairness create moral obligations for a group to act, or refrain from acting, 
in a certain way both during and after secession is an important one upon which most 
theorists tend to agree. For example, both Nielsen and Gauthier point out that if 
Quebec were to secede from Canada, then considerations of distributive justice create 
an obligation for Quebec to shoulder its fair share of the national debt146 and respect 
the rights of the Anglophone minority within its borders.147 Note, however, that 
Buchanan makes the possession of a right to secede contingent upon the fulfilment of 
these obligations.148 Moreover, because these conditions refer to a group's post 
secession actions149 this creates a problem for Buchanan. To allow a group to secede 
only to then turn around and say that, retrospectively, that group's secession was 
142 i.e. rectificatory justice, discriminatory redistribution and the need for self -preservation. 
143 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.37. 
144 Buchanan denies that groups such the Nazis or Khmer Rouge should be allowed to secede. See 
Buchanan (1991), p.56 and 61. Also see Margalit and Raz, p.459. 
145 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.37. 
146 Note that these same considerations may also require that Quebec be allowed to take possession of 
certain federal assets. See Kai Nielsen, `Secession: The Case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
Vol.10, No.1, 1993, p.36; and Gauthier, p.366 
147 Of particular concern is the welfare of the Anglophone minority in Quebec as well as certain ethnic 
groups of indigenous peoples. See for example Nielsen (1993), pp36ff; and Gauthier, p370. 
148 i.e. if these moral obligations remain unfulfilled then there is no right to secede. See for example 
Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.37. 
149 i.e. the group's ability to possess a right to secede is dependent upon its ability to fulfil certain 
conditions which it can only fulfil after it has exercised this same right. 
Just Cause Theories of Secession 110 
unjustified because of what it did (or failed to do) after having seceded, is the political 
equivalent of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted.150 
Buchanan's solution to this problem is to talk in terms of the secessionist group 
offering a 'credible guarantee' (i.e. a promise) that after having seceded, it will abide by 
the requirements of the just terms of secession.t51 Clearly Buchanan believes that 
requiring groups to divulge their post- secession intentions is an effective means of 
eliminating (at least some of) those groups who will proceed to behave immorally after 
seceding as, if it were not, then what possible reason could there be for such a 
requirement in the first place? This, however, does not mean that in order to possess a 
right to secede a group must not act in an unjust manner after having seceded. Rather, 
it simply means that prior to its secession a group must avoid suspicion that it would 
act in such a manner. Therefore, for those groups that do intend to act unjustly after 
having seceded, Buchanan's solution creates a perverse incentive for them to lie about 
their post secession intentions (e.g. a group which plans to establish a fundamentalist 
State may lie about its intention to respect human rights in order to remove any 
potential objections to its secession). 
To this Buchanan may respond that the elimination or minimisation of post -secession 
injustices (some of which may be quite severe) takes moral precedence over reducing 
the number of incidences of lie telling. Given that requiring groups to disclose their 
post- secession intentions is an instrumentally effective means of reducing the 
perpetration of such injustices, it should be preserved as the lesser of the two evils. 
Moreover, in order to demonstrate the relative superiority of RRO theories with respect 
to the criterion of the avoidance of perverse incentives, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that RRO theories produce no incentives for immoral behaviour. Rather, it 
15° Of course counter -factually we may be able to determine with a considerable degree of accuracy what 
the post- secession actions of a group are likely to be, before that group actually secedes. For example, in 
respect to the two cases mentioned by Buchanan of the Nazis and the Khmer Rouge, there exists clear 
historical antecedents of genocide which indicate that it would be most unwise to grant these groups a 
right to secede. In other cases, however, where no such clear indicators exist, the epistemic difficulty in 
distinguishing those groups which are likely to behave in an unjust manner after secession from those 
which are not, means that we may not always get things right, and hence may allow a group to secede only 
to then witness that group commit a grave injustice. 
151 i.e. a group must disclose what its post- secession intentions are, and where these intentions contradict 
certain principles of justice then we should conclude that that group does not possess a right to secede. 
Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession', p.37. 
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is only necessary to show that quantitatively and /or qualitatively they produce fewer 
perverse incentives than do other, alternative theories. Thus, while the general adoption 
of RRO theories may, indeed, produce numerous incentives for agents to act immorally, 
these pale into insignificance when compared to the perverse incentives produced by a 
PR theory such as Wellman's. 
However, while securing a morally optimal state of affairs is clearly an important 
concern, it is far from obvious that giving in to the threat of immoral acts is necessarily 
an instrumentally effective means of creating such an environment. A theory of moral 
rights - including the right to secede - should apportion rights on the basis of moral 
principles to those who are morally entitled to possess them. It should not seek to 
avoid conflict by allowing unjust antagonists to mistreat others. The purpose of moral 
rights is not to appease the morally destitute or reward the performance, or threat of the 
performance, of morally unjust actions. Yet, whenever we allow threats, or the 
possibility, of immoral acts to tip the moral scales in such a manner by declining to 
grant one party a right152 against another party, simply because doing so might 
encourage the latter to behave immorally, then that is exactly what we are doing. 
Consider, for example, a situation where the weight of moral reasoning supports 
giving G a right against S which may fail to promote, and may even damage, S's 
interests. To conclude that we should not grant G such a right because doing so might 
encourage S to behave immorally, in a way that s /he would not if G did not possess the 
right in question, is to reward the performance, or threat of the performance, of these 
immoral acts and thus perpetuate a morally sub -optimal state of affairs. Buchanan's 
criterion of the avoidance of perverse incentives replaces the possible injustice of 
avoidable economic and political dependency amongst a State's sub- regions, with the 
certain injustice of holding a sub- region captive against its will by denying it a moral 
right of secession which it would otherwise possess. Ironically, this itself creates a 
perverse incentive for States to behave, and threaten to behave, in an immoral manner 
safe in the knowledge that doing so remains an effective means of furthering their own 
interests by preventing others being granted rights to which, ceteris paribus, they are 
152 A right which, ceteris paribus, that party is morally justified in possessing. 
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morally entitled. There is nothing morally legitimate about a deal done to appease the 
(would -be) perpetrators of immoral acts. 
3.5 MORAL AND LEGAL CONSISTENCY 
A. Introduction 
Finally, with respect to the criterion of moral and legal consistency Buchanan claims 
that a theory of secession should "...build upon, or at least not squarely contradict, the 
more morally acceptable principles of existing international law, when these principles 
are interpreted in a morally progressive way. "153 Moreover, claims Buchanan, the 
principle of territorial integrity "...is generally regarded as the single most fundamental 
principle of international law. "154 Buchanan objects to PR theories because by granting 
a right to secede to nations and democratically self -defined groups they "...represent a 
direct and profound threat to the territorial integrity of states - even just states. "155 
Conversely, because RRO theories advance a much more restricted right to secede, they 
are consistent with rather than 'in direct opposition to' 156 the principle of the territorial 
integrity of existing States, and hence with existing international law. f 57 
B. The Moral Assessment of International Law 
To begin with, we should note that Buchanan's notion of 'consistency with the 
principle of territorial integrity' is simply a comparative term that indicates a theory's 
degree of permissiveness.158 The more restrictive a theory of secession is the fewer 
instances of secession it will justify and, therefore, the more `consistent' it will be with 
the principle of the territorial integrity of existing States. Moreover, because both RRO 
theories and PR theories may contain restrictions upon which groups may secede (i.e. 
both theories may coherently maintain that the right to secede is not an absolute right), 
153 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.42 [emphasis added]. 
154 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.46. 
155 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', p.45. 
156 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.46. 
157 See Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.46 and p.51. 
158 i.e. how much emphasis the theory places upon the right of States to maintain their territorial integrity 
relative to the right of groups to secede. 
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both may be `consistent' with the principle of territorial integrity. Therefore, what 
Buchanan should really say is that, because a RRO theory may place greater emphasis 
upon the right of States to maintain their territorial integrity than does a PR theory, it 
may be more consistent with the principle of the territorial integrity of existing States 
than is a PR theory. The important point for Buchanan, then, is that his theory is 
considerably less permissive - or, alternatively, more restrictive - than those of other 
theorists such as Wellman. 
There are two primary objections to Buchanan's claim that RRO theories are superior 
to PR theories because they are more consistent with the principle of the territorial 
integrity of existing States. The first objection, and Buchanan's response to it, have 
both been dealt with above (i.e. because international law is made and enforced by 
States who have no interest in sanctioning their own dismemberment, the fact that 
governments will not enact secession procedures, does not demonstrate that such 
procedures are unfair or unjust). There is no need to go over these arguments again 
here. 
The second objection claims that if Buchanan is correct - and the greater the degree of 
emphasis a theory places upon the right of States to maintain their existing political 
boundaries159 the more satisfactory that theory is - then it would seem that the only 
truly satisfactory theory of secession is one based upon an absolute notion of territorial 
integrity where there is no right for groups to secede. Not only would this make the 
search for a normative theory of secession a self -defeating task,160 but because 
Buchanan's theory maintains that there is a right to secede - albeit a highly qualified 
one - then it too must ultimately be judged to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, if 
consistency with the principles of existing international law is a valid criterion for 
assessing the satisfactoriness of a normative theory of secession then it is unclear why 
we need a theory of secession in the first place. If the superior theory is that which 
most closely mirrors existing international law then why not simply rely on 
international law for the normative assessment of demands to secede? 
159 And, therefore, the lesser the emphasis they place upon the right of groups to secede. 
160 i.e. why should we bother wasting our time trying to formulate a theory which tells us which groups 
have a right to secede, when the only truly satisfactory theory can be one which denies that there is any 
such right in the first place. 
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At this point, however, Buchanan introduces a distinction between an absolutist and a 
morally progressive interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity. As its title 
suggests, the absolutist interpretation of the principle of the territorial integrity of 
existing States recognises no right to secede - remedial or otherwise. Conversely, the 
morally progressive interpretation of the principle applies only to so- called 'legitimate' 
States, and not all existing States are legitimate.l61 Bearing in mind that whether or not 
a State is legitimate in the sense that it qualifies for the right to maintain its territorial 
integrity in the face of a demand by a sub -region to secede is, of course, exactly what a 
theory of secession is supposed to tell us, making legitimacy a necessary pre -condition 
for the possession of a moral right to secede simply begs the question of under what 
conditions a State becomes it /legitimate. In recognition of this difficulty Buchanan 
responds: 
...recent international law provides some guidance: States are not legitimate if they (I) threaten the 
lives of significant portions of their populations by a policy of ethnic or religious persecution, or if 
they (2) exhibit institutional racism that deprives a substantial proportion of the population of basic 
economic and political rights.162 
As an example of the former scenario Buchanan cites Iraq's mis- treatment of its 
Kurdish minority, whereas apartheid South Africa provides an example of the latter 
scenario. Buchanan's reliance on existing international law for the criteria of a State's 
il/legitimacy in this context, however, creates some ambiguity over exactly what is the 
source of a State's il/legitimacy. For example, was apartheid South Africa illegitimate 
because it employed racist policies against its black majority, or because in doing so it 
contravened international covenants on racial equality? Similarly, is Iraq illegitimate 
because it has mistreated its Kurdish minority, or, rather, because its mistreatment of 
the Kurds has contravened international law on human rights? In other words, is the 
breaking of international law the source of the illegitimacy or, rather, the immoral 
policies which both States have pursued (and which, it just so happens, are contrary to 
international law). 
161 See Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.50. 
162 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.50. 
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Buchanan seems to come down heavily on the side of the latter claim. Thus, the 
important thing for Buchanan is not that a RRO is more consistent with existing 
international law than a PR theory. Rather, Buchanan rejects legal positivism163 by 
claiming that a RRO theory is superior to a PR theory because by more closely 
mirroring international law it thereby instantiates to a greater degree certain antecedent 
moral principles. Buchanan explains: 
.,.it is important to emphasize that the relevance of actual international law is conditional upon the 
moral legitimacy of the interests that the law, or in this case, changes in the law, serves. The key 
point is that the shift in international law away from the absolutist interpretation of the principle of 
territorial integrity toward the progressive interpretation serves morally legitimate interests and 
reflects a superior normative stance. So it is not mere conformity to existing law, but consonance 
with morally progressive developments in law, which speaks here in favor of Remedial Right Only 
Theories.' 64 
In other words international law is itself morally assessable by reference to certain a 
priori moral principles that exist independent of, and prior to, international law.165 The 
relative superiority of RRO theories therefore stems, not from the fact that they mirror 
existing international law to a greater extent than do rival PR theories but, rather, that 
by more closely mirroring existing international law they thereby instantiate certain 
antecedent moral principles to a greater degree than do PR theories. The issue, 
therefore, is not simply the degree to which a theory reflects existing international law 
but, rather, the degree to which it instantiates the moral principles by which 
international law is morally assessed. This, however, simply shifts the focus of the 
disagreement to the question of what are the normative principles by which 
international is morally assessable. To claim, as Buchanan does, that by moving from 
an absolutist interpretation of territorial integrity to a freer, less- restrictive interpretation 
international law is thereby adopting a `superior normative stance' is simply to beg the 
question of how we should morally assess international law. 
163 i.e. the view that the law can be defined without any reference to its content and that the existence of 
law is one thing - its merit or demerit another. See A Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 
1979). 
164 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', p.51. 
16s i.e. a rejection of legal positivism. 
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The question is whether or not a RRO theory is morally superior to a PR theory. 
Buchanan answers: `Yes, because a RRO theory is more consistent with existing 
international law's treatment of the right of existing States to maintain their territorial 
integrity.' The question then becomes: `Why is consistency with international law's 
treatment of a State's right to maintain its territorial integrity necessarily a criterion of 
moral satisfactoriness ?' As we have seen, Buchanan's response is to claim that by 
moving from an absolutist interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity to a 
slightly less restrictive definition that allows for State -breaking in certain 
circumstances, international law has adopted a morally superior stance. This, however, 
simply begs the question of why the existing, highly restrictive, interpretation of the 
principle of territorial integrity is necessarily morally superior, not only to the absolutist 
interpretation that preceded it, but also to an even less restrictive interpretation such as 
that favoured by PR theorists. 
Thus, Buchanan simply returns us to the original question of whether or not a RRO 
theory is morally superior to a PR theory, while bringing us no closer to identifying a 
satisfactory answer to it. A PR theorist such as Wellman may, for example, agree with 
Buchanan that by adopting a less- restrictive interpretation of the principle of the 
territorial integrity of existing States (and thus allowing for the possibility that 
secession may, in certain circumstances, be justified) international law has, indeed, 
adopted a superior normative stance. However, Wellman would also claim that 
international law should go further than this and recognise that a State's territorial 
integrity may be legitimately infringed, not only where that State is engaging in 
practices of genocide and racial discrimination, but also where a regionally 
concentrated majority has expressed a desire to secede. Moreover, there is nothing in 
Buchanan's analysis in its present form which establishes that his interpretation of a 
State's right to maintain its territorial integrity is morally superior to that of Wellman 
or, for that matter, any other rival theorist. 
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3.6 A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF JUST CAUSE THEORIES 
A. Buchanan's RRO Theory as One Amongst Many 
Thus far the chapter has focussed upon the claim that RRO theories are superior to PR 
theories and the reasons Buchanan puts forward to support this claim. In this, the final 
section of this chapter, the aim is to clarify some issues about: (a) RRO theories in 
general; (b) Buchanan's distinction between RRO and PR theories; and (c) how these 
issues relate to Buchanan's claim that RRO theories are superior to other, rival types of 
theory. 
Above it was pointed out that simply requiring groups to be the victim of an injustice 
in order to possess a right of secession begs the question of exactly what injustices are 
capable of generating such a right.166 Moreover, depending upon what injustice(s) a 
RRO theory conceives of as sufficient to generate a right to secede, a RRO theory may, 
or may not, justify relatively few instances of secession. In other words, there is 
nothing inherent to the requirement that a group be a victim of injustice that is 
necessarily supportive of the State's right to maintain its territorial integrity. Therefore 
while the injustices specified by Buchanan in his version of a RRO theory would apply 
to relatively few groups over time - and hence justify relatively few instances of 
secession - this need not be true of all RRO theories. Indeed, Buchanan recognises this 
fact by noting that "[ d]epending upon which injustices they recognize as grievances 
sufficient to justify secession, Remedial Right Theories may be more liberal or more 
restrictive. " 167 
B. Three Issues With RRO Theories 
That RRO theories may - depending upon what injustices they consider to be 
sufficient to ground a right of secession - be relatively more or less supportive of a 
State's right to maintain its territorial integrity, raises three inter -related issues. The 
166 Of course, even if there is a agreement upon the injustice(s), or types of injustice(s), in question, there 
may remain disagreement over whether or not a given group actually is the victim of such an injustice and, 
therefore, whether that group possesses a right to secede. Thus, we need to distinguish between 
formulating the conditions which must be met if an act of secession is to be justified, and establishing 
whether or not those conditions are in fact met in some particular example. 
167 Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', pp.36 -37. 
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first issue - in many respects merely a clarification - is simply that the three criteria 
which Buchanan cites in support of his claim that RRO theories are superior to PR 
theories, even if correct, are really applicable only to a sub -class of highly restrictive 
RRO theories such as his own and others similar to it.168 
The second issue concerns what it is about Buchanan's theory that, in his opinion, 
makes it superior to other theories which he categorises as PR theories. Buchanan 
claims that because his theory is relatively less permissive than so- called PR theories it 
out scores them by reference to the above three criteria by which a secession theory's 
satisfactoriness may be assessed. Thus, because RRO theories justify fewer instances 
of secession than PR theories Buchanan believes they: (a) are more likely to be adopted 
by States into international law; (b) create fewer perverse incentives for States to 
behave immorally; and (c) are more consistent with the principle of the territorial 
integrity of existing States. Hence, the 'bottom line' for Buchanan - what in his 
opinion makes his theory better than other, rival theories - is not that his is a RRO 
theory that grants only a remedial right of secession and that these other theories are PR 
theories that grant a general right of secession in the absence of any injustice. Rather, 
what matters is that Buchanan's theory would justify relatively fewer instances of 
secession over time. 
Indeed, in many respects the distinction between PR and RRO theories appears 
increasingly redundant. One could, for example, imagine a RRO theory considerably 
more permissive than Buchanan's that considered relatively trivial injustices sufficient 
to justify a right of secession. However, despite qualifying as a RRO theory, Buchanan 
would presumably reject it for exactly the same reasons that lead him to reject PR 
theories such as Wellman's. Similarly, one could also imagine a highly restrictive 
Nationalist or LD theory that, through an extremely parsimonious definition of 
nationhood and the utilisation of onerous side constraints, was at least as restrictive as 
Buchanan's RRO theory. Such a theory would, despite being a PR rather than a RRO 
theory, also satisfy these three criteria to the same extent as Buchanan's theory. 
168 A point which, in all fairness to Buchanan, he does not appear to be completely unaware of. See 
Buchanan, Theories of Secession', p.35 and p.37. 
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The third, more serious, issue concerns whether or not Buchanan's distinction 
between PR and RRO theories is sustainable. It will be remembered that in order to 
qualify as a RRO theory all that is necessary is that the theory grant a right of secession 
only to those groups which have been the victim of injustice, and different RRO 
theories may take different injustices as sufficient grounds for secession. Buchanan 
repeatedly attempts to distinguish RRO theories from PR theories by claiming that 
because PR theories do not require a group to be the victim of an injustice in order to 
possess a right to secede they, unlike RRO theories, are therefore committed to the 
view that a group may possess a right to secede from a `perfectly just' State.169 
Buchanan, explains: 
According to Primary Right Theories, a group can have a (general) right to secede even if it has 
suffered no injustices, and hence it may have a (general) right to secede from a perfectly just state. 
Ascriptive characteristics, such as being a people or a nation, do not imply that the groups in 
question have suffered injustices. Similarly, according to Associative Group Theories, what confers 
the right to secede on a group is the voluntary choice of members of the group to form an 
independent state; no grievances are necessary.170 
The important issue as far as a normative theory of secession is concerned, is when 
does a State commit the injustice of not allowing a group to secede? So- called RRO 
theorists respond by saying: `When that group is the victim of an (extreme) injustice 
such as human rights abuses.' In contrast, so- called PR theorists respond: `When a 
majority of that group have expressed a desire to do so or when that group is a nation.' 
Moreover, to say that a group possesses a moral right to secede is also to say that that 
group's continued political union with its parent State, and hence any attempts by the 
parent State or any other party to maintain that union, are morally unjust. Thus, as long 
as the group remains a constituent component of its parent State a condition of injustice 
obtains - i.e. the State of which the group is a part is an unjust State - and the only way 
in which this condition of injustice may be remedied is by the group's secession. 
169 i.e. a State which has committed no injustices. 
170 Buchanan, 
'Theories of Secession', p.40 [emphasis added]. 
Just Cause Theories of Secession 120 
Of course, to the extent that different RRO theories take different injustices as 
sufficient to justify a right of secession, they will disagree over whether or not a given 
group possess a right to secede and, thus, whether or not the State of which that group 
is a constituent component is unjust. Moreover, because PR and RRO theories disagree 
over what conditions are sufficient to ground a right of secession they will therefore 
also disagree when a State becomes unjust by refusing to recognise a sub -region's 
demand to secede. This, however, is not to say that the two types of theory may not 
produce results that converge. For example, a State may contain no groups who are the 
victim of an injustice, who harbour a desire to secede and/or who constitute a nation 
(however that term is defined). Alternatively, a State may contain a group which is 
both the victim of serious human rights abuses and which for that, or some other 
reason, expresses a desire to secede and /or qualifies as a nation. 
In both examples the necessary conditions for possession, or lack of possession, of a 
right to secede under all three theories have been fulfilled and thus all three theories 
may agree that the State in question is either just or unjust. However, they would do so 
for different reasons. For example, in the second case, whereas Buchanan would claim 
that the group possesses a right of secession because it is a victim of serious human 
rights abuses, Wellman or Beran would claim that the group should be allowed to 
secede simply because a majority of its members desire to (regardless of why they 
possess this desire), and Miller because they are a nation.171 
Remembering that simply requiring a group to be the victim of an injustice if it is to 
possess a right to secede begs the question of exactly what injustices are sufficient to 
justify such a right, Buchanan's claim that PR theories grant a right of secession from 
States which are `perfectly just' begs the question of what constitutes an injustice and 
when the State is unjust. For both PR and RRO theories any State that refuses to 
recognise a group's legitimate right to secede is by definition unjust. This raises the 
question of whether: (a) RRO theories are, as Buchanan claims, distinct from PR 
171 That there may be an overlap between these different types of theory in the sense that, on occasion, 
they may produce the same directive, or lack of directive, for a group to secede is noted by Beran with 
respect to the Nationalist theory and Liberal- Democratic theories. Thus, while the Liberal- Democratic 
theory conflicts with the principle that nations should coincide with States, it grants nations a right of 
secession when the members of a nation are united in a wish for a State of their own. See Beran (1998), 
p.42. 
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theories because they require a group to first be the victim of an injustice if it is to 
possess a right of secession whereas PR theories do not; or (b) the only difference 
between the two types of theory are the types of injustice(s) which each regards as 
sufficient to justify a right of secession. 
For example, an associative PR theorist, such as Wellman or Beran may simply claim 
that where a group is not permitted to secede after a majority of its members have 
expressed a desire to do so, then that group is therefore the victim of the injustice of 
being held as a political captive against its will. Thus, for Wellman and Beran, ceteris 
paribus, any State that refuses to acknowledge a sub -region's right of secession after a 
majority of that sub -region's members have expressed a desire to secede is unjust. 
Similarly, an ascriptive PR theorist such as Miller would claim that where a national 
minority is not permitted to secede and create its own, independent State then it too is a 
victim of the injustice of being held against its will. Thus, for Miller, ceteris paribus, a 
State which contains a national minority and refuses to allow that minority to secede 
and create its own independent State is by definition unjust. In contrast, Buchanan 
denies both these suggestions by claiming that a group possesses a right to secede only 
if it is the victim of practices of discriminatory re- distribution, faces a Iethal threat or 
has had its territory taken from it. For Buchanan, then, any State that refuses to grant a 
group that fulfils one or more of these three conditions is unjust. 
The disagreement now appears to be one, not over whether or not a group should first 
have to be a victim of an injustice in order to possess a right to secede but, rather, over 
exactly what constitutes an injustice sufficient to ground a right of secession (and thus 
render a State unjust for as long as it continues to deny a sub -group the ability to 
exercise that right). Thus, it seems that what Buchanan should really say is that a PR 
theory may justify acts of secession from States which are perfectly just according to a 
RRO theory's conception of a perfectly just State. However, in anticipation of such an 
objection Buchanan claims that: 
...in the statement that Primary Right Theorists recognize a right to secede from perfectly just states 
the term `just' must be understood in what might be called the uncontroversial or standard or theory 
neutral sense. In other words, a perfectly just state here is one that does not violate relatively 
uncontroversial moral rights, including above all human rights, and which does not engage in 
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uncontroversially discriminatory policies towards minorities. This conception of justice is a neutral 
or relatively uncontroversial one in this sense: We may assume that it is acknowledged both by 
Remedial Right Only Theorists and Primary Right Only Theorists - that both types of theorists 
recognize these sorts of actions as injustices, though they may disagree in other ways as to the scope 
of justice. In contrast, to understand the term `just' here in such a fashion that a state is assumed to 
be unjust simply because it contains a minority people or nation...or simply because it contains a 
majority that seeks to secede but has not been permitted to do so, would be to an employ a 
conception of the justice [sic] that begs the question in this context, because it includes elements that 
are denied by one of the parties to the debate, namely Remedial Right Only Theorists. /72 
Thus, Buchanan rejects the claim that a State may be unjust simply because it refuses 
to permit a regionally concentrated majority to secede after that majority has expressed 
a desire to do so, or because it contains a minority nation, due to the fact that it employs 
a conception of justice upon which there is not universal agreement. But why should 
we be concerned about a universally acceptable, theory neutral, conception of justice 
when the very reason that there is disagreement between Buchanan and theorists such 
as Wellman and Beran, is precisely because the two sides have divergent conceptions of 
what constitutes a condition of injustice? Buchanan's response seems to be that one 
must point to principles above and beyond one's own theory in order to demonstrate 
why a given action is right or wrong, i.e. one cannot claim that the denial of a group's 
right to secede is unjust because it is a requirement of justice that that group possesses a 
right to secede. Hence, when the PR theorist claims that a State is unjust simply 
because it denies a group the right to secede, this simply begs the question of why a 
denial of a right to secede in that, or any other, context constitutes an example of an 
injustice. 
Suppose we accept Buchanan's question begging objection, and thus admit that one 
must provide a reason why a given action is, or is not, just by appealing to some 
external criterion of justice. Associative PR theorists such as Wellman, Gauthier and 
Beran do not appeal to what they take to be a self- evident right of secession. Rather, 
they conceive of a right to secede as a derivative right based upon, and justified by 
reference to, certain maxims such as freedom of association and the rights of 
democratically self -defined majorities that, in certain specified circumstances, are 
172 Buchanan, 
`Theories of Secession', pp.40 -41 [emphasis added]. 
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violated where a right of secession is denied. For associative PR theorists it is not the 
denial of a right to secede simpliciter that is the injustice but, rather, the violation of 
these underlying moral principles from which the right to secede is derived. Thus, even 
if Buchanan's objection is correct, it seems questionable whether it is really germane to 
the case of associative PR theories. 
Moreover, the principles from which the associative PR theorist derives a right of 
secession are principles to which Buchanan is himself also committed. Buchanan does 
not deny that democracy is a desirable form of government, nor does he question the 
individual rights of freedom of speech and association which are its concomitants. 
Indeed, one of the reasons which Buchanan gives for rejecting PR theories is the belief 
that their adoption would produce outcomes which would be unavoidably hostile to 
democracy. The difficulty for Buchanan is to demonstrate why democracy provides an 
answer only to the question `How should States be governed ?' and not the additional 
question of `What are the political boundaries of the State ?' Why should democratic 
methodology and the exercise of the right of freedom of association be confined within 
existing political boundaries and not also used to determine what those boundaries are? 
Indeed, it is Buchanan who, in claiming that the State's right to territorial integrity in all 
but the most extreme of circumstances trumps a right of secession,173 appears to be 
begging the question by first accepting democratic maxims, but then claiming that they 
do not provide a justification for secession in a manner asserted by other parties to the 
debate - i.e. associative PR theorists. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The difficulty for Buchanan is to demonstrate why there should be a weighty 
presumption in favour of the right of States to maintain their territorial integrity, such 
that a group is justified in seceding only where it: (a) is the victim of practices of 
serious discriminatory re- distribution; (b) faces a lethal threat to its existence; or (c) has 
had its land unjustly taken from it in the past. This is the position favoured by 
Buchanan and which he terms a RRO theory. Conversely, other, more permissive 
173 And thus claiming that the burden of justification - and an extremely onerous burden of justification 
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theories of secession which impose a considerably less onerous burden of justification 
upon would -be secessionists - which Buchanan wants to argue against - are termed PR 
theories. 
Above it was questioned whether in fact this distinction between RRO theories and 
so- called PR theories is really a coherent or a necessary one. Indeed, there seems good 
reason to question, not only whether such a distinction is sustainable, but also whether 
it - or rather the fact that Buchanan's theory is substantially less permissive than these 
other, competing theories - is really what provides the driving force behind his 
preference for RRO theories. Additionally, Buchanan's emphasis upon legitimate 
territorial sovereignty as a necessary pre- condition for possession of a right to secede 
was also critically evaluated and the claim made that such a requirement is simply a red 
herring that unnecessarily complicates matters. 
Even if, however, we put these various concerns aside, the question remains why we 
should grant a right of secession only to those groups which fall under one of the three 
arguments identified by Buchanan. In response Buchanan appeals to the three criteria 
of minimal realism, the avoidance of perverse incentives and consistency with a 
morally progressive interpretation of international law. However, upon examination it 
was found that each of these criteria were incapable of demonstrating that Buchanan's 
theory was in fact the superior option. The former criterion ignores the fact that States, 
and the institutions which have evolved around them, have no interest in sanctioning 
their own dismemberment. Moreover, the reasons given by Buchanan in support of the 
claim that States have a morally legitimate interest in maintaining their territorial 
integrity are not only unpersuasive, but also fail to demonstrate why - even if such an 
interest exists - it necessarily outweighs a group's right to secede unless that group has 
been a victim of the three types of injustices specified. 
The second criterion is unsatisfactory because it rewards the performance of morally 
illegitimate actions and, thus, creates a morally sub -optimal environment. Finally, the 
third criterion simply begs the question of what a morally superior theory of secession 
is - when it is precisely this question which we are supposed to be answering in the first 
at that - lies with would -be secessionist rather than their parent State. 
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place. In summary, then, while there may well be good reasons for preferring a highly 
restrictive theory of secession that grants a right to secede in only the three situations 
favoured by Buchanan, the reasons identified by Buchanan are not amongst them. 
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4 
LIBERAL- DEMOCRATIC 
THEORIES OF SECESSION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the third and final type of secession 
theory known as Liberal Democratic (LD) theories of secession. As in the case of the 
two preceding theories, the chapter will begin by first defining the LD theory. After 
having specified exactly what a LD theory is, the remainder of the chapter will be 
divided up into two substantive sections. The first section revisits the issues of 
territory and territorial sovereignty briefly introduced in the previous chapter and 
examines how they relate to the LD theory - particularly that of the leading LD 
theorist; Harry Beran. Having demonstrated the inadequacy of Beran's account of 
legitimate territorial sovereignty, the chapter will then make some general remarks 
about issues of territorial sovereignty and how these relate to the LD theory. 
In contrast, the second section of the chapter deals with the important, but nonetheless 
frequently overlooked, issue of whether or not there can be a liberal right to secede 
from a liberal State. A second, related issue also considered is exactly what type of 
liberalism the LD theory is premised upon. The aim of this discussion is to 
demonstrate that: (a) there are two, different types of liberalism to which the LD 
theorist may appeal; and, thus, (b) whether or not there can be a liberal right to secede 
- particularly a liberal right to secede from a liberal State - will depend upon which of 
these two variants of liberalism is adopted, each of which has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
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The first task is, then, to define a LD theory of secession. Put simply, a LD theory 
endorses the proposition that a group possesses a right to secede if, and only if a 
majority of that group's members express a desire to do so. Thus, a LD theory of 
secession supports what Buchanan terms a plebiscitary right to secede, i.e. "...the right 
of a majority in any portion of the territory of a state to form its own independent state 
if it so chooses, even if the majority of the state as a whole opposes their bid for 
independence. "I 
Amongst those theories that favour a plebiscitary right of secession we may 
distinguish three different, but ínter- related, types of LD theory. The first type of 
theory was outlined briefly in Chapter Two, and premises the right to secede upon 
liberalism's commitment to the freedom of the individual as a self -governing chooser. 
From this conception of individual liberty the requirement that political society 
approximate, as closely as is possible, a voluntary, or consensual, scheme is then 
derived and the claim made that if the majority of a group wish to secede then they 
prima facie should be permitted to do so. Thus, the argument begins by claiming that 
if we accept liberalism's characterisation of the individual as a self -governing chooser, 
then we must also accept that each individual enjoys moral dominion regarding 
themselves such that only their consent is sufficient to determine membership of any 
association - including political associations such as the State. 
Moreover, because States have no enforceable moral claims against their subjects 
other than those to which their subjects have freely consented,2 individuals have the 
right to associate politically with whomever they choose to associate with and the only 
just political divisions are those which reflect the willingness of people to live 
together.3 By far the most prominent advocate of this type of LD theory is Harry Beran 
who, in an impressive series of articles, has built up a detailed theory of secession to 
Allen Buchanan, `Democracy and Secession' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. 
Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.I5. 
2 Harry Beran, `A Liberal Theory of Secession', Political Studies, Vol.32, No.1, 1984, p.26. 
3 Michael Freeman, `The Priority of Function Over Structure: A New Approach to Secession' in Theories 
of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.19 -20. 
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rival that of the other secession heavyweight, Allen Buchanan. Other theorists who 
adopt a similar approach to Beran include Christopher Wellman and David Gauthier.5 
The second type of LD theory claims that a commitment to democracy and the moral 
principles that are its concomitants logically entails a commitment to a plebiscitary 
right of secession.6 The two main theorists which fall into this category are Philpott 
and Copp. Philpott adopts a Kantian approach claiming that a moral agent is free 
when s/he acts according to his/her own free will, pursuing ends which s /he has set for 
his /herself. From this principle of individual moral autonomy Philpott draws three 
conclusions, the most important of which as far as justifying a right of secession is 
concerned, is that individuals must be free to shape their political context and, thus, 
should be governed by democratic institutions in which they can either participate 
directly or have representatives who are directly accountable to them participate on 
their behalf.7 In other words, being autonomous means being self -governing and 
democracy is simply individuals governing themselves in the political realm.8 
Moreover, claims Philpott, democracy entails a plebiscitary right of secession because 
political self -determination itself promotes democracy in those groups "...whose 
members first claim to share an identity for political purposes, and second seek a 
separate government, as opposed to a larger proportion of representatives in their 
current State's government. "9 
4 Christopher H. Wellman, `A Defence of Secession and Political Self- Determination', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995, pp.143 -44. 
5 David Gauthier, `Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol24, No. 
3, September 1994. 
6 Freeman terms this type of theory the `republican version' of democratic theory as opposed to the 
former type of theory which he terms the `liberal version' of democratic theory (Freeman, p.18). 
7 For this part of his argument Philpott appeals to Amy Gutman, `The Disharmony of Democracy' in 
Democratic Community, ed. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 
1993), pp.126 -60; and Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), p.91. The other two conclusions drawn by Philpott from the principle of individual autonomy are 
that: (a) individuals possess, and the law of the State should protect, certain negative freedoms such as the 
freedom of expression, religious worship, association, speech etc; and (b) a society should distribute 
wealth, opportunities and other goods equitably amongst its citizens. See Daniel Philpott, 'In Defense of 
Self- Determination', Ethics, Vol.105, 1995, pp.356 -58. 
8 Philpott, p.357. 
9 Philpott, p.358. For a critical appraisal of Philpott's theory see Buchanan, pp. 17 -19. 
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Copp,10 on the other hand, offers an original analysis based upon the moral principle 
of equal respect for persons arguing that a guiding principle of democracy is the 
proposition that people must be shown equal respect and, thus, given equal authority 
over political matters. It is, claims Copp, "...an unjust lack of regard for a person to 
fail to give him or her authority over decisions that affect only his or her own life; it is 
similarly an unjust lack of regard to fail to give this person equal authority with other 
members of his or her society over political decisions regarding that society. "I1 
Furthermore, argues Copp, " [if the members of...a society have a stable desire for 
statehood, it would show a lack of respect for them and their judgment if they were not 
given the authority to make a decision about statehood. "12 
Finally, the third type of LD theory is advocated by a number of extreme 
individualist, or so- called libertarian, theorists who, in the tradition of Ludwig Von 
Mises,13 see the State as unavoidably hostile to individual liberty and argue against 
principles of (international) distributive justice and a duty of aid to fellow citizens. 
Concern about the power of the State and an inherent tendency for the State to attempt 
to increase that power at the cost of individual liberty, leads these theorists to conclude 
that an individual right of secession is a necessary control upon the State and, hence, 
an effective means of guaranteeing the freedom of the individual.l4 
10 David Copp, `Democracy and Communal Determination' in Rethinking Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. 
Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996). Also see David Copp, `Do 
Nations have the Right of Self -Determination ?' in Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, ed. 
Stanley G. French (Montreal: Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979). 
II Copp (1996), p.292. 
12 Copp (1996), p.292. For a reply to Copp's theory see Buchanan, p.20. 
13 See, for example, Ludwig Von Mises, Nation, State and Economy (New York: New York University 
Press, 1983) and Liberalism (New York: Foundation for Economic Education, 1985). 
14 
1 have in mind here the following theorists: David Gordon, `Introduction' in Secession, State and 
Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Steven Yates, 'When is 
Political Divorce Justified ?' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998); Murray N. Rothbard, `Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation State' 
in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998) and 
Ethics of Liberty (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982); Clyde N. Wilson, `Secession: The Last Bulwark 
of Our Liberties' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998); Hans -Hermann Hoppe, `The Western State as Paradigm', Society, Vol.35, No.5, 1998 
and `Small is Beautiful and Efficient: The Case for Secession', Telos, No.107, 1996; Donald W. 
Livingstone, `The Very Idea of Secession' Society, Vol.35, No.5, 1998; and Robert W, McGee, 
`Secession Reconsidered', Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vo1.11, No.1, 1994. 
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This chapter will principally be concerned with the former type of LD theory and, 
thus, with the writings of Beran, Wellman and Gauthier. While much of what is said 
below may well be accepted by, or relevant to,15 these other, less mainstream LD 
commentators, this is not a matter which will be directly pursued here. It should be 
emphasised, however, that while these alternative theories put forward by Philpott, 
Copp and others are largely omitted from discussion, this should by no means be 
interpreted as a claim that these theories are necessarily unsatisfactory or inferior to 
Beran's theory. 
Rather, because adequately dealing with all three types of theory and the various 
issues which each raises is beyond the scope of the chapter, it makes sense to pick out 
one particular type of theory and focus upon it in some detail. The former variant of 
LD theories has been selected due to the fact that both it and its main proponent - 
Harry Beran - have come to dominate discussion of LD theories of secession in a 
manner that has thus -far eluded the other two types of theory. Rightly or wrongly, the 
position adopted by Beran, Wellman and Gauthier is a great deal more predominant in 
the secession literature than the other two types of LD theory, with the result that much 
of the literature on LD theories is either written by them or is directed specifically 
towards them. Indeed, Beran's theory has come to be viewed as representative of the 
LD position in much the same way as Buchanan's has of Just Cause theories. 
B. Clarifying the Theory Under Consideration 
Having now specified which of the three types of LD theory will be addressed16 and 
why, it is now necessary to further clarify the theory before going on to evaluate it. As 
was noted above, the starting point for the LD theory is the principle of voluntary 
political association, which is itself a product of liberalism's individualistic moral 
ontology. To briefly re -cap: liberalism begins with the view that the individual is the 
ultimate unit of moral worth, and that individual well -being is dependent upon the 
freedom to live one's life `from the inside.' Thus, individuals must be free to live their 
15 Indeed, Beran admits that his theory of secession has much in common with that of libertarian theorists 
such as Von Mises, Rothbard and McGee. See Harry Beran, `A Democratic Theory of Political Self - 
Determination for a New World Order' in Theories ofSecession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York; 
Routledge, 1998), p.41. 
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lives in accordance with their own conception of the good life and to obtain knowledge 
of other, alternative conceptions which, after an appropriate period of critical 
reflection, they may adopt if they so wish.17 These precepts then give rise to certain 
individual rights. For example, the concern that individuals live their lives in 
accordance with a conception of the good life of their own choosing generates a right 
for individuals to be free from the coercive interference of others. Similarly, the 
concern that individuals be free to question their beliefs of the good life, to acquire an 
awareness of alternative conceptions and critically evaluate these, generates individual 
rights to freedom of association and expression." 
While liberalism is founded upon a strictly individualistic moral ontology, this does 
not mean that liberals cannot recognise the importance of interpersonal cooperation 
between individuals, or the fact that man is by nature a social creature and human 
flourishing is impossible without human relations.19 What it does mean, however, is 
that the liberal cannot attach any intrinsic importance to cooperative effort and the 
collective institutions that it creates, but may view such associations as only possessing 
an instrumental value strictly proportionate to the contribution that they make towards 
the well -being of their constituent, individual members.20 Therefore, it is not that 
liberals don't value community, or that they deny that individuals are frequently 
members of groups which influence their conduct and shape their loyalties and 
identity. Rather, they deny that: (a) moral claims can be attached to such 
16 Which shall henceforth, for reasons of brevity, be referred to simply as the LD theory.' 
17 See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.80 -81 and 
Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.9 -13. Also see Brian Barry, 
`Nationalism Versus Liberalism', Nations and Nationality, Vol.2, No.3, 1996, p.432. 
18 See Kymlicka (1995), p.81. Also see Harry Brighouse, `Against Nationalism' in Rethinking 
Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 1996), 
p.372. Admittedly, this is something of a simplistic and skeletal definition of liberal thought. However, 
as Beran quite correctly points out, a commitment to the freedom of the individual to attain genuine self - 
authorship (i.e. the freedom to live one's life from the inside) is a basic tenet that unites the diverse 
strands of liberalism. While there are serious disagreements between different types of liberals, these are 
generally to do with what method of social organisation maximises the freedom to live one's life from the 
inside, and are beyond the scope of this thesis. See Beran (1984), p.24. Also see Steinberg who Beran 
cites in support of this claim. Jules Steinberg, Locke, Rousseau and the Idea of Consent (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1978), p.24. A similar point is also made by Richard Bellamy, `Liberalism' in 
Contemporary Political Ideologies, ed. Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (New York: Continuum, 
1999), p.25. 
19 Refer Michael Hartney, `Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights' in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.205 -6. 
20 Hartney, pp.206 -8. 
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associations ;21 and (b) that these associations have any value over and above the 
contribution that they make to the welfare of their individual members.22 
While this commitment to value individualism has been severely criticised by other 
thinkers - particularly communitarians such as Taylor23 and Sande124 - these claims 
will not be addressed here.25 This is not to belittle the claims made by communitarians 
and other, associated critics of liberalism. However, while such claims are both 
interesting and important26 they are clearly beyond the scope, not only of this thesis, 
but in many respects also the contemporary secession debate which, rightly or wrongly, 
is generally conducted within a liberal framework. While some secession theorists 
such as Miller and Buchanan may deny the LD claim that democratically self -defined 
groups should possess a plebiscitary right of secession, this does not mean that they 
reject liberal democracy and the moral principles which are its concomitants. Rather, 
these theorists agree with LD theorists that States should be governed in accordance 
with the requirements of liberal democracy. However, unlike the LD theorist, they do 
not believe that the democratic majoritarianism of the LD theory should be employed 
to determine what the boundaries of those States are. Indeed, one of the reasons Miller 
21 See, for example, Chandran Kukathas, `Are There Any Cultural Rights ?' in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.231. Note that this article 
originally appeared in Political Theory, Vol.20, 1992. 
22 See, for example, Kymlicka, (1989), p.140. 
23 See, for example, Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); `Shared and Divergent Values' in Options For a New 
Canada, ed. Ronald Watts and D. Brown (Tornonto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); and `The 
Politics of Recognition' in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
24 See, for example, Michael Sande', Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); `The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, Vol.12, 
No.1, 1984; and `Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice' in Articles of Faith, Articles of Peace, 
ed. James Hunter and O. Guinness (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1990). 
2s For a good summary of the communitarian case against liberalism, and some responses to it, see 
Kymlicka (1989), pp.47 -70; and `Community' in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Also see Allen Buchanan, 
'Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', Ethics, Vol.99, No.4, 1989; and Omar Dahbour, 
`The Nation -State as a Political Community: A Critique of the Communitarian Argument for National 
Self- Determination' in Rethinking Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: 
Calgary University Press, 1996), pp.316 -21. 
26 Although this is not say that there are not some good, liberal replies to the criticisms made by 
communitarian thinkers. For example, refer, again, to Kymlicka (1989), pp.47 -70; and Buchanan (1989). 
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and Buchanan give for rejecting the LD theory is precisely the claim that its general 
adoption would undermine liberal -democratic institutions of governance.` 
Given that unless we can agree on certain fundamental precepts then there may not be 
enough common ground to discuss certain issues sensibly any further, not only would 
attempting to critically engage these liberal -based theories of secession from, say, a 
communitarian standpoint appear to be rather difficult, it is also hard to see what 
benefits or insights might be produced by such an undertaking. This is not to say that 
one might not construct a normative theory of secession from, say, a communitarian 
perspective. However, the present task is to critically engage with, and say something 
substantive about, existing normative theories of secession which are constructed 
within a liberal paradigm. In order to accomplish this task within the allotted pages of 
this thesis it is necessary to start from a position that takes certain propositions as 
given, while putting the relative merits and weaknesses of liberalism as compared to 
other, competing ideologies to one side. Moreover, an internal critique based upon 
factors which liberals regard as significant poses a more serious threat to the LD theory 
than one premised upon considerations which liberals would reject or consider 
questionable. 
An example of the sort of collective institution favoured by liberals as capable of 
making an effective contribution to the realisation of individual freedom is the State. 
Typically liberals tend to agree that through the application of its coercive mechanisms 
the State may play a positive role in providing an environment in which the Iiberal 
ideal of individuals leading their lives `from the inside' may be effectively realised. 
For example, by attaching penalties to the performance of actions which infringe the 
individual rights of others the State, through its legal institutions, intervenes in the 
practical deliberations of individuals by rigging the consequences of right- infringing 
27 See, for example, Buchanan (1998), pp.21ff; and `Theories of Secession', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol.26, No.1, 1997, pp.47 -49. Similarly, it will be remembered from Chapter Two that Miller 
argues that a right of secession should be granted to nations - as opposed to, say, democratically self - 
defined groups - because doing so will maximise the social pre- conditions necessary to the effective 
functioning of democracy. See David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.96 -98. 
My point is simply that, while there is serious disagreement amongst the various contributors to the 
secession debate over which sorts of entities possess a right to secede and why, most commentators 
nonetheless maintain a commitment to liberalism. 
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actions.28 Conversely, without the laws of the State intervening in the practical 
deliberations of individuals and upholding basic rights and liberties, individuals would 
have insufficient reason to not interfere with the rights of other individuals.29 Hence 
by providing an incentive for individuals to refrain from infringing the rights of others 
the State reduces the performance of right- infringing actions and, thus, produces an 
environment that, from a liberal perspective, is superior to that which would obtain in 
its absence.30 
However, while liberals tend to agree that the State has a positive role to play in 
providing an environment conducive to the realisation of the liberal ideal of individual 
self -authorship, there is nonetheless wide disagreement amongst liberals as to how far 
the State should go in such an endeavour. This is an on -going debate all too familiar to 
political theorists where numerous positions have been staked out by a variety of 
theorists ranging from the so- called `welfare liberalism' of T. H. Green,31 to the 
minimalistic State advocated by theorists such as Nozick 32 Thus, while liberals may 
agree that political society is a preferable alternative to a State -less environment 
various strands of liberalism nonetheless disagree as to the proper nature and extent of 
that State.33 
28 Thus, if the penalty for assault is five hundred dollars then E is still free to assault P (i.e. E is still 
physically capable of assaulting P), however the simple option of assaulting Pis no longer available. The 
options have been `rigged' by the State from: (a) assaulting P or not assaulting P; to (b) assaulting P and 
paying five hundred dollars or not assaulting P. The intended effect of the penalty is to decrease the 
desire to perform the action in question to a sufficient degree which ensures that in most (if not all) cases 
the action of assault will not be performed. On whether or not this constitutes a condition of unfreedom 
refer, for example, to Hillel Steiner, `Individual Liberty', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.75, 
1974 -75, p.33. 
29 See Wellman, p.156. 
30 Obviously for such a system to work a number of conditions must be met, e.g. there must be a 
sufficiently high likelihood of being caught and thus having the sanction applied and the sanction must be 
sufficiently severe to deter the type of action in question. These are the two obvious provisos although 
there may, of course, be others. If, for example, the penalty is too high then it may prove counter- 
productive, e.g. a common argument against raising the penalty for rape so that it approximates the 
penalty for murder, is that it encourages the rapist to murder his victim in order to minimise the likelihood 
of being caught and thus having the (increased) sanction applied. 
31 See Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, 1921) 
and Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884). 
32 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). 
33 Refer Keith Dowding, `Secession and Isolation' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), pp.72 -73. Also see above and Beran (1984), p.24. 
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It is clear, however, that liberalism's commitment to the individual as a self - 
governing chooser creates a problem in justifying coercive institutions such as the 
State. As was noted in Chapter Two, if the individual stands in a position of complete 
moral dominion over him/herself such that no second party is justified in coercing 
him/her providing his/her actions do not harm others, then by issuing legally binding 
directives that make certain actions mandatory and others forbidden, using the threat of 
sanctions to ensure compliance with these directives and coercing non -compliers, 
existing States must illegitimately interfere in the lives of their subjects.34 If the 
individual occupies a position of moral dominion regarding his/her own affairs, how 
can the State be justified in encroaching upon this domain and restricting the value 
which liberalism seeks to promote (i.e. individual liberty) ?35 
One response to this problem is, of course, simply to say that the State's coercive 
authority is legitimate in as much as it is the best instrument to secure the rights of 
others. Another, alternative response favoured by Beran is termed the Consent Theory 
of Political Obligation36 and attempts to reconcile the value of individual freedom with 
the State's exercise of coercive authority, by claiming that the legitimacy of the State is 
based upon the consent of its citizens. Because, under the Consent Theory, the 
obligation which agents have to obey the State is a self -assumed one (i.e. a product of 
an individual's own, voluntary actions37) it is argued that there is no inconsistency in 
maintaining both that the individual is free and that the State is morally justified in 
restricting that freedom.38 
This principle of voluntary political association that underpins the Consent Theory 
also provides the basis for the LD theory of secession. If only the individual's free 
34 See, for example, Wellman, p.155. 
35 Wellman, p.150. 
36 Hereafter referred to simply as `the Consent Theory.' 
37 See A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), p.64. 
38 There are, of course, conditions which must first be met if an individual's consent is to generate an 
obligation for that individual to obey the State - particularly with respect to so- called `tacit' consent 
where consent is given by failing to do certain things rather than being expressed by action. For example; 
consent must be given intentionally and knowingly; consent must be given voluntarily; individuals must 
be aware of the situation and that consent is being requested; there must be a reasonable period of time for 
expression of dissent; it must be reasonably easy to express dissent; and the consequences of dissent must 
not penalise such expressions (Simmons, pp.64ff especially pp.80 -83). 
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consent is sufficient to determine membership of a political union, then individuals 
have the right to associate politically with whomever they wish and, a fortiori, the only 
just political divisions are those which reflect the willingness of people to live 
together.39 Of course, in some senses the relationship between the individual and the 
State already is voluntary as, at least in most cases, individuals have a right to emigrate 
or change their nationality.40 However, while individuals are generally free to leave 
their parent State and join another already existing State,41 this voluntarism has yet to 
be applied to the unity of the State itself. This, the LD theory claims, is a mistake. A 
commitment to the freedom of self -governing choosers to live in societies that 
approximate as closely as is possible voluntary schemes42 requires that secession be 
permitted whenever possible.43 
From the requirement that the unity of a State be based upon the willingness of its 
citizens to be a part of that State, Beran appeals to what he terms a right of habitation 
to conclude that geographically concentrated groups of individuals referred to as 
territorial communities possess a right to secede if, and only if, a majority of their 
members favour secession.44 However, while a majority in favour of secession is a 
necessary condition for the possession of a right to secede it is not a sufficient 
condition, i.e. Beran subordinates the right to considerations of stability and viability 
by the inclusion of certain conditions, or side constraints, which would -be secessionists 
must first fulfil if their secession is to be morally justified.45 
39 Freeman, pp.19 -20. Both Gauthier and Beran, draw an analogy between the right of the individual to 
determine his /her personal relationships, and the right to determine one's political relationships. Thus, 
just as each individual has a right to freely determine who they marry, who they work for and who they 
socialise with so they should be free to determine who they associate with politically in the same State. 
Moreover, such relationships are not irrevocable -just as one may divorce one's spouse, quit one's job 
and sever friendships so one should be permitted to withdraw from a political association (Beran (1984), 
pp.24 -25; and Gauthier, pp360ff). 
40 See Beran (1998), p.35. Also see Beran (1984), p.26. 
41 Assuming, of course, that they can in fact find another State which they want to join and which is also 
willing to have them. 
42 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p.13. 
43 Beran (1984), pp.24-25. 
44 The twin notions of a right of habitation and territorial communities will be addressed in greater detail 
below. 
45 Beran specifies six such constraints: (a) the group must be sufficiently large to assume the basic 
responsibilities of a State; (b) the group must be prepared to allow sub -groups the right to secede; (c) the 
group must not wish to exploit or oppress sub -groups; (d) the group's secession must not produce a 
territorial enclave; (e) the group must not occupy an area which is culturally, economically or militarily 
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For the moment, then, the LD theory may be summarised as the following set of four 
propositions: (1) Normal adults have the right of personal self -determination and, thus, 
freedom of association with willing partners. (2) This principle of voluntary political 
association justifies an individual right of emigration and a right for democratically 
self -defined groups of individuals to secede. (3) A group's right to secede must be 
determined by majoritarian means, i.e. a necessary condition for a group to possess a 
right of secession is the requirement that a majority of the constituent members of that 
group express a desire to secede. (4) The right may be further restricted by certain side 
constraints which the would -be secessionists must also fulfil if they are to possess a 
right of secession.46 
4.2 ISSUES OF TERRITORY AND THE IDENTITY OF THE RIGHT- HOLDER 
A. Introduction 
One of the more curious features of Beran's theory is the manner in which he begins 
with a commitment to normative individualism and yet concludes with a thesis of 
democratic majoritarianism. Whereas the former suggests that each individual has the 
right to secede unilaterally from any State to which they fail to give (or subsequently 
retract) their consent,47 the latter entails that the right is possessed by groups of 
individuals which Beran terms `territorial communities.' The purpose of the 
discussion that follows is to take a critical look at this feature of Beran's theory and 
also the wider issue of the proper role of legitimate territorial sovereignty in a liberal 
theory of secession. 
essential to the parent State; and (f) the group must not occupy an area which has a disproportionately 
high share of the economic resources of the existing State. See Harry Beran, The Consent Theory of 
Political Obligation (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), p.42. These restrictions are further clarified in Beran 
(1998), pp.46ff. 
46 e.g. the considerations of viability and stability discussed above. In other words, the expression of a 
majority of individuals within a geographical area of a desire to secede is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for possession of the right to secede. The group must also satisfy these other, additional 
conditions to possess such a right. Thus, the right to secede is not indefeasible and may, therefore, be 
overridden by other, conflicting rights. 
47 The proposition that individuals possess a right of unilateral secession is generally characteristic of the 
above -mentioned extreme individualist, or libertarian, secession theorists. See, for example, Hoppe and 
Livingstone. 
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The first task is to spell out exactly what Beran means by the two terms of a 'right of 
habitation' and `territorial community.' Whereas both Wellman and Gauthier largely 
ignore the question of territory and do not make possession of legitimate territorial 
sovereignty a necessary pre- condition to possession of a right to secede,48 Beran claims 
that in order to possess a right to secede a group must first qualify for a right to occupy 
the territory on which they live - a right of habitation. Underlying this territorial 
component of his theory is Brilmayer's observation that in the absence of a non - 
territorial delineation of political sovereignty, a right to secede - unlike, say, a right to 
emigrate or change one's nationality - is necessarily defined in terms of the removal of 
territory from the State. Therefore, to grant a right of secession is, ex hypothesi, to 
grant a right of territorial sovereignty and this raises the question of exactly what 
territory and why.49 In recognition of this fact Beran notes: 
...the distinction between emigration and secession is important, because the former does not 
involve the removal of territory from the state while the latter does. An individual or family has 
the right to emigrate from their state, but it is by no means obvious that they have the right to 
remove territory from the state which they wish to leave. Any theory of rightful secession has 
to specify what sorts of groups have the right not only to leave their state but to leave it with 
their territory: in other words, have the right of continuing occupation of their territory (the 
right of habitation),50 
The difficulty now is to specify exactly what types of entities qualify for Beran's right 
of habitation. Nations are one possible candidate, but Beran believes that there may be 
48 On the subject of territory Gauthier writes: "...I regard the territorial claims of political communities as 
strictly derivative from what might be called claims of habitation by individuals. If most of the persons 
actually inhabiting a particular territory wish to establish a political community among and restricted to 
themselves, then their claims of habitation provide a basis for the territorial claim of the community they 
establish - and a basis that normally overrides any other territorial claims." See Gauthier, p.369. 
Similarly, Wellman does not distinguish between a right of secession and an antecedent right to territorial 
sovereignty, but argues that to demonstrate that an agent possesses a right to secede is to also demonstrate 
that that party possesses legitimate territorial sovereignty (e.g. see Wellman's discussion of Buchanan on 
pp.144 -45 and pp.152 -53). While both theorists fail to explicitly address the objection that the LD theory 
begs the question of what the relevant constituency is in which a plebiscite may be held (see Allen 
Buchanan, `Self -Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law' in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. 
Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.314 -15; and Freeman, 
p.24) Wellman appears to agree with Gauthier that such issues should be determined by claims of 
habitation arguing that "...any group able and willing to perform the functions required of a liberal 
political state has a claim to the territory it occupies..." Wellman, p.164 [emphasis added]. 
49 See Lea Brilmayer, `Secession and Self Determination: A Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale Journal 
of International Law, Vol.16, No.1, January 1991, p.201. 
50 Beran (1998), p.35 [emphasis added]. 
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other, smaller social groups - which he refers to as territorial communities - that also 
have a right of habitation. Beran defines a territorial community as: 
...a social group that has a common habitat, consists of numerous families (i.e. is larger and 
more complex than a family), and is capable of self -perpetuation through time as a distinct 
identity. Its members have direct and many -sided relationships to each other, have some 
common interests, have a sense of belonging to the group...and are conscious of themselves as 
a distinct group... Territorial communities can range from small ones, such as villages, to large 
ones, such as nations. The latter can perhaps be thought of as communities of communities and 
as communities in their own right.51 
Because the territorial community is the smallest possible unit which may qualify for 
a right of habitation, it is at the level of the territorial community that the decision to 
secede or not to secede is made, by holding a referendum on the issue in order to 
determine whether or not a majority of the community's members are in favour of 
seceding. Thus, for Beran the right to secede is a collective right held and exercised by 
groups of individuals known as territorial communities, that is derived from a set of 
antecedent individual rights to autonomy and freedom of association. Individuals, 
claims Beran, have the right to free association and this includes the right to form 
territorial communities on land they rightfully own or acquire. Moreover, "[t]erritorial 
communities have the right to maintain themselves, and for this they need territory. "52 
While a territorial community may be able to maintain itself if forced to move to a new 
location against its will, there remains a high risk of disintegration. Conversely, 
because individuals and families can quite readily survive relocation Beran concludes 
that they only have a right of emigration whereas "...[territorial] communities have the 
right of habitation [and therefore a right of secession], provided they have acquired 
their land rightfully. "53 
51 Beran (1998), p.36. Despite the fact that Beran elsewhere rejects Nationalist theories of secession (see 
Harry Beran, `Border Disputes and the Right of National Self -Determination', History of European Ideas, 
Vol.16, No.4 -6, 1993), his definition of a territorial community sounds remarkably like the 
subjective /objective hybrid definition of a nation given by theorists such as Tamir and Margalit and Raz. 
Tamir, it will be remembered, claims that a group of individuals constitute a nation when they: (a) exhibit 
a sufficient number of shared objective characteristics such as a common culture, history, language etc.; 
and (b) are conscious of their distinctiveness and are bound together by a sense of solidarity which this 
consciousness creates. Also see Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, `National Self -Determination', Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol.87, No.9, (1990). 
52 Beran (1998), p.36. 
53 Beran (1998), p.36. Similarly, elsewhere Beran claims that "...if a group rightfully occupies part of the 
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Finally, because within larger territorial communities - the overall majority of whose 
members may favour secession - there may be smaller territorial communities who do 
not favour secession, Beran proposes the repeated use of the majority principle through 
a process of reiterated referenda held in each territorial community: 
...a separatist movement can call for a referendum, within a territory specified by it, to 
determine whether there should be a change in this territory's political status, e.g. whether it 
should secede from its state. If there is a majority in the territory as a whole for secession, then 
the territory's people may exercise its right of self -determination and secede. But there may be 
people within this territory who do not wish to he a part of the newly independent state. They 
could show, by majority vote within their territory, that this is so, and then become independent 
in turn, or remain within the state from which the others wish to secede.54 
As an example of such a scenario Beran cites the case of the former Yugoslavia 
where a majority of Croats were in favour of secession, but in the portion of Croatia 
known as Krajina which was populated mostly by Serbs, there was a majority against 
secession. Under Beran's theory, the larger territorial community of Croatia would 
have been justified in seceding from the former Yugoslav Federation subsequent to a 
referendum confirming that a majority of Croats did in fact favour such a move. This 
would then have been followed by another referendum in Kraijina (and any other 
similar dissident territorial communities like it) to determine whether Kraijina stayed 
within the Serb -dominated former Yugoslavia, became a part of the nascent State of 
Croatia or formed their own independent State.55 
To summarise: under Beran's theory, in order to possess a right to secede a group 
must have a right of habitation. In order to qualify for a right of habitation - which is 
essentially a theory of legitimate territorial sovereignty - a group must not only: (1) 
qualify as a territorial community by fulfilling the above sociological criteria; they 
territory of the existing state, that territory primarily belongs to that group." See Harry Beran, , `The 
Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' in Nations, Cultures and Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and 
Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.61 [emphasis added]. 
54 Beran (1998), p.38. 
55 Refer Beran (1998), p.38. Beran neglects to mention the third option of independent Statehood and 
discusses the issue only in terms of Kraijina: (a) remaining within Yugoslavia; or (b) breaking away from 
it as a part of the new State of Croatia. Presumably this is because there was never a discernible desire on 
the part of the people of Kraijina to form an independent State. However, it is worth pointing out that as a 
distinct territorial community they would, under Beran's theory, nonetheless have been justified in 
forming their own State had they so wished. 
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must also (2) be the traditional occupants of a territory that they acquired as a result of 
a transaction, or series of transactions, which accord with certain antecedent principles 
of procedural justice;56 and (3) demonstrate that continued occupancy of their 
traditional territory is essential to the maintenance of their identity as a distinct 
territorial community.57 
B. A Critical Assessment of Beran's Right of Habitation 
A common objection to the LD theory of secession is that ascribing a plebiscitary 
right of secession to democratically self -defined groups simply begs the question of 
what is the relevant constituency in which such a plebiscite might be held.58 In other 
words, even if we agree that separatist conflicts should be decided democratically by a 
majority vote, there will remain the difficulty of specifying what the relevant 
democratic unit is - a question that cannot itself be answered democratically.59 
Alternatively, as another writer puts it: "...the people cannot decide [issues of political 
56 A condition which, it should be noted, requires a theory of property rights. 
57 This emphasis upon so- called territorial communities as the legitimate holders of a right to secede, and 
the requirement that in order to possess a right to secede a group must first demonstrate that there is a 
necessary connection between continued occupancy of its traditional territory and the maintenance of its 
distinct identity, appears to be something of a departure from Beran's prior position. Previously, in 
response to the objection that a plebiscitary right of secession begged the question of what the 
constituency in which such a plebiscite might be held is, Beran simply stated that a secessionist group 
should specify the constituency that votes on the issue of secession, as if all the citizens of the State were 
permitted to vote then they could outvote the secessionists with the result that the resultant political union 
would be involuntary (Beran (1993), p.485 and (1984), p.27). A similar approach is adopted by Philpott 
who argues that it is wrong to claim that all the citizens of a State should have a say in whether or not a 
sub -group within that State has the right to secede as one does not have the autonomy to restrict another's 
autonomy and, a fortiori, one's autonomy is thus not restricted when one no longer has a say in how 
others are governed (Philpott, p.363). While it is true that Beran has previously stated that "...a 
community which is the traditional occupant of a territory has a moral right to continue to inhabit this 
territory" (Beran (1994), p.56) he doesn't go into any detail as to why this might be so or what the source 
of such a right of continued habitation might be. 
58 Theorists such as Caney and Ryan argue that ascribing a right of political self -determination to `the 
people' simply begs the question of who counts as the people and, thus, what the relevant democratic unit 
in which a plebiscite might be held is. For example, Caney questions whether, when in 1988 the citizens 
of France voted to deny New Caledonia the right secede, the decision was legitimate (Simon Caney, 
`National Self- Determination and National Secession: Individualistic and Communitarian Approaches' in 
Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.154 -55) whereas Ryan 
raises the same question with respect to Northern Ireland by asking whether the future of Northern Ireland 
should be decided by a vote in Northern Ireland alone, the whole of Ireland, or the U.K (Stephen Ryan, no 
title, Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol.16, No.2, 1997, p.269). On this issue also see Margalit and Raz, 
p.456; Brian Barry, 'Self -Govemment Revisited' in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. David Miller and 
Larry Siedentop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p.127; and Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, `The 
Requirement of Plebiscite in Territorial Rapprochement', Houston Journal of International Law, Vo1.12, 
No.1, 1989, pp.49 -51. 
59 Margalit and Raz, p.456. 
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borders] until someone [first] decides who are the people." 60 In response Beran claims 
that the reiterated use of the majority principle effectively overcomes this difficulty 
because it "...always yields a determinate result...[and] maximises the number of 
individuals who live in mutually desired political association, an ideal implicit in the 
right of freedom of association... "61 
However, making territorial communities the bearers of a right of secession does not - 
- despite Beran's claims to the contrary - resolve the problem of who counts as the 
people, but simply succeeds in replacing the term `the people' with the alternative of `a 
territorial community.' Even if we agree that territorial communities should be the 
bearers of a right to secede, there is likely to remain residual disagreement over what 
groups qualify as territorial communities.62 Beran's definition of a territorial 
community is of no assistance in resolving such disputes because, as was noted in 
Chapter Two, factors such as a sense of belonging, the possession of a distinct identity 
and an awareness of being different from other groups are all matters of degree and 
interpretation. 
Indeed, there is a fundamental difficulty in appealing to notions of group membership 
in order to identify candidates for a right to secede, when secessionist disputes are 
themselves frequently a result of conflicting accounts of who qualifies as a separate 
'people' or 'nation.' For example, while the East Timorese may conceive of 
themselves as a distinct group and possess a strong sense of inter- personal solidarity 
and identify with one another as East Timorese, the same is true of many Indonesians 
who conceive of themselves as members of a broader Indonesian community that 
includes the people of East Timor. Similarly, while Kashmiris frequently appeal to a 
sense of Kashmiri nationalism in an attempt to justify their secession from India, many 
Indians deny that Kashmir has a right to secede precisely because they see Kashmiris 
as members of a wider Indian nation. 
60 Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self :Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 
p.56. 
61 Beran (1998), pp.38 -39. 
62 And, a fortiori, holders of a right to secede. For example, see Linda Bishai, `Altered States: Secession 
and the Problems of Liberal Theory' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: 
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Who, then, is the community - the people of East Timor simpliciter, or the people of 
Indonesia including the people of East Timor? Who are the nation - the Kashmiris or 
the people of India together with the inhabitants of Kashmir ?63 It is difficult to 
understand how notions of a shared identity, a sense of belonging and self -awareness 
might be employed to distinguish between different groups in order to identify 
candidates for a right of secession, when divergent interpretations of such features are 
the very reason that many secessionist disputes exist in the first place. 
Suppose we put the difficulties of distinguishing between territorial communities to 
one side. It is evident that not all so- called territorial communities will fulfil both of 
Beran's latter criteria. For example, a group might need its territory in order to 
maintain its distinctive communal existence yet have a relatively weak historical claim 
to it.64 Conversely, a group might possess a relatively strong historical claim to its 
territory, yet be quite capable of maintaining its communal identity in another, 
alternative territory or even with no territory at al165 Indeed, it is questionable as to 
just how many groups would in fact be capable of demonstrating a necessary 
connection between the continued occupancy of their traditional territory and the 
maintenance of their communal identity. As immigrant communities all around the 
world demonstrate, it is quite possible for groups to maintain their Ianguage, identity 
and cultural norms despite being far removed from their traditional homeland. 
Routledge, 1998), p.101, 
63 There is also the associated issue of whether or not only the indigenous people of a territory should be 
entitled to vote in the plebiscite or whether the right should be extended to settlers and, if so, whether only 
long -term or more recent settlers may participate. For example, Argentina rejects the notion of a 
plebiscite as a means of resolving its dispute with Britain over the Falkland Islands by arguing that the 
indigenous population of the islands were forcibly evicted by the British colonial administration and 
replaced by a population of British origin. The same reason is given by Spain in its rejection of a 
plebiscite to settle the dispute with Britain over Gibraltar. See Rudrakumaran, pp.41 -45. 
64 See Freeman, p.24. On the one hand, it is not difficult to understand the moral imperatives which 
underlie Beran's requirement of just acquisition; clearly we do not want to legitimate the unjust taking of 
territory or reward aggressive acts of unjust appropriation. Although this is not to say that such a 
requirement does not raise numerous difficulties. For example, in addition to the question of what counts 
as the just acquisition of territory, there is also the problem that the circumstances of acquisition may 
simply be unknown or subject to dispute and that most existing States have acquired the territory over 
which they currently claim sovereignty through morally questionable means. On this latter point see, for 
example, Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania 
and Quebec (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), pp.I09 
-1 10; and Jeffrey Reiman, `Can Nations Have Moral 
Rights to Territory' in The Territorial Rights of Nations and Peoples, ed. John R. Jacobson (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p.í64. 
65 Also, as Freeman points out, both the historical and communal grounds may give more than one group 
a right to the same territory and hence produce conflict (Freeman, p.24). 
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Furthermore, different territorial communities may be geographically inter -twined 
and/or claim (parts of) the same territory as essential to the maintenance of their 
distinctive lifestyles. Once again, Beran's right of habitation simply begs the question 
it is supposed to answer, as it is precisely such disputes over territory and its 
significance to the identity of various competing groups which often produce 
secessionist disputes in the first place. For example, both Israelis and Palestinians 
claim sovereignty over the holy city of Jerusalem and numerous other sites in the West 
Bank (e.g. Hebron), which are of religious and historical significance to both 
communities. Alternatively, consider the 1992 communal riots in India which were 
sparked when a Mosque in the small town of Ayodhya was demolished by religious 
fanatics who wanted to construct a Hindu temple on the site.66 It is unclear how we 
might settle territorial disputes between warring groups - not to mention identify 
candidates for secession - by asking whether or not a particular territory is important to 
a group's identity, when it is precisely because the same territory is claimed as 
essential to the respective identities of two or more groups that these sorts of conflicts 
exist in the first place. 
Beran claims that liberalism stipulates that the people possess sovereignty with the 
result that "the moral rights of rulers can be derived only from the...voluntary 
acceptance of certain political arrangements [and that]... there can be no [legitimate] 
political authority without the consent of the governed. "67 But if the State's authority 
over its subjects is contingent upon the free consent of those subjects, then presumably 
the same is true of the State's authority over its (subjects') territory. Indeed, it is for 
this reason that Beran rejects Buchanan's agent /trustee model of territorial 
sovereignty68 claiming that: "[i]f the people are the principal in the political unit and 
the State merely its agent, then the primary right to the territory of the state must 
belong to the people, not the state. "69 
66 The so- called Babri Mosque is believed to have been built by the Moghul emperor Babur, after a 
Hindu temple on the site which marked the birthplace of the Hindu god Lord Rama had been demolished 
to make way for it. See Peter Van der Veer, `Ayodhya and Somnath: Eternal Shrines, Contested 
Histories', Social Research, Vol.59. No.1, 1992, p.97. 
67 Beran (1984), pp.25 -26. 
68 See Buchanan (1991), pp.108 -110 
69 Beran (1994), p.6]. Elsewhere, in relation to Buchanan's agent /trustee model of territorial sovereignty, 
Beran similarly notes that the State's right to territory must be derived from the people whose agent it is 
and thus "...if a substantial part of a state's population no longer wishes the present state to be its agent, it 
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,,the sovereignty of the people cannot be an essentially collective property which can only be 
exercised by all the citizens of an existing state within eternally immutable borders. Instead, 
this sovereignty must be composed of the moral rights of individuals to decide their political 
relationships. Liberalism grants this for individual citizens by acknowledging their right to 
emigrate and to change their nationality 7° 
But why not also a right to secede? Why is it that liberalism justifies a right of 
secession only for certain groups, but individuals and other types of groups such as 
families must make do with a right to emigrate or to change their nationality? The 
answer is, of course, that secession necessarily involves a claim to territory whereas 
emigrating or changing one's nationality do not. Hence, in order to possess a right to 
secede a group must first possess sovereignty over the territory which it wants to take 
with it and that, according to Beran, means that the group must qualify for a right of 
habitation by fulfilling the three criteria listed above. 
Indeed, secession does contain a territorial element - and thus a claim to legitimate 
territorial sovereignty - that is absent in the act of immigration or changing one's 
nationality. To grant a group the right to secede is, in the contemporary world of 
territorial States, to grant that group the right to remove a portion of the parent State's 
territory. There are, then, two concerns underlying Beran's preoccupation with 
Iegitimate territorial sovereignty. The first concern is that to grant a right of secession 
is (pace Brilmayer) to grant a right of territorial sovereignty and this raises the question 
of exactly what territory and why that territory as opposed to some alternative territory. 
The second concern is that if, as Beran suggests, secessionist disputes are to be settled 
by referenda then we must first have a principle that tells us what the relevant 
territorial unit is in which such a referendum might be held. Beran's response to both 
these difficulties is, of course, to appeal to what he terms `a right of habitation' that 
defines the holder of a right to secede as both a collective and a territorial entity. 
may terminate the agency relationship and remove itself from the state with its land." See Beran (1998), 
p.35. 
Beran (1984), p.26. Also see Harry Beran, `Self -Determination: A Philosophical Perspective' in Self. 
Determination in the Commonwealth, ed. W. J. A. Macartney (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1988), p.28. 
Liberal -Democratic Theories of Secession 146 
Of course, different theories of secession may take different conditions as sufficient to 
generate a right of legitimate territorial sovereignty.71 However, while there may be a 
variety of different accounts of how a group might acquire sovereignty over a given 
territory, any such account must not only be internally consistent, it must also be 
consistent with the principle that justifies a group's right to secede in the first place. 
Beran's right of habitation fails both of these tests: not only are there problems within 
each of the three criteria that make up his right of habitation, but they may conflict 
with one another and with the liberal principle of voluntary political association to 
which he subscribes.72 
For example, a group of individuals might express a desire to secede, yet remain 
unable to demonstrate that continued habitation of their territory is necessary to the 
maintenance of their distinct communal identity. Under Beran's account because this 
group would fail to qualify for a right of habitation it would also fail to qualify for a 
right to secede, and consequently have to remain within its parent State against its will 
- a clear violation of the liberal requirement that political associations be voluntary. 
To grant a right of secession only to those groups who need to remain in their territory 
in order to retain their distinctive way of life, is to make the right to secede a derivative 
of a prior right to cultural preservation rather than the right to freely determine one's 
political associations. Indeed, because the bearers of Beran's right of secession are not 
democratically self -defined groups which express a desire to secede, but rather cultural 
collectivities which need their territory to maintain their distinct identity, his theory 
turns out to be more nationalistic than liberal.73 
C. The Need for a Liberal Theory of Territorial Sovereignty 
The first thing to note, then, is that if the important thing is the liberal freedom of 
individuals to determine their membership in political associations, then there is no 
71 i.e. as was noted in the previous chapter, making legitimate territorial sovereignty a necessary pre- 
condition to the possession of a right to secede will not, by itself, bring us any closer to arriving at a 
satisfactory theory of secession. Rather, it simply raises the additional question of under what conditions 
does a group possess legitimate territorial sovereignty. 
72 i.e. the notion that individuals should be free to determine their political associations and that this 
freedom generates a right of secession. 
73 A point also made by Freeman (Freeman, p.24). 
Liberal- Democratic Theories of Secession 147 
liberal reason to suppose that a group of individuals should have to share a common 
identity or affiliation with any particular piece of territory to exercise their right of 
freedom of association. The second, more general, point to be made is that if the 
overriding concern is the right of individuals to determine their political associations, 
then issues of territorial sovereignty need not be anterior to the determination of 
whether or not a given group possesses a right to secede. Rather, we may conclude 
what types of groups qualify for a right to secede without first determining what 
territory they are entitled to take with them when they secede, i.e. we do not need to 
resolve competing territorial claims in order to determine in what types of situation a 
group's secession may be justified under a LD theory. 
In Chapter Three it was pointed out that the simple requirement that a group possess 
legitimate title to the territory that it covets in order to possess a right to secede will 
not, on its own, tell us which groups possess a right to secede. Rather, making 
legitimate territorial sovereignty a necessary pre -condition to possession of a right to 
secede simply changes the question from when a group possesses a right to secede, to 
when it possesses legitimate territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, however, to 
grant a right to secede is, in the contemporary world of territorially defined States, also 
to grant a right of legitimate territorial sovereignty and we need to inquire what 
territory a group is entitled to take with them when they secede, and why that territory 
as opposed to some alternative territory or no territory at all. 
However, while it is true that acceptance of the territorial delineation of States makes 
legitimate sovereignty over a territory a necessary pre- condition to the exercise of a 
right to secede, we may still agree that a given group possesses a prima facie right of 
secession without first determining what territory that group is entitled to when it 
secedes. This is not to deny that where the State is a territorially defined entity then a 
right to independent Statehood is substantively empty with an accompanying legitimate 
territorial claim. If a State requires a territory then a group's right to secede and 
establish its own independent State is vacuous if that group does not have a territory in 
which such a State may be founded. Nonetheless, it does not follow from this that 
issues of territorial sovereignty must necessarily be dealt with prior to the issue of 
determining the identity of the right- holder. We may sensibly discuss the conditions 
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under which a group may qualify for a right of secession without first settling issues of 
how that theory might deal with disputes over territorial sovereignty in specific cases. 
Analogously, we may - and generally do - recognise a primary right for agents to 
own private property without first specifying exactly what goods each agent is entitled 
to and settling competing claims by two or more individuals to the same good. Private 
property rights and all the derivative rights that normally flow from them - e.g. to 
dispose of, make use of and deny others access to a particular good - are meaningless 
unless one first possesses a property right in a particular good. One cannot legitimately 
deny others access to a particular good unless one first possesses a legitimate property 
right in that good. Nonetheless, we may still adduce the conditions under which agents 
qualify for private property rights, the limitations placed upon such rights, and the 
conditions under which property rights are out -weighed or voided, without first settling 
issues raised by the implementation of the general principle in specific cases by 
determining what goods belong to whom. Indeed, it is not until we have first properly 
elucidated the general principle that its application in specific cases can be adequately 
addressed. 
At this point it may be objected, however, that in the case of the LD theory the two 
issues of determining the right -holder and the territory that the right -holder is entitled 
to take with them when they secede can neither be separated from, nor discussed 
independently of, one another. Rather, because the identity of the group doing the 
seceding is itself determined by territorial criteria through the holding of a plebiscite in 
a geographically defined region, the two issues necessarily go hand -in -hand. By 
drawing a boundary around a geographical area and holding a plebiscite amongst the 
inhabitants of that area - the outcome of which will determine whether or not there 
exists a right to secede - the LD theory concurrently determines both who has a right to 
secede and what territory they are entitled to take with them should they vote in favour 
of political independence. 
As was noted earlier, however, it is unclear what liberal reason there might be for 
distinguishing candidates for a right to secede on an exclusively territorial basis. 
Rather, if the important consideration is that political associations are voluntary, then if 
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a group of individuals together decide that they want to secede and live together in a 
State of their own, this on its own should be sufficient to generate a prima facie right 
of secession. Where the concern is to maximise the number of individuals who live in 
mutually desired association, then what matters is the desire to associate with each 
other, not that would -be secessionists inhabit a common territory or share a common 
identity. The problem with Beran's theory of rightful habitation by territorial 
communities, however, is that rather than maximising the number of individuals who 
live in mutually desired association, it instead grants a right to coerce others to secede 
by virtue of being a numerical majority in an arbitrarily- defined territorial entity 
Indeed, not only does a geographical delineation of group identity legitimate the 
coercion of individuals who have the misfortune to be included within a territorial 
community as a minority, but it also mitigates against groups who are territorially 
dispersed. Moreover, the very reason that a group of individuals who share certain 
features wish to live together in a common State, may be precisely because they are 
geographically dispersed and do not yet have a shared territory in which they may form 
an independent political association. Consider, for example, the case of Jewish people 
post World War Two who were geographically dispersed across Europe and parts of 
the Middle East and who desired the relative security offered by an independent, 
Jewish State. Had a geographical boundary been drawn around these groups, and a 
plebiscite held on the creation of Jewish State amongst the individuals within that 
boundary - the vast majority of whom would not have been Jewish - then one may 
presume that such a proposal would have been defeated. This is despite the fact that 
the establishment of a Jewish State would nonetheless have maximised the number of 
people living in mutually desired association -a desideratum to which Beran explicitly 
subscribes. 
This is not to say that Israel necessarily possesses legitimate sovereignty to the land it 
now occupies. Indeed, the simple requirement that a group be granted a right to 
independent Statehood merely because the members of that group desire to associate 
with one another in a State of their own, fails to address the question of in what 
territory such a State may be founded. Thus, while the creation of an independent 
Jewish State in 1948 may well have been justified under the principle of voluntary 
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political association, it does not follow from this that the founders of Israel had a right 
to establish a State where they did.74 The important point, however, remains that 
while a territorial definition of Statehood means that in order to establish a State a 
group must first have a territory, it does not follow from this that membership in the 
group must also be defined by reference to territorial criteria or that such a definition is 
even consistent with liberal political theory. 
In conclusion: if we accept the contemporary territorial delineation of States then any 
normative theory of secession must address the two questions of who qualifies for a 
right to secede, and what territory they are entitled to take with them when they secede. 
Because, however, there is nothing inherent to the LD theory that requires the right - 
holder to be defined territorially, we can sensibly discuss the former issue without first 
settling the latter. In other words, issues of territorial sovereignty need not be logically 
prior to issues pertaining to the determination of the right- holder. Thus, while the 
ensuing discussion largely ignores issues of territorial sovereignty, this in no way 
detracts from the usefulness of the discussion nor undermines it. Where the territorial 
issue is finally addressed, however, this must be done in a manner consistent with the 
underlying theory and how that theory apportions rights to independent Statehood -a 
test which Beran's right of habitation fails. 
4.3 CAN THERE BE SUCH A THING AS A `LIBERAL' THEORY OF 
SECESSION? 
A. Introduction 
For Beran, all individuals have the right to determine their own political relationships 
- a right which Beran assumes to be both consistent with, and required by, liberal 
democratic theory. However, to premise a right of secession upon the principle of 
individual self -determination is to raise fundamental questions about this principle and 
its justification within liberal political theory. In the ensuing discussion it shall be 
argued that, whether or not a plebiscitary right to secede may be premised upon such a 
principle, is dependent upon exactly what form of liberalism is being appealed to: (a) 
74 Particularly in view of the fact that the creation of modern -day Israel included the forceful taking of 
territory that belonged to others, i.e. the Palestinians. 
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an account premised upon the prioritisation of certain ideals of equality and individual 
autonomy; or (b) a form of liberalism in which the overriding consideration is the 
toleration of dissent. Furthermore, by examining the linkages between the two issues 
of how liberalism should respond to demands for independent Statehood, and how it 
should respond to demands by minority groups for special recognition or preferential 
treatment, it shall be argued that neither of the above two forms of liberalism will yield 
a theory of secession that approximates the plebiscitary right theory put forward by 
Beran, Wellman and Gauthier. 
Above it was pointed out that typically liberals favour the State as an institution 
capable of creating an environment in which individuals may more effectively realise 
the goal of self -authorship, but face a problem in justifying the sort of coercive 
authority that the State employs to create that environment. However, acknowledging 
that the State may provide an environment which, from a liberal perspective, is 
superior to that which would obtain in a state of nature is not to say that all existing 
States do so, or that they do so equally well. Indeed, there are numerous contemporary 
examples of downright pernicious States that not only fail to assist their citizens in the 
attainment of the Iiberal democratic ideal by protecting their rights, but who 
deliberately violate those rights.75 Clearly the ideal solution in such cases is the 
removal of the cause of the injustice either through the reform of the existing 
government or, where this is not possible, through its removal in favour of a more 
liberal alternative that is prepared to respect and enforce the rights of individuals.76 
Unfortunately, however, such wholesale reform is, at least in the short to medium 
term, often impossible. Engaging in forms of action which result in the substantive 
reform or overthrow of governments requires a degree of effort and coordination 
amongst a State's citizens. If one is to risk the wrath of an oppressive regime by 
agitating for political reform then there must be a reasonable probability of 
successfully achieving it and this (pace Miller77) requires a degree of certainty, or 
trust, that others will reciprocate by joining in and also standing up to the 
75 e.g. Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Afghanistan under the Taleban, North Korea, Burma/Myanmar etc. 
76 A point also made by Dowding. See Dowding, p.79. 
77 See, for example, Miller (1995), p.91; and `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence' in Political 
Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p.143. 
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government.78 Where this certainty is lacking then the likelihood of ending up as a 
voice in the wilderness that suffers a rather unfortunate fate for what transpires to be a 
foolish lack of timidity will, in most cases, direct agents to refrain from attempting to 
liberalise their rulers. 
Furthermore, by intentionally creating an environment of mutual mistrust, suspicion 
and enmity amongst its subjects, a repressive government may effectively prevent, or 
at least substantially delay, the development of the mutual trust necessary to overcome 
such prisoner's dilemmas. Therefore, for this and a variety of other reasons, the 
removal of illiberal, oppressive regimes may, without outside intervention and 
assistance, and in some cases even with them, be unrealisable in the short to medium 
term. Given that this is the case then, subject to certain side constraints, we might be 
prepared to acknowledge a right for a liberal sub -group to secede from an illiberal 
State providing that their secession would result in the members of that group enjoying 
an environment which, from a liberal perspective, was superior to that which they left 
behind in their former State.79 
In many respects, however, the formulation of a liberal argument for seceding from 
an illiberal State is relatively unproblematic. The real question is what liberal reason 
might one have for seceding from a State that does respect and uphold its citizens' 
rights to freedom of association and so forth. What liberal reasons are there for 
seceding from one's parent State where that State is a liberal one ?ß° In response, 
78 See, for example, Coleman's discussion of the importance of inter -personal networks of trust in the 
1986 campaign of political disobedience in South Korea, and how such networks enabled individuals to 
effectively organise a campaign of political reform in an environment that was hostile to political freedom. 
J. Coleman, `Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', American Journal of Sociology, Vol.94, 
1988, pp.98-1 18. 
79 An added complication is whether or not a condition of State -perpetrated injustice is particular to a 
certain sub -group of that State's population. In consideration of a situation where a State is engaged in 
indiscriminate violations of its citizens' rights, Buchanan claims that while this may give rise to a right of 
revolution (i.e. a right to overthrow the unjust government and replace it with ajust one) it is unclear 
whether a particular sub -region would have a right to secede and form an independent State. See 
Buchanan (1991), p.112. 
80 By a 'liberal State' 1 mean here one which, following Kukathas, "...is not governed by particular 
common ends or goals but [rather] provides the framework of rights or liberties or duties within which 
people may pursue their various ends, individually or cooperatively. It is a society governed by law and, 
as such, is regulated by right principles. These are principles of justice, which do not themselves 
presuppose the rightness or bettemess of any particular way of life." Kukathas, pp.230 -31. 
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Dowding - the only theorist who to my knowledge considers this issue at any length81 
- replies that: 
There may be liberal accounts about when secession is justified, but in the just liberal state 
there can be no just reason for one group to wish to secede from the whole... The only liberal 
justification for one portion of a country to secede is social injustice which does not occur in 
the just liberal state.82 
Underlying the objection that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State is the intuition that, from a liberal point of view, it shouldn't really matter 
who governs us or what State we live in, so long as that State is a liberal one. The 
important thing, from a liberal viewpoint, is that individuals are the authors of their 
own lives and that they have the freedom to acquire knowledge about a range of 
different life -plans and, where necessary, adjust their current way of life to match 
these. Assuming that, through the enforcement of the individual rights that these 
precepts give rise to, the State is capable of enhancing the ability of individuals to live 
their lives from the inside, why should it matter what State we are governed by 
provided that that State is a liberal one that fulfils this function ?83 
Of course, this would not be a difficulty if the LD theorist was content to restrict a 
right of secession to only those groups unfortunate enough to find themselves trapped 
in an illiberal State. However, LD theorists like Beran do argue for a right to secede 
from liberal States. This is not to say that they do not limit the right to secede to only 
liberal groups, merely that there is no similar restriction upon the nature of the parent 
State from which the group wishes to secede. What matters to LD theorists is not the 
character of the State from which the group wishes to secede but, rather, that a majority 
of a group favour secession and that their secession would not violate certain 
81 The issue is also raised briefly by Barry in relation to a Lockean justification of the State. See Barry 
(1983), p.128. 
82 Dowding, pp.71 -72. 
83 See, for example: Dowding who claims that liberalism has no account of the morally correct 
boundaries of the State but can only suggest how the State should behave once formed (Dowding, p.88); 
and Caney who claims that we need to distinguish between the questions, `Who should rule ?' and 'How 
should the rulers govern ?' A commitment to liberty, claims Caney, provides an answer only to the latter 
question (Caney, pp. 153-54). 
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additional side constraints.84 The difficulty for the LD theorist, then, is to show why, 
from a liberal perspective, it does matter who governs us and, thus, why a group of 
individuals might have good liberal reasons for seceding from a just liberal State. The 
purpose of the discussion that follows is twofold: (a) to consider two different, but 
inter -related, ways of overcoming this difficulty; and (b) to argue that while both of 
these arguments may well have an element of truth in them, the former will in most 
cases be insufficient to justify a right of secession while the latter, even if correct, is 
not germane to the LD theories of secession here under consideration. 
B. Kymlicka's Theory of Minority Rights 
The first response to the claim that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State is based upon an assertion that an individuaI's ability to live their life from 
the inside and make choices between alternative conceptions of the good life is, at least 
to some degree, determined by and dependent upon the character and laws of the 
(liberal) State within which s/he resides. In other words, because different life plans 
will require different environments in which to flourish, not all liberal States will be 
equal in terms of providing an environment in which one may truly be the author of 
one's own life. Hence, just because one's parent State is a liberal State, it does not 
follow from this that it provides the optimal conditions for one to realise one's life plan 
and flourish as an individual. 
An example of this type of argument is that of Will Kymlicka.ß5 It will be 
remembered from Chapter Two that Kymlicka attempts to make a liberal case for 
84 See, for example, Boykin who claims that Buchanan is wrong to suggest that secession is an act of 
rectificatoryjustice - it is rather an act of procedural justice. Secessionists, claims Boykin, are not 
punishing the State nor its citizens, they are merely expressing a preference to govern themselves and this 
is the only significant issue. See Scott Boykin, `The Ethics of Secession' in Secession, Slate and Liberty, 
ed. David Gordon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998, p.77. 
85 Before continuing it should be emphasised that Kymlicka's concern is not to justify a right of secession 
for minority cultures but, rather, to investigate how a liberal case might be made for granting such people 
special rights that allow them to flourish within their existing State. To this end Kymlicka largely ignores 
the issue of secession and concentrates instead upon less extreme measures for securing the welfare of 
cultural minorities. On the one hand, then, there is some truth in the claim that by contextualising 
Kymlicka's analysis within the secession debate, and investigating whether or not it can be used to make a 
case for a group's secession, Kymlicka's theory is being used in a manner in which he never intended it to 
be. On the other hand, however, there are important insights to be gained from such an approach. The 
aim of the discussion that follows is not to say anything of substantive importance about Kymlicka's 
theory of minority rights or the issues that divide him and his critics. Rather, the more modest goal is 
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special, group rights by forging a connection between the ability of the individual to 
achieve the liberal ideal of self -authorship and the policies, institutions and symbolism 
of that individual's parent State by claiming that freedom of choice has certain cultural 
pre- conditions.86 Thus, while a key component of liberalism is the freedom of 
individuals to choose between alternative life plans, our culture of birth and 
upbringing87 - what Kymlicka terms our societal culture - not only provides these 
alternatives, but also makes them meaningful to us.88 
Moreover, argues Kymlicka, a policy of common citizenship - or so- called benign 
neglect - where the State neither opposes the freedom of its citizens to express their 
cultural allegiances nor nurtures such expression, is flawed because it ignores the fact 
that the State cannot possibly be culturally neutral.S9 For example, a State must have 
an official language, official symbols, public holidays, political borders and division of 
powers and in determining such things there will be no way to avoid favouring a 
particular societal culture - usually that of the dominant majority.90 Because the 
simply to determine whether or not the various issues contained within the minority rights debate, might 
be employed to successfully counter the claim that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State. This is not to say that some of the issues raised in the following discussion might not be 
relevant to, and have implications for, Kymlicka's defence of minority rights, only that such 
considerations will not be directly pursued here. 
86 Clearly other theorists such as Tamir and Margalit and Raz are also relevant here. However, for 
reasons of brevity the present discussion will concentrate on Kymlicka. 
87 Note that Kymlicka believes that people are bound in an important way to their own cultural 
community, i.e. respecting peoples' own cultural membership and facilitating their transition to another 
culture are not equally legitimate options. The primary good of cultural membership therefore refers to 
individual's own cultural community. See, for example, Kymlicka (1989), pp. 175 -77. 
88 Kymlicka (1995), p.83. 
89 Moreover, argues Kymlicka, the analogy between religion and culture is mistaken, as it is quite 
possible for a state not to have an established church, but in making decisions about the official language 
and the provision of State services, the government cannot help but give partial establishment to a culture. 
Kymlicka (1995), pp.108 -13. 
90 While Kymlicka has a valid point here (i.e. in deciding things such as official language(s) and public 
holidays most States favour the cultural identity of the dominant majority) the claim that States cannot be 
culturally neutral in deciding such things needs to be qualified. Consider, for example, a State in, say, the 
Middle East populated by two so- called societal cultures: a dominant Muslim community; and a smaller 
Jewish one. It is conceivable that in determining its official language, holidays, public practices, 
symbolism and so forth such a State could favour a culture, or set of cultures, that was neutral between its 
two constituent societal cultures. ft might, for example, adopt the Chinese lunar calendar, make Hindi its 
official language and take Zimbabwe's national holidays as its own. In doing so it would, of course, be 
favouring the national cultures of China, India and Zimbabwe but it would also, presumably, remain 
neutral between the cultural communities that make up its own citizenry. While Kymlicka may well reject 
such a proposal as specious, it is nonetheless a point worth making and is not as hypothetical as one might 
at first imagine. For example, in many respects the success of English as the global lingua franca is a 
product of its status as a culturally neutral means of communication in ethnically diverse States where the 
politics of language is a major issue but English (while it may be linked to an educated middle and upper 
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identity of the dominant societal culture is generally instantiated within the State's 
official institutions and practices, this gives the majority a head -start in ensuring the 
continued vitality of their societal culture, while at the same time placing minority 
societal cultures within that State at a disadvantage.91 Additionally, because of their 
relatively few numbers and frequently low level of material wealth, minority societal 
cultures are in constant danger of being outvoted or outbid on the resources and 
policies which are essential to the continued flourishing, and in some cases survival, of 
their culture.92 
Kymlicka's solution to the disadvantage suffered by minority societal cultures is to 
grant them special, group -specific rights of territorial autonomy (i.e. self - 
government)93 and special (political) representation.94 However, Kymlicka has an 
extremely restrictive view of what counts as a societal culture. Not only does 
Kymlicka want to rule out granting special rights to illiberal groups,95 he also wants to 
particularise these rights to very specific minority groups which he calls national 
minorities and which primarily include people such as a State's indigenous inhabitants. 
At the same time, Kymlicka also wants to deny this privileged treatment to other, 
similar groups such as immigrants, voluntary associations, social movements and 
lifestyle collectivities.96 Furthermore, in addition to the question of what types of 
groups qualify for these special rights, Kymlicka's theory of minority rights is also 
class) is not identified with one particular ethno -cultural group. Tamils in the south of India, for example, 
often express resentment at being forced to leam Hindi in public schools, because they identify Hindi with 
the people of north India who they see as dominating public and economic life in that country. However, 
to my knowledge no such resentment is expressed against learning English, which is not only viewed as an 
educational necessity, but is culturally neutral in the sense that it is not identified with any one ethno- 
cultural group in India. This indicates that States may, at least as far as the variable of language is 
concerned, be neutral between the various ethnic groups that make up their citizenry. 
91 On this point also see Young who claims that the impartial, general perspective is a myth as people 
necessarily consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated experience and perception of social 
relations. Moreover, different social groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and 
perceptions of social relations which influence their interpretations of the meaning and consequences of 
policy proposals and the form of their political reasoning. Iris Marion Young, 'Polity and Group 
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', Ethics, Vol.99, No.2, 1989, pp.257 -58. 
92 Kymlicka (1995), pp.152 and 108 -11. 
93 e.g. the re- drawing of boundaries between federal sub -units, devolution of central authority to 
administrative and political sub -entities such as tribal reservations over matters such as education, health, 
criminal justice, policing and resource development (Kymlicka (1995), pp.27 -30). 
94 See Kymlicka (1995), pp31 -33. 
95 A point to which will be returned to shortly. 
96 See, for example, to Kymlicka's distinction between multiculturalism and poly- ethnicity. See 
Kymlicka (1995), pp.1 1 ff. 
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restrictive in the sense that it generally fails to include a right for groups to opt out of 
their parent State.97 
There are, then, two questions we need to ask about Kymlicka's theory of minority 
rights in relation to the question of whether or not there can be a liberal right to secede 
from a liberal State: (a) how many and what sort of groups will this sort of 
instrumental approach justify giving special rights to; and (b) will these rights include 
a right of secession? In the discussion that follows it will be argued that while the 
ability of all sorts of groups - not just indigenous people - to attain the liberal ideal of 
self -authorship may be tied to the environment that their State provides,98 this will 
rarely be sufficient to justify a right of secession. 
C. Particularising Kymlicka's Minority Rights 
Kymlicka offers two arguments for why special, group- specific rights should be 
particularised exclusively to national minorities, the first of which is premised upon the 
claim that only national minorities qualify as societal cultures.99 Kymlicka defines a 
societal culture as one which: (a) provides its members with meaningful ways of life 
across a range of human activities (e.g. educational, social, economic and religious); 
(b) tends to be territory specific and based upon a common language; and (c) is 
comprised of common institutions and practices.10o Immigrant groups - unlike, say, 
indigenous peoples - do not qualify as societal cultures because: (a) they do not occupy 
homelands; (b) they manifest their distinctiveness primarily in their family lives and 
voluntary associations; and (c) they participate within the public institutions of the 
97 On the various types of group -specific rights see Jacob, T. Levy, `Classifying Cultural Rights' in 
Nomos 39. Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997). While Kymlicka does concede that liberalism might support a restricted 
right of liberal groups to secede from their parent State, he quite correctly points out that for a variety 
of reasons this will not be an option available to many minorities. For this reason he prefers to 
concentrate on less extreme measures for securing the welfare of minority cultures (Kymlicka (1995), 
p.186). 
98 i.e. some liberal States will provide an environment more conducive to the effective realisation of a 
group's life plans than other liberal States. 
99 Kymlicka writes: "[w]hat matters, from a liberal point of view, is that people have access to a societal 
culture which provides them with meaningful options encompassing the range of human activities and, for 
the most part, national minorities have societal cultures and these other types of groups do not." 
Kymlicka (1995), p.101. 
100 See Kymlicka (1995), pp.76ff. 
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dominant culture(s) and speak the dominant language(s).101 Similarly, life -style 
groups, voluntary associations and social movements also do not qualify as societal 
cultures because they are not "...distinct and potentially self -governing societies 
incorporated into a larger state. "102 
The second way in which Kymlicka attempts to particularise his special rights is by 
employing a criterion of voluntariness, and claiming that immigrants 103 are distinct 
from indigenous peoples because immigrants uproot themselves voluntarily in full 
knowledge of the fact that, upon arrival in their new land, they will have to adapt to 
new customs and, of course, a foreign language. Conversely, indigenous people have 
historically had very little say in such matters and, for the most part, have been forcibly 
incorporated into a wider society dominated by a foreign societal culture through a 
process of often violent colonisation over which they exercised little, if any, control.' °4 
Other theorists - most notably Kukathas - have cast aspersions upon these two 
methods of picking out candidates for special rights. Kukathas points out that not only 
will some national minorities fail to qualify as societal cultures, but other types of 
groups which Kymlicka wants to exclude as candidates for special rights, will have 
more of a societal culture than some national minorities which Kymlicka claims should 
101 This is not to say that immigrant groups might not assert a right to publicly express their ethnic 
particularity, merely that they usually wish to do so within the institutions of the larger society of which 
they are apart, whereas indigenous peoples typically want to set up a parallel society in the form of a 
separate, self -governing nation (Kymlicka (1995), pp.14 -15 and pp.77 -79). 
102 Kymlicka acknowledges that while we may use the term `culture' in a non- ethnic sense (e.g. a gay or 
bureaucratic culture), he is more concerned with national and ethnic differences, and so uses the term in a 
relatively restrictive sense. While Kymlicka admits that this is simply his stipulative definition of culture, 
he believes that it nonetheless corresponds to a common usage of the term. See Kymlicka (1995), pp. 18- 
20. 
103 Which Kymlicka refers to as an ethnic group, as opposed to indigenous peoples who are a national 
minority. 
104 Kymlicka (1995), pp.95 -96 and (1989), pp.186 -89. Kymlicka believes that, while there may be some 
'hard cases' (e.g. African -Americans who were brought to the US involuntarily as slaves and then 
prevented from integrating into the institutions of the majority culture, and the Hutterites of Canada who 
came voluntarily on the understanding that they would be permitted to establish a separate, self -governing 
society), most groups will nonetheless slot fairly neatly into either the category of involuntary national 
minority or voluntary ethnic group. In support of this claim Kymlicka cites Ted Gun, Minorities at Risk: 
A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p.15. 
Although, as Kukathas points out, even Gurr acknowledges that there are limits to such a distinction. See 
Kymlicka (1995), pp.24 -25; Chandran Kukathas, `Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka's 
Multicultural Citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.4, 1997, p.415; and Gurr, p.15. 
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be entitled to such preferential treatment.105 Similarly, with respect to the criterion of 
voluntariness Kukathas notes that: (a) cultural minorities such as indigenous peoples 
are not the only individuals who face inequalities which are not the product of their 
free choices;106 (b) not all members of cultural minorities will be equally 
disadvantaged and some may be better off than most members of the majority cultural 
group;107 (c) not all migrants come voluntarily to their new homeland (e.g. some come 
as refugees fleeing persecution, whereas others are driven by economic imperatives 
and come in search of a better standard of living); 108 and (d) not all indigenous people 
are involuntary members of minority societal cultures (e.g. those who are of mixed 
descent or who have become urbanised have the choice of exiting their aboriginal 
communities to enter the wider society at relatively low cost).109 
D. Justifying a Right to Secede From a Liberal State 
Earlier it was noted that while liberalism is based upon an individualistic moral 
ontology, this does not mean that liberals do not value cooperative effort and the 
collective institutions that it creates. Rather, liberals view such associations as 
possessing only an instrumental value commensurate to the contribution that they 
make towards the well -being of their individual members. Indeed, few people 
liberals included - would deny that at least some minimal level of inter -personal 
105 e.g. see Kukathas's discussion of Malaysian Chinese who, despite being an immigrant people, have 
more of a societal culture than a tribe of Australian aborigines known as the Ngarrindjeri (Kukathas 
(1997), p.415). 
106 e.g. anyone born physically or mentally handicapped could also make this claim as could anyone born 
into poverty. 
107 Kukathas (1995), p.245. 
108 In fact Kymlicka concedes that not all migrants come voluntarily to their new State - e.g. refugees 
fleeing persecution, and those in search of a better standard of living - but nonetheless denies that such 
people should be afforded the same rights as national minorities (Kymlicka (1995), pp.98 -101). 
109 See Kukathas (1997), pp.412 -13. In illustration of this point Kukathas again cites the example of the 
Ngarrindjeri people of South Australia who are all of mixed (European and Aboriginal) descent, have 
been raised in the traditions of Christianity and Australian capitalism and who know less about their 
group's traditions than white anthropologists do. This in turn raises another difficulty with Kymlická s 
theory of minority rights: given that there are some individuals who will have a choice regarding their 
cultural membership, then granting special rights to members of indigenous cultures that are denied to 
members of the wider society effectively provides an incentive for such individuals to opt for the 
aboriginal identity. Thus, we need to ask to what degree such rights protect the legitimate interests of pre- 
existing cultural minorities, and to what degree they in fact contribute to the creation of such groups by 
providing an incentive for people to identify as members of minority cultures by artificially rigging the 
consequences of their decision to do so. On this point also see Kukathas (1995), pp.232 -34; and Donald 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp.66 -67. 
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cooperation is necessary if individuals are to flourish. While we may question, as the 
communitarian does, whether or not liberalism's rational instrumentality attaches 
adequate importance to man's social nature and collective institutions and practices, 
there is nonetheless generally no disagreement over the fact that man is, by nature, a 
social creature. Moreover, it is also clear that social cooperation for mutual advantage 
is a practical necessity if individuals are to realise sufficient levels of material well- 
being, freedom and security which are themselves pre- requisites to each individual 
fulfilling his/her desires and potential and, thus, realising the liberal ideal of genuine 
self -authorship. 
However, while inter -personal cooperation for social advantage is clearly of 
undeniable benefit to individuals in their pursuit of what gives meaning to their life, 
and may itself be a constituent component of one's conception of the good life, it also 
presupposes a certain degree of inter -personal coordination. Given that natural, 
spontaneous social harmony will generally prove elusive then, to avoid sliding into a 
sub -optimal - even Hobbesian - state of affairs, individuals must regulate their actions 
in accordance with certain binding rules and create an agency (i.e. a State) to 
administer and enforce these rules. By prohibiting certain actions and making others 
mandatory, these rules specify what each individual is free to do and not to do in 
pursuit of their life plan, and so, provide a general framework within which individuals 
may peacefully resolve disagreements and conflicts of interest in a manner which 
minimises social disruption, while at the same time striving to live their lives 
according to the values which give meaning to it. t la Not only do these rules constitute 
an instrumentally effective means of promoting the value of individual freedom by 
providing the conditions necessary for each individual member of that society to 
achieve their goals, they also determine each individual's rights and duties towards one 
another and the distribution of the benefits and burdens made possible by their 
cooperation. 
110 Also see De George's orchestra analogy where he claims that an orchestra requires a conductor and 
"...each individual musician accepts limits of his freedom to play as he wishes in order that all may play 
effectively together." Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1985), p.120. 
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On the one hand, then, it is clear that individuals have a mutual interest in cooperating 
to create an environment in which each can more effectively attain the liberal ideal of 
living their lives according to a plan of their own design. On the other hand, however, 
it is also clear that each individual's divergent needs, desires, values and conceptions 
of the good life' 1 will, to varying degrees, conflict with those of their fellow citizens. 
Bearing in mind the limited nature of natural and social resources, and also that 
individuals begin life with different natural endowments and means for satisfying their 
wants and achieving their ends, it will be practically - not to mention logically - 
impossible to design mutually binding rules of social conduct that are optimal from 
every individual's point of view. Whereas a set of rules may be advantageous to some 
individuals in their pursuit of their own, idiosyncratic conception of the public good, 
other individuals will be disadvantaged - some more so than others.' 122 
This is true, not only for the narrow range of groups which Kymlicka terms cultural 
minorities and to which he wants to grant special rights, but for all manner of 
individuals with different life plans. For example, feminists such as Okin note that 
while (pace Kymlicka) the institutions of (liberal) States tend to reflect the cultural 
ethos of the dominant societal culture, most cultures - particularly minority, non - 
Western cultures of the type that Kymlicka wants to preserve - tend to be patriarchal 
and gendered in an unfair way that uses the male as the norm.13 Indeed, many 
minority cultures instantiate discriminatory practices against women of the sort that not 
only severely restrict their freedom of choice, but also threaten their well -being and 
even their Iíves.114 Consequently, not only may the female members of a minority 
culture have no interest in the preservation of their culture, they may actually be better 
off if it were to become extinct so that they might then be integrated into a less -sexist 
surrounding culture.' 15 Okin concludes that because this discrimination against 
111 i.e. their life plan, or conception of the public good. 
112 See, for example, Richard Allen Rodewald, Liberalism and the Problem of Justifying the State, Ph.D 
Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1978, pp.5 -7. 
113 See, for example, Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women ?' in Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women ?, ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
114 e.g. practices of clitoridectomy, coerced marriages, polygamous marriages and systems of property 
rights that make women financially dependent upon their husband and his family, and which also bring 
female sexuality and reproductive capacities under male control. 
115 Okin, pp.22 -23. While it is true that Kymlicka rules out groups who discriminate formally and overtly 
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women frequently has very powerful cultural roots and is often informal and private, 
granting minority cultures the special rights which Kymlicka proposes will not only 
fail to address the subjugation of women but may actually perpetuate or exacerbate it. 
Kymlicka, however, sees multiculturalism and feminism as allies and claims that the 
concerns raised by Okin are simply further evidence that liberalism's strict adherence 
to a thesis of moral egalitarianism needs to be abandoned)16 Just as liberal theorists 
have implicitly or explicitly laboured under the misapprehension that citizens share the 
same language and national culture, they have also overlooked gender differences and 
operated under the assumption that the citizen is a man.117 Thus, while liberals have 
neglected to ask what sorts of principles or institutions would be favoured by women, 
they have also failed to ask the same question with respect to ethno -cultural minorities 
with the result that both groups have had their distinctive needs and interests 
disregarded. Moreover, claims Kymlicka, both feminists and multiculturalists look to 
the same remedy of special group rights. Just as justice between ethno- cultural groups 
cannot be achieved simply by granting national minorities the same rights as the 
majority; so women's equality with men cannot be achieved by giving them the same 
set of individual rights as men. 
Kymlicka's argument for special rights for minority cultures - at least as I understand 
it - is concerned with the cultural pre- conditions of individual choice, i.e. it is 
restricted to considerations that are anterior to an índívíduaI's selection of a life plan. 
The idea is that because individual freedom of choice pre- supposes certain cultural 
structures, before individuals can decide between different ways of living their life they 
need to have a set of alternative life plans from which they may choose and which have 
against women (refer Kymlicka (1995), p.153 and 165) Okin claims that this misses the point. In many 
cultures a woman's basic civil rights and liberties are formally assured, yet women still suffer because 
discrimination against them is enforced informally in the private sphere within, say, family structures. 
Indeed, argues Okin, no culture in the world today - whether minority or majority - could pass a test of 
`no sex discrimination.' See Okin, p.22. 
116 Kymlicka writes: "I see multiculturalism and feminism as allies engaged in related struggles for a 
more inclusive conception of justice. Indeed, my own thoughts on ethnocultural justice have been deeply 
influenced by Okin's work on gender justice, since I think there are many comparable historical patterns 
and contemporary lessons." See Will Kymlicka, `Liberal Complacencies. in Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women ?, ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), p.34. 
117 Kymlicka (1999), p.33. 
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meaning to them, and for this they will look to their societal culture.118 However, 
because minority societal cultures are disadvantaged in terms of securing conditions 
favourable to their continued flourishing and survival, their members require special 
rights and entitlements not enjoyed by members of the majority culture. 
If, however, Kymlicka is going to support extending these special rights to groups 
other than (minority) societal cultures then this must mean one of two things: either (a) 
membership of a flourishing societal culture is not the only determinant of freedom of 
choice;' 19 or (b) within societal cultures there are certain inequalities that restrict 
individual freedom of choice, and in order to eliminate these we need to grant the 
aggrieved party the same, special rights which Kymlicka claims minority cultures 
should possess. Both Okín and Kymlicka appear to prefer the latter view: 
...surely self -respect and self -esteem require more than simple membership in a viable culture. 
Surely it is not enough, for one to be able to "question one's inherited social roles" and to have 
the capacity to make choices about the life one wants to lead, that one's culture he protected. 
At least as important to the development of self -respect and self-esteem is our place within our 
culture. And at least as pertinent to our capacity to question our social roles is whether our 
culture instills in us and forces on us particular social roles.120 
Suppose we accept the claim that the structure of State institutions and practices has 
tended to embody a mono -cultural, mono -linguistic norm that is male- centric and, 
thus, biased against women. It is equally true that this norm has also tended to be, for 
example, both heterosexual and able- bodied and, thus, biased against homosexuals and 
the disabled. Therefore, even if we accept Kymlicka's claim that liberals have 
typically neglected to ask what sorts of principles or institutions would be favoured by 
118 To emphasise: membership in a secure, flourishing societal culture is a prerequisite to the capacity of 
making choices about how to live one's life. 
119 i.e. there are other factors which also determine an individual's ability to choose between different life 
plans that have meaning to them and gender is one of these. 
120 Okin, p.22. Elsewhere Okin similarly states that: "Those who make liberal arguments for the rights of 
groups, then, must take special care to consider inequalities between the sexes, since they are likely to be 
less public, and thus less easily discernible. Moreover policies designed to respond to the needs and 
claims of cultural minority groups must take seriously the urgency of adequately representing less 
powerful members of such groups." See Okín, p.23. Kymlicka, on the other hand, notes that "I agree 
with the basic claim of Okin's paper -that a liberal egalitarian (and feminist) approach to multiculturalism 
must look carefully at intra -group inequalities, and specifically at gender inequalities, when examining the 
legitimacy of minority group rights. Justice within ethnocultural groups is as important as justice between 
ethnocultural groups." Refer Kymlicka (1999), p.31. 
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women and members of ethno- cultural minorities,121 the same is true of any number of 
other variables; not just gender and culture. So if we are going to grant special rights 
to women and cultural minorities, why not also grant them to gays, lesbians, the 
disabled and, indeed, any marginalised group whose identity is not represented within, 
and promulgated by, their State's official institutions and practices? As Kymlicka 
admits, this same sort of claim for special rights can be, and has been, made by all 
sorts of marginalised groups.» 
Here, again, we run into the problem raised by Kukathas of how to pick out properties 
which particularise special rights only to that narrow range of groups to which 
Kymlicka wants to grant such rights. If we are going to support granting women 
special, group -specific rights for the reasons listed above then presumably we must 
also grant the same rights to groups such as homosexuals and the disabled. The 
important issue, however, is whether or not such considerations might be effectively 
employed to counter the claim that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State. Suppose, then, that we accept that both between and within different 
cultural groups there will be a range of divergent conceptions of the good life 
competing for public recognition and support. Bearing in mind the scarcity of 
resources and the mutually exclusive nature of some of these conceptions, it is clear 
that the State cannot fully satisfy the competing demands of all the various groups that 
make up its citizenry. Thus, perhaps a group of people who share a common life plan 
but whose State, for whatever reason(s), is unable to offer the understanding and 
sustenance that that group desires, might be better off in a State of their own whose 
formal institutions, policies and practices reflect their common beliefs and values 
while giving succour to them. 
Homosexuals, for example, may flourish to a greater degree in a State whose policies, 
institutions and symbolism instantiate and reflect the values and priorities that together 
121 See Kymlicka (1999), pp.32 -33. 
122 See Kymlicka (1999), pp.33-34. In this context it is instructive to refer to Kukathas's discussion of 
'liberal equality' with respect to `basic' and `derivative' rights. Refer Chandran Kukathas, `Cultural 
Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka', Political Theory, Vol.20, No.4, 1992, pp.675 -76. Also note that 
Kymlicka cannot appeal to the criterion of voluntariness to exclude such groups from consideration for 
special rights because, just as one may have no choice about being a member of a so- called national 
minority, so no one has a choice about being a woman, being disabled or (according to those theorists who 
subscribe to a thesis of biological determinism) being homosexual. 
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constitute a homosexual- centric conception of the public good. Such a State might 
promote homosexual -specific needs and interests by, for example, recognising 
marriages between homosexuals, funnelling extra money towards AIDS research and 
prevention, educating people about the evils of homophobia while attaching more 
rigorous penalties to acts of discrimination against homosexuals, and so forth. 
Conservative Catholics, on the other hand, may do quite well for themselves in a 
secular State, however they may nonetheless find it easier to flourish in a State which, 
while being liberal, nonetheless encourages religiosity, discourages sexual promiscuity 
(not to mention birth control and homosexuality) and promulgates the Church's 
symbolism and teachings through its institutions, policies and symbols. Indeed, the 
same could be said of almost any type of group which has its own identity and whose 
identity- specific needs and interests are a constituent component of its members' 
conception of the good life. Even the disabled might find it easier to flourish in a 
disabled -centric State with, for example, more wheelchair ramps, a fully government 
subsidised health system and rehabilitation network and so forth. 
Are such considerations sufficient to provide a liberal justification for a group's 
secession from a liberal State? On the one hand, groups such as, say, homosexuals 
may benefit if their specific needs and interests were more adequately addressed by 
changes in public policy of the sort mentioned above. On the other hand, however, this 
does not mean that the creation of a gay and lesbian State would be an instrumentally 
effective, nor the most instrumentally effective, means of achieving such an outcome. 
Not only does secession usually come with high attendant costs, but there may be 
other, less extreme means of furthering the ability of a group's members to achieve the 
liberal goal of self -authorship which may, or may not, include group -specific rights of 
the type proposed by Kymlicka. 
Indeed, it is a matter of little dispute that there are more groups in the world, with 
their own group -specific interests around which their members' conception of the good 
life is formed, than there are possible States. As Kymlicka notes, while there is no 
reason to suppose that liberals should necessarily oppose peaceful secessions by liberal 
groups, for many groups the option of secession is not always possible or desirable.l23 
123 e.g. many groups - particularly indigenous peoples who are frequently relatively small in number and 
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Thus, even where a group's secession were feasible, the costs of such a move - 
particularly when it involves the setting up of a new, independent State rather than 
simply joining a neighbouring State - may nonetheless prove to be prohibitively high. 
E. Two Divergent Accounts of Liberalism & Illiberalism 
The second argument for why a group might have a liberal reason to secede from a 
liberal State concerns a situation where a group of individuals does not subscribe to 
liberalism, are themselves rather illiberal in their beliefs and practices, and so want to 
secede in order to create an illiberal State.124 The argument trades on the question of 
just how much illiberalism liberalism can allow and, like the analysis above, finds 
expression in the debate between Kymlicka and Kukathas. The purpose of the brief 
discussion that follows is to briefly outline the dispute between these two theorists and, 
in addition to then making some general remarks about it, demonstrate that even if we 
accept the claim that liberalism includes the freedom to establish an illiberal 
community, this type of argument is not really germane to the LD theories of secession 
here under consideration. 
In his defence of minority rights Kymlicka makes a distinction between two different 
types of claim which a group may make: (a) a claim against its own members; and (b) 
a claim against the larger society of which the group is a constituent component. The 
former type of claim - which Kymlicka terms internal restrictions - are designed to 
protect a group from the effects of internal dissent125 in the name of group solidarity 
and cultural tradition or integrity. Kymlicka claims that because they restrict the very 
value which liberalism seeks to promote - i.e. individual choice - internal restrictions 
are rarely justifiable from a liberal perspective.126 For example, Kymlicka argues 
against Lord Devlin's rejection of the legalisation of homosexual practices on the 
grounds that doing so would change England's cultural structure. Protecting the 
homophobic character of England's cultural structure from the effects of allowing free 
choice of sexual life- style, claims Kymlicka, undermines the very reason we have to 
materially disadvantaged - would have enormous difficulty forming a viable, independent State. 
Kymlicka (1995), p.186. 
124 Or, alternatively, to join an existing illiberal State 
125 i.e. a refusal by individuals to follow traditional practices or customs. 
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protect England's cultural structure in the first place (i.e. to allow meaningful 
individual choice).127 
Conversely, Kymlicka believes that the latter type of claim - which he terms external 
protections - may be justified from a liberal standpoint, provided they reduce the 
minority group's vulnerability to the decisions of the larger society and do not enable 
one group to exploit or oppress other groups. In summary: liberalism requires freedom 
within the minority group and equality between the minority and the majority 
groups.128 Special, group -specific rights are, therefore, permissible if they help 
promote justice between ethno- cultural groups, but are impermissible if they produce, 
perpetuate or exacerbate inequalities within groups.129 
Once again, however, Kukathas has challenged this view by pointing out that many 
cultural minorities of the sort that Kymlicka wants to grant special rights to are, in 
many respects, fundamentally illiberal. Not only do these groups place very little value 
upon individual freedom of chóice, but they also subordinate the interests of the 
individual to those of the community.13Ó Such groups would, presumably, not only 
have no interest in a system of minority rights that challenged their illiberal practices, 
but would reject it out of a concern that it would imply the reorganisation of their 
community's structure in accordance with liberal precepts of democracy and individual 
rights. 
This tension between respecting cultural differences and upholding certain individual 
rights leads Kukathas to conclude that there are, in fact, two different and inconsonant 
views of liberalism and what a liberal society is. For Kymlicka, a liberal society is one 
which is comprised of `liberal' communities - i.e. communities which uphold certain 
ideals of equality and individual autonomy of the sort associated with Kant, Mill and 
Rawls. On this understanding a way of life is legitimate if it values individual 
126 Kymlicka (1995), pp.35 -36 and p.152. 
127 Kymlicka (1989), pp. 171 -72. Also see Kymlicka's discussion of the Pueblo Indians. Kymlicka 
(1989), p.196. 
128 Kymlicka (1995), pp.35 -36 and p.152. 
129 Refer Kymlicka (1999), p.31. 
130 Kukathas (1995), pp.241-42. 
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autonomy and, thus, individuals possess certain civil rights that override, or `trump', 
other, opposing considerations. Conversely, for Kukathas a liberal society is 
distinguished by its toleration of dissent and therefore may contain `illiberal' 
communities that place very little value upon individual equality and autonomy, and 
which subordinate the interests of the individual to those of the community.13' Under 
this version of liberalism a way of life is legitimate if the individuals taking part in it 
do so willingly and, thus, have a right of exit that takes precedence over all other 
rights.132 In summary: for Kymlicka individuals have certain antecedent freedoms 
which generate a set of enforceable moral claims against the wider community; for 
Kukathas individuals have only the freedoms allowed them by the community of 
which they are a member, and the only enforceable claim individuals can make against 
that community is to be permitted to leave.133 
To interfere in illiberal communities in an attempt to liberalise them would, from 
Kukathas's perspective, express an intolerance of dissent and, thus, be illiberal. 
Rather, "...different communities in a liberal order should be able to go their own 
moral ways [regardless of their attitudes towards the values of equality and individual 
autonomy]. "134 On the other hand, however, Kukathas believes that adherence to 
KymIicka's model of liberalism necessarily entails a commitment of interference in 
such groups, as if we embrace the values of autonomy and individuality and the 
substantive civil rights that they give rise to, then we should also enforce that view 
upon those communities that do not subscribe to ít135 a process which will, at least in 
most cases, paradoxically lead to that culture's destruction.136 For this reason, 
Kukathas objects that Kymlicka's theory entrenches cultural rights "...on a basis which 
131 Kukathas (1992), p.680. 
132 See Kukathas (1995), pp.248 -49. 
133 See also Jeremy Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper (London: Routlege, 1996), 
pp.143ff. Shearmur compares this approach with that of Nozick (see above) and Karl Menger, Morality, 
Decision and Social Organization: Toward a Logic of Ethics (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1974). 
134 Kukathas (1997), p.425. 
135 See Kukathas (1997), p.425. 
136 Kukathas explains: "If their culture is not already liberal, if it does not prize individuality or 
individual choice, then to talk of liberalization is inescapably to talk of undermining their culture. Culture 
is not simply a matter of colorful dances and rituals, nor is it even a framework of context for individual 
choice. Rather, it is the product of the association of individuals over time, which in turn shapes 
individual commitments and gives meaning to individual lives - lives for which individual choice or 
autonomy may be quite valueless. To try to reshape it in accordance with ideals of individual choice is to 
Liberal- Democratic Theories of Secession 169 
itself undermines many forms of cultural community, specifically those that fail in 
their practices to conform to liberal norms of tolerance and to honour the liberal ideal 
of autonomy."' 37 
Suppose that we accept Kukathas's version of liberalism in which the members of an 
association are free to determine the terms of their association. How might such a 
view be employed to successfully counter the claim that there can be no Iiberal reason 
for seceding form a liberal State? We might, for example, begin by imagining a group 
which adheres to certain beliefs and practices that do not value equality and individual 
autonomy, and which subordinates the needs and interests of its individual members to 
those of the larger group. Imagine, further, that this group exists as a minority in a 
larger State, the majority of whose members do value equality and individual 
autonomy, and who dominate public life with the result that their conception and 
prioritisation of individual rights and autonomy are generally reflected within the 
State' s official institutions and practices. 
The smaller group might then base a right to secede on the claim that the welfare and 
survival of the collectivist, group- orientated beliefs and practices to which they adhere 
requires that they be afforded the degree of control over their own affairs that only 
independent Statehood can offer. In as much as the right to secede is justified by 
reference to the disadvantage and vulnerability suffered by a group as a result of its 
minority status, such an argument is similar to that which Kymlicka makes in favour of 
special rights for minority societal cultures. Kymlicka would, however, reject the 
argument because, rather than bestowing rights with the aim of increasing the total sum 
of individual freedom of choice, it does exactly the opposite by according a right of 
independent Statehood for the sake of preserving a way of life that places little, if any, 
value upon individual freedom of choice.138 
strike at its very core." See Kukathas (1995), pp.243 -44. 
137 Kukathas (1995), p.244. Also see Yael Tamir, Who Do You Trust ?' in Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women ?, ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999). 
138 Moreover, such an argument also differs from that of Kymlicka in the sense that Kymlicka is 
concerned with rights that allow cultural minorities to flourish within their existing State. 
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Moreover, it is clear that even if we accept the right of groups to determine the terms 
of their own association, this will nonetheless be insufficient to rescue the LD theorist 
from the claim that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a liberal State. 
There may, for example, be less extreme measures than secession which do not come 
with the high price tag of setting up an independent State, but which are sufficient to 
preserve an illiberal minority's way of life from being undermined by their more 
autonomy- minded neighbours. We might exempt members of the group from certain 
laws which govern the other citizens of the State, e.g. laws regarding bigamy might be 
made inapplicable to the group's members, thus allowing for polygamous marriages. 
Similar exemptions might be made with respect to laws regarding bodily integrity - 
thus allowing certain practices such as, say, clitoridectomy which would otherwise be 
illegal. The group might also be granted its own territory, or 'reservation', and given 
the right to restrict entry to that territory (particularly with respect to non- members) 
and to enforce its own rules within that territory. 
The issue, however, is not whether illiberal practices can be adequately protected in a 
larger, liberal State by less extreme measures than secession. Rather, the issue is that 
the whole question of whether or not there can be a liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State, only makes sense if we are operating under the assumption that a liberal 
society is one which is comprised of so- called liberal communities that emphasise the 
values of individual autonomy and equality. If, however, a liberal society may be 
comprised of illiberal communities that do not place any emphasis upon individual 
autonomy and equality, then the claim that there can be no right to secede from a 
liberal State simply will not hold. After all, if a society is prepared to tolerate an 
illiberal community in their midst that engages in practices of discrimination against 
their own members and so forth, then why .wouldn't the society also be prepared to let 
that community secede? 
If we adopt a Rawlsian conception of liberalism like that preferred by Kymlicka then 
the case for secession must be substantially weakened. Under this account any right to 
secede must necessarily be cashed out in terms of an increase in the ability of 
individuals to live their life from the inside (i.e. much in the same way as Kymlicka 
attempts to justify special rights for minority cultures by demonstrating a link between 
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cultural membership and individual choice). With this version of liberalism it is 
difficult to see how a group might possess a right to secede from a liberal State that 
respects and upholds the individual rights, to which this conception of liberalism gives 
rise. Even if a sub- group's life plan does differ substantially from that of the majority, 
there may be less extreme measures than secession which satisfactorily address such 
considerations and allow the members of the minority to live their lives according to 
that life plan. 
If, on the other hand, we adopt the type of liberalism favoured by theorists such as 
Kukathas, then the most important thing is that, as a liberal society, we tolerate dissent 
and do not impose our views upon others. This means, first, that a right to secede no 
longer needs to be explicated in terms of individual autonomy and an increased ability 
to live one's life from the inside. Second, it also means that where a sub -group wants 
to secede, then to deny that group the right to secede and maintain the political union 
by force is to fail to tolerate that group's expression of (political) dissent which, by 
definition, is an illiberal act. Under the former type of liberalism, a group has to justify 
its desire to secede by demonstrating an instrumental connection between independent 
Statehood and the ability of individuals to achieve genuine self -authorship. 
Conversely, under the latter type of liberalism, the expression of a desire to secede as 
an act of dissent to the political status quo is itself sufficient to ground a prima facie 
right to secede. 
Therefore whether or not there can be a liberal right to secede from a liberal State 
depends upon exactly what type of liberalism we are working with and, thus, what we 
understand a liberal State to be. If we adopt the type of liberalism favoured by 
Kukathas then the objection that there can be no liberal reason for seceding from a 
liberal State would appear to be irrelevant. Yet, at least in the case of Beran's theory, 
it is evident that this is not the type of liberalism to which the LD theory appeals. 
Indeed, Beran specifically rules out the possibility of a group seceding to create an 
illiberal State by claiming that in order to possess a right to secede, not only must the 
seceding group be prepared to allow sub -groups to secede (providing that they too 
fulfil all the requisite criteria and so qualify for a right to secede), but they must not 
intend to oppress or exploit a subgroup for whom secession is not an available 
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option.139 Hence, the right to secede in order to establish an illiberal State is a right 
that is simply not countenanced by Beran. 
...in real world theory it has to be granted, and indeed stressed, that a community's right of 
secession, if exercised in order to oppress minorities in its midst, may be overridden by the 
right of these minorities not to be oppressed.140 
In the case of the other two theorists who fit into the same broad category as Beran - 
Gauthier and Wellman - things are not so clear cut. However, there is nonetheless 
some reason to believe that they would not favour the type of liberalism propounded by 
Kukathas. The emphasis that Gauthier places upon the right of individuals to associate 
politically with those who also wish to associate with them, indicates that he believes 
that any State established by a group's secession must allow a sub -group the right to 
also secede if it so wishes. However, aside from a right of exit, it is not entirely clear 
what additional restraints Gauthier favours placing upon would -be secessionists - 
including the question of whether or not a group must place adequate emphasis upon 
the values of individual equality and autonomy if they are to possess a right to secede. 
Note, however, Gauthier's concern for the Anglophone minority that would be created 
by the secession of Quebec, but for whom secession would not really be a feasible 
option. While Gauthier draws no firm conclusions from this discussion, at the very 
least it does indicate a belief by Gauthier that the post secession welfare of minority 
groups within a State created by secession is not entirely irrelevant to the determination 
of whether or not a group's secession would be legitimate.141 
Finally, Wellman argues that a group has a right to secede if: (a) the group's members 
wish to secede; and (b) their secession would not create `harmful conditions.' While 
Wellman, like Gauthier, never explicitly addresses the question of whether or not the 
right to secede includes the right to establish an illiberal State, there are good reasons 
to suppose that he would not be supportive of such a proposition. The `harmful 
conditions' which Wellman believes would justify withholding a right of secession 
refer to situations in which "...either the seceding region or the remainder state is 
139 See Beran (1984), p.30. 
140 Beran (1998), p.54. 
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unable to perform its political function of protecting rights... "142 The fact that 
Wellman rejects an individual right of unilateral secession because he believes it 
would produce infringements of individual property rights,143 indicates a belief that the 
rights which a State must protect includes more than just a simple right of exit. 
Therefore, while both Gauthier and Wellman do not explicitly reject the right of a 
group to secede and create an illiberal State that does not emphasise individual equality 
and autonomy - as, say, Beran does - there is nonetheless good reason to suppose that 
they also would not be supportive of such a proposal. Suppose, then, that we allow 
that the type of liberalism favoured by KukathaS is capable of satisfactorily dealing 
with the objection that there can be no reason for seceding from a liberal State. The 
apparent hostility of these three LD theorists to the notion that a group may permissibly 
secede to create an illiberal State - i.e. a State in which the only enforceable moral 
claim that people have against their rulers is to be allowed to exit - indicates that they 
would reject the form of liberalism favoured by Kukathas. Thus, even if Kukathas's 
liberalism does provide an effective counter to the claim that there can be no reason for 
seceding from a liberal State, such a counter -argument is apparently not pertinent to 
the LD theorists here under consideration. 
It seems, then, that LD theorists such as Beran are in something of a bind. If, on the 
one hand, they stick with the type of liberalism favoured by Kymlicka then, in all but 
the most extreme cases, the right to secede must be limited to those groups unfortunate 
enough to find themselves trapped in an illiberal State with no immediate prospect of 
achieving liberal reform. If, on the other hand, the LD theorist opts for the model of 
liberalism favoured by Kukathas then, while this will allow for a right to secede from 
liberal States, it will also sanction the creation of States which do not value individual 
autonomy and equality. Do we: (a) allow a plebiscitary right of secession based upon 
simple majoritarian considerations of the type favoured by theorists such as Beran - 
but which also includes the right to establish an illiberal State in which the only 
enforceable claim which individuals have against the wider community is to be 
141 See Gauthier, p.370. 
142 Wellman, p.161 [emphasis added]. 
143 Wellman believes that an individual right of secession would produce a breakdown of law and order 
creating a state of affairs resembling a Hobbesian state of nature (Wellman, p.156). 
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permitted to leave - or; (b) do we restrict the right to secede to those groups prepared 
to respect and uphold individual rights of autonomy and equality and in doing so 
acknowledge that the right to secede will apply to relatively few groups over time? 
Unfortunately, as Kukathas puts it, "...one cannot have it both ways. "144 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
If the LD theory of secession is defined simply as one which endorses a plebiscitary 
right of secession then this raises numerous, inter- related issues regarding territory and 
the determination of the right -holder. Above it was argued that one account which 
aims to resolve these issues - that of Beran - should, from a liberal perspective, be 
rejected as unsatisfactory. However, even if a satisfactory account of these various 
issues is forthcoming, there will remain the additional, often neglected, question of 
how liberalism justifies a right for individuals to determine their own political 
relationships and precisely why a group of liberal individuals might want to secede 
from a liberal State. 
Above two possible responses to this question were considered and found wanting. 
The first response - that an individual's ability to realise their life plan will, at least to 
some degree, be dependent upon the character and identity of the official institutions 
and practices of the State within which that individual finds him/herself - is inadequate 
because less extreme measures than secession will usually be sufficient to satisfy such 
considerations. The second response - that individuals cannot adequately realise 
illiberal ways of life in a liberal State and should be free to establish such States if they 
so wish - is not really germane to the type of LD theory under consideration here and 
would, in any case, presumably be rejected by LD theorists as it is by Beran. 
There may, of course, be other, more satisfactory responses that do demonstrate a 
liberal reason for seceding from a liberal State, however it remains entirely mysterious 
as to what these might be. In the absence of any such account it would seem that, if 
(pace Beran) we rule out the creation of illiberal States that do not uphold ideals of 
144 Kukathas (1992), p.678. 
Liberal -Democratic Theories of Secession 175 
individual autonomy and equality, then any LD right to secede must be restricted to 
those groups unfortunate enough to find themselves trapped within illiberal States. 
This does not mean that liberals may not be able to produce pragmatic accounts of 
when secession should be allowed, only that such accounts are not specifically liberal 
and must be viewed as "...`second best' solutions outside of, though not necessarily 
inconsistent with, a general iberal account of the just state. "145 
Consider, for example, a situation where two groups which share a history of mutual 
antagonism, mistrust and violence inhabit the same State and are engaged in a 
seemingly endless campaign of serious abuse against one another. Suppose, further, 
that the members of these two groups are incapable of putting their differences aside, 
and that a political division where each group has its own State would allow their 
members to get on with living their lives in accordance with the values of their 
choosing in a manner in which they are unable to when they both share the same State. 
While, from a liberal perspective, such a division might, ceteris paribus, be entirely 
justified, it is nonetheless a second best option in response to a problem that arises as a 
result of the members of each group not respecting the liberal rights of the members of 
the other group. Consequently, the LD theory, even if it does turn out to have some 
advantages over the other two types of secession theory, nonetheless appears to find 
itself in the peculiar position of addressing an issue - i.e. secession - which, if 
everyone accepted the theory (of liberalism), would not exist. 
145 Dowding, p.72. 
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5 
KASHMIR 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters consisted of a process of critical engagement with the three 
types of secession theory under consideration in this thesis. Two of these theories - 
Nationalist and Just Cause (JC) theories - were rejected as unsatisfactory, while a 
number of problems were identified with Beran's Liberal- Democratic (LD) theory. 
The aim of this and the following chapter is to now analyse these claims in the context 
of the current secessionist dispute in the Indian-held State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
However, before introducing this empirical component of the thesis, perhaps it will be 
useful to elaborate upon some of the broad reasons behind the incorporation of the 
Kashmir case -study and exactly what is hoped to be gained from its inclusion here. 
Clearly the inclusion of the case -study within what is otherwise a highly analytical 
investigation raises wider questions of to what degree theoretical claims are capable of 
substantiation through empirical argument. While these issues are largely beyond the 
scope of the present project, it is important to once again emphasise that despite their 
high level of theoretical abstraction and sophistication Nationalist, JC and LD theories 
nonetheless have as their ultimate aim the normative assessment, and eventual 
resolution, of disputes that are very much a part of the `real world.' Thus, while each 
of these three theories stresses abstract rights as such, this is done with a view towards 
the actual implementation of these rights as a means for resolving conflicts which are a 
part of the fabric of reality. 
Consequently, there is a sense in which, because these theories attempt to interpret 
and resolve real -life conflicts, they can only be understood and assessed with respect to 
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those same conflicts. Thus, given the type of material under consideration it is entirely 
appropriate to include an empirical case study within the thesis. This should by no 
means be interpreted as an attempt to detract from, or question the importance of, the 
preceding analytical investigation. However, to acknowledge the significance of 
analytical argument and logical coherency in the assessment of normative theories of 
secession is not to also say that empirical claims are thereby irrelevant to such an 
undertaking. Indeed, the importance of real -world examples in the evaluation of these 
theories is underscored by the fact that many of the theorists previously considered 
make frequent appeals to empirical analysis to bolster their respective cases. I 
Accordingly, one often finds in the literature on how liberalism should respond to the 
related issues of nationalism, secession and minority rights a significant inter -play 
between theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. 
Similarly, the first, and foremost, aim of including this case study on Kashmir is to 
take the critical insights contained in Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis and 
put them to the test in a real -life, contemporary secessionist dispute and see whether or 
not they stand up and, if so, how and in what form. The overriding objective is, then, 
to use the case of Kashmir as illustrative material by examining to what degree the 
general criticisms made in Chapters Two, Three and Four may be substantiated with 
empirical data. For example, in Chapter Two it was argued that both subjective and 
objective criteria of nationhood should be rejected as unsatisfactory. By investigating 
how one might construct a subjective or objective definition of a Kashmiri nation we 
may also examine to what extent the criticisms of these criteria are applicable to such 
an account of national identity and, perhaps, in need of clarification or re- 
interpretation. 
To quote just a few examples: Miller refers to the cases of Canada and Switzerland in support of his 
distinction between multi -nationalism and multi -communalism. See David Miller, On Nationality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.93 -98. Similarly, Kymlicka uses the example of Australian 
aborigines to support his claim that people are bound to their culture of birth and upbringing in important 
ways and, thus, that respecting peoples' own cultural membership and facilitating their transition to 
another culture are not equally legitimate options. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and 
Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.175 -77. Kukathas, on the other hand, also uses the example 
of Australian aborigines -the Ngarrindjeri tribe - in support of his critique of Kymlicka's criteria for 
selecting what groups will be the bearers of his special rights. See Chandran Kukathas, `Multiculturalism 
as Fairness: Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.4, 
1997, p.415. 
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A less -developed, but nonetheless important, aim is to take a critical look at some of 
the claims put forward by the various parties to the Kashmir dispute in order to see 
what normative significance should be attached to such assertions by a liberal theory of 
secession. Thus, while the thesis does not seek to directly analyse or normatively 
evaluate claimed rights to secede in Kashmir, it does take a critical look at some of the 
various arguments given for and against Kashmir's secession with a view towards 
determining how a liberal theory might deal with these claims. The goal, then, is not 
to take a normative theory of secession and apply it to the case of Kashmir in order to 
determine whether Kashmir's secession from India would be morally justified - 
although this is not to say that much of the following discussion may not be relevant to 
such an enterprise. Rather, the more modest goal is to determine what we can learn 
about the normative assessment of secessionist claims by taking some of the arguments 
advanced in the case of Kashmir and seeing how a liberal theory of secession should 
respond to these. 
Because, however, one cannot properly understand, nor say anything substantive 
about, the dispute in Kashmir without first knowing something about its historical 
background, it is first necessary to provide a brief historical narrative which establishes 
who the parties to the dispute are, what their competing claims consist of and why they 
are making these demands. The purpose of following discussion ís, therefore, to 
introduce the case -study of Kashmir which will then be related to the preceding 
theoretical discussion in the following chapter. Before beginning, however, it is vital 
to stress that Kashmir is a disputed territory, and each party to this dispute promulgates 
its own version of events in an attempt to legitimise its claims. The purpose of the 
following discussion is not to arrive at any conclusion as to which version of events is 
the correct one, or who is telling the truth and who is not. Rather, each version of 
events and the arguments supporting it will be summarised and contrasted with other, 
competing accounts. The objective is simply to paint a brief picture of the current 
situation in Kashmir and, in so- doing, to provide a historical context in which the 
conflict in Kashmir may then be employe& as illustrative material for the preceding 
theoretical discussion in the manner described. 
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5.2 PRE -PARTITION KASHMIR 
A. Geography & Ethnography of the Region 
The term `Kashmir' is used in reference to a variety of different geographical regions 
but generally refers to what is known as the `Vale of Kashmir', or simply `the Valley', 
which, since 1947, has been a part of the Indian-held State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The State is divided geographically and ethnographically into three regions - Kashmir, 
Jammu and Ladakh. The people of each region possess a distinct language, religion, 
culture, ethnicity and, thus, sense of self -awareness, or cultural identity, which 
distinguishes them from the inhabitants of the other two regions within the State. 
Because of their beauty, fertility, geographical location and topography, the areas 
contained within the Indian-held State of Jammu and Kashmir have for many centuries 
been highly coveted and regarded as the gateway from Central Asia to the Indian 
subcontinent. The State's strategic value is equally important today given that it 
borders on, or is proximate to, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and States of the former 
Soviet Union.2 Additionally, the agriculture of both the Indian and Pakistani districts 
of Punjab and Sind are dependent upon rivers that either rise in or traverse the State.3 
The Vale of Kashmir (capital Srinagar) is a place of astounding beauty located at a 
height of just over six thousand feet, and a mere eighty four miles in length and twenty 
four miles in width.4 It is an important centre of rice and fruit cultivations and also 
possesses some wealth in terms of industrial minerals and precious stones.6 The 
majority of Kashmiris are Sunni Muslims, although until the recent crisis there existed 
a minority of Hindus, or Pandits. To the south of the Valley lies Jammu -a mainly 
Hindu region that is an extension of the Punjabi plains (an area of about 12,000 square 
miles) and is separated from Kashmir by the Pir Panjal mountains7 which range in 
2 See, for example, D. K. Joshi, A New Deal in Kashmir (New Delhi: Ankur Publishing House, 1978), 
pp. l -2. 
3 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.11. 
4 Vernon Hewitt, Reclaiming the Past? (London: Portland Books, 1995), p.20. 
5 Lamb, p.9. 
6 K. S. Saxena, Political History of Kashmir (Lucknow: Upper India Publishing House, 1974), p.9. 
7 Lamb, p.11. 
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height from four thousand to twelve thousand feet.8 To the Valley's east lies the 
Buddhist region of Ladakh (capital Leh). Ladakh is separated from the Valley by a 
mountainous range that is traversable for only 5 months of the year and takes the 
traveller over the 11,300 ft Zoji -La Pass.9 Ladakh, an extension of the Tibetan Plateau, 
is a vast, desolate area with one of the lowest population densities in India.10 Ladakh's 
inhabitants are almost exclusively Tibetan Buddhists, although there exists a small 
minority of Shiite Muslims concentrated around the Kargil Area. 
B. Pre -Islamic History of the Region 
Kashmir's early history is obscure. The region was not a part of what scholars refer 
to as the Indus river civilisation, although it evidently witnessed the Aryan invasions 
that began in approximately 1500 -1000 BC.11 With these invasions the residents of 
the region were introduced to Hinduism which gradually came to supplant the existing 
animist religion known as Naga.12 Knowledge of this early phase of Kashmiri history 
is derived mostly from archaeological evidence and a set of twelfth century AD. 
chronicles entitled the Rajatarangini (`River of Kings') by Kalhana.13 The historical 
veracity of the Rajatarangini is questionable, and its earlier portions are very much 
hearsay and traditional lore. The first ruler of the Valley upon whose identity 
historians are generally agreed is that of the Buddhist emperor Ashoka (274 -237 BC.), 
and it is he who is credited with founding the city of Srinagar,14 
8 Hewitt, p.20. 
9 Hewitt, p.20. 
10 Four people per square mile (Hewitt, p.21). 
11 See Hewitt, p.26 
12 See Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: Tauris, 1996), p.1 . The authority of Hindu 
ideas is directly derived from a set of Vedic scripts, some of which date back to 1,000 BC. A feature of 
Hinduism is that of caste which arose from an economic division of labour, where professions were 
ranked hierachically according to an index of polluting or non -polluting tasks. The most powerful caste 
was that of the Brahmins, who possessed the greatest material wealth and social prestige. Hinduism 
rationalised the economic basis of caste by reference to other religious ideas such as dharma and karma, 
thus providing a religious justification for a system of social organisation characterised by vast 
inequalities of material wealth and social prestige (Hewitt, pp.26 -29). 
13 Lamb, p.9. 
14 See Saxena, p.16; and Joshi, p.16. After Ashoka's death Buddhism continued to flourish in Kashmir 
(Hewitt, p.3 I, and Saxena, pp.23ft). 
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Buddhism directly challenged the authority of Hindu Vedic scripts upon which the 
authority of the ruling Brahmins were based, and condemned the practice of caste and 
the social prejudices which it created. As a movement committed to radical social 
reform Buddhism gained immense popularity. However, after several dynasties 
adopted Buddhism as the courtly faith, it began to lose its popular status as a vehicle 
for social change. l' As a result, in the middle of the ninth century AD., Buddhism was 
supplanted by the Hindu reform movement of Shaivism16 known as T(r)ika Sastra.17 
A product of its religious forebears, Shaivism was the outcome of the blending of 
Buddhist and Vedic cultures with some uniquely Kashmiri insights.'8 
Kashmir at various times, suffered under the cruellest and most barbaric of tyrants. 
The two most notable rulers of pre- Islamic Kashmir appear to be Lalitaditya (724 -760 
AD.)19 who erected the great temple of Martand, and Avantivarman (855 -883 AD.)20 
who constructed extensive drainage and irrigation schemes in the Valley. 
Archaeological evidence and literary sources suggest that during the period 600 -855 
AD. the Valley was the centre of a powerful regional kingdom whose influence 
extended north into Baltistan and as far south as Rajasthan.2I 
C. The Arrival of Islam & the Sultan Dynasty 
From the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries the last remnants of a centralised Hindu 
State were swept from northern India and replaced by Islamic dynasties. There appears 
to have been no effort to prevent Islamic teachers and preachers entering the Valley,22 
and in the second half of the fourteenth century seven hundred followers of Saiyyid Ali 
15 Moreover, there is evidence that by the early fifth century AD. some Buddhist priests had adopted 
Brahmanical practices based upon conceptions of spiritual pollution (Hewitt, p.32). 
16 i.e. the worship of the Hindu god Siva. 
17 Sunil Chandra Ray, Early History and Culture of Kashmir (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970), 
pp.165ff. 
18 Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967), p.10. The 
popularity of Shaivism is often attributed to its emphasis upon magical practice, sexual rites, secret 
societies and the fact that, unlike earlier Hindu Vedic practices, it did not exclude lower social orders (e.g. 
see Hewitt, p.33). 
19 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Kashmir The Wounded Valley (New Delhi; UBSPD Publishers, 1994), p.26. 
20 Bhattacharjea, p.27; and Scofield, pp.9 -11. 
21 See Hewitt, pp.33 -34; Saxena pp.51 -89, pp.109 -36; and Bhattacharjea, pp.26ff. 
22 Hewitt, p.35. 
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Hamdani arrived in Kashmir from the Persian city of Hamadan.23 Gradually most 
Kashmiris converted to Islam, however these conversions appear not to have been the 
result of force. 
The popular appeal of Islam is often explained by reference to the meditative, eclectic 
form of Islam introduced to the Valley: The followers of Saiyyid Ali Hamdani, who 
were fleeing the cruel intolerance of Persia's conqueror Timur, were a collection of 
meditative, mystic Sufis24 who emphasised the universality of all religions,25 thus 
furthering the personal and devotional routes to salvation contained in the Valley's 
earlier religions of Buddhism and Shaivism.26 This fitted in well with the popular 
idiom of thirteenth and fourteenth century Kashmir where religious observance was 
traditionally practised by the laity itself, and was aimed at personal salvation and 
liberation.27 
As in the case of Shaivism, the introduction of Islam resulted in the emergence of a 
composite culture, often referred to as religious humanism.28 While Kashmiri Islam 
stands on the cardinal principles of the Koran it has been deeply influenced by ancient 
Kashmiri culture. Kashmiri Muslims share with the Pandits many inhibitions, 
superstitions, idolatrous practices, social liberties and intellectual freedoms which are 
alien to Islam.29 Evidence of this blending of cultures can be seen in the distinctive 
style of traditional architecture where Islamic spires rise from structures with designs 
that are Buddhist in origin, and the numerous shrines throughout the Valley which are 
23 Bhattacharjea, p.30. As early as the eleventh century AD. attempts had been made by Muslims to 
conquer the Valley. Mahmud of Ghazni tried to take the Valley twice in 1015 and 1021 but both times 
was unable to cross the Pir Panjal range (Bhattacharjea, p.27; and Hewitt, p.35). 
24 Muslim mystics associated with Persia, who objected to the excessive codification and strict 
interpretation of the Koran. See Hewitt, p.35. Also see A. Q. Rafiqi, 'Sufism in Kashmir' in 
Contemporary Relevance of Sufism, ed. Syeda Saiyidain Hameed (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural 
Relations, 1993), p.322. 
25 Bhattacharjea, p.30. 
26 Hewitt, p.34. For a full account of Kashmir's conversion to Islam see Mohammad Ishaq Khan, 
Kashmir's Transition to Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994). 
27 Hewitt, pp.33 -36. Also see Rafiqi, p.322; Mohammed Ishaq Khan, `Evidence of Social Protest In Sufi 
Literature: A Case Study of Kashmir' in Contemprorary Relevance of Sufism, ed. Syeda Saiyidain 
Hameed (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1993), p.299; Bhattacharjea, pp.32 -33; and 
Rafiqi, p.322. 
28 R. N. Kaul, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1985), p.2. 
29 
See Bazaz, p.14; Riyaz Punjabi, `Kashmir: The Bruised Identity' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju 
G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westvíew Press, 1992), p.137; and Kaul, p.3. 
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revered by Hindus and Muslims alike.30 This common cultural heritage is a constituent 
component of a distinct sense of politico -cultural self -identity in the Valley known as 
Kashmiriyat, which historically has frequently overridden religious differences amongst 
Kashmiris. Consequently, any religious intolerance in the Valley was usually the 
product of the personality of the ruler or competing factions of the nobility seeking to 
promote their own self -interest or economic considerations.31 
The first Muslim ruler of Kashmir was Rinchin, who captured the Valley in 1320 
after it was sacked by the Mongols. Following Rinchin's death power reverted to a 
Hindu queen, however in 1339 Shah Mir crowned himself Sultan Shamsuddin, thus 
beginning the Kashmiri Sultanate (which was to last almost two hundred and thirty 
years) and, more significantly, almost five hundred years of uninterrupted Muslim rule 
in the Valley. Most of the Sultans of Kashmir tolerated the Valley's Hindus, allowing 
them to build temples and carry on as norma1.32 Any ` Kashmiri golden age' existed 
under the rule of Sultan Zain- Ul- Abidin (1420 -1470)33 who encouraged the Hindus to 
return to the Valley by rebuilding their temples, undertook numerous public works, 
encouraged the growth of handicraft industries for which Kashmir was later to become 
famous and revived scholarly pursuits. His death was followed by a period of civil war 
and strife that opened the Valley to external influences. 
D. The Moghuls, Afghans & Sikhs 
In 1586 Kashmir was conquered by Akbar the Great (1556 -1605) and formally 
integrated into the Moghul Empire. The Moghuls were Sunni Muslims who ruled their 
vast Indian empire from the Indian plains. Moghul rule consisted of the appointment 
of revenue -collecting officials and the establishment of elaborate rights over revenue 
producing lands. The nobility were converted into Jagidars, who retained rights to a 
30 Bhattacharjea, p.35. 
31 For example the need to pay the army on some occasions necessitated the confiscation of temple 
property. See D. D. Kosambi, An Introduction to the Study of Indian History (Bombay: Popular Book 
Depot, 1956), p.337. Also see P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads (New Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House, 1994), pp.4 -5. 
32 The two notable exceptions were Sultan Sikander (1389 -1413) and Ali Shah (1413 -20), both of whom 
are associated with the murder of Hindus, the destruction of their temples and their forced conversion to 
Islam (Hewitt, p.37). 
33 Josef, Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p.11. 
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proportion of the revenue generated by the land for which they were accountable and 
paid the remainder to the Moghul Court.34 In addition, Kashmir was overseen by a 
governor (Subhedar) directly accountable to the emperor.35 In return the Kashmiris 
benefited from Pax Mughala and were exposed to broad northern Indian influences.36 
By the middle of the eighteenth century Moghul power had waned considerably and 
the Valley became a distant outpost cut off from a shrinking empire. With the gradual 
collapse of Moghul authority and the increasing greed and brutality of its provincial 
governors, two members of the Kashmiri nobility invited the Afghans to enter Kashmir 
and rid it of Moghul influence in 1752.37 Afghan rule is generally depicted as a period 
of lawlessness and religious persecution of both non -Muslims and non -Shiites. The 
Afghans were extraordinarily brutal and exhorbitantly taxed the people to pay for their 
almost constant military campaigns, bankrupting the Valley by destroying the shawl 
trade in the process.38 
In response to another invitation from the Kashmiri nobility, Ranjit Singh, under the 
guidance of his ally Gulab Singh, annexed the Valley in 1819 making it a part of the 
Sikh empire. As a reward for his assistance, Gulab Singh was given the title of Jagir 
and entitled to administer Jammu.39 Sikh rule is usually characterised as being little 
different to that of the Afghans. The main sources of knowledge concerning the 
condition of the Valley's population at this time are the writings of various British 
travellers. In 1824 one such traveller, William Moorcroft, wrote: 
Everywhere the people are in the most abject condition, exorbitantly taxed by the Sikh 
Government and subjected to every kind of extortion and oppression... Not more than one 
sixteenth of the cultivable land is in cultivation and the inhabitants, starving at home, are driven 
34 The emperor was the sole proprietor of all cultivable land in the Valley (Bazaz, p.21). 
35 Hewitt, p.41. 
36 The rule of the Moghuls appears to have been a time of stability in Kashmir. While there are some 
reports of famine, floods and plague in the seventeenth century (Hewitt, p.43; and Bhattacharjea, p.43), 
most complaints against Moghul rule seem to have been based upon the character of successive governors 
and the zeal with which they extracted taxes. 
37 Lamb gives the date for the incorporation of Kashmir into the Afghan empire as 1752 (Lamb, p.9) as 
does Bhattacharjea (Bhattacharjea, p.45), Hewitt alone gives the date as being 1753 (Hewitt, p.45). 
38 See, for example, Schofield, pp.29 -30. 
39 Hewitt, pp.46 -47. 
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in great numbers to the plains of Hindustan... Butchers, bakers, boatmen, vendors of fuel, 
public notaries, scavengers, prostitutes, all paid a sort of corporation tax4° 
E. The Dogra Kingdom to Maharaja Hari Singh 
Gulab Singh followed a strategy of expansionism conquering Ladakh in 1834 and 
Baltistan in 1840.41 The British, who were by now the dominant force on the 
subcontinent, grew increasingly concerned about the break -down of order in Punjab 
following Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 and the growing influence of Czarist Russia in 
the region. Events culminated in the British defeating the Sikhs in a hard fought 
campaign which was ended by the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar in which the British 
awarded Gulab Singh the territories of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit and Chamba for the 
sum of Rs750,000.42 Consequently, Kashmir became a part of what is often termed 
the Dogra Kingdom 43 
Maharaja Gulab Singh was succeeded by his son Ranbir Singh in 1857, who was 
himself succeeded by his son Pratap Singh in 1885. British concern about the 
administration of the Dogra Kingdom44 and the security of their northern frontiers 
against Czarist influence45 led to the installation of a British Resident in the State in 
1885,46 and the 1889 removal of Pratap Singh's governing powers in favour of a 
40 William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and 
Punjab, Vol.11, pp.293 -94. 
41 See Hewitt, p.48; and Lamb, p.ix. 
42 See Schofield, pp.49 -62. The decision to award these areas to Gulab Singh seems to have been a 
pragmatic mixture of practical considerations and the desire to reward Gulab Singh for his assistance 
during both the Sikh, and the earlier Afghan Wars. The Sikh Wars had drained the resources of the 
British East India Company, while the region's distance from the centre of British administration in the 
subcontinent and lack of easy access would not have endeared the British to the idea of governing the 
region directly. On Gulab Singh's assistance to the British during the Afghan and Sikh Wars see Lord 
Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Robert Hale, 1956), pp.26 -28. Also see Bhattacharjea, 
pp.50 -55. 
43 The term "Dogra" is a corruption of the Sanskrit word for two lakes and refers to the name of the 
Rajput dynasty that ruled the land between the Mansar and Siroinsar lakes (Hewitt, p.19). 
44 There had been a disastrous series of famines in the Valley, the worst of which was in 1877 when up to 
a third of the Valley's population is reported to have perished (Lamb, pp.12 -13; and Bhattacharjea, pp.58- 
59). 
45 Schofield, p.75. 
46 The resident was the official representative of the British Crown in the princely court. He was a person 
of great importance and no monarch could afford to ignore his advice or insult his honour. Since 1846 
there had been only a British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir who was able to exercise few governing 
powers. In 1885, however, this Officer on Special Duty became the State's British Resident. 
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Council of State in which the final arbiter was the British Resident.47 During this time 
the British carried out some limited land and labour reforms, which mildly alleviated 
the condition of the Valley's Muslims. In 1905 some of the Maharaja's powers were 
returned to him, and this process was virtually complete by 1922. Thus, by the time 
Pratap Singh died in 1925 to be succeeded by his nephew Hari Singh, the State was 
still very much an autocracy.48 Hari Singh continued to discriminate against the 
Valley's Muslim majority. Hindus alone were allowed licenses to possess firearms, 
and Muslims were excluded from serving in the State's armed forces 49 Furthermore, 
while the land settlement devised by the British theoretically left the cultivator with 
seventy percent of the land's yield, zealous Jagadirs and a burdensome tax regime kept 
the Muslims, most of whom were peasants, in poverty.50 
In 1905 the religious leader of the Muslims of the Vale, Mirwaiz Maulvi Rasool 
Shah, formed the Anjuman-í- Nusrat -ul -Islam to improve the lot of Kashmiri Muslims, 
especially with regard to education, and to ensure the spread of pure Islamic doctrine.51 
The Anjuman- i- Nusrat -td- Islam, which was followed by other Kashmiri Muslim 
groups in the 1920s and 1930s,52 became a centre of activism against the rule of the 
Maharaja, embarking in the 1920s upon an examination of the social reforms necessary 
to improve the condition of the Muslim community, and sending delegations to the 
State government to seek redress of Muslim grievances. While none of these groups 
were particularly effective in securing substantive economic or political reform, they 
nonetheless established an important precedent of Muslim organisation in the Valley 
and helped to publicise the plight of the State's Muslims. In March 1929 Sir Albion 
47 Lamb, p.13; and Schofield, pp.80 -83. 
48 See Lamb, pp.13 -14. 
49 This practice was introduced by the Moghuls and continued by the Afghans, Sikhs and Dogras. See 
Bazaz, p.21. Also see Tavleen Singh, Kashmir. A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), p.XIV. 
50 While the reforms of the British theoretically improved the lot of the Valley's Muslim majority, many 
writers have cast doubt upon what occurred in practice. Land reform is but one example, another is the 
practice of begar (i.e. forced labour) where men were literally dragged from their homes by the 
Maharaja's troops to work on the State's roads - an inherently dangerous task from which many did not 
return. While the British officially outlawed begar in 1893, there is evidence that it persisted, particularly 
in remote areas, until 1947. See Lamb, pp.83 -84; Punjabi, p.135; Korbel, p.15; and Sumit Ganguly, The 
Crisis in Kahmir. Portents of War. Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p.30. 
51 See Lamb, p.85; and Hewitt, p.70. 
52 e.g. the Anjuman -i- Hamdard Islam, Anjuman- i- Tahaffuz -i- Namaz- Wa- Satri- Masturat and the 
Anjuman-i-Islarnia in Jammu (Lamb, p.86). 
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Bannerji resigned his position as Senior Member of the Council of State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, publicly declaring:53 
Jammu and Kashmir State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a largely Muhammadan 
population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of 
living in the villages and practically governed like dumb driven cattle. There is no touch 
between the Government and the people, no suitable opportunity for representing grievances 
and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to 
the modem conditions of efficiency. It has at present no sympathy with the people's wants and 
grievances.54 
Because of the interest of the various Anjuman in educational reform, a number of 
Kashmiri Muslims were able to leave the State and study in institutions of higher 
learning in British India, such as the Aligarh Muslim University.55 It is a matter of 
more than mere coincidence that once the first Kashmiri graduates from Aligarh began 
to return to Kashmir, there began for the first time an organised opposition movement 
against the rule of the Maharaja.56 Additionally, many of those who would dominate 
the politics of the State for decades to come, were those who had benefited from the 
educational scholarships provided by the various Anjuman. 
F. Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah 
By the beginning of the 1930's the first Kashmiri graduates who had benefited from 
the scholarships provided by the various Anjuman returned to the Vale. The result was 
a new focus of opposition to the Maharaja's rule, based upon the inability of these 
graduates to secure positions in the State's administration which, as the table below 
demonstrates, was heavily monopolised by the Pandit community. 
53 Sir Albion, an Indian Christian, since 1927 had been Senior Member of the Council of State of Jammu 
and Kashmir (a position which was soon to be renamed Prime Minister). See Lamb, p.88. 
54 See Lamb, p.88; and Bhattacharjea, p.63. 
55 Founded in 1875 as a centre for Muslim learning by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (Korbel, p.33). 
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TABLE 5.1. REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIMS AND NON- MUSLIMS IN 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES (1930 -31)57 
Department Total number 
of 
officials 
Non -Muslims Muslims Percentage of 
Muslims 
Forest 124 120 4 3.2 
Customs 159 150 9 5.8 
Education 62 56 6 9.6 
Judiciary 37 33 4 10.8 
Medical 220 188 32 14.5 
Revenue 148 113 35 23.6 
Treasury Police 201 188 13 6.4 
From IGP to 87 71 12 13.2 
Sub -Inspectors 
Constabulary 1378 728 650 47.1 
One such graduate who would come to dominate politics in the State was Sheikh 
Mohammed Abdullah (1905 -82). Abdullah co- founded the All Jammu and Kashmir 
Muslim Conference in 1932 which became the major vehicle for opposition to the 
Maharaja. In response to unrest within the State and the resignation of Sir Albion 
Bannerji, the British established the Glancy Commission, which led to the adoption of 
a constitution in the State. The constitution granted a degree of freedom of speech and 
established a legislative assembly which, though it possessed little power, created a 
forum for political activity which the Muslim Conference was able to dominate.58 
56 See Lamb, pp.88 -89. 
57 Verma, p.I3. 
38 The Legislative Assembly contained thirty three elected seats out of a total of seventy five. The 
remaining forty two seats were held by members appointed by the Maharaja. Of the thirty three elected 
seats twenty one were reserved for Muslims, ten for Hindus and two for Sikhs. The assembly did not 
possess any final authority and could only advise the Maharaja who retained ultimate authority in the 
State. The constitution was replaced in 1938 by another which expanded the number of elected seats to 
forty (see Lamb, pp.92 -94; Hewitt, pp.70 -71; Bhattacharjea, pp.70 -71; and Bazaz, p.30). Additionally 
franchise was limited those residents of the State who were literate, possessed a minimum amount of 
property and whose annual income was above the equivalent of US$80. As a result only a paltry eight 
percent of the population was eligible to vote in Legislative Assembly elections. See Korbel, p.19. 
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Abdullah's Muslim Conference gradually widened its agenda beyond demanding jobs 
for Muslims, to demands for social, political and agrarian reform. in 1938 Abdullah 
met Jawaharlal Nehru and abandoned Muslim orthodoxy in favour of a secular 
approach declaring: 
Like us, the Hindus and the Sikhs suffer innumerable disabilities under the present system of 
government. They too are steeped in ignorance. They too pay taxes. They too face hunger. 
The institution of the responsible government [sic] is as necessary for them as it is for us. So it 
is necessary that we change our organisation into a non -communal political organisation and 
amend its constitution.59 
This shift in Abdullah's ideology may he attributed to: (a) his association with Nehru 
and exposure to Iiberal ideas; (b) the fact that Islamic radicalism had never been 
popular in Kashmir; and/or (e) financial advantage.60 Whatever his reasons, Abdullah 
continued to accelerate the process of secularisation by dissolving the Muslim 
Conference in 1939, replacing it with the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 
and becoming deeply involved the Indian National Congress Party within which his 
close friend Nehru was rapidly becoming the predominant figure. This process of 
secularisation was not appreciated by the conservative Islamic elements in Kashmiri 
politics, who revived the Muslim Conference and allied with the Indian Muslim 
League of Mohammed Ali Jinnah - who would go onto to form the State of Pakistan 
and who strongly disliked both Abdullah and Nehru.61 
59 Quoted in R. K. Kaul Bhatt, Political and Constitutional Development of the Jammu and Kashmir 
State, (Delhi: Seema Publications, 1984), p.85. 
60 This suggestion is made by Lamb in reference to the Ahmadiya sect of Islam. The Ahmadiyas were 
regarded as heretics by many Muslims, although their business acumen, unlike their faith, seems to have 
been above reproach. The suggestion is that Abdullah may have found some personal financial advantage 
in adopting a more sympathetic approach towards the Ahmadiya community. See Lamb, p.93. 
St See Verma, p.29. Also see Prem Nath Bazaz, History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (New 
Delhi, Pamposh Publications, 1954), pp.153 -54 and p.179; and Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and 
Kashmir (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p.62. 
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5.3 PARTITION 
A. Introduction 
After a Iong campaign for independence, on 4 June 1947, the British Viceroy, 
Mountbatten, announced that the British departure date from India would be 15 August 
1947.62 The two challengers to the British in India were Jinnah's Muslim League 
which was founded in 190663 to further the interests of Muslims, and was calling for 
the creation of a separate Muslim State (Pakistan), and Nehru's Congress Party. All 
attempts to avoid the partition of the Subcontinent failed. Muslim League- Congress 
intransigence at the Shimla conference in 1946, and the inability of Congress and 
Muslim League members of the interim government established by Lord Wavell the 
same year to work together, demonstrated that maintaining Indian unity was an 
impossible task.64 Consequently, Pakistan was created as a result of the so- called Two 
Nation Theory advanced by the Muslim League which stated that: (a) Hindu and 
Muslim communities constituted two separate nations - and thus when the British 
granted independence they must do so to two States not one; and (b) the welfare of 
Muslims could not be guaranteed in a Hindu -majority State. 
The British Indian Empire, or Raj, was comprised of two different types of States: 
those under direct British administration (British India); and those under the 
administration of a native ruler who recognised the British as the paramount power in 
India (princely India). This notion of paramountcy in addition to various treaty rights 
and obligations, tied each regional kingdom to the British crown 65 In effect these 
princely kingdoms were autonomous except in the vital areas of defence, foreign 
affairs and communications.66 Of the 584 States of princely India,67 the two States of 
Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir were dominant due to their large populations and 
geographical size 68 
62 Lamb, p.101. 
63 Bhattacharjea, p.86. 
64 See Hewitt, pp.63 -65. 
65 See Hewitt, p.53. 
66 Ganguly, p.6. 
67 Korbel, p.46. 
68 Princely India accounted for forty percent of the subcontinent's area and had a population of over 
ninety million people, See Damodar R. Sar Desai, `Origins of Kashmir's International and Legal Status' 
Kashmir 191 
Two Boundary Commissions, one to deal with Bengal in the east, the other to deal 
with Punjab in the west, headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe,69 were charged with deciding 
where the boundaries of the two successor States to the Raj would fall in British India. 
The decisions of the two Commissions would be final. Each Commission was 
comprised of two Muslims and two Non -Muslims who usually voted on communal 
lines. Thus, Sir Cyril's casting vote frequently decided the award of territories. The 
Commission's terms of reference were: 
To demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the 
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non -Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into 
account other factors.70 
With the lapse of Paramountcy the States of princely India - the partition of which 
was governed by the concepts of the Standstill Agreement and the Instrument of 
Accession - technically became independent.71 The Standstill Agreement was an 
interim measure where essential services to a State could be maintained until that State 
joined either India or Pakistan. In contrast, the Instrument of Accession was a 
permanent agreement whereby a State acceded to either India or Pakistan, ceding to 
that State authority in the areas of foreign affairs, defence and communications which 
had previously been the preserve of the British as the paramount power.72 The 
decision as to which polity the State would join was that of the ruler alone - there was 
no provision, legal or otherwise, for popular consultation.73 Generally a State's 
in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.82. 
69 The Vice Chairman of the English Bar Council whose major qualification for the job was that he was 
totally inexperienced and ignorant about Indian affairs - which at the time was seen to be a prudent 
qualification against any charges of bias. 
70 See Lamb, p.104; and Hewitt, p.66. What "other factors" the Commissions were to take into account 
were never spelled out. 
71 See the British Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May 1946 (Command Paper 6855) which stated 
that "...the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and 
that all the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the States." Quoted in 
Sar Desai, p.82. Also see Korbel, p.47. 
72 See the British Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 16 May 1946 (Command Paper 6821) which stated 
that aside from the areas of foreign affairs, defence and communications "Itlhe States will retain all 
subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union." Additionally Mountbatten promised the 
princes that having acceded to either India or Pakistan neither government would have the authority "...to 
encroach on the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States." See Nicholas Kaye, Time Only to 
Look Forward. Speeches of Rear Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma (London: N. Kaye, 1952), 
p.55. 
73 See Sar Desai, p.82. 
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geographical context made the ruler's decision for him. However, in order to rule out 
the further Balkanisation of the subcontinent, the British strongly discouraged notions 
of independence or the rulers of those States not contiguous with Pakistan from joining 
Pakistan.74 
B. Kashmir Prior to Partition 
The fate of Jammu and Kashmir State had already attracted the attention of the 
Congress and Muslim League. While the State's strategic geo- political location 
remained a significant issue,75 there was now the added factor of Jammu and 
Kashmir's relationship to the founding ideologies of the two States which succeeded 
the British Raj. Ganguly explains: 
The dispute over the accession of Kashmir to India can be traced to the profoundly divergent 
conceptions of nation -building that underlay the Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements. 
The Indian National Congress, which spearheaded the Indian nationalist movement, was 
committed to the notion of creating a secular and democratic state. The Pakistani nationalist 
movement, in contrast, sought to create a religiously based state that would serve as a homeland 
for South Asian Muslims. Possession of Kashmir, a Muslim -majority state abutting the two 
nascent states, therefore assumed a significance far greater than a mere territorial claim. For 
Indian nationalists such as Nehru, the integration of Kashmir into India was critical because it 
would demonstrate that all faiths could live under the aegis of a secular state. By the same token, 
Pakistani nationalists such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah saw the absorption of Kashmir into Pakistan 
as equally critical, but for diametrically opposite reasons. For Jinnah, Pakistan would be 
"incomplete" without Kashmir. In essence, Pakistan's claim to Kashmir was and remains 
irredentist.76 
74 Raju G. C. Thomas, `Reflections on the Kashmir Problem' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. 
Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.19. There was a concern that the Muslim Nizam of 
Hyderabad -a Hindu majority State - would opt for Pakistan and thus create a Pakistani enclave in India. 
Similarly there was a rumour that the Khan of Kalat was considering joining India which would have 
created an Indian enclave surrounded by the Pakistani province of Baluchistan (Hewitt, p.67). 
75 The main determinant of the area's strategic value remained its geographical proximity to Soviet 
Russia. Of particular concern was the area known as the Gilgit Agency which the British had leased from 
the Maharaja for sixty years in 1935 in order to observe and, if necessary, counter Soviet influence in 
Sinkiang. It was agreed that prior to independence the lease would lapse and the area would revert to 
Dogra control. The motives behind the region's reversion to Dogra control are the subject of some 
speculation and controversy amongst historians but are beyond the scope of the present analysis. See 
Hewitt p.68; and Lamb, pp.107ff. 
76 Ganguly, p.8. Also see Korbel who emphasises that the dispute over Kashmir is not territorial but 
fundamentally a clash of ideologies in which Kashmir has become both a symbol and a battleground 
(Korbel, pp.25ft). 
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Numerous factors complicated Jammu and Kashmir's accession. Within the State 
were two political groups vying for popular support - the Muslim Conference (who 
favoured the Muslim League, i.e. Pakistan) and the National Conference (who 
favoured Congress, i.e. India). Moreover, seventy -seven per cent of the State's 
4,021,616 people were Muslim, however the Maharaja - in whose hands their fate 
rested - was Hindu.77 Being contiguous with Pakistan, the Maharaja could 
realistically consider accession to either India or Pakistan. However, the geographical 
and economic links between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan were better than those 
with India. 
At the moment of Partition in 1947 there existed but one road from India to Jammu, by way of 
Pathankot; and this was then of the poorest quality and much of it unsurfaced. The only railway 
in the State in 1947 was a short branch line (opened in 1890) linking Sialkot in the Punjab with 
Jammu City. It was to be severed in the process of Partition in the Punjab which put Sialkot on 
the Pakistani side.78 
The Boundary Commission's findings were greeted with uproar, particularly 
regarding the four tehsils79 of Gurdaspur. Of these four tehsils three went to India, 
despite the fact that only one tehsil (Pathankot) had a Hindu majority.80 The award of 
these tehsils gave India greatly improved connections with the State to rival those of 
Pakistan, and thus made the accession of the Dogra kingdom to India a practical, as 
opposed to a merely theoretical, possibility. Consequently Pakistan has alleged that 
the process of partition was manipulated in order to favour the interests of India.81 
Had the principles of the Boundary Commissions been applied to the Dogra kingdom 
large parts of the territory (including the Valley) could have gone to Pakistan. 
However, the logic of the Commissions applied only to British India. Nevertheless 
Jinnah believed that, despite its princely status, the Dogra Kingdom, as a Muslim- 
77 1941 census data cited in Ramesh C. Dogra, Jammu and Kashmir: A Select and Annotated 
Bibliography of Manuscripts, Books, Articles etc (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1986), p.28. 
78 Lamb, p.I I. 
79 i.e. sub -districts. 
80 See Lamb, p.103; and Schofield, pp.125 -31. In addition to the Hindu -majority tehsil of Pathankot, 
India was also awarded the tehsils of Batala and Gurdaspur, the remaining tehsil of Shakargarh went to 
Pakistan. 
81 See Lamb, pp.1 14 -15. Birdwood states that the main reason for awarding the tehsils of Batala and 
Gurdaspur to India was that their award to Pakistan would have isolated the important (Indian) district of 
Amritsar from surrounding Indian soil (Birdwood, p.75). 
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majority area, should go to Pakistan. Jinnah explained on 17 May 1947 the 
significance of the name Pakistan: 
the derivation of the word Pakistan - P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. Pathan or Northwest 
Frontier Province); K for Kashmir; 1 for nothing because that letter was not in the word in 
Urdu; S for Sind and TAN for the last syllable for Baluchistan.82 
C. The Crisis of Accession 
On the eve of transfer only four princely States had not acceded to either India or 
Pakistan: Junagadh, Kathiawar, Jammu and Kashmir and Hyderabad.S3 Junagadh had 
a population of 670,719 of whom eighty- percent were Hindu, however they were ruled 
by a Muslim Nawab who on 15 August 1947 acceded to Pakistan despite not being 
geographically contiguous with it.84 On 25 October 1947 India intervened militarily in 
the State to restore order in the districts of Mangrol and Babaríawad.85 On 20 
February 1948 a plebiscite was held in Junagadh in which the overwhelming majority 
of voters elected to accede to India, however Pakistan continues to claim Junagadh as a 
part of its territory.86 
82 See Lamb, p.107. 
83 Hewitt, p.68. 
84 Junagadh did have a long coastline along the Indian Ocean, so theoretically there was an unobstructed 
line of maritime communication with Pakistan. However the geographical situation was complicated by 
the fact that there were pockets of Junagadh territory in the middle of other States which had already 
acceded to India, and within Junagadh itself there were pockets of territory which had expressed a wish to 
join India. See Lamb, p.127; and V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Delhi: 
Longmans, 1956), pp.126 -27. 
85 The Sheikh of Mangrol had declared his independence from Junagadh on 15 August 1947 and 
subsequently acceded to India. Soon after, however, the Sheikh withdrew his accession - allegedly under 
duress. Similarly Babariawad had asserted its independence from Junagadh and acceded to India. 
Junagadh responded by sending troops to occupy Babariawad. Refer Menon, pp.133ff. Also see P. 
Ziegler, Mountbatten. The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985), pp.442ff. 
86 The Dewan of Junagadh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (father of future Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto), enjoyed a close relationship with Jinnah. Some writers have suggested that the accession of 
Junagadh to Pakistan was manipulated by Pakistan in order to positively influence the accession of Jammu 
and Kashmir to Pakistan. There are a number of possibilities: Junagadh might have been exchanged for 
Jammu and Kashmir; the provocation of military action by India in order to secure Mangrol might have 
provided justification for Pakistan taking similar action in the case of Jammu and Kashmir; or the 
Junagadh situation might have been exploited in order to establish a precedent whereby the problem of 
Jammu and Kashmir could be settled by a plebiscite. Refer H. V, Hodson, The Great Divide. Britain - 
India - Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969), Ch 4. Also see Ziegler, pp.442 -43. 
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Over eighty -five percent of Hyderabad's sixteen million people were Hindu, yet they 
were ruled by a Muslim Nizam, who had previously declared his intention to assume 
the status of an independent sovereign following the Iapse of paramountcy.S7 India 
concluded a standstill agreement with the Nizam but soon alleged that the Nizam had 
seriously breached it.88 Additionally, Razakars89 from Hyderabad had massacred 
Hindu villagers in neighbouring States and attacked trains passing through the State's 
territory.90 On 13 September 1948 India sent troops into Hyderabad to restore order 
and annexed the State. 
Meanwhile, Hari Singh's failure to accede to India or Pakistan meant that the State 
was now technically independent. On 14 November 1946 the State's British Resident, 
Colonel Wilfred Webb, reported to Mountbatten that, "The Maharaja's attitude is, I 
suspect, that once Paramountcy disappears Kashmir will have to stand on its own feet, 
and that the question of loyalty to the British Government will not arise and that 
Kashmir will be free to ally with any power - not excluding Russia - she chooses. "91 
Thus, the Maharaja's failure to accede cannot have come as any surprise. Indeed, 
declaring independence was the Maharaja's best chance of maintaining his power and 
position.92 On 15 August 1947 a Standstill Agreement was concluded by the State 
with Pakistan, but no such agreement was ever reached with India despite the State 
seeking it.93 However, despite the Maharaja's best intentions - whatever they may 
have been - events were soon to over -take him. 
87 See Menon, pp.317ff. 
88 For a full account of these alleged breaches refer Menon, pp.346 -47. 
89 A private army of Muslim irregulars. 
90 See Menon, pp.356ff. 
91 Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power, Vol. IX, No.37. Also see 
Birdwood, p.40; and Joshi, pp.8 -9 and 28 -29. Also see a letter allegedly written by Hari Singh to a 
`friend' in which he states his intention of declaring independence. See The National Herald, Lucknow, 
10 January, 1947; and Riyaz Punjabi, `Kashmir Imbroglio: The Socio- Political Roots', Contemporary 
South Asia, Vol.4, No.1, 1995, pp.41 -42. 
92 Hari Singh's future as a Hindu ruler in Islamic Pakistan would be uncertain, while was no friend of 
either Nehru or Abdullah; both of whom he had jailed in the past. Additionally, Birdwood suggests that 
the Maharaja may have chosen to pursue independence in the belief that doing so would avert the State 
being drawn into the Muslim -Hindu holocaust that accompanied the partition of the neighbouring State of 
Punjab. See Birdwood, p.41. 
93 See Lamb, p.122; and Birdwood, pp.45 -46. 
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Since June 1947 there had been disturbances in the Poonch region of the State, the 
inhabitants of which had never really reconciled themselves to the Maharaja's rule.94 
The insurrection continued to intensify and the area was placed under martial law. 
Meanwhile communal tensions erupted across northern India resulting in enormous 
loss of life. Pakistani nationals - usually characterised as being tribesmen from the 
North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP) - and numbering about 3,000- 
4,00095 - crossed the border to assist the Poonch rebels in late September /early 
October 1947. In September the Jammu and Kashmir government accused the 
government of Pakistan of withholding essential supplies of petrol, oils, food, salt and 
cloth, leading to the charge that Pakistan sought to compel the Dogra Kingdom into 
joining Pakistan by means of an economic embargo coupled with a tribal invasion.96 
Some writers have gone further and claimed that the tribesmen were really Pakistani 
regular troops in disguise.97 Others claim that reports of the massacre of Muslims 
coupled with sentiments of Muslim solidarity and the promise of loot and plunder 
would have been sufficient to persuade the tribesmen to cross the border. 
Similarly the complicity of the Pakistani government is also subject to dispute. Some 
argue that the Pakistani government gave the tribesmen weapons and encouraged them 
to cross the border. Others maintain that at the very least, because of the number of 
invaders and the logistics involved in transporting them from the NWFP, the Pakistani 
government must have been aware of what was happening, made no effort to stop it, 
and was therefore guilty of providing tacit consent, if not assistance.98 Pakistan, 
94 In the early nineteenth century Ranjit Singh had rewarded Dhian Singh with the jagir of Poonch. The 
claim that the Poonch jagir was under the sovereignty of the Dogra State, and not a separate princely State 
under paramountcy, had been successfully established by Hari Singh through legal action in the 1930's 
(refer Hewitt, p.74). When Poonchi soldiers, returning from World War Two, discovered that they were 
now subjects of Hari Singh - and thus required to pay his exorbitant rates of taxation - they rebelled. See 
Birdwood, p.49; Korbel, pp.54 -55 and p.68; and Schofield, pp.I33 -35. 
95 No accurate figures are available, but this seems to be the generally accepted figure amongst scholars 
(see Lamb p. 133; and Hewitt, p.74). Birdwood, however, states that the initial tribal advance of 22 
October consisted of 2,000 men (Birdwood, p.56). 
96 For example, see Hewitt, p.75. 
97 M. G. Chitkara, Kashmir Imbroglio: Diagnosis and Remedy (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 
1996), p.4; Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1996); and Major General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashir (Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1970). 
98 See Hewitt, p.75; and Birdwood, pp.54 -55. 
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however, denied any involvement in the tribal incursions or that it was placing 
economic pressure on the State 99 
On 18 October the government of Jammu and Kashmir warned Pakistan that if the 
situation did not improve; "[t]he government fully hope that you [Liaquat Ali Khan, 
the Prime Minister of Pakistan] would agree that it would be justified in asking for 
friendly assistance. "100 The tribal invaders continued their advance, overcoming local 
opposition and committing acts of violence on both Muslims and non- Muslims.101 
There is speculation that had the tribesmen foregone the pleasures of rape and looting 
then they could have captured Srinagar with relative ease. However, their lack of 
discipline resulted in crucial delays and a most unfortunate public image. 
On 24 October the tribesmen captured the power station at Mohara, plunging Srinagar 
into darkness and causing mass panic,102 while the Poonch rebels formally declared 
their independence from the Maharaja as the State of Azad (Free) Kashmir.103 On the 
same day Jammu and Kashmir Deputy Prime Minister, R. L. Batra, was sent to Delhi 
to seek immediate military assistance and carried a signed letter of accession from the 
Maharaja.104 This request was communicated to the Indian Defence Committee the 
following moming,105 where it was decided that V. P. Menon of the Indian States 
Department would fly to Srinagar that day (25 October) to assess the situation. He 
returned to Delhi the following day (26 October) with Jammu and Kashmir's Prime 
99 Pakistan claimed that supply lines between the State and Pakistan had been disturbed by communal 
violence - roads were blocked by fleeing refugees and lorry drivers, fearing for their safety, were reluctant 
to cross the border. See Sir Zafrulla Khan's statement before the UN Security Council, Security Council 
Official Records, Third Year, Nos 1 -15, pp.101 -103. Pakistan also claimed that the Poonch rebellion was 
an example of the Maharaja's attempts to stage situations which would have provided him with an excuse 
to ask for Indian military assistance, and thus secure the State's accession to India against the people's 
wishes. See Birdwood, pp.64 -65. 
100 Lamb, pp.126 -27; and Hewitt, p.75. 
1 °1 See Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India- Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 
1967), p.111 . 
102 Hewitt, p.76; Lamb, p.135; and Birdwood, p.57. 
103 Lamb, p.135. 
104 So states M. C. Mahajan in his autobiography, Looking Back (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 
1963), p.150. Lamb speculates that the signed Instrument of Accession was almost certainly not shown to 
the Indian leaders, as the Maharaja hoped to secure Indian military assistance without having to surrender 
his independence by acceding to India (Lamb, pp. 134-35). 
1o5 Menon, p.397. 
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Minister, M. C. Mahajan.106 That evening the Maharaja, fearing capture by the 
invaders, began a dash for the safety of Jammu over the Banihal Pass.1°7 
The details and exact time of the State's alleged accession to India are subject to 
controversy. Mountbatten had insisted that it would be improper to move Indian 
troops into what was at the time an independent country, i.e. Indian forces could only 
be sent to the State if the Maharaja first acceded to India.108 Mahajan reports that in 
order to obtain Indian military assistance he offered the State's accession to India at a 
meeting with Nehru, Sheik Abdullah and Sardar Patel" and flew to Jammu the 
following day (27 October) to obtain the Maharaja's signature on "formal 
documents. "110 However, Menon claims that he and Mahajan flew to Jammu on the 
26 October where they obtained the Maharaja's signature on the final version of the 
Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten (which outlined the conditions under which he was 
offering accession) and the Instrument of Accession.1" 
On the morning of 27 October a massive airlift of Indian troops to Srinagar began just 
in time to save Srinagar.112 The official Indian version of events is that the Maharaja 
acceded to India on 26 October.113 However, Lamb points out that if Mahajan's 
account of events is true, then the Indian intervention occurred before the Instrument of 
106 Menon, pp.397 -99. Also see Mahajan, p.I S I. 
107 Menon, p.398. 
108 Menon, p.399. 
109 Indian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for States. 
110 Mahajan, p.154. 
I See Menon, pp.399 -400; and Alan Campbell- Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New York: E. P. 
Dutton & Co, 1953), p.224. 
112 Note that General Sir Frank Messervy (commander -in -chief of the Pakistan Army from 15 August 
1947 to 15 February 1948) alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in the State several weeks 
before the event (General Sir Frank Messervy, `Kashmir', Asiatic Review, Vol.45, January 1949, p.469). 
Lamb also suggests that the logistics of the airlift would have required more preparation and time than the 
official Indian version of events allows, and so claims that Indian military intervention on such a scale 
must have been planned weeks in advance (Lamb, pp.1 40-41). Also see Pervaiz lqbal Cheema, 'Pakistan, 
India and Kashmir: A Historical Review' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), p.96. Birdwood, on the other hand, denies this allegation and includes a 
statement by the commanders of the Indian military which denies any planning of military intervention in 
the State occurred prior to 25 October 1947. See Birdwood, p.59. Also see Korbel, pp.86 -87. 
113 The published versions of both the Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten and the Instrument of Accession 
are dated 26 October 1947 (Menon, pp.399 -400). 
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Accession was signed, and thus India was invading an independent country.114 Other 
historians have, however, rejected Lamb's thesis.115 The accession was further 
complicated by the introduction of the notion of a plebiscite to ratify the State's 
accession to India. Mountbatten, in accepting the State's accession, replied to the 
Maharaja: 
In consistence [sic] with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession 
has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with 
the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order 
have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State's 
accession should be settled by a reference to the people.l 16 
This suggested that the State's accession was provisional and, being subject to 
ratification, might be reversed. The introduction of the notion of a plebiscite (which 
has never been held) and the controversy surrounding the legality of the Indian 
intervention - not to mention the fact that a sole individual (who was a Hindu) could 
decide the fate of millions of Muslims - has, over time, only added to the sense of 
historical grievance felt by the Muslims of the State. 
Fighting continued between the Indian troops and what Pakistan now called the 
Government of Azad Kashmir. In May 1948, when the Indians began to advance 
towards the Pakistan border, approval was given for Pakistani regulars to be committed 
114 See Lamb, pp.135 -40. For a good summary of the events surrounding this controversy also see 
Schofield, pp.148 -50. 
115 For example, see Hewitt, p.78; and Ganguly, p.11 
116 See Lamb p.137; Hewitt, p.77; and Birdwood, p.214. On 27 October 1947 Nehru sent the following 
telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan - Prime Minister of Pakistan: "I should like to make it clear that the 
question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede 
to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed 
territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this 
view." Quoted in M. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), p.242. Also see World Kashmir Freedom Movement, U. N. Resolutions and 
India's Commitments on Kashmir (London: World Kashmir Freedom Movement, 1993). Similarly, 
Nehru broadcast on All India Radio on 2 November 1947: "That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja 
has supported it not only to the people of Kashmir but the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. 
We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under 
international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, 
and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer." See Lamb p.137: Hewitt, 
p.77; and Birdwood, p.214. 
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to the battle) 17 The war was ended by a cease -fire agreement which took effect on 1 
January 1949. A cease -fire line was defined in a further agreement signed on 27 July 
1949.1 18 As a result the Dogra kingdom was divided with India occupying 
approximately two thirds of the State including the Valley, Ladakh and Jammu, while 
the Pakistanis held the areas of Mirpur, Poonch, Muzzafarabad (now known as Azad 
Kashmir) and the tribal areas of Gilgit and Skardu.l 19 
5.4 POST -PARTITION JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
A. United Nations Involvement 
India first bought the Kashmir issue to the United Nations (UN) on 31 December 
1947. India's case was based upon the legal validity of the Maharaja's accession and 
Pakistan's aid to the tribal invaders. Pakistan contested the validity of the Maharaja's 
accession and portrayed the situation as a popular revolt against an oppressive ruler. 
The LN Security Council resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 called for 
a plebiscite to determine the State's final status, and required that both governments 
ought to take measures to ensure proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite 
by: (a) Pakistan first withdrawing from Azad Kashmir; followed by (b) India 
withdrawing the majority of its troops from Jammu and Kashmir 120 
In 1948 the United Nations Commission for India .and Pakistan (UNCIP) was 
established.121 Numerous resolutions seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict 
117 Birdwood states the causes of Pakistani intervention as being a belief that the Indian advance 
constituted a threat to Pakistan's security, and the fact that hostilities had produced an increasing wave of 
Muslim refugees to cross into Pakistan (Birdwood, p.67). Korbel concurs with Birdwood and also points 
out that had India been allowed to seize all of Kashmir then it would been able to present the world the 
possession of Kashmir as a fait accompli thus closing the issue for good. Moreover, Indian possession of 
Kashmir would have placed Pakistan at a severe military and economic disadvantage (Korbel, pp.138 -39). 
118 Lamb, pp.163 -64; and Hewitt, p.79. 
119 Hewitt, p.79. 
120 Mutual suspicions between the two nations precluded the de- militarisation of the State. India refused 
to disclose the size and strength of her army in Kashmir, fearing that doing so would give Pakistan a 
military advantage. It should be noted that by this time the forces in Azad Kashmir had developed into a 
disciplined and effective fighting force. Moreover, once having withdrawn its forces from the State, India 
would face substantial difficulty in re- deploying them due to the mountainous terrain and the vast 
distances involved. This was in contrast with Pakistan which faced no such difficulties in deploying and 
supplying its army in the area (Korbel, pp.158 -59). 
121 For a first -hand account of the Commission's work and the difficulties faced by it see Korbel. 
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were passed, and a number of reports commissioned; the two most significant being 
the McNaughton Report (1949) and the Dixon Report (1950).122 However, an 
agreement between the two countries proved unachievable due to mutual suspicions 
and disagreements concerning the administration, supervision and structure of a 
plebiscite. Invariably both blamed the other's intransigence for the lack of a break- 
through. 
B. The First Administration of Sheikh Abdullah 
Abdullah, whom Nehru had repeatedly declared represented the true voice of the 
Kashmiri people, was declared head of an interim government by the Maharaja 
following the departure of Mahajan on 5 March 1948.}23 However India faced, and 
indeed continues to face, the problem of how to clarify the constitutional relationship 
between the State and the Indian Union. This was complicated by the provisional 
nature of the State's place in the Indian Union subject to its ratification by a plebiscite. 
Direct Indian administration could result in the charge that India was repudiating the 
UN and its promises to hold a plebiscite and that it was seeking to prejudice the 
outcome of any settlement of the issue. 
India's constitution came into operation in 1950 and contained Article 370 which 
governed the relationship between `the centre' (i.e. the Indian Federal Government) 
and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370 gave the Indian national parliament 
substantive rights over Kashmir in only those three areas covered in the original 
Instrument of Accession, i.e. defence, foreign affairs and finance. The State was 
therefore able to legislate in matters denied to all other Indian States. Additionally, the 
State retained expressions such as "Prime Minister" (instead of Chief Minister) and 
Sadar -i- Raiyasat (instead of Governor), and was also allowed to display its own flag 
and other cultural symbolism.124 
122 The Dixon report in particular is notable because it acknowledged that the former Dogra Kingdom 
was created by an imperial process and consisted of a series of regionally defined ethnic enclaves. The 
final version of the plan proposed that certain areas go to Pakistan, others to India and that a plebiscite be 
held in the Valley. This, like many of Dixon's proposals, was rejected by India, leading Dixon to question 
India's commitment to hold a free plebiscite in the State to ascertain the true wishes of its people. Refer 
UN Security Council Document 1791 of 15 September 1950, pp.I6 -23. 
123 Lamb, p.I85. 
124 Hewitt, p.140. 
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In 1949 the Maharaja handed over to his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, as regent. In 1951 
The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly was convened following elections the 
same year.125 A few days later the Legislative Assembly ended the Dogra dynasty by 
stripping the Maharaja of all powers and replacing him with a constitutional Head of 
State (Sadar-i-Riyasat) elected by the Legislative Assembly.126 In 1952 The Delhi 
Agreement, which attempted to clarify the relationship between the State and the 
Indian Union, was concluded. The Delhi Agreement affirmed the provisions contained 
within Article 370, thus further entrenching the State's privileged status within the 
Indian Federation.127 Of the Delhi Agreement Abdullah commented, "...it is, of 
course, for the Constituent Assembly, which is seized of these matters, to determine 
the extent and scope of the State's accession to India. "128 This suggested that, 
regardless of the content of any agreements reached between the State and India, the 
nature of Kashmir's relationship with India was ultimately a matter for the State to 
decide. 
C. Regional Imbalances & Hostilities 
In 1950 Abdullah abolished the system of jagir through two pieces of legislation: The 
Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act; and The Distressed Debtor s Relief Act. The 
former confiscated all cultivable land greater than twenty-three acres and either 
distributed it to the land -less peasantry or converted it into State property. The latter 
created a board that instituted policies for the relief of mostly Muslim peasants, who 
were financially crippled by the debts they owed to their mostly Hindu landlords. 
These two pieces of legislation won Abdullah the loyalty of both lower and middle 
class Muslims and those Hindus who had suffered under the policies of the Maharaja, 
125 The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly is also often referred to as The Jammu and Kashmir 
Constituent Assembly. 
126 See Korbel, pp.222 -23. Yuvraj Karan Singh was the first such elected Head of State. See Lamb, 
p.186. Interestingly there appears to be no real support for re- instituting the reign of the Dogra dynasty as 
there is, say, in Russia where the Romonovs have, at least amongst some limited sections of society, 
enjoyed the support of a Czarist movement who favour the re- establishment of the Russian royal house. 
127 See for example Korbel, pp.224 -25. 
128 Quoted in V. Bhushan, State Politics and Government: Jammu and Kashmir (Jammu: Tawi, 1985), 
pp.395 -400. 
Kashmir 203 
but alienated the Jammu -based Hindu landed aristocracy who received no financial 
compensation for their losses.129 
The Delhi Agreement combined with Abdullah's agrarian reforms to spark bloody 
protests in Jammu led by the Praja Parishad. The Praja Parishad, essentially a Hindu 
middle class movement founded by Balraj Madhok in 1947,130 was symptomatic of the 
deep ethno- regional divisions within the State. It represented the views and interests of 
those Hindus, whose social and political aspirations had benefited to some degree from 
the rule of the Maharaja, but were not advanced by a change to a Muslim dominated 
government centred in Srinagar. The Praja Parishad, which had close links to Hindu 
bodies across India including the extremist Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)131 and 
Jana Sangh, not only felt that Jammu was neglected by the Muslim dominated 
administration of Abdullah, but feared that the State was drifting towards 
independence or, even worse, Pakistan.132 The two groups sought the abolition of 
Article 370 and the separation of Jammu from the Vale of Kashmir, and campaigned 
under the slogan, "Two constitutions, two flags, two Heads of State in one country will 
not be tolerated. "133 
D. The Fall of Abdullah and the Rise of the Government of Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammed 
It soon became apparent that Article 370 and the term `accession' increasingly meant 
different things to different people. To New Delhi, Article 370 was a temporary 
measure which preceded the State's full and final integration within the Indian Union. 
However, Abdullah, who was beginning to doubt India's commitment to secularism, 
especially in view of the Praja Parishad's agitations in Jammu,134 regarded Article 
129 Ganguly, p.30. Also see Birdwood, p.169; and Joshi, pp.50 -51. 
130 Bhattacharjea, p.186. 
131 Founded in 1925 by Dr K. B. Hedgewar, the RSS rejected the traditional, pacifist philosophy of 
Hinduism believing that it ill- equipped them to deal with what they saw as the increasing belligerency of 
India's Muslim minority. The RSS was a highly organised, militarist organisation responsible for 
numerous atrocities against Muslims (Korbel, p.52). 
132 Korbel, pp.226 -28. 
133 Either as a separate State or as part of the Indian Punjab. See K. R. Malkani, `Why Article 370 Must 
Go' in Kashmir: From Autonomy to Azadi, ed. G. M. Wani (Srinagar: Valley Book House, 1996). 
134 See for example, Kaul, pp.58 -59; Schofield, pp.171 -72 and pp.183 -85; and Ashutosh Varshney, 
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370 as a permanent measure which did not preclude the possibility of the State one day 
becoming independent. For Abdullah accession to India did not indicate that the State 
was to be a part of India in perpetuity - it simply indicated that it wasn't a part of 
Pakistan and had yet to exercise its right to independence. Abdullah stated: 
Though the accession of Kashmir to India is complete in all aspects it is conditional and 
temporary in the sense that the people of the State have to ratify it. Therefore it is not final.135 
Abdullah continued to embarrass Nehru by promoting the goal of Kashmiri 
independence both in public and private. Additionally, concerns were raised regarding 
the authoritarian nature of Abdullah's administration further souring Abdullah's 
relationship with New Delhi.136 The death in police custody of Jana Sangh president, 
Dr Mookerjee, in Srinagar was the last straw.137 On 8 August I953, with the consent 
of Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as Prime Minister and replaced by Bakshi 
Ghulam Mohammed. Subsequently Abdullah was arrested and imprisoned leading to 
violent demonstrations in the Valley in which a number of people were killed. 
Under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed the State drifted back towards India, the National 
Conference slowly became a branch of the Indian Congress Party and the allegations of 
authoritarianism and corruption continued.138 In February 1954 the Legislative 
Assembly confirmed the legality of the State's accession to India, while in 1957 it 
adopted a new constitution for the State which declared that the State "...is and shall 
be an integral part of the Union of India." It also placed the State within the 
`Three Comprised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem', in Prespectives on Kashmir, ed. 
Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.204 -5. Varshney points out that Abdullah's 
public expressions of doubt regarding India's commitment to secularism and the State's final status simply 
added credibility to the Praja Parishad's claims that Abdullah was duplicitous and that Muslims were 
disloyal to India. Also see Korbel, pp.240 -41. 
135 The Hindustan Times, 24 July 1953. 
136 Anxiety about Abdullah's style of government had first been advanced shortly after its inception in 
1947. See Mahajan, pp.175 -77. Also see Bazaz (1967), pp.64 -65; and Korbel, pp.207 -9. Note, however, 
that some writers have suggested that figures in Jammu and New Delhi had been conspiring for some time 
to oust Abdullah, and that many of the allegations of corruption and misgovernment directed towards 
Abdullah may have been part of a campaign of mis- information by such people (see, for example, Joshi, 
p.53 and pp.94 -95). 
137 He apparently died of a heart attack. However, it was rumoured that he had been murdered, possibly 
on the orders of Abdullah. See Lamb, p.198. 
138 See Bazaz (1967), pp.69 -70. Also see Karan Singh, Autobiography (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1994); Mir Qasim, My Life and Times (New Delhi: Allied, 1992); and Joshi, p.55. 
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jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court, Controller and Auditor General. In 1964 
Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution, which had hitherto been excluded by 
Article 370, were applied to Jammu and Kashmir.139 Thus began the gradual 
diminishment of the State's independence from the centre. Elections were held in 
1957 and 1962 which returned the National Conference to power. 
By 1956 Nehru had fundamentally altered his view of the Kashmir issue and 
withdrew the offer of a plebiscite. Nehru cited three justifications for his action: (a) 
The Cold War and Pakistan's alignment to the West via the SEATO and CENTO 
treaties had drastically changed the objective situation; (b) Kashmir's Constituent 
Assembly had approved the State's merger with India and accepted the Indian 
constitution - thus satisfying the requirement that the State's final status be settled in 
accordance with the wishes of its people ;loo and (c) the UN Security Council 
resolution of 21 April 1948's requirement that Pakistan withdraw its troops from Azad 
Kashmir so that a plebiscite might be held, had not been satisfied.141 
E. The 1965 & 1971 Indo- Pakistan Wars 
On 26 December 1963 it was discovered that a sacred relic -a hair from the beard of 
the prophet Mohammed (the Moe -í- Muqaddas) - was missing from the Hazratbal 
shrine near Srinagar, resulting in enormous riots. It was widely believed that Bakshi 
Ghulam Mohammed was somehow responsible for the theft, and property belonging to 
him and his family was set alight.142 The relic mysteriously reappeared on 3 January 
1964 and calm was established following a special verification ceremony (Deedar) on 
3 February 1964. Following the Hazratbal crisis Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was 
removed from office and replaced by G. M Sadiq who was himself replaced by Syed 
Mir Qasim in 1971. 
139 These two Articles enabled Indian Presidential rule to be instituted in the State and Indian legislation 
to come into effect in the State without prior approval by the State legislature respectively. 
140 Birdwood claims that in an interview with Nehru in 1955, Nehru stated that because most Kashmiris 
were illiterate and uneducated, they were thus incapable of understanding the issues at stake and making 
an informed decision on Kashmir's future. Thus, the prudent course of action would be for the people to 
elect an "intelligent" representative group to make the decision on their behalf. See Birdwood, p.191. 
141 See Varshney, p.215. Also see Verma, pp.44 -45. 
142 There are numerous theories regarding the identity of those responsible for the relic's disappearance, 
the true identity of whom remains a mystery. 
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The violent demonstrations following the Hazratbal crisis and Abdullah's 1965 re- 
arrest after a brief spell of freedom, indicated to Pakistan that the Valley was ripe for a 
popular revolt against Indian rule, Additionally, the lack of diplomatic progress and 
the further incorporation of the State into the Indian Union, provoked a fear that India 
would soon declare the Kashmir issue closed.143 In a radio broadcast in early 1964, 
Pakistani President Ayub Khan stated: 
This upheaval was set in motion by the mysterious theft of the holy relic from the Hazratbal 
shrine, which injured the religious susceptibilities not only of the Muslims of occupied Kashmir 
but also of Pakistan. Subsequent events have, however, shown that the agitation was due also 
to the resentment of the people of Jammu and Kashmir at the subjugation by India and the 
Indian design to integrate their State.144 
Thus, Pakistan, having witnessed India's humiliating defeat by China in 1962, chose 
to seek a military solution to the Kashmir issue. Furthermore, following its 
procurement of advanced American military hardware by virtue of its membership of 
the CENTO and SEATO treaties, Pakistan was now militarily a match for India. 
143 Cheema, p.105. 
144 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspectives (Washington D. C.: Embassy of Pakistan, no date of 
publication), p.47. 
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TABLE 5.2. ORIGIN AND QUANTITY OF MILITARY HARDWARE 
POSSESSED BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN PRIOR TO THE 1965 INDO- 
PAKISTAN WAR145 
United States India Pakistan 
F86 Sabre Jets 0 100 
F104 Starfighters 0 50 
B87 Bombers 0 30 
C130 Transports 0 4 
C119 Transports 25 0 
Patton Tanks 0 200 
Sherman Tanks 30 0 
Great Britain 
Viscount Transports 5 0 
Hunter Jet Fighters 150 0 
Vampire Jet Fighters 100 0 
Gnat Jet Fighters 100 0 
Canberra Bombers 80 50 
Canberra Photo Planes 8 0 
Centurion Tanks 210 0 
Stuart Tanks 80 0 
Soviet Union 
MIG 2I Jet Fighters 6 0 
Ilyushin Transports 2 0 
Antonov Transports 24 0 
France 
Mystere IV Fighters 100 0 
AMX13 Tanks 40 0 
145 Newsweek, 20 September 1965. 
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Following a series of border clashes in the Rann of Kutch sector in Gujarat, Pakistan 
launched Operation Gibraltar. Pakistani Mujahideen (freedom fighters) crossed the 
border in increasing numbers during the first half of 1965 to sabotage military targets, 
disrupt communications and foment rebellion amongst Kashmiris against the 
occupying Indian troops. By August Pakistani regulars had entered the conflict. The 
Indian response came on 14/15 August 1965 in the Kargil sector. On 1 September 
Pakistan launched a major attack in the Chhamb district advancing to within 20km of 
Jammu City in an attempt to cut the Indian lines of communication and supply to the 
State.t46 India responded by widening the conflict with an advance towards the 
Pakistani cities of Lahore, Sialkot and Karachi. The war ended with a cease -fire on 23 
September 1965, and following the Tashkent Conference of 3 -10 January 1966 both 
armies withdrew to their former positions. Pakistan had falsely assumed that: (a) the 
Kashmiris would rise up in popular rebellion against India (they instead actively 
assisted the Indian army in countering the Pakistani threat147); and (b) that the Indians 
would confine the fighting to Jammu and Kashmir.148 
The third Indo- Pakistan war in 1971 began with a brutal crackdown in the capital of 
East Pakistan, Dacca (now Dhaka), in response to demands for increased autonomy.149 
This resulted in the deaths of several thousand East Pakistanis and a stream of close to 
ten million refugees crossing from East Pakistan into India placing a huge burden on 
that country.15° After all attempts at a diplomatic solution failed, India openly came 
out in support of the Mukti Bahini rebels in East Pakistan in late November 1971. In 
response Pakistan attacked India on 3 December 1971 sparking a fourteen -day war. 
Although the war was not fought directly over Kashmir, much of the fighting 
occurred there. Pakistani managed to capture Chhamb but lost some territory in the 
Kargil, Tithwal, Uri and Poonch areas of the State.151 Elsewhere, India advanced into 
146 See Lamb, p.262. 
147 See, for example, Bazaz (1967), pp.102 -3. Although there is evidence that some Kashmiris supported 
and assisted the Mujahideen. See Schofield, p.207. 
148 Lamb, pp.259 -60; and Gowher Rizvi, `India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem 1947 -72' in 
Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.70. 
149 Ganguly, p.58. 
ISO See Ganguly, p.58. 
151 The White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977), 
Kashmir 209 
two sectors in the Punjab. Moreover, Pakistan lost its eastern wing which now became 
the independent State of Bangladesh, thus making India without a doubt the dominant 
power on the subcontinent. While Pakistan was now relieved of its previously 
burdensome responsibility of defending East Pakistan, the loss of its eastern wing dealt 
an enormous psychological, symbolic and material blow to the Pakistani State and 
substantially undermined its claim to Kashmir. Again, Ganguly explains: 
The Pakistani claim [to Kashmir], it will be recalled, was based on the state's predominantly 
Muslim population. Since Pakistan was unable to maintain its own integrity on the slender basis 
of religion, it could ìIl afford to make another religiously based claim on Kashmir. Thus, its 
ethnoreligious claim to Kashmir appeared all the more dubious after the 1971 civil war.152 
On 2 July 1972 India and Pakistan concluded the Simla Agreement in which the two 
countries agreed to: (a) settle their differences through bilateral negotiations;153 (b) 
settle their differences peacefully; (c) "respect each other's national unity, territorial 
integrity, political independence and sovereign equality "; and (d) respect the line of 
control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the cease -fire of 17 December 
1971, and refrain from seeking to alter it irrespective of mutual differences. 
F. The Return of Abdullah 
Recognising that the popular legitimacy of both the State government and the Indian 
position in Jammu and Kashmir were dependent upon the credibility of the leader of its 
government, in 1975 the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, concluded the Kashmir 
Accord with Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah, continued to command the greatest level of 
popular support in the Valley, and thus was the leader most likely to unite Kashmiris 
behind Indian rule. The State continued to be governed by Article 370, while Abdullah 
as governor ruled the State through the Congress Party, winning a second term in 1977 
under the banner of a revived National Conference. 
pp.101 -III. 
152 Ganguly, p.60. 
153 Thus ruling out appeal to a third party such as the UN and depriving the dispute of its international 
character. See A. G. Noorani, `Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity' in 
Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.257. 
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Like the Delhi Agreement of 1952, the 1975 Kashmir Accord prompted protests both 
in Jammu and Ladakh. In 1979 -81 both regions were again the scene of demands for 
autonomy from the Valley and violent protests relating to allegations of discrimination 
by the government in Srinagar concerning matters such as the division of Federal Aid, 
employment in the Public Service and the concentration of professional/technical 
institutions and industrial plants in the Valley.154 In Jammu and Ladakh such 
imbalances generated feelings of hostility and alienation which, due to the domination 
of each region by a different ethno -religious community, developed a communal 
dimension.155 These regional imbalances were institutionalised through the State's 
representative institutions, i.e. the demographic dominance of the Valley meant that it 
contained the majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. 
Both major political parties increasingly became identified with a different region in 
the State - the Congress (I) party with Hindu -majority Jammu, and the National 
Conference with the Muslim- majority valley. In the 1977 election, of the forty seven 
seats156 won by Abdullah's National Conference only seven were from the Jammu 
region. This trend continued in the 1983 and 1987 elections. The following table 
demonstrates the ethno- regional identifications of different political parties in the 
State. 
154 See Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, `Jammu: Autonomy Within an Autonomous Kashmir' in 
Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westvíew Press, 1992), pp.155 -57. 
155 Refer Verma, pp.36 -38. 
156 Out of a possible total of seventy six seats. 
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TABLE 5.3. REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PERCENTAGE OF VALID 
VOTES WON BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1983 AND 1987 
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS157 
Parties 1983: 
Jammu Kashmir 
Region Valley 
1987.' 
Jammu Kashmir Valley 
Region 
Congress (I) 45.30 19.08 37.24 8.96 
National 29.91 59.35 14.78 45.11 
Conference 
BJP 8.11 0.05 12.38 0.13 
Jamaat -i- 0.06 6.62 0.28 31.84 
Islami /MUF 
People's 0.84 7.30 0.03 6.36 
Conference 
Others 1.50 0.16 12.73 0.59 
Independents 14.66 7.41 22.56 8.09 
G. The History of Electoral Mal/Practices in the State 
Since the State's first election in 1951 to the present day, there have existed charges 
of electoral malpractice by the ruling party in order to ensure its return to power. 
These have included disqualification of opponents on flimsy /frivolous grounds, use of 
the government machinery in support of the ruling party, beatings and kidnappings of 
opposition candidates, intimidation of voters and tampering with ballot boxes.158 One 
of the most disturbing features of 1951 -72 State elections was the incidence of 
unopposed returns where the candidacy of opposition politicians was rejected - 
allegedly on spurious grounds - leaving only the ruling party's candidate to contest the 
electorate and thus eliminating any voter -choice. 
157 Verma, p.142. 
158 Bazaz (1967), p.87. 
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TABLE 5.4. UNOPPOSED RETURNS TO THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
STATE ASSEMBLY159 
Year of 
Election 
Total 
number 
of seats 
contest- 
ed 
Number 
of 
unoppo- 
sed 
returns 
Percentage 
of 
unopposed 
returns to 
the total 
number of 
seats 
Percentage of 
unopposed 
returns in the 
Kashmir 
Valley to the 
rest of the 
State 
Proportion of 
unopposed 
returns in the 
Kashmir 
Valley to the 
total number 
of seats 
1951 75 73 97.33 58.90 100 
1957 75 43 57.33 86.04 96.04 
1962 75 34 45.33 97.05 74.41 
1967 75 22 29.33 95.45 50.00 
1972 75 5 6.66 80.00 7.14 
1977 76 - - - 
1983 76 - 
1987 76 - - - 
The National Conference dominated State politics and was itself dominated by a 
clique of ruling families who monopolised the best government jobs and controlled 
access to the most prestigious educational institutions. 160 Its hostility to the idea of 
any rival parties in the State retarded the growth of opposition parties, restricted 
popular opportunity to participate in the democratic process and prevented the 
development of a popular democratic culture.161 Furthermore, it also removed any 
potential check upon the abuse of power by the ruling party, about which allegations 
were never in short supply. The following table illustrates the electoral performance of 
different parties in State elections: 
159 Verma, p.116. 
160 See Punjabi (1992), pp.42 -43. 
161 See Bazaz (1967), pp.64 -65; and Ganguly, p.29 and p.38. See Prem Nath Bazaz, Democracy 
Through Intimidation and Terror (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1978) for a full account of the harsh 
nature of Abdullah's rule. 
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TABLE 5.5 PARTY -WISE PERFORMANCE IN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
(1951 -87)162 
Year Congr- 
ess 
Party 
National 
Confe- 
rente 
Praja 
Parish- 
ad/Jana 
Sangh/ 
BJP 
Janata 
Party 
Jamaat- 
i- Islami/ 
MUF 
Other 
minor 
parties 
Indepe- 
ndents 
1951 - 75 - - 
Unopp- 
osed 
1957 - 68 5 - 
(56.22) (24.11) 
1962 - 70 3 0 2 
(66.96) (17.47) (8.14) (7.43) 
1967 61 - 3 8 3 
(53.2) (16.45) (21.44) (9.09) 
1972 58 3 5 9 
(55.44) (9.85) (7.18) (0.78) (26.75) 
1977 11 47 - 13 1 0 4 
(16.89) (46.22) (23.72) (3.59) (0.11) (9.47) 
1983 26 46 1 2 
(30.32) (47.29) (3.19) (0.28) (3.88) (4.98) (10.06) 
1987 26 40 2 0 4 - 4 
(20.20) (32.98) (5.10) (0.43) (18.20) (8.71) (14.38) 
NB: Figures in brackets indicate the State -wide percentage of the vote won by each party. 
H. The Gradual Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism 
It will be remembered that historically Islam was not a major determinant in the 
political mobilisation of Kashmiris. The peaceful conversion of Kashmiris to an 
162 Election Department of Jammu and Kashmir, quoted in Verma, p.145. 
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eclectic, meditative brand of Islam, combined with the Valley's geographical isolation 
and long- standing presence of a Hindu minority, to produce a brand of Islam that had 
little in common with the various other branches of Islam in the region.163 The 
dominant feature of Kashmiri social life remained a shared sense of cultural identity, 
which encompassed all of the Valley's inhabitants regardless of religious affiliation. 
Additionally, because Kashmiris have traditionally been ruled by outsiders and 
consequently barred from serving in the military, they lack the martial history which 
characterises many people of the region. Thus, Kashmiri history has in many ways 
been characterised by religious and ethnic tolerance, and the Kashmiri eulogised as 
naturally secular and non -belligerent in nature. In the nineteenth century Sir Walter 
Lawrence wrote: 
The Sunny [Sunni] Mussalmans (ninety five per cent of the population) do not strike me as 
zealous or earnest in the profession of their faith, and except in their quarrels with Shíahs, they 
seem free from all forms of fanaticism. It is true that they observe very strictly the fast of 
Ramzan, but they do keep Friday as a day of rest, and very few Kashmiris make the pilgrimage 
to Mecca...Holy men from Arabia have spoken to me with contempt of the feeble flame of 
Islam which burns in Kashmir and the local Muslims talk with indignation of the apathy of the 
people.164 
Geographically isolated from the rest of the region, Kashmiri Islam was largely 
separated from the larger currents of Muslim politics in India. "Except on particular 
occasions, Muslims elsewhere in India rarely joined in common cause with their 
fellows in the Valley. In turn, the Muslims of the Valley never developed extensive 
ties with Muslim communities in the rest of India. As a consequence they did not air 
their grievances as part of the national community but as a regional sub -community, 
with particular, parochial concerns. "165 Thus, while Islam was the dominant religion 
in Kashmir, it was generally an accommodating social force which, by- and -large, was 
not a barrier to the region's integration within a larger political unit populated 
predominantly by non -Muslims. 
163 G. M. D. Sufi, Islamic Culture in Kashmir (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1979). 
164 Sir Walter Lawrence, quoted in Tavleen Singh, p.8. 
165 Ganguly, p.40. 
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By the 1983 elections things had, however, begun to change. Following the death of 
Abdullah in 1982, his son Farooq Abdullah - the new head of the National Conference 
and Chief Minister of the State - decided to compete head -to -head with Indira 
Gandhi's Congress (I) party. Throughout the election campaign Islamic political 
symbolism and rhetoric became increasingly apparent. Islamic fundamentalist groups 
such as the Jamaat -i- Islami held election rallies which attracted large crowds.166 The 
importance of Article 370 and the need to maintain the State's independence from the 
centre became the central issues of the campaign. Farooq's success in reclaiming the 
heritage of his father and the National Conference regarding unjust central interference, 
and the appropriation of the campaign issues by the two main parties, succeeded in 
combating the Islamic lobby. Indira Gandhi campaigned successfully in Jammu, where 
she exploited feelings of alienation, neglect and injustice by the Hindu community 
towards the Muslim dominated administration in Srinagar,167 however Farooq 
captured the Valley's constituencies and, thus, the government. Congress (I) 
maintained that the elections had been rigged by the National Conference. Mass 
meetings and demonstrations were organised by the Congress (I) to protest the election 
result which produced severe rioting in Srinagar. 
Farooq's administration was short lived. On 2 July 1984 he was dismissed as Chief 
Minister by the State Governor, Jagmohan Malhotra.168 It was widely believed that 
Farooq's downfall was part of a carefully orchestrated campaign by Indira Gandhi. 
There are allegations that the twelve defecting National Conference members received 
large sums of money to defect169 and that Jagmohan, a trusted aide to Indira Gandhi, 
was appointed to the position of Governor on 26 April 1984 with the aim of toppling 
Farooq.170 
166 For a first hand account of the election see Tavleen Singh, pp.34 -49. 
167 See Varshney, p.219; and Tavleen Singh, pp.24 -43. Singh also explains that a contributory factor in 
Indira's lack of electoral success in the Valley was the fact that she spoke only Urdu and not Kashmiri. 
Conversely, outside of Srinagar many rural Kashmiris could understand only Kashmiri and spoke no 
Urdu. Thus, many of those Kashmiris in rural localities who did attend her campaign rallies were unable 
to understand a word she said. See Tavleen Singh, pp.34 -5. 
168 Farooq's parliamentary majority had been destroyed by the defection of twelve National Conference 
members of the Legislative Assembly and an independent to the Congress (1). 
169 See Hewitt, p.I50; and Tavleen Singh, pp.52 -53. 
170 Jagmohan had demonstrated both his ability and loyalty to Indira Gandhi as Lieutenant -Governor of 
Delhi. He developed a reputation for being both efficient and anti -Muslim due to his role in overseeing 
the demolishment of a primarily Muslim ghetto in the Turkman Gate area of Delhi in which a number of 
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It was Mrs Gandhi who through her accord with Sheikh Abdullah in 1974, started the process 
of restoring democracy in Kashmir, and it is she who has now ended it. Nobody in the valley 
has any illusions that the governor was not acting on the instructions of Delhi and that he was 
only doing the job that he was sent on here [sic].171 
Indira Gandhi's commitment to strong central government and suspicion of non - 
Congress (I) State administrations had brought her into conflict with several States. 
Farooq had openly supported the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. T. Rama 
Rao,172 and had criticised the central government's propensity to arbitrarily dismiss 
legitimately elected State governments. Additionally, Farooq's emphasis upon Article 
370 during the 1983 election campaign and the shouting of anti -Indian slogans by 
members of the Jamaat -i- Islami at an India -West Indies cricket match in Srinagar are 
also cited as factors which led Indira Gandhi to the conclusion that Farooq's 
government had to go.173 
The State government was now headed by Farooq's bother -in -law, G. M. Shah, who 
had unsuccessfully bid for the leadership of the National Conference following Sheikh 
Abdullah's death. Despite the pre -emptive stationing of troops in the Valley, Farooq's 
dismissal produced considerable tension and protest. The arbitrary dismissal of a 
popularly elected government, and its replacement by an administration widely 
considered to be incompetent and corrupt, caused a break -down in law and order. Of 
the first ninety -two days of G. M. Shah's administration seventy -two were spent under 
curfew.174 
Unable to stem the rising violence G. M. Shah lost his parliamentary majority 
whereupon Jagmohan announced the suspension of the Legislative assembly and the 
people were killed (Tavleen Singh, pp.54 -55; and Lamb, p.329). 
171 The Telegraph, Calcutta, 11 July 1984. 
172 Who had embarrassingly defeated Congress (I) in 1983 (Schofield, p.225). 
173 See Tavleen Singh, pp.49 -S1; and Lamb, p.329. Publicly Farooq's dismissal was rather 
unconvincingly justified by claims that Farooq had: (a) consorted with and encouraged secessionist forces 
within the State; (b) permitted Sikh terrorists to train in Kashmir; and (c) met with the charismatic and 
violent Sikh extremist Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. For a full account of the official reasons for 
Farooq's dismissal see Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied, 1991). Most 
writers dismiss Jagmohan's justifications for the sacking of Farooq as flimsy and specious. See, for 
example, Ganguly, pp.87 -88. 
174 Tavleen Singh, p.83; and Ganguly, p.88. 
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imposition of Governor's rule in March 1986. In September 1986 Governor's rule was 
replaced by direct State rule from New Delhi. In November 1986, following an accord 
between Farooq Abdullah and Rajiv Gandhi 175 designed to counter the rise of violence 
and Islamic fundamentalism in the State, direct rule came to an end, the suspension of 
the Legislative Assembly was lifted and Farooq installed as the Chief Minister heading 
a Congress (I)- National Conference coalition. Elections were held in March 1987 in 
which the National Conference allied with the Congress (I) to battle against a broad 
alliance of Islamic fundamentalist groups known as the Muslim United Front (MUF). 
The 1987 election is seen by many to have been the most rigged and unfair in the 
State's history.176 It was preceded by the mass arrests of MUF leaders and election 
agents prior to the poll. Even allowing for the discrepancy created by a First Past the 
Post electoral system, the outcome was viewed by many as being grossly 
disproportionate to campaign raIIy attendances and the general mood in the Valley. 
Rightly or wrongly, many Kashmiris concluded that New Delhi had disregarded 
democratic procedures in order to cheat the MUF out of its rightful political 
inheritance.177 The 1987 elections were followed by a series of communal riots in 
various parts of the State and a continuing break -down in law and order. By late 1988 
groups of armed rebels, known as militants, were demanding the secession of the State 
from India and engaged in a violent battle with Indian security forces. This resulted in 
the mass exodus of Pandits from the Valley and the re- imposition of Governor's rule in 
January 1990.178 In May 1990 Jagmohan was replaced as Governor by Girish Chandra 
Saxena who continued the harsh measures initiated by Jagmohan in an attempt to halt 
the insurgency,179 and was himself replaced by General Krishna Rao on II March 
1993.180 
175 Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother, Indira, following her assassination by Sikh body guards in 1984. 
176 See Hewitt, p.152; Lamb, p.331; Tavleen Singh, pp.95 -104; Ganguly, p.98; and Bhattacharjea, 
pp.253 -54. 
177 See Sumit Ganguly, The Prospects of War and Peace in Kashmir' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. 
Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.357; Bhattacharjea, p.253; and Fernandes, p.288. 
178 Some have alleged that the exodus of Pandits was deliberately orchestrated by India in an attempt to 
communalise the Kashmir dispute and paint the militants as Pakistan- sponsored Islamic fundamentalists. 
Author interviews with Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt (Chairman of the Muslim Conference), Srinagar, 25 
November 1998; and Yasin Malik (JKLF Chairman), Srinagar, 26 November 1998. 
179 An example of Saxena's style of govemment is the Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act of 5 July 1990. 
This act authorised any magistrate or police officer above the rank of sub -inspector, to use force even to 
the extent of causing death without permission from higher authorities. See Ganguly (1997), p.1 12; and 
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5.5 THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KASHMIR 
The various militant groups can generally be categorised according to two ideological 
variables: (a) those that favour the creation of an independent State versus those that 
favour joining Pakistan; and (b) those that favour the creation of a secular State versus 
those that prefer an Islamic State. Those groups which favour joining Pakistan tend to 
espouse a more fundamentalist brand of Islam. The first wave of militancy from 1988- 
89 through to 1990/91 was very much an urban, middle -class affair dominated by the 
secular, pro- independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).181 Much of 
the fighting was concentrated in Srinagar182 and most of the militants were 
unemployed university graduates who had campaigned for the MUF in the 1987 
election. Rarely did the militants engage the security forces for sustained periods of 
time, preferring instead hit -and -run tactics and the use of mines, booby traps and 
bombs. Frequently the security forces were engaged in urban settings to maximise the 
loss of innocent lives when they returned fire, and thus further alienate the population 
from the Indian army.183 The militants also attempted to disrupt daily life by 
destroying bridges, shops, schools and government buildings.' 84 
Gradually the number of militant groups began to increase with the JKLF losing its 
position of dominance to the Islamist, pro -Pakistan Hizbul- Mujahìdeen. The rise of 
Islamic, pro -Pakistan groups is frequently associated with a shift to a more rural -based 
militancy.' 85 While the reasons behind this shift in militancy towards the countryside 
is still a matter of scholarly debate, some theorists maintain that the initial reluctance 
of rural Kashmiris to join militant groups may be attributed to a residual sense of 
loyalty towards the National Conference because of Abdullab's 1950's land 
Schofield, p.265. 
180 Ganguly (1997), p,117, 
181 Schofield, p.240. 
182 And also certain rural centres such as Anantnag (since re -named Islamabad), Baramulla and Kupwara. 
183 G. Fernandes, `India's Policies in Kashmir: An Assessment and a Discourse' in Prespectives on 
Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.289. 
184 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Profile of Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 
1994, p.98. Also see M. L. Kotru, The Kashmir Story, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
p.50, no date of publication, 
185 Roger Howard, `Evolving Rather than Receding, the Killing in Kashmir Continues', Jane's 
Intelligence Review, VoI.I I, No.1, 1999, p.40. 
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reforms.186 Just why rural militancy, when it did take hold, had such an Islamic 
flavour to it requires a more complicated explanation than can be provided here. 
However, it is worth pointing out that fundamentalist Islam in Kashmir has historically 
tended to be a rural phenomenon.187 
As the number of militant groups continued to grow, clashes between ideologically 
opposed militant outfits became more common and many foreign Mujahideen from 
places such as Afghanistan, Bahrain and Sudan also began to enter the Valley.188 The 
Islamisation and internationalisation of militancy in Kashmir was also accompanied by 
its criminalisation.189 Initially the militants enjoyed wide popular support, however as 
people became increasingly war -weary from the steadily mounting number of 
casualties190 this support gradually began to evaporate. Consequently, the militants 
were forced to resort to tactics such as kidnapping to extort money and food from the 
local population.191 This, however, only further alienated the militants from common 
Kashmiris and initiated a vicious cycle of increasing resentment and violence. 
In addition to gangsters masquerading as militants to extort money, bona fide militant 
groups also stepped into the vacuum left by the breakdown of civil order becoming a 
de facto police force motivated, not by a sense of civic duty, but rather a desire to 
enrich themselves at others' expense. Consequently, many of the violent acts 
186 Author interview, Dr Amitab Mattoo (professor of international relations at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University), New Delhi, 9 November 1998. 
187 e.g. most madrassas (Islamic schools) tend to be located in rural areas. 
188 Times of India, New Delhi, 23 July 1993. Additionally, Iran has also been accused by Farooq of 
funding schools run by the Jamaat- i- Islami in Kashmir, See Greater Kashmir, 13 October 1999. 
189 See, for example, Schofield, pp.267 -68. 
190 There have been countless documented cases of torture, rape and extra- judicial killings by the Indian 
security forces. For example, see Amnesty International, India, Torture and Deaths in Custody in Jammu 
and Kashmir (New York: Amnesty International, 1995). Also see Asia Watch and Physicians for Human 
Rights, The Human Rights Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity (New York: Asía Watch, 1993). 
Indian apologists claim that such allegations are usually False or grossly exaggerated and point out that the 
militants themselves are guilty of the same crimes. See, for example, D. P. Kumar, Kashmir: Pakistan's 
Proxy War (New Delhi: Har Anand Publishers, no date of publication), p.136. That both sides of the 
conflict are guilty of human rights abuses is undeniable, as is the fact that most victims of the violence are 
innocent civilians. Various estimates of the number killed since 1989 range from twenty thousand to fifty 
thousand, while some two hundred thousand, mostly Hindu, Kashmiris have fled the Valley and live as 
refugees in Jammu and elsewhere in India. See Robert G. Wisering, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir 
Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: St Martins, 1994), p.126. 
191 Ganguly (1997), p.139. Also see Harinder Baweja, `The Hostage Crisis' India Today, 15 September 
1995, pp.19-25. 
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perpetrated by militants were not ideologically motivated, but were instead a result of 
the militants being employed as a type of 'rent-a-gang' to settle, amongst other things, 
marriage and property disputes.I92 Given that official channels of dispute -resolution 
such as the courts were, even in the best of times, hopelessly inefficient, corrupt and 
over -burdened, it is hardly surprising that many people looked to the militants to 
provide a `quick fix' to their personal disputes,193 
India's response is based upon its counter -insurgency experiences in Punjab, Assam 
and Nagaland. It involves persistent cordon and search operations where 
neighbourhoods are cordoned off, houses searched and identity parades held. This is 
combined with counter- intelligence operations194 and attempts seal off the LoC to halt 
Pakistani infiltration.195 Estimates of the number of Indian military and para- military 
personnel in the State vary from two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand.196 In 
1995 the Indian government was responsible for the creation of several locally -based 
counter -insurgency movements known as Ikhwan. Ikhwan are mostly former militants 
who have been `turned' and are provided with weapons, money and protection by the 
192 For an account of the relationship between ideological factors, local issues and personal disputes as 
motivating forces behind militancy see Praveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: Left Word, 1999), 
p.84. There have also been reports of the local police disguising themselves as militants in order to settle 
personal scores. For example, the local press recently reported the case of a police officer who staged a 
fake encounter in Poonch in order to kill a subordinate officer. See The Kashmir Times, 23 August 1999. 
193 Another example of an event which alienated many people from the militants is the Hazratbal siege of 
October 1993 when a group of insurgents armed with light machine guns managed to occupy the 
Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar, which continues to house that most important of holy relics the Moen- 
Mugaddas. 'Army units laid siege to the mosque and negotiations between the two parties commenced. 
The grave significance of this stand -off cannot have been lost on any of the parties involved, Both the 
shrine and the relic which houses it are of enormous significance to Muslims in Kashmir and around the 
world, while the severe riots of 1963 -64 sparked by the relic's disappearance had reached as far as 
Calcutta and were not easily forgotten. Additionally, the similarities between the Hazratbal siege and that 
of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by the Indian army in 1984 (which preceded the bloody war in the 
Punjab and the assassination of Indira Gandhi) fired the imagination of Kashmiris. Eventually a 
negotiated settlement was reached, which saw the militants being allowed to escape after leaving their 
weapons behind in the shrine, See Ganguly (1997) and Amit Baruah, `Advantage Nobody', The Hindu, 
28 November 1993, p.4. However many Kashmiris viewed the settlement of the Hazratbal siege as a lost 
opportunity, and a `sell -out' by the militants to the occupying Indian army. Author interview with JKLF 
Area Commander, Srinagar, May 1994. 
194 e.g. the use of informants and attempts to infiltrate militant groups. The government also made wide 
(mis)use of the 1985 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (TADA) Act which granted the government 
powers of preventive detention. 
195 See Hewitt, p.161; and Maroof Raza, `Pakistan- Sponsored Insurgency in Kashmir: A Case Study', 
Asian Journal on Terrorism and Internal Conflicts, Vol.2, No.4, 1999. 
196 A respectable estimate is four hundred thousand. See Anthony Davis, `The Conflict in Kashmir', 
Jane's Intelligence Review 7:1 (1995), p.40. 
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government.197 At best the various Ikhwan are a local militia, at worst they are State - 
sponsored vigilantes with carte blanche to do as they please.198 
Whereas the burden of counter -insurgency operations initially fell upon federal 
military and para- military forces,199 their place has now largely been taken by the local 
State police (JKP).200 In many respects the JKP's campaign against the militants has 
proven to be a qualified success.201 While those areas that border on, or are proximate 
to, Pakistan202 continue to be the scene of acts of violence, there has been a significant 
decrease in militant activity with most acts of militancy now confined to locations 
outside the Valley such as Doda, Rajouri and Poonch.203 At the same time, official 
statistics - which must be treated with some caution - indicate that the proportion of 
militants who are of foreign origin has dramatically increased.204 While Indian claims 
197 See Ganguly (1997), p.153. Also see Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinayak, `A Dangerous Liason', 
India Today, 15 March 1996, pp.52 -55; and Human Rights Watch, India's Secret Army in Kashmir: New 
Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict', Human Rights Watch Asia Report, Vol.8, No.4, May 1996. 
198 The Ikhwan have also been implicated in the killing of numerous National Conference activists in 
Kashmir. Shortly after his return to power in 1996 Farooq launched a campaign against the Ikhwan by 
removing several privileges (including security) which were afforded to them while the State was under 
direct rule from New Delhi. Some commentators have claimed that the Ikhwan have attempted to exact 
revenge by killing National Conference activists in Kashmir. See M. L. Kak, 'CM Suspects Central 
Agencies', The Tribune, 18 December 1998. 
199 e.g. such as the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). 
200 There remains, however, a high concentration of military forces in the State who, particularly the 
notorious Rashtriya Rifles (RR), are frequently used for counter -insurgency operations. 
201 Although to what extent factors other than the JKP's military prowess (e.g. a lack of popular support 
from ordinary Kashmiris) has been responsible for the decline in militancy ís, of course, a moot point. 
There have also been reports of the JKP staging fake encounters in order to increase their prestige and 
chances of promotion (see, for example, 'High Drama on NH, Kathua', The Kashmir Times, 17 August 
1999). It should also be pointed out that the various forces fighting the militants on India's behalf are far 
from a united force, and there have been numerous reports of clashes between the JKP and the BSF (e.g. 
refer 'JK Police Has Become a Vibrant Force', The Kashmir Times, 16 April 1999; and Raza, p.44). 
202 e.g. Poonch, Baramulla and Kupwara. 
203 Reasons given for why the militants have chosen to now focus upon this area of the State include: (a) 
that it is an attempt to open a new corridor from Pakistan into Kashmir; (b) the mountainous terrain offers 
the militants a strategic advantage over the Indian forces; and (e) it is an attempt to forment religious 
violence between the evenly balanced Hindu and Muslim communities in the region. Author interviews 
with Sarah Tiffin (First Secretary, British High Commission), New Delhi, 6 November 1998; Harinder 
Baweja (Senior Correspondent, India Today), New Delhi, 6 November 1998; and Chaman Lal Gupta 
(BJP Member of federal Parliament), Jammu, 12 November 1998. Also see Raza, p.45; and Swami, 
pp.65ff. Similar reasons were given for the 1999 incursion by Pakistan -sponsored Mujahideen in the 
Kargil sector. See lftikhar Gilani, ' Kargil Operations May Take Longer than Expected', The Kashmir 
Times, 2 June 1999. 
204 In 1998 forty seven percent of militants killed by the Indian forces were reported to have been of 
foreign origin. This is compared to thirty one percent in 1997, twenty one percent in 1996 and six percent 
in 1996. See '45 Foreign Militants Killed in 1999', The Kashmir Times, 15 April 1999. Also 
see Mercenary Assault on Kashmir (Government of India); Profile of Terrorist Violence in Jammu and 
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of a return to normalcy in Kashmir are clearly a gross exaggeration, there can be no 
doubt that the situation has improved from, say, the early 1990's. This is not to deny 
that political violence in the State remains a serious problem,2205 however 
circumstances have improved to the extent that Kashmiris are at least able to conduct 
their daily affairs in a manner which would have been unthinkable in the not -so- distant 
past. 
The nature and make up of the militant groups has also changed. While the Hizb -ul- 
Mujahideen remain active other, Islamic groups based in Pakistan such as Lashkar -e- 
Toiba, Tehrik -ul -Jihad and Harkut- ul- Mujahideen206 are arguably now the dominant 
militant groups operating in Kashmir.207 Consequently, what started out as a popular, 
indigenous rebellion against Indian authority has increasingly been transformed into a 
largely unpopular, foreign- sponsored and controIIed phenomenon. 
While Pakistan claims that it provides only moral and diplomatic support to the 
Kashmiri militants there is considerable evidence to suggest otherwise.208 India 
repeatedly claims that Pakistan arms, funds and trains Kashmiri militant groups, 
relying in large part upon the sophisticated weaponry which entered Pakistan following 
the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and its experience in training the Afghan 
Mujahideen.209 While an in -depth analysis of the case for Pakistani complicity is 
clearly beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that there is an overwhelming 
consensus - not just within India - of substantial Pakistani involvement in Kashmir.21° 
Kashmir (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, December 1994); Profile of Terrorist Violence 
in Jammu and Kashmir (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, September 1997); and The 
Proxy War Continues (Government of India, no further publication details given). 
7 °5 For a critique of the effectiveness of India's counter -insurgency strategy in Jammu and Kashmir see 
Swami, pp.74ff. 
206 Formerly known as Harkut- ul- Ansar. See Howard, pp.41 -42. 
207 See `LeT Takes Overall Control of Militancy', The Kashmir Times, 24 August 1999. The JKLF - 
which, true to form, is divided into at least 2 main factions - in May 1994 declared a cease -fire with the 
Indian government following the release from an Indian jail of one of its leaders, Yasin Malik (Schofield, 
p.268). 
208 The evidence that India has produced to corroborate these claims is hotly contested by Pakistan and 
sometimes inconclusive, consisting of such things as `confessions' by individuals caught crossing the 
border to /from Pakistan, or arms seizures. 
209 Thomas, p.27; and Bhattacharjea, pp.17 -18. 
21° e.g. refer 'Asia Overview' in Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Washington D.C: United States 
State Department, April 1999). The case for Pakistani complicity in Kashmir was strengthened by that 
country's involvement in the 1999 Kargil Crisis when Pakistani sponsored Mujahideen and regular troops 
Kashmir 223 
Both the nature and extent of this involvement has no doubt changed over time to 
reflect the political, military, social and economic realities and upheavals in both 
countries. However, while Pakistan's role in sponsoring militancy in Kashmir may 
have initially been restricted to aiding and exacerbating an already existing problem in 
Kashmir, the lack of popular support amongst ordinary Kashmiris for the militants, 
combined with the dominance of pro -Pakistan groups and foreign mercenaries, would 
appear to indicate that Pakistani interference is now one of the primary causes of the 
residual violence in Kashmir.211 
In addition to Pakistani interference, other factors cited as being responsible for 
militancy in Kashmir include a rise in levels of literacy and education212 which, it is 
claimed, produced a politically sophisticated and knowledgeable generation. 
Frustrated by a lack of jobs and outlets for democratic expression,213 Kashmiri youth 
finally resorted to violence to overthrow a regime increasingly viewed as unresponsive, 
corrupt and nepotistic 214 Other theorists emphasise Indian political mismanagement 
as being responsible for the crisis citing factors such as Farooq's 1985 dismissal and 
1987 accord with Congress,215 and also the popular belief that the 1987 election had 
crossed the LoC to occupy parts of Indian- occupied Kashmir. For a summary of the Kargil Crisis see 
Afsir Karim, `Pakistan's Aggression in Kashmir: 1999', Asian Journal on Terrorism and Internal 
Conflicts, Vol.2, No.4, 1999, 
211 For a summary of the Indian case regarding Pakistani complicity in the Kashmir rebellion refer to 
Kumar, pp.181ff. 
212 From 1971 to 1981 the overall literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir grew by more than forty-three 
percent - the third fastest growth rate in India. Refer Afsir Karim and the Indian Defence Review Team, 
Kashmir: The Troubled Frontiers (New Delhi: Lancer, 1994), p.188 and p.250. Moreover the percentage 
of the State's population enrolled at University increased from 0.087 percent in 1950 -51 to 0.414 percent 
in 1976 -77. See Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Department of Planning and Development, 
Directorate of Evaluation and Statistics, Digest of Statistics 1977 -78, Vol.2 (Srinagar: Government of 
Jammu and Kashmir, 1978). This rise of literacy levels and the number of students attending universities 
in the State was matched by a dramatic growth in the number of newspapers published in the State which, 
in the twenty -five years to 1991, had grown to two hundred and fifty four - an increase of four hundred 
and fifty per cent - while total newspaper circulation rose from 119,000 in 1982 to 369,000 in 1989. See 
Mass Media in India (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Government of India). 
213 See Mustapha Kama! Pasha, `Beyond the Two Nation Divide: Kashmir and Resurgent Islam' in 
Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.371 -72. 
214 See Ganguly (1997) for a full account of this explanation of the causes of the conflict. 
215 Historically when the National Conference and the Congress parties fought one another they did so 
bitterly, each party appropriating the main campaign issues in order to strengthen their relative positions. 
Consequently the performance of their communal rivals declined (Verma, p.151). It is claimed that his 
accord with Rajiv robbed Farooq of his father's role as a Kashmiri patriot standing up to New Delhi, thus 
creating a power vacuum and allowing the initiative against unjust central interference to slip to Islamic 
parties like the MUF. 
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been rigged by the ruling party.216 Finally, it is also claimed that certain inter /national 
events217 inspired Kashmiris in their struggle for freedom and Islamised 
Kashmiriyat.218 
Whatever the causes of the violence in Kashmir, the response of any Indian 
government is constrained by the popularity of Hindu nationalism in that country, and 
a fear of being seen as soft on Pakistan, which would be electorally damaging and 
could provoke an anti -Muslim backlash.219 This is particularly true of the current 
Hindu -nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) administration in New Delhi which 
has links to fundamentalist Hindu organisations such as the RSS and Jana Sangh, and 
has consistently ruled out any return to Article 370 or the granting of any form of 
special status or autonomy to Kashmir. Indeed, as a result of its 1998 nuclear tests and 
resolute stand against Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil Crisis, the BJP has - 
notwithstanding its surrender to the demands made by the hijackers of an Indian 
Airlines flight in 1999 - staked its political credentials upon taking a hard line with 
Pakistan over Kashmir.220 
Political developments within Kashmir have been similarly restrained. In an attempt 
to restore some degree of political normalcy, in May 1996 parliamentary elections for 
the federal lower house (Lok Sabha) were held for the first time in Jammu and 
Kashmir since 1989. Many commentators regarded the election result221 as suspect 
216 See for example, Bhattacharjea, p.253; and Hewitt, p.8. 
217 
e.g. the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the war in Afghanistan, militancy in the neighbouring State of 
Punjab, the break up of the USSR and the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
218 See Bhattacharjea, pp.254 -55; and Tavleen Singh, p.122. 
219 Tavleen Singh, p.239. 
220 Prior to the Kargil Crisis Indo- Pakistan relations had appeared to be warming with the signing of the 
so- called Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999, in which both sides agreed to refrain from interfering 
in each other's affairs and to take steps to reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict on the Indian 
subcontinent. Aside from its affects upon Indo- Pakistan relations the Kargil Crisis also damaged 
Pakistan's relationship with the various groups opposed to Indian rule in Kashmir. For example, on 22 
August 1999 the chairman of the All Parties Hurries Council (APHC) severely criticised Pakistan's policy 
in Kashmir (see `APHC Blasts Pak for Damaging Kashmir Cause', The Kashmir Times, 24 August 1999; 
and Zahir -Ud -Din, `Hurriet's Love -Hate Relationship with Pakistan', Greater Kashmir, 21 July 1999) 
while similar remarks were also made by Amanullah Khan of the JKLF (see 'JKLF Threatens to Take Up 
Arms Against Pakistan', The Kashmir Times, 3 August 1999). 
221 Congress (I) secured four of the six seats with the other two going to the Janata Dal and BJP. Refer 
Ganguly (1997), p.152. 
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and blamed the relatively high voter turnout of forty percent222 on coercion by the BSF 
and RR.223 This was followed by local assembly elections in September of the same 
year which returned the National Conference under Farooq to power, winning fifty - 
seven of a possible eighty -seven seats.224 
Since its re- election Farooq's government has had a mixed record of success in 
dealing with the State's many problems. On the one hand, the military situation has 
undoubtedly improved when compared to the early 1990's when the insurgency was at 
its peak.225 On the other hand, however, the State remains hamstrung by the network 
of political patronage that has always existed under the National Conference and which 
is characterised by gross economic inefficiency, nepotism, corruption and 
incompetence.226 Financially the State runs a considerable deficit227 and is largely 
dependent upon handouts from the central government. Aside from mal- 
administration, the State's financial woes may also be attributed to a break -down in 
civil order and institutions228 and a lack of investment in the State; all of which have 
contributed to alarmingly high levels of unemployment and few opportunities for 
222 In contrast voter turnout for the last Lok Sabha elections held in the State in 1989 was a mere two 
percent. See Harinder Baweja, `Exercise in Opportunism', India Today, 30 April 1996, pp.70 -71. 
223 See, for example, Ganguly (1997), p.152; and Shiraz Sidhva, `Guns and Votes', Frontline, 14 June 
1996, pp.122 -25. Others have, however, cast doubt upon these claims (e.g. Praveen Swami, `Questions of 
Fact: A Critique of Reportage in the English- Language Press of the 1996 Kashmir Lok Sabha Elections', 
Unpublished Paper). 
224 Ganguly (1997), p.155. These elections have been followed by others which have also been subject 
to allegations of vote rigging and intimidation. For example, the 1999 Lok Sabha elections were 
compared to those of 1997 by some commentators who accused the ruling National Conference of 
massive vote rigging and the RR and JKP of voter intimidation. See The Kashmir Times, 16 September, 
20 October and 5 October 1999. The final voter turnout in Kashmir in these elections was reported to be 
a mere twelve percent. See The Kashmir Times, 6 September 1999. 
22s The Jammu and Kashmir State Minister for Industries and Commerce (Mr Bodh Raj Bali) indicated 
that, from January 1998 to September 1999, 1,538 civilians, 87 police, 1,761 militants and 991 military 
personnel were either killed or wounded in Kashmir. See Greater Kashmir, 12 October 1999. 
226 The local press are full of stories of corruption and ineptitude amongst the State officials. For 
example on 17 November 1999 the local press reported that the State had apparently lost Rs300 Crore 
(one Crore is equivalent to ten million) clue to excessive and fraudulent payments by the State Revenue 
Department in compensation for land claims. See `Irregularities Detected in Land Compensation', The 
Kashmir Times. 17 November 1999. Similar claims were previously made against the Industries 
Department (refer `Large Scale Irregular Appointments in Industries Department', The Kashmir Times, 26 
October 1999) for misappropriation of funds and irregular appointments. Indeed, the entire State 
administration appears riven with ineptitude and corruption, with individual members of parliament also 
implicated in many shady financial transactions. 
227 Reported to be Rs 142.08 Crore for the 1999 -2000 budget. See The Kashmir Times, 5 March 1999. 
228 Which, apart from anything else, has damaged the government's ability to collect taxes. 
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Kashmiri youth.229 Moreover, it is precisely these factors (i.e. unemployment and 
financial hardship) which have been officially recognised by the government of India 
as primary causes of militancy, both in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.230 
The various secessionist groups have also attempted to get their political act together 
by forming an umbrella organisation known as the All Parties Hurriet Conference 
(APHC), which includes groups as diverse as the Yasin Malik faction of the JKLF and 
the Jammat -i- Islami. One of the main reasons behind the creation of the APHC was to 
counter the Indian claim that the large number and conflicting agendas of the various 
militant groups, made it extremely difficult for New Delhi to identify with whom they 
should negotiate. However, since the APHC's creation there has been little meaningful 
dialogue between it and the Indian government. The I3JP government continues to 
refuse to consider any form of special autonomy for the State whereas the APHC, 
citing the corrupt nature of the electoral process in Kashmir, has consistently boycotted 
State elections and called upon ordinary Kashmiris to do the same. 
While the rough and tumble nature of Kashmiri politics cannot be denied, the 
APHC's political fortunes have not been helped by the fact that it has yet to receive a 
clear political mandate from the electorate. Moreover, the divergent aims and 
aspirations of the various groups that together constitute the APHC, not to mention 
their frequent public squabbles and the quickly -acquired wealth of many of their 
leaders,23 t have combined to discredit the APHC in the eyes of many Kashmiris. This, 
combined with the National Conference's unpopularity due to its inability to deliver on 
promises of more schools, roads, hospitals and jobs, has tended to create something of 
229 An education is no guarantee of finding employment: in 1998 there were reported to be 12,156 
unemployed graduates in Jammu and Kashmir. See `Unemployment Assuming Alarming Proportions', 
The Daily Excelsior, 18 December 1998. 
230 See, for example, S. S. Banyal, `Ministry's Paper Blames Poor Governance for N -E Militancy', The 
Hindustan Times, 13 December 1998; Harinder Baweja, 'In the Mind of the Militant', India Today, 31 
December 1994, pp.120 -22; and 'Joblessness Will Push Youth into Militancy: BJP', Greater Kashmir, 17 
December, 1999. 
231 Allegations of corruption and mis- appropriation of funds are, of course, hotly denied by APHC 
leaders who regard such claims as part of a campaign of mis- information by India designed to publicly 
discredit pro- secessionist groups. Author interviews with Yasin Malik (details above); and Mirwaiz Umar 
Farooq (pro -independence activist and spiritual leader), Srinagar, 28 November 1998. 
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a political vacuum in Kashmir with no one party being able to claim the overwhelming 
support of the people 232 
In conclusion: the current situation in Kashmir may be described as one of economic, 
political and social stagnation. While levels of militancy have receded in comparison 
to earlier years, not only this has not been matched by a commensurate improvement in 
the socio- economic welfare of ordinary Kashmiris, but a political solution to the 
State's final status remains as elusive as ever. On the one hand, then, the decline in 
militancy is, at least to some degree, attributable to a lack of popular support for the 
militants and an overwhelming desire on the part of ordinary Kashmiris for a return to 
pre -1987 levels of normalcy. On the other hand, however, the fatigue of Kashmiris 
should not be interpreted as resignation to Indian rule but, rather, a realisation that the 
goal of Azadi233 is unachievable through military means. Indeed, there remains an 
enormous amount of bitterness in Kashmir towards both India and Pakistan that will 
not be easily erased. 
232 In recognition of this fact a number of groups have begun to disassociate themselves from the APHC. 
For example, former Chief Minister G. M. Shah recently allied his pro -independence group the Awami 
National Conference with the separatist alliance of the Quami Mushawari Council which also includes 
the Amanullah Khan faction of the JKLF. See `New Outfit Calls for Ceasefire', The Kashmir Times, 20 
October 1999. 
233 i.e. freedom - whether it be in the form of an independent State or secession to Pakistan. 
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6 
SECESSION AND KASHMIR 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters Two, Three and Four of this thesis consisted of a process of critical 
engagement with Nationalist JC and LD theories of secession. The purpose of this 
chapter is to complete this process by analysing the three types of secession theory here 
under consideration - i.e. Nationalist, Just Cause (JC) and Liberal Democratic (LD) 
theories - with respect to the contemporary secessionist dispute in Kashmir. In order 
to accomplish this task the chapter will first detail the competing claims of the various 
Kashmiri secessionist groups as well as the counter -claims put forward by the Indian 
and Pakistani governments. These and other arguments will then be related back to the 
three types of normative theory in order to examine how the arguments advanced by 
those seeking the secession of Kashmir mirror Nationalist, JC and LD theories. 
The second task of this chapter will be to apply these general critiques to the case of 
Kashmir. In other words, after having identified how Kashmir's secession might be, 
and frequently is, justified on, say, nationalist grounds, the critique of Nationalist 
theories of secession outlined in Chapter Two will then be applied to these claims. 
This same process will then be undertaken with respect to JC and LD theories of 
secession. The aim of this process is to corroborate the claims made in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four with empirical data by examining the linkages between these three 
theories and the case -study of Kashmir. The findings of this investigation will then be 
summarised in the following chapter along with a general summing -up of the thesis. 
It might, at this point, be objected that to analyse these theories in terms of the case of 
Kashmir is to apply a Western sense of rationality to a situation which does not lend 
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itself to it. In other words, it is improper to apply theories written by Western 
intellectuals within a liberal- democratic context to a dispute in which the main 
protagonists are from a completely different philosophical tradition premised upon a 
completely different type of rationalism and (interpretation of) moral principles. Such 
an approach makes about as much sense as, say, taking an Islamic theory of secession 
based upon the teachings of the Koran and applying it to the secessionist dispute in 
Northern Ireland in which the main protagonists are not Muslims and so would reject a 
theory of secession based upon Islamic insights. 
The aim, however, is not to use abstract normative principles to say something 
substantive about the conflict in Kashmir. Rather, the more modest goal is to use the 
example of Kashmir as illustrative material to substantiate the analytical investigation 
of the three normative theories being considered in this thesis. As was pointed out in 
the previous chapter this approach is entirely consistent with the material here under 
consideration and mirrors that taken by many other theorists. Furthermore, rightly or 
wrongly, the theories considered in this thesis are premised upon moral principles 
which are taken to be universal and so do not distinguish between secessionist disputes 
in which the various actors subscribe to Western, liberal- democratic norms and those 
in which they do not. 
One may, of course, question the universality of moral principles and their 
interpretation. However, it would be highly inaccurate to describe all the protagonists 
in the Kashmir dispute as entirely ignorant of, or hostile to, Western, liberal - 
democratic norms. Furthermore, if the goal is to assess the satisfactoriness of these 
three theories then not only is it necessary to take certain fundamental precepts as 
given, but an internal critique premised upon factors which these theories regard as 
significant is likely to be more effective than one premised upon considerations which 
they would reject or consider questionable. 
Finally, given that the protagonists in the Kashmir dispute are themselves from 
different religious and social traditions with a long history of conflict, they too are 
unlikely to agree upon particular moral principles, not to mention their interpretation 
and application in specific cases. Thus, the disparity between the principles employed 
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by these theories and those held by the various parties to the dispute over Kashmir, 
may be no less than that which already exists between these various protagonists in the 
first place. The alternative to accepting some level of disagreement over first 
principles is either to engage in the extreme relativism which characterises many 
Postmodernist thinkers, or attempt to secure unanimous agreement upon fundamental 
moral principles and their interpretation/application in specific instances. Not only is 
the latter approach likely to often be implausible, but the conclusions yielded by it are 
likely to be as unhelpful as those produced by the former approach which are, in the 
main, so general as to be practically useless. 
6.2. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST KASHMIR'S SECESSION 
A. The Claims of the Indian & Pakistani Governments 
Kashmir is, first and foremost, the subject of a bilateral dispute between India and 
Pakistan. Furthermore, many of the factors cited by both India and Pakistan in support 
of their respective stances on Kashmir are relevant to the three theories of secession 
here under consideration. Therefore, before going on to consider the claims of the 
various separatist groups, it will first be helpful to first detail the arguments put 
forward by both of these countries for sovereignty over Kashmir. 
Pakistan, in support of its claim to legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir, maintains 
that: (a) by 26/27 October 1947 the Maharaja was no longer competent to sign an 
Instrument of Accession because he had effectively been overthrown by his subjects; 
(b) the Instrument of Accession is conditional upon the holding of a plebiscite, as 
stipulated in the 1948/49 UN Resolutions to which India agreed, which has never 
taken place; and (c) the State satisfied all the criteria to accede to Pakistan, i.e. it is a 
Muslim- majority State that is contiguous with it, and therefore should have gone to 
Pakistan. In support of this latter claim Pakistan cites the fact that both Junagadh and 
Hyderabad went to India because they were Hindu -majority States - despite the fact 
that the former had signed an Instrument of Accession with Pakistan.' Therefore, by 
I See Raju G. C. Thomas, `Reflections on the Kashmir Problem' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. 
C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.22; and Iftikhar H. Malik, `The Kashmir Dispute: A Cul - 
de -Sac in Indo- Pakistan Relations' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: 
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the same logic, Jammu and Kashmir should go to Pakistan, i.e. India cannot 
consistently refuse to accept the validity of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan while 
also insisting upon the legal validity of Kashmir's accession to it 2 
The Indian case for retaining the Valley, on the other hand, is based upon 
historical /legal antecedents and counter -factual reasoning. India claims that the 
Instrument of Accession gives it legal title to the entire former Dogra Kingdom. India 
also points out that the 1948/49 UN resolutions for a plebiscite require that Pakistan 
first withdraw its troops from the parts of the former Dogra kingdom which it still 
(illegally) occupies before a plebiscite can be held,3 and questions why Pakistan 
demands a plebiscite only in Indian-held Kashmir when the UN resolution calls for a 
plebiscite in the entire former Dogra Kingdom. 
Nehru's offer of a plebiscite is characterised by India as an extra -legal offer made to 
the people of Kashmir - not Pakistan - that cannot be held to be valid for all time.4 
Moreover, even if India's promise of a plebiscite is regarded as an international 
commitment, India claims that it would still be entitled to not hold a plebiscite on the 
principle of rebus sic stantibus (a vital change in circumstances).' Additionally, India 
also claims that: (a) the requirement to hold a plebiscite was satisfied by elections in 
the State which were an adequate test of public opinion;6 (b) that legally "...the assent 
of the people was not necessary for the validity and the perpetual character of a State's 
accession "7; (c) that had such a plebiscite been held in 1948 -49 then, because of the 
atrocities committed by the Pakistani tribal invaders, India would have convincingly 
secured the majority of valid votes anyway; and (d) the Kashmir issue should be 
settled bilaterally between the two countries in accordance with the Simla Agreement 
Westview Press, 1992), p.305. 
2 UN Security Counci Official Records, Third Year, Nos 16 -35, pp. 189 -209 and Nos 36 -51, pp.44 -65. 
3 See Thomas, p.21. Also see Damodar R. Sar Desai, `Origins of Kashmir's International and Legal 
Status' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.89 -90. 
4 Sar Desai, p.82 and pp.88 -90. 
5 Sar Desai, p.91. 
6 See Ajit Bhattacharjea, Kashmir The Wounded Valley (New Delhi: UBSPD Publishers, 1994), p.124. 
7 Excerpt from a speech by the Indian spokesman, V. K. Krishna Menon, to the UN Security Council 
quoted in P. B. Gajendragadkar, Kashmir, Retrospect and Prospect (Bombay: Bombay University Press, 
1967), pp.1 I5 -16. 
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which supercedes all previous Indo- Pakistani agreements on Jammu and Kashmir, 
including the 1948 UN resolution calling for a plebiscite. 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that, due to its contextualisation in terms of 
the conflicting founding principles of both India and Pakistan, the Kashmir issue has 
become an ideological, in addition to a territorial, dispute.8 Both India and Pakistan 
have attempted to establish a distinctive national identity that overrides the various 
conflicting loyalties of their constitutive, regionally concentrated and ethnically diverse 
sub -communities. The problem, however, is that Kashmir has become a legitimating 
factor in both countries' respective national identities upon which their national unity 
is based .9 To India, Kashmir is a test case for that country's commitment to 
secularism,10 whereas for Pakistan, Kashmir's position in India is an anathema to the 
Two Nation Theory and the notion that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate 
nations.11 
These considerations form the basis for a less -stated argument in favour of India 
retaining Kashmir based upon the possible consequences of Kashmir's secession - 
either to Pakistan or as an independent State. It is claimed that while the original 
causes of Kashmir's unrest may not be religious, because the Kashmir issue has 
nonetheless become contextualised outside of the State in terms of religious 
nationalism, if Kashmir really did break away from India then the fate of the remaining 
105,000,000 Muslims in India would be in jeopardy.12 Kashmir's secession would: (a) 
8 Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967), p.128. 
9 See Vernon Hewitt, Reclaiming the Past? (London: Portland Books, 1995), p.20 and p.126. 
10 See Bhattacharjea, p.4; Ashutosh Varshney, `Three Comprised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been 
a Problem', in Prespectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 
pp.196 -97; Omar Khalidi, `Kashmir and Muslim Politics in India' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju 
G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.277; and Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir. 
Portents of War. Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.145. 
11 See D. P. Kumar, Kashmir: Pakistan's Proxy War (New Delhi: Har Anand Publishers, no date of 
publication), p.136. Pakistan's population is almost entirely Muslim, but within their ranks exist a number 
of conflicting sects and ethno -regional divisions that have frequently produced violent clashes. Because 
religious identity has not always been sufficient to provide Pakistan's different minorities with the 
necessary political pluralism to co -exist peacefully, Indian apologists claim that Pakistan needs Kashmir 
to divert attention from its own domestic problems and has no interest in seeing a viable, long -term 
solution to the crisis (e.g. see Hewitt, p.195). 
12 See Varshney, p.198. 
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provoke a Hindu -Muslim bloodbath across India;13 (b) empower Hindu nationalists 
such as the RSS and Jana Sangh, by legitimating the claim that Muslims are disloyal 
to India; and/or (e) reopen the accession of hundreds of princely States which acceded 
to India, thus threatening India's national unity and the stability of the entire region.l4 
Typically Kashmiri separatists tend to respond to these arguments by claiming that if 
India cannot control Hindu extremists then this is India's problem and that such 
factors, even if true, are not sufficient to override a right for Kashmir to secede.15 
B. The Demands of Kashmiri Secessionist Groups 
The demands of the various Kashmiri separatist organisations are difficult to specify 
with a great deal of accuracy simply because there are so many of them, they are 
frequently highly secretive, and they often rely more on bluster and emotion than 
statements of fact. It needs to be borne in mind that the people advocating Kashmir's 
secession are typically appealing to a wider audience. Even if the leaders of these 
various separatist organisations possess a degree of theoretical sophistication, the 
people to whom their message is addressed frequently do not. Ordinary Kashmiris - 
many of whom are uneducated and illiterate - are more likely to be swayed by emotive 
appeal and religious symbolism than they are by rational dialogue. 
As it turns out, many of the considerations appealed to by the various separatist 
outfits in Kashmir generally do mirror the three types of theory considered in this 
thesis. Typically, however, these groups appeal to a combination of factors that cut 
across the different theories here under consideration. Moreover, even where two or 
more groups appeal to the same (sorts of) considerations to justify a right of secession, 
they may nonetheless have different interpretations of what the final outcome of the 
exercise of that right should be, i.e. whether Kashmir should secede to Pakistan or to 
form an independent State. 
13 This fear was articulated as early as 1955. See Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: 
Robert Hale, 1956), p.189. 
14 Author interview with George Verghese (former editor -in -chief of the Times of India and Indian 
diplomat), New Delhi, 29 December 1998. Also see Sar Desai, p.91. 
15 Author interviews with Yasin Malik (JKLF Chairman), Srinagar, 26 November 1998; Prof. Abdul 
Ghani Bhatt (chairman of the Muslim Conference), Srinagar, 25 November 1998; and Mirwaiz Umar 
Farooq (pro- independence activist and spiritual leader), Srinagar, 28 November 1998. 
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The pro- independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), for example, 
along with Muslim orientated, pro -Pakistan groups such as the revived Muslim 
Conference, both appeal to a sense of Kashmiri nationalism in order to bolster their 
respective cases for secession. In addition to noting that most Kashmiris are Muslims 
in a Hindu -majority State, these groups also appeal to the apparent linguistic and 
cultural distinctiveness of Kashmiris and their history as a subjugated people. 
Centuries of misrule and oppression have, it is claimed, forged a unique identity 
amongst the people of the Valley which, in addition to other cultural and linguistic 
factors, makes Kashmiris a `people' or a nation. Indeed, the present Indian occupation 
of Kashmir and the associated human rights abuses perpetuated against ordinary 
Kashmiris are seen as just another stage in this defining, almost dialectical, process of 
foreign subjugation.16 
Similarly, there are also clear parallels with the JC theory advanced in Chapter Three 
of this thesis. Reference is often made by Kashmiri separatist groups to the 
circumstances surrounding the State's incorporation into the Indian Union and the 
unfulfilled promise of a plebiscite to ratify that incorporation. These claims will be 
analysed in greater detail shortly, however the general idea is that Kashmir was 
unjustly incorporated into India in much the same way as, say, the Baltic States were 
into the former Soviet Union (USSR), and should therefore be permitted to regain its 
political independence. 
Finally, with respect to the LD theory of secession, both factions of the secular, pro - 
independence JKLF along with other groups often appeal to what they see as a `natural 
right to political self -determination.' Again, these demands will shortly be explicated 
in greater detail, however the general idea is that if a majority of Kashmiris want to 
secede from India - and, not surprisingly, groups such as the JKLF believe that they do 
- then they should be permitted to do so.l7 Clearly there are resonances here with the 
liberal principle of voluntary political association and Beran's plebiscitary right of 
secession. 
16 Author interviews with Yasin Malik and Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt (details above). 
17 Author interview with Yasin Malik (details above). 
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6.3 THE NATIONALIST CASE FOR KASHMIR'S SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
It will be remembered from Chapter Two that the Nationalist theory of secession was 
rejected as unsatisfactory because of difficulties in determining a set of criteria which 
both distinguished one nation from another and nations in general from other, similar 
social entities. Additionally, it was also argued that a Nationalist theory of secession is 
incapable of demonstrating why nations, and only nations, should possess a right to 
independent Statehood. The following discussion deals primarily with the prior 
question of how Kashmir might sensibly be described as a nation. The additional 
question of why Kashmir possesses a right to secede qua its status as a separate nation 
is largely omitted from discussion. Not only would such a discussion be greater than 
that which could be sustained within the allotted pages of this chapter, but it is the 
prior question of how to define a nation that is the primary point of contention, i.e. 
even if we agree that nations should be granted a right to secede, in what circumstances 
and why, such agreement is likely to be fruitless unless we can first agree upon which 
groups qualify as nations. 
Furthermore, while Kashmiri separatists have, at least to some degree, speculated 
upon the basis of Kashmiri nationalism, they often take the right of nations to political 
independence to be self -evident.'$ Occasional oblique references to United Nations 
(UN) resolutions notwithstanding,19 such people generally seem to take it for granted 
that nations possess a right of secession and that if groups such as the East Timorese, 
the former Soviet Republics and the Baltic States can permissibly secede, then so can 
Kashmir.2Ó Thus, the real issue - both from a theoretical viewpoint and in the context 
18 i.e. they assume that to demonstrate that Kashmir is a nation is to also show that Kashmir has a right to 
secede. 
19 e.g. articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter that list the `self -determination of peoples' as 
one of the UN's goals. Kashmiri separatists also often refer to numerous UN resolutions which state that 
`peoples' have a right to self -determination and, thus, should be free to determine their political status and 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, e.g. see UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 
(Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G. A. Res. 1514, 15 
U.N. GAOR Supp. No.16 at 66, 67 U.N. Doc.A/4684 1960); the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, art.1, para.1, 997 U.N.T.S. 171, 173); and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted Dec.I6, 1966, art.l, para.I, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5). 
20 Author interviews with Yasin Malik and Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt (details above) and JKLF Press 
Release of 10 August 1998 by Dr Haider Hijazi (JKLF Secretary General). Repeated reference is made 
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of the demands made by Kashmiri separatists - is how Kashmiris might be said to 
constitute a nation. The ensuing discussion, while hardly exhaustive, takes some of the 
main factors appealed to as a suitable basis of (Kashmiri) nationhood and, applying the 
insights contained in Chapter Two, argues that such accounts must be judged as 
unsatisfactory. 
B. Objective Definitions of Kashmiri Nationhood 
First, it must be noted that any nationalist argument - no matter how obtuse - is likely 
to apply to the Valley alone. The present Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, like its 
predecessor the Dogra Kingdom, is an administrative entity created by an imperial 
process. Not only are there enormous linguistic, religious, historical and cultural 
differences between the State's three regions of Kashmir, Ladakh and Jammu, but the 
residents of Ladakh and Jammu have repeatedly expressed considerable hostility 
towards Kashmiri dominance of political and economic life in the State. Additionally, 
the residents of these two regions have also expressed a strong preference to remain 
within India rather than join Pakistan or become a part of an independent State of 
Kashmir. 
Thus, it is difficult to see how any definition of nationhood based upon the subjective 
and objective criteria discussed in Chapter Two, could sensibly claim that Kashmiris, 
Ladakhis and Jammuites were members of a common nation. The question, then, must 
be how the residents of the Valley might be described as `a nation.' One possible 
response to this question is to appeal to certain objective factors such as a common 
language, history, ethnicity and culture. Chapter Two of this thesis offered a general 
theoretical critique of these criteria. The purpose of the following discussion is to 
examine how that critique is applicable in the case of Kashmir. 
In discussion of how Kashmir might be said to constitute a nation by reference to 
these objective criteria, the first thing to note is that while Kashmiri society may 
initially appear to be rather homogenous, such appearances are often misleading and 
by Kashmiri separatists to Kashmir's `right of self -determination' but the source or justification of such a 
right is rarely a topic of speculation amongst such people. 
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disguise deeper social divisions. Consider, for example, the following breakdown of 
religious affiliation in the State's three regions. 
TABLE 6.1 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS BY REGION IN JAMMU AND 
KASHMIR AS AT 198121 
Region Population Percent- Percent- Percent- Percent- 
age of age of age of age of 
State Muslims Hindus Others 
Populat- 
ion 
Kashmir 3,134,904 52.36 94.96 4.59 0.05 
Jammu 2,718,113 45.39 29.60 66.25 4.15 
Ladakh 134,372 2.24 46.04 2.66 51.30 
Total 5,987,389 64.19 32.24 3.57 
It first needs to be emphasised that any appeal to religious nationalism to justify 
Kashmir's secession will be limited to Islamist, pro -Pakistan Kashmiri separatist 
groups such as the Jamaat- i- Islami, Hizb -ul- Mujahideen, Harkut -ul- Mujahideen and 
Lashkar -e- Toiba. These groups frequently see Kashmir's secession as an initial step in 
the creation of a larger Islamic State in South Asia.22 "For these far -right chauvinist 
organizations, the struggle in Jammu and Kashmir is merely an instrument in a broader 
war against both the Indian state and `unbelievers' at large. They seek to derive 
legitimacy for these objectives from Muslim insecurity both within Jammu and 
Kashmir and elsewhere in India... "23 
21 See Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir (Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 1996), p.33. 
22 Author interview with a Harkut -ul- Mujahideen area commander, Srinagar, 22 November 1998. Also 
see Riyaz Punjabi, The Concept of an Islamic Caliphate; The Religious and Ethnic Pulls of Kashmir 
Militant Movement', Journal of Peace Studies, Vol.!, No.1, 1993; and Praveen Swami, The Kargil War 
(New Delhi: Left Word, 1999), pp.78 -85. 
23 Swami, p.78. 
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In contrast, other Kashmiri separatist groups such as the JKLF envisage an 
independent, democratic and secular State of Kashmir The JKLF not only calls for 
the Pandits to be allowed to return to the Valley, but also stringently rejects the appeal 
to Islam which characterises these other, Islamist groups.24 Furthermore, the type of 
illiberal, fundamentalist State which the Jamaat -i- Islami and other, similar groups 
want to create conflicts with the liberal nationalism here under consideration. 
Nationalist theorists such as Nielsen,25 Miller26 and Tamir27 argue for a liberal, 
democratic version of nationalism that respects and upholds the individual rights of its 
citizens and cultural minorities. This is something that will be examined in greater 
detail shortly. For the moment, however, it will be sufficient to note that these 
theorists would reject the fundamentalist, illiberal type of State which groups such as 
the Jamaat -i- Islami and their cohorts want to create.28 
Suppose, then, that we concentrate upon the merits of a Kashmiri national identity 
based upon Islam, and put to one side the question of whether or not the agenda of 
those groups who favour an Islamic State of Kashmir is concordant with liberalism. In 
1981, almost ninety -five percent of Kashmiris were Sunni Muslims (a figure which 
would now be higher due to the Pandit exodus of 1990).29 Yet, it would nonetheless 
be inappropriate to attempt to construct a definition of Kashmiri nationhood on the 
basis of this understanding alone. Within each of these religious communities there 
are strict social divisions according to profession, education and family background. 
Pandits, for example, are divided primarily into Gors and Karkuns within which there 
are other sub -divisions such as Pandas, Buhuris and Jyotishis.30 Kashmiri Muslims 
24 See Rahman, p.153. 
25 Kai Nielsen, `Liberalism, Nationalism and Secession' in National Self -Determination and Secession, 
ed. Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
26 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
27 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
28 e.g. see Nielsen's rejection of exclusionist ethnic nationalism (Nielsen, pp.106 -108) and his 
characterisation of liberal democracies "...where human rights are protected and there is a general 
egalitarian ambience..." (Nielsen, p.110 also see pp.112 -13). 
29 Due to a breakdown in law and order 1981 was the last year in which a census was held in Kashmir 
and, thus, the most recent year for which reliable figures are available. 
30 See Maharaj K. Koul, A Sociolinguistic Study of Kashmiri (Delhi: Indian Institute of Language Studies, 
1986), pp.22 -24; and Henny Sender, The Kashmiri Pandits: A Study in Cultural Choice in North India 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.22 -24. 
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are similarly divided into Pujs (butchers), Hanjis (boat- people) and so forth.31 Not 
only is inter -marriage between these different social groups often strictly forbidden, but 
one's membership of such a group is frequently a more significant determinant of 
personal identity and social status than the simple variable of religion and, thus, one's 
identity as a Hindu or a MusIim.32 Hence, the straightforward statement that ninety 
five percent of Kashmiris are Sunni Muslims, while formally correct, is in many 
respects misleading if it is taken to indicate social solidarity across Kashmiri society. 
Furthermore, it seems peculiar to attempt to construct a Kashmiri national identity 
upon religious factors which, by- and -large, are not regarded as important, defining 
characteristics by many Kashmiris themselves. Aside from the above intra- religious 
divisions which are frequently more important than one's simple identity as a Muslim 
or Hindu, Islam has traditionally not been a major factor in the mobilisation of 
Kashmiris. Indeed, Kashmiris have remained largely isolated from broader Islamic 
influences and the larger currents of Muslim politics in the region 33 If one were to 
attempt to define a Kashmiri nation, then presumably it would be preferable to appeal 
to considerations which do have substantial appeal to Kashmiris, and which are 
regarded as being significant by them in terms of their self -identity. 
Moreover, Kashmiri Islam also contains numerous practices which are alien to other 
Muslims and which are regarded as heretical by them.34 Thus, even if Islam were a 
central, defining feature of Kashmiri self -identity, it would be a brand of Islam which 
contains numerous features that would be rejected by other Muslims. This makes it 
difficult to understand how Kashmir's secession to a larger Islamic State might be 
justified on the grounds of religion, when the citizens of that State would presumably 
reject cardinal features of Kashmiri religious identity. 
31 Hanjis (who include houseboat owners on Srinagar's Dal and Negin Lakes) in particular appear to be 
the subject of popular disapprobation by ordinary Kashmiris. 
32 See Koul, pp.22 -25; and P. N. K. Bamzaí, .4 History of Kashmir Political, Cultural and Social (Delhi: 
Metropolitan Book Company, 1962), pp.18ff. 
33 Ganguly, p.40. 
34 Author interview with Balraj Puri (veteran Kashmiri activist and commentator), Jammu, 17 December 
1998. Also see G. M. D, Sufi, Islamic Culture in Kashmir (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1979); Bazaz, 
p.14; Riyaz Punjabi, 'Kashmir: The Bruised Identity' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.137; and R. N. Kaul, Sheik Mohammad Abdullah (New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers, 1985), p.3. 
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What, then, about a Kashmiri national identity based upon ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic grounds? Kashmir is racially divided and contains a number of ethnic 
minorities such as Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals, all of whom are to varying degrees 
linguistically, culturally and ethnically distinct from so- called 'ordinary Kashmiris'. 
Gujjars, for example, while being Sunni Muslims, are semi -nomadic graziers who have 
their own dress and language (Gujjari) thought to be derived from the Punjabi 
Pathans.35 Similarly, Sikhs who migrated to Kashmir under Afghan and Sikh rule also 
speak their own language,36 practice their own religion, follow their own distinctive 
customs and so forth. Any definition of Kashmiri nationhood based upon ethnic, 
linguistic, or cultural grounds would presumably exclude these minorities. Yet it is far 
from obvious why these people should not be considered to be Kashmiris and, by 
extension, excluded from having a say in Kashmir's future. 
In consideration of these various, overlapping ethnic, cultural and linguistic schisms 
within Kashmiri society a brief look at the variable of language is instructive. As the 
following table indicates, even before the partition of the State and the associated 
flows of refugees, Kashmir - with the exception of Muzaffarabad which is in present - 
day Pakistan - was remarkably linguistically homogenous. Yet, while the vast 
majority of people in modern-day Kashmir continue to speak Kashmiri (ninety seven 
percent in 197137 and ninety eight percent in 198138), this simple fact on its own is 
misleading. 
35 See Sukhdev Singh Chib, This Beautiful India: Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Light and Life, 
1977), p.94; Somnath Dhar, Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1977), p.23 and 
Jammu and Kashmir Folklore (New Delhi: Marwah Publications, 1986), p.23; and Frederic Drew, The 
Jummoo and Kashmir Territories (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1971), pp.109 -111. 
36 Kashmiri Sikhs tend to primarily speak Punjabi and Dogri (Koul, p.21). 
37 1971 census data quoted in Koul, p.8. 
38 The 1981 census gives the total population of the Valley as 3,132,000 (quoted in Hewitt, p.22) and the 
total number of native Kashmiri speakers within the Valley as 3,076,398 (quoted in Roopkríshen Bhat, A 
Descriptive Study of Kashmiri (Delhi: Amar Prakashan, 1987), p.2). 
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TABLE 6.2. DISTRIBUTION OF LINGUISTIC GROUPS IN THE FORMER 
DOGRA KINGDOM AS AT 194139 
District Percent- Percent- Percentage Percentage 
(2g_e_of 
Kashmiri 
age of of Punjabi o 
Hindustani Dogri Speakers 
Speakers Speakers Speakers 
1. Jammu Province 
Jammu 0.68 72.13 20.14 7.05 
Kathua 1.40 92.56 1.98 4.06 
Udhampur 47.30 51.12 0.59 0.99 
Riasi 18.55 60.74 10.84 9.87 
Mirpur 0.04 11.82 80.61 7.53 
Chenani Jagir 7.56 84.07 0.80 7.57 
Poonch Jagir 13.59 0.58 15.86 69.97 
2. Kashmir 
Baramula 97.13 0.03 2.13 0.71 
Anantnag 98.20 0.24 1.17 0.39 
Muzaffarabad 31.71 0.07 63.53 4.69 
3. Frontier Districts 
Ladakh 71.43 13.09 14.28 1.20 
Astor 35.29 3.17 60.18 1.36 
Gilgit Lease 33.04 - 45.65 21.31 
Gilgit Agency 3.12 - 17.19 79.69 
One of the reasons why language was rejected as a criterion of nationhood in Chapter 
Two was the difficulty in distinguishing between different dialects of the same 
language.4° Similar considerations are also relevant in the context of Kashmir. Aside 
from the numerous linguistic minorities who live in Kashmir, there is also substantial 
39 Adapted from 1941 census data quoted in Rahman, p.34. 
40 See Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.49. 
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variation within the Kashmiri language. For example, there are some differences 
between the Kashmiri spoken by Muslims and that spoken by Pandits.41 Furthermore, 
the Kashmiri spoken in the Valley is divided into three dialects: (a) Maraz, spoken in 
the south and south -eastern regions of Kashmir; (b) Kamraz, spoken in northern and 
north -western Kashmir; and (c) Yamraz, the dialect of Srinagar and surrounding areas. 
Other mixed dialects of Kashmiri (e.g. Kashtawari /Kishtawari and Poguli) are spoken 
outside of the Valley in Doda and Pogul respectively, as are Siraji and Rambani.42 
Therefore if the variable of language were made the measure of Kashmiri nationhood, 
then in order to accommodate the various dialects of Kashmiri spoken within the 
Valley, such a definition would presumably also have to include these other Kashmiri - 
speaking groups outside of Kashmir. However, while Kashtawari / Kishtawari, Poguli, 
Siraji and Rambani are dialects of Kashmiri, the people who speak these languages 
generally have no real connection or sense of solidarity with the residents of the 
Valley. More importantly, a linguistic definition of Kashmiri nationhood would also 
exclude minority groups such as Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals within Kashmir, many 
of whom have not only resided in the Valley for centuries, but who are regarded by 
themselves (and others in Kashmir) as being Kashmiri Such a situation would be 
analogous to giving Australians citizenship rights in New Zealand while denying those 
same rights to the indigenous Maori population and first generation immigrants to New 
Zealand from non -English speaking countries. Not surprisingly, such a state of affairs 
would be rejected by most people for its most unsavoury and deleterious moral and 
practical implications. 
C. Subjective Definitions of Kashmiri Nationhood 
What, then, about subjective criteria, i.e. a collective Kashmiri consciousness based 
upon an awareness of a distinct Kashmiri identity and the sense of solidarity that this 
consciousness creates? Here one might appeal to the secular, politico -cultural identity 
41 See Koul, pp.74ff; and Bhat, pp.2 -3. 
42 See Omkar N. Koul and Kashi Wali, Kashmiri (London: Routledge, 1997), p.xiii; Omkar N. Koul and 
Ruth Laila Schmidt, Kashmiri- A Sociolinguistic Survey (Patiala: Indian Institute of Language Studies, 
1983); Koul, pp.I -9; and Somnath Dhar, Jammu and Kashmir Folklore (New Delhi: Marwah 
Publications, 1986), pp.28 -30. Rahman and Bhat also states that some people in Poonch, Uri and Riasi - 
all areas outside the Valley - also speak Kashmiri (see Rahman, p.34; and Bhat, pp.2 -3). 
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in the Valley known as Kashmiriyat that is allegedly comprised of Muslim, Hindu and 
uniquely Kashmiri understandings and cultural elements. However, Kashmiriyat is an 
elusive and controversial notion. Some scholars place a great deal of importance upon 
Kashmiriyat as a sociological phenomenon and claim that it is fundamental to a proper 
understanding of Kashmiri society, politics and history 43 Others, on the other hand, 
reject it as an "ill- defined" and "ineffable" product of the romantic, idealised 
misconceptions to which writers on Kashmir are frequently prone.44 
For present purposes the issue of Kashmiriyat may be put to one side and other, 
alternative conceptions of Kashmiri national identity given prominence. To construct a 
Kashmiri national identity based upon the notion of Kashmiriyat is to presuppose the 
existence of such an identity. However, we cannot simply assume that there exists a 
common national identity amongst Kashmiris (that makes them a nation), when the 
very question we are supposed to be addressing in the first place is precisely whether 
or not such an identity exists. Moreover, as the scholarly debate surrounding 
Kashmiriyat clearly demonstrates, the nature and, indeed, very existence of such a 
notion, is something that clearly cannot be taken for granted. 
Hence, because an in -depth study of the case for Kashmiriyat is beyond the scope of 
the present analysis, it makes sense to look at alternative, subjective definitions of 
Kashmiri nationhood. Before doing so, however, it is worth noting that the 
disagreement over the existence and nature of Kashmiriyat does point to a general 
problem with subjective definitions of nationhood: i.e. to the extent that such 
definitions must frequently rely on factors which are difficult to quantify and /or 
empirically corroborate, they are likely to be the subject of considerable controversy 
and charges of idealism and fakery. 
43 e.g. Punjabi (1992); T. N. Madan, 'Meaning of Kashmiriyat: Cultural Means and Political Ends' in 
Kashmir: Need for Sub -Continental Political Initiative, ed. G. M. Wani (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing 
House, 1995); and Dr Amitab Mattoo (Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University), author interview, New Delhi, 9 November 1998. 
44 Ganguly, pp.17 -18. Also see Swami, p.107; and Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Kashmir's Transition to 
Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994). This opinion was expressed to me in 
person by Dr Khan (Srinagar, 12 December 1998) and numerous other journalists and writers in India. 
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One factor frequently appealed to by a variety of Kashmiri separatists as a constituent 
component of Kashmiri national identity is Kashmir's history as a subjugated territory. 
The claim, briefly introduced above, is that this historical process of occupation and 
misrule has created a collective consciousness amongst Kashmiris as a distinct people, 
or nation. The problem with such an account, however, is that Kashmiris are hardly 
the only people (in the region) to have suffered harsh and oppressive rulers of foreign 
origin. Indeed, the Indian sub -continent has seen an enormous number of foreign 
intruders come and go over the centuries, from the Aryan invasions of 1500 -1000 
BC 45 to the Mongols and the Moghuls just to name a few. If foreign subjugation and 
misrule are the measure of nationhood, then Kashmiris cannot constitute a separate 
nation, but must instead be part of a larger nation that incorporates other, similar, 
historical victims. 
Perhaps, then, the claim is not that foreign conquest by the Moghuls, Afghans and 
Sikhs has created a common Kashmiri identity - although these may well be 
contributing factors. Rather, it is the present Indian occupation and atrocities 
committed by Indian troops which have produced an awareness amongst Kashmiris 
that they constitute a separate people. Once again, however, Kashmir is not the only 
region in India to rebel against Indian authority or to have that rebellion repressed, 
often brutally, by the Indian government. The same was true of Punjab in the 1980s 
and is today also true of, for example, Assam and Nagaland in India's north -east. 
Thus, if Indian occupation and repression are the yardstick of nationhood, then 
Kashmiris must be members of the same nation as, say, the Punjabi Sikhs, Assamese 
and Nagas. 
It might, at this point, be objected that Indian occupation and oppression are not the 
source of Kashmiri national identity but, rather, that this identity already existed and 
Indian misrule merely aroused it. If, however, Indian misrule is not the basis of 
Kashmiri national identity - but simply a catalyst for its formation - then what is? 
Furthermore, the argument is back -to- front. The nationalist argument says that in 
order to possess a right to secede a group must first constitute a nation, Where a nation 
demands the right to secede and this demand is refused by its parent State then, ceteris 
45 See Hewitt, p26 
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paribus, that nation has the right to revolt against its parent State in order to claim its 
rightful political inheritance. In contrast, what is being claimed here is that Kashmiris 
became a nation only after they revolted against Indian authority and had their 
rebellion brutally suppressed. If, however, Kashmiris did not constitute a nation at the 
time of their rebellion against Indian authority then, according to the Nationalist 
argument, they can't have possessed a right to secede and, thus, their rebellion must be 
judged to have been unjust. We cannot consistently claim that a group possesses a 
moral right because, at some time in the (recent) past, the same group performed an act 
which they did not have a right to perform and which at the time was morally wrong. 
Indeed, making Indian repression the basis of Kashmiri national identity might, quite 
paradoxically, provide an argument in favour of continued Indian occupation and 
misrule. Under the nationalist account in order to possess a right to secede, Kashmiris 
must first be a nation. What happens, however, when the source, or catalyst, of that 
national identity is injustice in the form of foreign misrule and oppression? If the 
injustice is removed then while the national identity may not disappear altogether, it 
may nonetheless suffer a degree of quantitative and /or qualitative harm. Where people 
are victims of a common oppressor then a mutual interest in cooperating to survive and 
end that oppression may induce a sense of empathy and shared identity and 
understanding. Once the oppression disappears, however, then so too may the 
(national) solidarity it inspired, only to be replaced by old differences and enmities. 
Ironically, then, from a nationalist perspective it might be better if India remained in 
Kashmir and continued to brutalise its people. 
Furthermore, if Kashmiri nationhood is defined in terms of Indian oppression and 
misrule then this also creates a conflict with the defence of nationality given by the 
liberal -nationalist theorists under consideration in this thesis. Miller, for example, 
defends nationality by arguing that it upholds liberal values by serving as the main 
focus of collective loyalty in large societies in which the clan and village can no longer 
fulfil this function.46 An example of this form of argument is Miller's claim that there 
is a positive relationship between national homogeneity on the one hand, and 
democratic government and the effective operation of schemes of redistributive and 
46 See, for example, Miller, p.153 and pp.184 -85. 
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social justice on the other. Similarly, Kymlicka also attempts to construct a link 
between liberalism and national identity by claiming that a flourishing national culture 
is a necessary prerequisite to the effective exercise of individual freedom of choice, 
while the same sorts of claims are also attributable to Tamir's so- called `liberal 
nationalism.' 
This creates a problem, however, when the basis of the national identity in question is 
a decidedly illiberal state of affairs characterised by misrule and oppression. Here one 
is inclined to recall Kukathas's observation that the entrenchment of Kymlicka's 
minority rights would destroy many of the (illiberal) cultural communities which 
Kymlicka wants to preserve.47 Similarly, we cannot defend Kashmiri national identity 
on the basis that it furthers democratic governance and individual liberty, when this 
same national identity was both created by, and is dependent upon, a denial of the very 
democratic rights and individual freedoms which it is supposed to preserve. Indeed, if 
Indian oppression really is the source of Kashmiri national identity, then it seems that a 
defence of Kashmir's right to secede premised upon the imperative of preserving 
Kashmiri national identity must necessarily entail a rejection of liberalism. 
6.4 THE JUST CAUSE CASE FOR KASHMIR'S SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
A JC theory is one which grants a right of secession only to those groups which have 
been the victim of an injustice, and different JC theories may take different injustices 
as sufficient grounds for secession. Buchanan claims that JC theories are distinct from 
other, alternative types of theory because they require a group to first be the victim of 
certain specified injustices before that group can possess a right to secede. Conversely, 
LD or nationalist theories, claims Buchanan, do not require a group to be the victim of 
an injustice and, thus, are committed to the view that groups may secede from States 
which are `perfectly just.' For this reason Buchanan believes that LD and Nationalist 
theories of secession are inferior to JC theories.48 
47 Chandran Kukathas, `Are There Any Cultural Rights ?' in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will 
Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.244. 
48 See Alien Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.26, No.1, 1997, 
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Chapter Three of this thesis questioned these claims by pointing out that, as far as a 
normative theory of secession is concerned, the important issue is when a State 
commits the injustice of not allowing a group to secede. Moreover, to say that a group 
possesses a moral right to secede is also to say that that group's continued political 
union with its parent State is morally unjust, as are any attempts by the parent State (or 
other parties) to maintain that union. Hence, as long as the group remains a constituent 
component of its parent State a condition of injustice obtains (i.e. the State of which the 
group is a part is an unjust State), and the only way in which this condition of injustice 
can be remedied is by the group's secession. 
Therefore, Buchanan's claim that non -JC theories of secession grant a right of 
secession from States which are `perfectly just' simply begs the question of what 
constitutes an injustice and when a State is un/just. Moreover, for all three types of 
theory any State that refuses to recognise a group's legitimate right to secede is by 
definition unjust. Thus, it seems that the only difference between a JC theory such as 
Buchanan's and, say, a LD theory such as Wellman's,49 are the types of injustice(s) 
which each theory regards as sufficient to justify a right of secession. Whereas 
Buchanan requires a group to be a victim of discriminatory re- distribution, unjust 
incorporation or a lethal threat in order to possess a right to secede, Wellman, and 
other LD theorists like him, take the simple injustice of holding a group captive against 
the will of (a majority of) the group's members as sufficient to ground a right to 
secede. 
Buchanan identifies three types of injustice which he believes are sufficient to ground 
a right to secede: discriminatory redistribution; the need for self -preservation; and 
rectificatory justice. Beginning with the former argument, it is difficult to see how one 
might coherently attempt to justify Kashmir's secession by reference to a claim of 
discriminatory redistribution. Rather than contributing a disproportionately high 
amount of revenue to the Indian federation, Kashmir instead receives substantial 
injections of capital from the Indian government to cover the State's often substantial 
pp.40ff. 
49 Christopher H. Wellman, `A Defence of Secession and Political Self -Determination', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995. 
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budget deficits.5° Indeed, financially speaking, Kashmir is to India what Tasmania is 
to Australia, or the Falkland Islands are to Britain. 
Similarly, while one might attempt to make a case for Kashmir's secession by 
reference to the Argument from the Need for Self -Preservation (ANSP), such a claim 
would be problematic. Kashmiris have undoubtedly suffered a great deal over the last 
decade, however the atrocities committed by Indian troops could not really be said to 
constitute a lethal threat of the sort imagined by Buchanan as sufficient to justify a 
right of secession.51 Moreover, these atrocities were committed only after Kashmiris 
demanded a right to secede and violently attempted to exercise this right. 
Consequently, any argument for Kashmir's secession based upon atrocities committed 
by the occupying Indian forces is back -to -front in the same way that a definition of 
Kashmiri national identity based upon these injustices is. It seems bizarre - not to 
mention philosophically incoherent - to grant a right of secession to a group because 
they suffered certain injustices as a result of trying to exercise a right (to secede) that 
they never in fact possessed. 
Amongst the three types of injustice identified by Buchanan as sufficient to ground a 
right to secede, it is the ARJ which is most pertinent to Kashmir. The ARJ states that 
"...a [geographical] region has the right to secede if it was unjustly incorporated into 
the larger unit from which its members wish to separate. "52 `Unjust incorporation' is 
defined as the forceful annexation of the seceding region by either the existing State or 
by some earlier State that is the predecessor of the currently existing State.53 Two 
factors are pertinent in the claim that Kashmir was unjustly incorporated into India: (a) 
50 e.g. for the 1997 -98 financial year the State's income and expenditure were projected to be Rs5662 
Crore and Rs6155 Crore respectively -a shortfall of Rs533 Crore (source: Jammu and Kashmir 50 Years 
(Information Department, Jammu and Kashmir State Government, 1998), p.288). This deficit was 
forecast to decrease to Rs 142.08 Crore for the 1999 -2000 financial year (see The Kashmir Times, 5 March 
1999). Indeed, in many respects the State is caught in something of a poverty trap as a large part of its 
expenditure (Rs 209 Crore in 1997 -98) is devoted to interest payments on loans from the central 
government (see Jammu and Kashmir 50 Years, p.285). 
51 Buchanan cites the plight of Jews in Nazi occupied Poland as an example of the type of lethal threat 
that might justify a group's secession on the grounds of self- preservation (Buchanan (1991), pp.66 -67). 
While the serious human rights abuses perpetrated by Indian forces in Kashmir should neither be ignored 
nor belittled, they are simply not comparable to the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis in Poland. 
s2 Buchanan, p.67 [emphasis added]. 
53 Also see Lea Brilmayer, `Secession and Self Determination: A Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale 
Journal of International Law, Vol.16, No.1, January 199I, p.190. 
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the circumstances surrounding the State's accession to India; and (b) the unfulfilled 
Indian promise of a plebiscite. The respective arguments based upon each of these two 
factors may be briefly summarised as follows. 
1. The Circumstances of Accession Argument: As was noted in Chapter Five, the 
circumstances surrounding Kashmir's accession to India are the subject of 
considerable controversy amongst historians. Some scholars - most notably Lamb 
- have claimed that Indian military intervention in the State occurred prior to the 
Maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession. There is also some speculation 
over whether or not the Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession at all or, if in 
fact he did, whether or not he did so under duress.54 The Circumstances of 
Accession. Argument claims that if India seized Kashmir prior to the State formally 
acceding to the Indian federation, then India was effectively invading an 
independent country in much the same way as Indonesia annexed East Timor, 
China seized Tibet or the USSR invaded the Baltic States. Thus, because India's 
occupation of Kashmir is a result of aggressive military action it not only lacks de 
jure authority over Kashmir but, according to the ART, also moral authority over 
Kashmir. 
2. The Broken Promise Argument: Whereas the above argument relies upon a claim 
of wrongful taking, or illegitimate acquisition, the Broken Promise Argument relies 
more upon contractual considerations and concerns India's refusal to honour its 
pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. The claim is that the people of Kashmir 
acceded to India on the understanding that they would have the subsequent 
opportunity to ratify that accession in a plebiscite and, if a majority of them so 
chose, opting instead for Pakistan. Because India has not only never held such a 
54 See Alastair Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.135 -40; 
and Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: Tauris, 1996), pp.148 -50. Hewitt, on the other 
hand, ridicules Lamb's reservations over the timing and legitimacy of the accession (Hewitt, p.78). There 
is also the associated claim that India had always planned to seize the State militarily and had been 
preparing to do so weeks before the event. See, for example, General Sir Frank Messervy, `Kashmir', 
Asiatic Review, Vol.45, January 1949, p.469; and Pervaiz lqbal Cheema, `Pakistan, India and Kashmir: A 
Historical Review' in Perspectives on Kashmir, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 
p.96. Similarly. Choudhury claims that Kashmir's accession "...was achieved by deliberately creating a 
set of circumstances with the object of finding an excuse to stage the accession." See G. W. Choudhury, 
Pakistan's Relations with India 1947 -66 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), pp. 104 -105. Others, such as 
Birdwood, claim that these allegations are false (Birdwood, p.59). 
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plebiscite, but now refuses to do so, it is claimed that India has broken the terms of 
the agreement it entered into with Kashmiris over the future of their State and, 
therefore, cannot be said to possess legitimate territorial sovereignty over it. Just 
as under common law a party's (Iegal) property right is voided when that party fails 
to adhere to the terms and conditions which govern the property right, so India's 
right of sovereignty over Kashmir is also invalidated by it reneging on its 
commitment to hold a plebiscite. 
B. The Primacy of Theoretical Versus Real -World Considerations 
At this point it should be noted that what is at issue here is an argument's 
philosophical coherency, not the extent to which it is articulated by political elites and 
laymen. One might, for example, claim that the circumstances surrounding the State's 
accession, while clearly a relevant issue to many who advocate Kashmir's secession, 
cannot adequately explain why there are secessionist tendencies in Kashmir and 
therefore is not germane to the determination of whether or not Kashmiris possess a 
right to secede. On the one hand, the belief that India seized Kashmir through a 
combination of duplicity and force may lend a sense of historical and legal authenticity 
to the claim that India does not possess legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Kashmiris experience these historical injustices as part 
of their own heritage, they might then become motivated to support Kashmir's 
secession from India as a matter of rectificatory justice.55 
On the other hand, however, such factors cannot be exclusively responsible for the 
insurgency in Kashmir. Suppose, for example, that some fresh, relatively 
incontestable, historical evidence came to light which established beyond any 
reasonable doubt that the Maharaja really did voluntarily sign the Instrument of 
Accession before Indian troops entered the State. Would this then validate the Indian 
claim to Kashmir in the eyes of Kashmiri separatists? Presumably not. Counter- 
factually, we may suppose that even if such evidence did emerge then Kashmiri 
separatists would nevertheless not abandon their demands for an independent Kashmir, 
or a Kashmir in Pakistan. Militants in Kashmir, once they learned of such a discovery, 
55 See Brilmayer, pp.191 -92. 
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would be unlikely to lie down their guns secure in the knowledge that the Maharaja 
and India did their paperwork correctly. 
Similarly, a widespread belief that the legal principles and conventions pertaining to 
the State's accession were not adhered to cannot, on its own, explain the popular 
support in Kashmir for political independence from India. Militants fighting in 
Kashmir - not to mention most ordinary Kashmiris who also oppose Indian rule - are 
not aggrieved by a lack of due process in 1947, nor are they seeking posthumous 
redress for an authoritarian monarch. Indeed, it seems bizarre to argue that Kashmir's 
final political status should be decided by attempting to read the mind of a long - 
deceased tyrant like Hari Singh. 
A similar objection may also be levelled against the claim that Kashmir possesses a 
right to secede because of India's unfulfilled promise of a plebiscite. The promise of a 
plebiscite, while clearly a relevant issue to many who advocate Kashmir's secession, 
cannot on its own adequately explain why there are secessionist tendencies in Kashmir. 
On the one hand, the unfulfilled Indian promise of a plebiscite clearly adds a sense of 
moral (and, perhaps, legal) veracity to the claim that Kashmir has a right to secede and 
that India's position in Kashmir is duplicitous and contrary to the wishes of most 
Kashmiris. Why, ask many Kashmiris, does India refuse to hold a plebiscite other than 
for the simple reason that India knows that, because most Kashmiris oppose Indian 
rule, it would lose such a vote? 
On the other hand, however, suppose that some relatively indisputable historical 
evidence came to light that showed that, despite all appearances to the contrary, no 
promise of a plebiscite had ever been made by Nehru, Mountbatten, the Indian 
government or anyone else. Rather, the whole question of a plebiscite had been an 
elaborate ruse constructed by some misguided or malevolent group of individuals. 
Would those who support a plebiscitary right of secession for Kashmir then be 
appeased by India's fidelity and abandon their demand for a plebiscite to determine the 
State's future? Almost certainly not. Those who demand a right for Kashmir to secede 
do not do so simply because they want to punish India for breaching a past promise, 
nor would they abandon this demand were it to transpire that no such promise had ever 
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been made. If, however, Kashmir possesses a right to secede despite the fact that India 
never promised Kashmiris a plebiscite in which they could unilaterally determine their 
political future, then it must be something other than India's failure to abide by its 
promise of a plebiscite that justifies Kashmir's right to secede. 
In response to these objections it must be emphasised that the important thing is an 
argument's theoretical coherency; not the degree to which it is enunciated by political 
actors and laymen. A normative theory of secession is not undermined by virtue of the 
fact that secessionist tendencies in the real -world are typically motivated by 
considerations other than those which underpin the general theory. Act - 
consequentialism, for example, is an ethical theory of moral rightness /wrongness that 
is neither properly understood nor explicitly endorsed by many people other than moral 
philosophers. Ordinary people may, on occasion, employ act -consequentialist 
reasoning in an attempt to justify a certain course of action or state of affairs. 
However, typically they do so in a manner that is not entirely consistent with act - 
consequentialism and without fully understanding all of the theoretical and practical 
implications of act -consequentialist reasoning. Yet, philosophically speaking, we 
would not be inclined to exclude act -consequentialism from consideration as a 
satisfactory theory of normative ethics simply because it did not enjoy wide public 
appeal or understanding. 
Similar considerations also apply in the case of Kashmir. In the present context the 
issue is not the degree to which a particular moral argument for Kashmir's secession 
enjoys acceptance amongst Kashmiri political elites and laymen. Rather, the issue is 
whether or not the argument provides a coherent case for Kashmir's political 
independence from India. Regardless of whether or not it mirrors demands made in 
the real -world, one could, nonetheless, still construct and defend from objection a 
denial of legitimate Indian title to Kashmir based upon that country's 1947 violation of 
the provisions governing the accession of the princely States. This might not be how 
Kashmiri separatists refute Indian claims of sovereignty to Kashmir, but it would, 
nevertheless, be a refutation of Indian claims to sovereignty over Kashmir which, were 
it properly pursued, may ultimately provide a valid moral justification for Kashmir's 
secession. 
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C. The First Variant of the Circumstances of Accession Argument 
There are two, inter -related questions we need to ask about the claim that India lacks 
legitimate territorial sovereignty over Kashmir because of its alleged actions in 1947 
and the circumstances surrounding the State's accession to India. First, exactly why 
does India lack territorial sovereignty over Kashmir because of what occurred at the 
time of Kashmir's accession, i.e. in what sense does India's 1947 military intervention 
negate its claim to present -day sovereignty over Kashmir? Second, if India does not 
possess legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir then who does? Demonstrating that India 
lacks legitimate title to Kashmir does not also demonstrate that, say, Pakistan does 
possess such title. 
In relation to the former question one may, for example, begin with the simple claim 
that (pace Lamb) India intervened militarily in Kashmir prior to Maharaja Hari Singh 
signing the Instrument of Accession. Thus, while the Maharaja did sign the Instrument 
of Accession, and did not do so under duress, he nonetheless signed it after India 
began landing troops in the State with the result that India illegitimately seized the 
State by force.56 Alternatively, it may be claimed that the Maharaja never agreed to 
accede to India, or only did so under duress as a result of the Indian military occupation 
effectively making the State's accession to that country afait accompli. Consequently, 
the issue is no longer simply one to do with the timing of accession, but whether or not 
formal accession ever took place and, if it did, whether or not it was done 
voluntarily.57 
1f, in fact, this is what actually happened, then one might make a case for Kashmir's 
secession along the same lines as, say, the secession of the Baltic States from the 
former USSR or East Timor from Indonesia. Note, however, that these arguments rely 
on a controversial account of historical events that may, or may not, be correct. 
Indeed, it is possible - even quite likely - that the real events pertaining to the State's 
accession may never be known for certain.58 
56 Lamb, pp.135 -40. 
57 See, for example, Alastair Lamb, The Indian Claim to Jammu and Kashmir: A Reappraisal (London: 
World Kashmir Freedom Movement, 1993). 
58 Clearly various parties to the Kashmir dispute have an interest in promulgating their own particular 
version of the events surrounding accession and in some cases concealing the true events of the time. This 
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Another possible response is to claim that India lacks legitimate sovereignty over 
Kashmir because, by manipulating events and using military force, it failed to adhere 
to the agreed rules and procedures governing accession. Because, however, the 
provisions governing accession only allowed a State's ruler the simple choice of 
joining India or Pakistan, failure to follow these provisions cannot, on its own, justify 
the creation of an independent State of Kashmir. Rather, if Kashmiris possess a right 
to independent Statehood, then it must be for some reason other than the fact that 
Indian military intervention prevented the provisions governing the partition of 
Kashmir following the lapse of British paramountcy in 1947 being adhered to. 
The argument, then, must be that had India not interfered in Kashmir's accession, and 
the Maharaja been permitted to make a voluntary decision on the State's future, then 
he would have opted to join Pakistan. At the very least, however, such a claim is 
controversial and difficult to empirically corroborate. Counterfactually, it is difficult to 
determine with any real degree of accuracy whether the Maharaja would have preferred 
Pakistan to India. Moreover, given the available historical sources59 - not to mention 
the fact that the Maharaja was a Hindu - there is at least some reason to doubt such an 
assertion. 
More importantly, to base Kashmir's right to secede upon a failure by India to adhere 
to the original agreement governing the partition of the princely States is to assume 
that that agreement was itself just. Yet it is far from obvious why, particularly from a 
liberal perspective, such an assumption should be made. For example, just because the 
original partition agreement contained no opportunity for independent Statehood, it 
became evident during fieldwork in India in 1998/99 at which time I was fortunate enough to be granted 
an interview with a former officer in the Maharaja's army, Capt (Retd.) Diwan Singh (Jammu, 14 
November, 1998). During the interview Captain Singh insisted that the Maharaja always intended to 
accede to India, but gave the impression of favouring independence to enable the withdrawal of troops 
from the North Western Frontier Province and the transfer of certain privately owned lands in Gurdaspur. 
Others, however, cast aspersions upon these claims and Capt Singh himself later retracted his statement 
claiming that because there were officials in a neighbouring room monitoring the interview he was unable 
to recount an accurate version of events. He nonetheless suggested that I travel to Pathankot to search for 
the official records pertaining to the transfer of the lands in Gurdaspur. Reluctantly I was forced to the 
conclusion that the whole story was a ruse, and that the duplicity of certain vested interests made 
uncovering the real version of events surrounding Kashmir's accession a seemingly impossible task. 
59 On the Maharaja's hostility towards Pakistan and his proclivity towards independent Statehood see 
Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power, Vol. IX, No.37; Birdwood, 
p.40; D. K. Joshi, A New Deal in Kashmir (New Delhi: Ankur Publishing House, 1978), pp.8 -9 and 28- 
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does not follow from this that Kashmir did not in 1947 - and does not today - possess 
a right to full political independence from India. Rather, it simply means that such a 
right cannot be grounded in the provisions governing the accession of the princely 
States, or a failure by India to adhere to them. Thus, we need to look beyond the 
narrow legalities of the issue instead of simply taking as given the moral rectitude of an 
agreement concluded between a colonial power and an autocratic monarch that 
included no provision for popular consultation. 
Moreover, if Kashmir's right to secede is grounded exclusively in India's failure to 
abide by the provisions governing the accession of princely India, then this must mean 
that had India in fact adhered to these provisions then there would be no question of 
Kashmir today possessing a right to secede. Conversely, if Kashmir possesses a right 
to secede despite the fact that India faithfully adhered to these provisions, then it must 
be something other than a failure to follow these provisions which justifies Kashmir's 
secession. Hence, to claim that India lacks legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir 
because it failed to abide by the rules and procedures governing Kashmir's accession, 
is to endorse those rules and procedures - and, a fortiori, the Maharaja's authority to 
unilaterally decide Kashmir's future - as legitimate.6° 
Similar considerations also apply to the claim that Kashmir possesses a right to 
secede because the Maharaja never acceded to India, or did so under duress as a result 
of prior military intervention by India. If it is the simple lack of voluntary accession 
which is the source of a contemporary right for Kashmiris to secede, then this must 
mean that the sovereignty of the Maharaja and his authority to unilaterally determine 
Kashmir's political future were legitimate. If, on the other hand, the Maharaja was not 
the legitimate sovereign of Kashmir - and thus had no authority to determine the 
State's political future - then it must be something other than lack of formal accession 
by Hari Singh which justifies Kashmir's right to secede. One cannot ground a right 
29; and Riyaz Punjabi, `Kashmir Imbroglio: The Socio- Political Roots', Contemporary South Asia, Vol.4, 
No.1, 1995, pp.41 -42. 
60 Note, however, that Pakistan explicitly denies this assertion by claiming that the Maharaja had 
effectively been overthrown by his subjects and forced to leave his capital. See Cheema, p.96; S. M. 
Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
pp.27 -28; and UN Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No.7, UNCIP 
Third Report, S/1430, 9 December 1949. 
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upon the failure of an agent to perform an action that s /he had no authority to perform 
in the first place. 
It is, however, an unusual political philosophy, indeed, that would endorse the 
authority of an autocratic despot such as Hari Singh to decide the political fate of more 
than four million individuals, the majority whom he had actively discriminated against 
and conspired to keep in a condition of abject poverty. Whatever the philosophical 
worth of such a theory, or the form that it might take, it is clear that it cannot be a 
liberal theory. Indeed, to premise a right for Kashmir to secede upon a lack of 
adherence to the formal provisions governing the partition of princely India is, from a 
liberal perspective, to throw the baby out with the bath -water. Thus, while the 
injustice of the rules and procedures governing the accession of the princely States not 
being adhered to may justify a right for Kashmir to secede to Pakistan - although not a 
right of independent Statehood - it does so at the price of abandoning liberalism and so 
would be rejected by the theorists here under consideration including the leading JC 
theorist, Allen Buchanan. 
D. The Second Variant of the Circumstances of Accession Argument 
A second possible response to the question of why India lacks sovereignty over 
Kashmir because of its actions in 1947, is that by militarily intervening in Kashmir and 
seizing the State by force, India denied Kashmiris the right to determine their political 
destiny. The morally significant thing here is the use of force simpliciter, not that the 
use of force prevented certain rules and procedures being followed. There are two 
things that should be noted about this claim. First, the assertion that India lacks 
legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir because it acquired the State by force in 1947, 
even if correct, simply raises the question of who now does possess sovereignty over 
Kashmir. Thus, the Pakistani claim that the Maharaja cannot have transferred 
legitimate sovereignty to India because he had effectively been overthrown by his 
subjects demonstrates, at best, that India does not possess legitimate title to Kashmir. 
It does not also show that Pakistan now possesses that sovereignty. 
Second, there remains the additional question of why India's past use of force negates 
its contemporary claim to legitimate territorial sovereignty over Kashmir. Why is it 
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that acquisition by force is insufficient to ground a claim of legitimate territorial 
sovereignty? Buchanan claims that the ARJ's appeal stems from the assumption that 
in cases of forceful acquisition such as the USSR's acquisition of the Baltic States 
"...secession is simply the reappropriation, by the legitimate owner, of stolen property. 
The right to secede, under these circumstances, is just the right to reclaim what is one's 
own "61 
On its own, however, Buchanan's assertion simply begs the question it is supposed to 
answer. If a right to secede is explicated in terms of whether or not a territory - as 
opposed to a group - has a moral right to secede, then what matters is who the 
legitimate owner(s) of that territory is /are, i.e. the State or a secessionist sub -group 
within the State. We cannot simply assume that the secessionists are the legitimate 
owners of the seceding territory, when it is precisely this question of territorial 
ownership that the theory is supposed to address in the first place.62 For this reason the 
ARJ must be coupled with an account of legitimate territorial ownership, or 
sovereignty, that tells us in what circumstances a State has legitimate title to its territory 
and in what circumstances that title is transferred to, or resides with, a secessionist sub- 
group. 
Buchanan recognises this difficulty by appealing to an agent /trustee account of 
territorial sovereignty,63 which states that a secessionist group possesses legitimate title 
to the territory it covets when the terms of the State's trusteeship are either breeched or 
were never fulfilled.64 According to this agent/trustee account a State breeches its 
trusteeship - and thus loses its territorial sovereignty - when it engages in practices of 
discriminatory redistribution or oppression of the sort that constitutes a so- called lethal 
61 Buchanan (1991), p.67. 
62 This point is also recognised by Kymlicka who questions why should we start from the assumption that 
the State already possesses legitimate title to its territory and, hence, that the burden of justification 
therefore falls upon the secessionists rather than the State of which they are a constituent component. Will 
Kymlicka, 'Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec', Political Theory, Vol.20, No.3, 1992, p.532. 
63 See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
64 See Buchanan (1991), pp.108 -114. 
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threat against the inhabitants of a sub -region 65 In contrast, where a State wrongly 
acquired a territory through so- called `unjust taking' then that State was never the 
trustee of the particular territory and, thus, the question of the State's possession of 
legitimate sovereignty over the territory simply does not arise.66 
As was noted above, it is the latter argument of wrongful acquisition through unjust 
taking/incorporation which is pertinent in the case of Kashmir. Moreover, a territory is 
unjustly taken/incorporated when it is forcibly annexed by a Iarger, more powerful State 
such as. say, the Baltic States were by the USSR. For Buchanan, the strength of the 
ARJ lies in its ability to demonstrate, not only that the State lacks legitimate title to the 
seceding region, but also that the secessionists possess such title: `By appealing to 
history, it [i.e. the ARJ] shows that the state lacks territorial sovereignty over the 
seceding area because it unjustly appropriated the area from the seceding group, which 
has a valid claim to it. "b7 Moreover, because the Baltic States were forcibly annexed 
by the USSR, it would be illegitimate for the USSR to prevent the secession of Baltic 
States on the grounds that the USSR had made certain investments in the Baltic States. 
...the USSR has no valid claim to the investment because of the circumstances under which the 
investment was made. (Analogously, if you force your way onto my land, take over my house, and 
then proceed to make improvements in it, I owe you no compensation for your investment when I 
finally succeed in expelling you.)68 
There are two, inter- related things that should be noted about Buchanan's argument 
here: (a) once again, Buchanan is assuming that the secessionists possess a valid claim 
to the territory they covet; and (b) even if we put to one side the question of who has 
legitimate title to the territory in question, there remains the prior question of why, 
under Buchanan's agent/trustee account of territorial sovereignty, forcible annexation is 
incapable of grounding a legitimate claim to territorial sovereignty. At least one 
theorist - Harry Beran - has claimed that Buchanan's account of legitimate territorial 
65 Buchanan (1991), pp.112ff. Buchanan claims that in situations of discriminatory re- distribution the 
State forfeits its territorial sovereignty, whereas in the case of a lethal threat the State's territorial 
sovereignty is overridden. See Buchanan (1991), p.114. 
66 Buchanan (1991), p.I 10. 
67 Buchanan (1991), pp.113 -14 [emphasis added]. 
68 Buchanan (1991), p.107. 
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sovereignty collapses into a LD theory of secession. Reran questions Buchanan's claim 
that his agent /trustee account of territorial sovereignty supports the ",..presumption that 
the legitimate territory of the State is to be kept intact. "69 If the State is merely the 
agent of the people, claims Beran, then this suggests that it is the people who 
collectively possess sovereignty over the territory. Thus, why can't "...part of the 
people sack the agent and appoint a new one, independent from the previous agent, in 
its part of the territory? "70 
Similarly, the intuition which underpins the claim that forceful annexation cannot 
ground a claim of legitimate territorial sovereignty, and which is also evident in 
Buchanan's home -invasion analogy above, appears to he the same as that which also 
underpins the LD theory, i.e. the absence of consent. Consider, for example, the case of 
the Baltic States which Buchanan regards as a relatively straight - forward case of a 
group possessing a right to secede because they had their territory unjustly taken from 
them in the past What matters from a moral point of view is that the Baltic States were 
forcibly incorporated into the USSR, i.e. against the wishes of (a majority of) the 
inhabitants of the Baltic States. Had (a majority of) the citizens of the Baltic States 
consented to Soviet rule then, ceteris parabis, presumably there would be no more 
question of their permissibly seceding from the USSR than there is of, say, the former 
East Germany seceding from modern-day, unified Germany to which it voluntarily 
acceded. Similarly, in the case of Buchanan's uninvited home handyman, it is 
Buchanan's lack of consent to the occupation of, and repairs to, his house that is the 
morally significant factor and which invalidates any claim for restitution by his 
unwanted visitor. 
The question is: would the Baltic States have been justified in seceding if they had 
explicitly consented to Soviet invasion and rule? Analogously, would Buchanan still 
not owe compensation to his repairman had he agreed to the repairs being done to his 
house (for a fee) but then refused to pay him/her for the work that s /he had done? If the 
answer to both questions is `Yes', then it must be something other than the simple lack 
69 Buchanan (1991), p.109 [emphasis added]. 
70 Harry Beran, `The Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' in Nations, Cultures and 
Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.61. Also see Scott Boykin, 
`The Ethics of Secession' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. D. Gordon (New Jersey: Transaction 
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of consent which justifies the secession of the Baltic States and Buchanan's refusal of 
restitution. The question, however, is what? If, on the other hand, the answer is `No' 
then presumably it is the mere lack of consent which is doing the moral work, and 
which justifies the secession of the Baltic States and Buchanan's financial recalcitrance. 
The former response indicates that Buchanan's theory of legitimate territorial 
sovereignty is, at best, incomplete, whereas the latter reduces his theory of secession to 
a LD theory. 
To summarise: if a territory's secession is to be morally justified then it must be 
shown that the secessionists - not the State - have legitimate title to that territory, and 
this requires a theory of legitimate territorial sovereignty. On the one hand, Buchanan's 
claim that legitimate territorial sovereignty resides with the people and that the State is 
merely the agent of the people, would explain why forcible annexation of a territory by 
an aggressor State against the wishes of that territory's inhabitants is insufficient to 
ground a claim of legitimate territorial sovereignty on behalf of that State. 
Additionally, these same considerations of popular sovereignty and the associated 
notion of consent would also explain Buchanan's assumption that, in cases such as that 
of the Baltic States, legitimate sovereignty resides with the inhabitants of the disputed 
territory as opposed to some other third party. Furthermore, such an account would 
also encompass the other two types of situations in which Buchanan believes a group's 
secession would, ceteris paribus, be justified, i.e. people are no more likely to consent 
to being the victim of practices of discriminatory re- distribution or genocide than they 
are to invasion by a foreign aggressor. 
On the other hand, however, acceptance of the notion of popular sovereignty as the 
basis for legitimate territorial sovereignty raises a problem for Buchanan's rejection of 
LD theories in favour of a comparatively restrictive JC theory. Buchanan wants to 
grant a right of secession only to those groups who are victims of the three types of 
injustice specified by him. However, if the people possesses sovereignty to a territory 
in the manner described, then what matters is that they consent to the authority of the 
State. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that people would withhold their 
consent or, having already consented, subsequently withdraw their consent, only in 
Publishers, 1998), p.76. 
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situations of discriminatory redistribution, genocide and unjust incorporation. Thus, 
Buchanan must either: (a) explain why, if the people possess sovereignty as his 
agent/trustee account of territorial sovereignty suggests, their lack of consent to 
political authority is sufficient to justify a right of secession only in cases of unjust 
incorporation, discriminatory redistribution and genocide; or (b) acknowledge that 
because sovereignty resides with the people the simple absence of consent is sufficient 
to ground a right of secession and, thus, his is a LD, rather than a JC, theory of 
secession. 
Returning to the case of Kashmir: if Kashmir's secession is justified by reference to 
India's forcible acquisition of the State, then this suggests that India's position in 
Kashmir is illegitimate because it never received, and has yet to receive, the popular 
consent of Kashmiris In other words, the claim is one of procedural, rather than 
rectificatory, injustice. The significant thing is that Kashmiris never consented to 
Indian rule and, indeed, have explicitly dissented to Indian rule; not that they are 
punishing India for its past actions.71 Thus, the claim that Kashmir possesses a right to 
secede is premised, not upon considerations of rectificatory justice but, rather, on the 
same sorts of considerations of popular sovereignty which underpin the LD theory. If, 
however, this is the case, then it is unclear why the ARJ cannot simply be dispensed 
with and the claim that Kashmir possesses a right to secede assessed solely in LD 
terms. 
E. The Broken Promise Argument 
The same considerations of popular sovereignty described above are similarly evident 
in the claim that India lacks sovereignty over Kashmir because it has failed to honour 
its promise to hold a plebiscite in which Kashmiris might freely determine their 
political fate. It should first be noted, however, that this claim is also not as straight- 
forward as what it might initially appear. Aside from the question of whether the 
promise is regarded as a legal or a moral undertaking, there is the additional question 
of to whom the promise was made - Pakistan and /or the Kashmiri people - and who is 
the bearer of the obligation created by the promise, i.e. Nehru or the Indian State. Is 
71 Compare with Boykin, p.77. 
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the promise to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir an undertaking by the Indian State - in 
which case did Nehru have the (legal) authority to bind India to such a commitment? - 
or was it simply a personal assurance by Nehru? 
This is not to deny that one might, on the basis of the unfulfilled promise of a 
plebiscite, construct a moral argument for Kashmir's secession or that such an 
undertaking would be a philosophically commendable one. However, any such 
argument would need to be linked into a larger project which, amongst other things, 
provided a philosophical defence of promissory obligations that addressed 
considerations such as: (a) how an agent can create an obligation by the mere process 
of wishing or declaring to have one; (b) whether a promisor can place other, third 
parties under an enforceable obligation by making a promise; and (c) what 
considerations are capable of defeating a promissory obligation.72 
It should also be noted that the promise of a plebiscite - presuming, of course, that 
such a promise was ever made and is still valid - included only the option of staying 
within India or joining Pakistan; it did not include the third option of seceding to create 
an independent State of Kashmir. Thus, the simple failure by India to abide by its 
promise of a plebiscite cannot be employed to justify Kashmir's political 
independence. This is not to say that Kashmiris might not possess a right to 
collectively determine their political destiny by means of a plebiscite that includes the 
option of independent Statehood. However, such a right cannot be grounded in India's 
failure to fulfil a promise to allow them to do so when no such promise was ever made. 
Rather, if Kashmiris possess a right of secession that includes the option of 
independent Statehood, then the right of Kashmiris to secede must be grounded in 
considerations other than the Indian promise of a plebiscite. 
One might, of course, claim that the right of Kashmiris to independent Statehood is a 
fundamental right which they possess irrespective of any promise by India to allow 
them to secede. In other words, in order to demonstrate that Kashmiris possess a right 
to secede to create an independent Kashmiri State there is no need to first demonstrate 
72 On such issues see Michael H. Robins, Promising, Intending and Moral Autonomy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984); and P. S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Secession and Kashmir 263 
that India promised Kashmiris their own State, and then subsequently failed to fulfil 
that promise, in order to show that Kashmir has a right to secede from India as an 
independent political unit. Rather, the simple desire of a majority of Kashmiris for 
political independence from India is sufficient to ground a prima facie right of 
independent Statehood. This, however, renders the ARJ redundant by reducing the 
argument to a LD one where the right to secede is predicated, not upon the injustice of 
a broken promise but, rather, the injustice of holding a group captive against their will. 
Moreover, to claim that India lacks legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir because it 
failed to abide by its promise of a plebiscite is to endorse India's authority to make 
such a promise as legitimate. It is, a fortiori, to acknowledge that India possessed 
legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir at the time that it made the promise. Conversely, 
if India never possessed legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir, or did not do so at the 
time of its promise of a plebiscite, then it cannot have legitimately made a promise to 
transfer that sovereignty and, thus, failure to adhere to a promise to do so cannot be 
employed to justify a contemporary right of Kashmiris to secede. To emphasise: one 
cannot legitimately promise to transfer a right - in this case a right of legitimate 
territorial sovereignty - which one does not first possess. Therefore, to claim that 
Kashmiris have a right to democratically determine their political future by means of a 
plebiscite exclusively because India promised them a right to do so, is to endorse 
India's claim to territorial sovereignty over Kashmir at the time of its promise as 
legitimate. 
This, in turn, raises the question of from where India - which, having gained 
independence on 15 August 1947, had itself only been in existence as a political entity 
for a matter of a few months - obtained sovereignty over Kashmir. One possible 
response is to claim that, in accordance with the legal provisions governing princely 
States in the partition of the Indian sub -continent, legitimate sovereignty was 
transferred to India by the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh. However, as was noted 
earlier, to sanction Hari Singh's sovereignty over Kashmir is to reject liberalism by 
endorsing the authority of an autocratic despot who conspired against the majority of 
his subjects in order to maintain an environment characterised by immense social, 
Press, 1981). 
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economic and political inequities. If, on the other hand, legitimate sovereignty was not 
transferred to India by Hari Singh then where did India obtain this sovereignty from? 
F. Conclusion 
It needs to be borne in mind that JC arguments are not a distinct type of secession 
theory. Rather, all normative theories of secession premise a right of secession upon 
the perpetration of injustices and may therefore be said to be JC theories. Rival 
theories will, however, differ over exactly what injustices are sufficient to ground a 
right of secession and, thus, under what conditions a State's authority over a given 
group is deemed to be illegitimate. The three JC arguments above, for example, 
premise the right of Kashmiris to secede upon the injustices of a failure to adhere to 
certain provisions, unjust incorporation and a broken promise. Similarly, a consent - 
based LD theory premises a right of secession upon the injustice of enforced rule 
against the wishes of a majority of a sub -group's members, whereas a Nationalist 
theory premises the right to secede upon the injustice of one nation holding another 
nation captive in the same State. Consequently, because so- called JC theories are not a 
separate type of secession theory, they cannot be singled out as possessing a property 
that makes them both distinct from, and superior to, other, alternative types of theory. 
Consider, for example, Brilmayer's defence of the importance of territory to theories 
of political obligation and secession. Existing theories of political obligation, claims 
Brilmayer, take the voluntary performance of a specific action - e.g. accepting benefits 
provided by the State, continued residence in a State, explicit consent to a State's 
authority etc. - as sufficient to justify a duty of obedience to a specific State,73 without 
first explaining why the sovereign is entitled to conclude that performance of these 
actions amounts to assuming an obligation to obey.74 England, for example, cannot 
infer an obligation on the part of English subjects from their residence or entry upon 
the land known as England, unless England already possesses legitimate territorial 
73 Providing, of course, certain conditions are met, e.g. with respect to consent arguments: (a) individuals 
must be aware of the situation and that consent is being requested; (b) there must be a reasonable period 
of time for expression of dissent; (c) it must be clear by what point any objection must be made; (d) it 
must be reasonably easy to express consent; and (e) the consequences of dissent must not penalise such 
expressions. See A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), pp.64ff. 
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sovereignty over that land. Brilmayer terms this the bootstrapping objection and 
claims that if consent arguments are to work then they must be coupled with a prior 
account of territorial acquisition, rather than simply presuming the very State power 
which they attempt to justify.75 Similarly, argues Brilmayer, any right to secede must 
also be explicated in terms of territorial sovereignty, i.e. when a group seeks to secede, 
`...it is claiming a right to a piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it 
is entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land - or 
no land at all. "76 
As the example of Kashmir clearly demonstrates, however, the bootstrapping 
objection 1s not restricted to consent theories alone, and hence cannot be employed to 
demonstrate the relative superiority of so- called JC theories. England cannot infer 
obligations of English subjects from their consent to English authority without first 
explaining how it acquired sovereignty over the territory of England. Similarly, 
however, Kashmiris cannot premise a right to secede upon the injustice of India's 
broken promise to hold a plebiscite without first explaining from where India 
originally obtained sovereignty over Kashmir and, thus, the authority to make such a 
promise.77 Correspondingly, to claim that Kashmiris possess a right to secede because 
India failed to abide by the provisions governing the accession of the princely States, is 
also to raise the question of from where the authority of these provisions is derived. 
The same difficulty also exists with Nationalist theories, i.e. to claim that a nation is 
entitled to a particular piece of land qua its status as a separate nation, begs the 
question of what the source of that nation's title is and why it is entitled to that piece of 
land as opposed to an alternative piece of land, or no land at all. 
Brilmayer, however, endorses the unjust incorporation variant of the ARJ and claims 
that a sub -group can successfully establish title to the territory it covets - and, thus, 
74 Lea Brilmayer, Justfing International Acts (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p.77. 
75 e.g. how did England acquire sovereignty over a piece of territory such that it may claim that persons 
who consent to England's authority there are subject to its legitimate exercise of power? See, for 
example, Lea Brilmayer, `Consent, Contract and Territory', Minnesota Law Review, Vol.74, No.1, 1989., 
p.12. 
76 Brilmayer, (1991), p.201. 
77 To repeat: one cannot promise to transfer a right - here a right of legitimate territorial sovereignty - 
which one does not already possess. 
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possess a right to secede - by demonstrating that: (a) its land was acquired through 
conquest by the State from the group wishes to secede; or (b) a third party with no 
stake in the current dispute improperly joined the territories of the separatist group and 
the parent State.78 However, to claim that a group is entitled to a piece of land because 
it was unjustly seized by another party is itself to presuppose a prior account of 
territorial acquisition. As in the case of Buchanan's argument from unjust 
incorporation mentioned earlier, Brilmayer simply assumes that the separatist group 
already possessed legitimate title to its territory at the time of the territory's seizure, 
without offering an account of how that group initially acquired the territory. Yet, we 
cannot presuppose that the secessionists are the legitimate owners of the seceding 
territory, when it is exactly this question of territorial ownership that the theory is 
supposed to address in the first place. 
In conclusion, then, the case of Kashmir supports the claim that JC theories are not a 
distinct type of secession theory. Thus, because all normative theories of secession 
may equally be described as JC theories, JC theories cannot be singled out as 
possessing a property which makes them distinct from, or superior to, other, alternative 
forms of theory. The question, then, is not whether JC theories are superior to other, 
different types of secession theory but, rather, which JC theory is superior to all other 
JC theories. 
6.5 THE LIBERAL -DEMOCRATIC CASE FOR KASHMIR'S SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
In Chapter Four it was pointed out that whether or not there exists a LD right for a 
group to secede depends upon what type of liberalism we are operating under: (a) a 
Rawlsian model in which a liberal society is defined as one which is comprised of so- 
called `liberal' communities that adhere to ideals of individual equality and autonomy; 
18 Brilmayer cites the case of the Baltic States as an example of the former scenario and East Pakistan's 
(present -day Bangladesh) war of secession with West Pakistan as an example of the latter scenario. These 
two types of argument, claims Brilmayer, "...can be used to demonstrate that current state boundaries are 
illegitimate and that secessionists have a superior claim to the land they seek." See Brilmayer (1991), 
p.I90. A similar argument is advanced by Buchanan (Buchanan (1991), p.67) although, as was noted in 
Chapter Three, there are also significant differences between these two theorists in terms of the conditions 
which each takes as sufficient to establish a valid territorial claim. 
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or (b) a form of liberalism premised upon the toleration of dissent. Under the former 
type of theory a group's secession is unjustified unless: (a) it adheres to ideals of 
individual equality and autonomy; (b) its secession would create an environment 
which, from a liberal perspective, is superior to that which obtained prior to the act of 
secession;74 and (c) other, less extreme, measures of achieving this environment are, at 
least in the short to medium term, unavailable. Where a group manages to meet these 
three, rather onerous, conditions then, ceteris paribus, we might conclude that that 
group has a moral right to secede. 
Conversely, if a liberal society is defined as one that may be comprised of 'illiberal' 
communities then it becomes comparatively easier to justify a group's session. The 
important thing under this model of liberalism is the toleration of dissent, i.e. the right 
to secede no longer needs to be explicated in terms of a quantitative /qualitative 
increase in the ability of individuals to live their lives from the inside. Rather, if a 
group is prepared to allow its members a right of exit - which may, or may not, take 
the form of secession - then, as an expression of (political) dissent, the mere assertion 
of a desire to secede is sufficient to ground a prima facie right of secession. 
Because such an enterprise would require a more comprehensive analysis than can be 
undertaken here, no attempt has been made to argue for one type of liberalism - and, 
by extension, LD theory - as being more satisfactory than the other. Rather, it was 
simply pointed out that in selecting one of the two forms of LD theory one is forced to 
choose between: (a) the prioritisation and enforcement of principles of individual 
rights and equality; or (b) a plebiscitary right of secession that includes the right to 
establish illiberal States. The purpose of the following discussion is to apply these two 
forms of liberalism to the case of Kashmir. The intention is to demonstrate that, 
because the number of groups which qualify for a right to secede under each type of 
theory may be substantially less than at first might appear, neither type of will theory 
yield the simple plebiscitary right of secession favoured by Beran and other LD 
theorists. 
79 i.e. an environment in which individuals are able to live their lives from the inside - according to their 
own views about what gives meaning to life - more effectively. 
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While the objectives of some Kashmiri separatist groups such as the JKLF might, at a 
very basic level, be said to mirror the simple plebíscitary right of secession advanced 
by the LD theory, these groups never specify which of the above forms of liberalism 
they prefer. This observation should not be construed as a critical comment upon 
Kashmiri separatists for failing to participate in a philosophical debate with liberal 
political theorists. Rather, the intention is simply to point out that because Kashmiri 
separatists operate in a world governed more by considerations of Realpolitik than 
philosophical principle, they typically have other things on their mind than the 
contextualisation of their political aims within complicated theoretical disputes 
between foreign academics. Because, however, under the LD model so much hinges 
on which type of liberalism one is operating under, if we are to assess the demands of 
Kashmiri separatist groups in LD terms, then clearly some determination has to be 
made as to what type of liberalism is being appealed to in order to justify Kashmir's 
secession. 
One possible approach is to look separately at each of the Kashmiri separatist and, 
based upon their stated objectives and political ideologies, ask which of the above two 
types of liberalism they might prefer. This, however, runs the risk of putting words 
into peoples' mouths and consequently mis- representing their position. Moreover, 
regardless of whether or not the JKLF would prefer, say, a Rawlsian model of 
liberalism to that favoured by Kukathas, from a purely theoretical perspective the real 
issue is whether or not Kashmir's secession can be justified by reference to these two 
types of liberalism. Thus, the best solution is to look separately at each type of 
liberalism in the context of Kashmir with a view towards determining: (a) whether or 
not each model of liberalism is capable of justifying a right for Kashmir to secede; and, 
if so, (b) what practical and theoretical difficulties the example of Kashmir poses for 
the model. 
B. Common Arguments For & Against an Independent Kashmir 
Before going on to examine the linkages between the case of Kashmir and the two 
types of LD theory here under consideration, it will first be helpful to examine some 
common arguments regarding Kashmir's proper political status. All parties to the 
Kashmir dispute attempt to legitimate their respective claims by advancing various 
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reasons why Kashmir should, or should not, be afforded a right of secession. By 
examining how these arguments relate to the two LD theories here under consideration 
and what, if any, credence should be afforded these claims, we may eliminate a source 
of possible confusion and be in a better position to more competently consider the LD 
case for Kashmir's secession. 
One common argument against granting Kashmir political independence from India is 
the claim, briefly introduced above, that Kashmir's secession would seriously 
undermine Indian secularism and democracy by initiating a religious bloodbath in India 
and /or legitimating the claim that Muslims are disloyal to India. It is a matter of little 
dispute that typically a group's secession has wide -reaching implications that may 
extend, not only to the parent State, but also to other, third parties. Consequently, it 
may also be claimed that while secession may increase the ability of the members of 
the seceding group to live their lives from the inside, it may nonetheless produce an 
even bigger decrease in the ability of others to do the same. In other words, while 
Kashmiris might, from a liberal perspective, be better off with their own State, their 
secession may nonetheless produce an overall decrease in the ability of individuals to 
live their lives from the inside by undermining democracy and secularism in India and 
the region as a whole. 
There are, then, two questions we need to ask of this argument against granting 
Kashmir a right to secede: (a) is there really a causal connection between Kashmir's 
secession and the stated negative consequences and, if so; (b) are these negative 
consequences morally sufficient to override any right of Kashmiris to secede? On the 
one hand, the sociological effects of a group's secession upon liberal institutions and 
practices in the nascent, remainder or any other State are, from a liberal perspective, an 
important factor in determining whether a group possesses a right to secede. Clearly 
no liberal theory of secession should sanction a right to secede in situations where the 
exercise of that right would effectively undermine liberal institutions and practices by 
creating an environment of extreme disorder and violence. Moreover, there are those 
who genuinely fear that Kashmir's secession would provoke a violent anti -Muslim 
backlash in India. Such people see the violent anti -Sikh riots in New Delhi that 
followed the assassination of Indira Ghandi in 1984 and the horrors of partition as 
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precedents that could well be repeated on an enormous scale were Kashmir to break 
away from India.80 
On the other hand, however, there may also be a self -fulfilling character to such 
assertions. To assume that Kashmir's secession would necessarily be followed by 
widespread violence is also to perpetuate that violence by creating an expectation of 
disorder. This in turn erases any sense of accountability amongst the perpetrators of 
violent acts by encouraging the belief that, rather than being responsible for their 
actions, they are instead helpless participants in an historical inevitability. 
Yet, far from being an unavoidable outcome, any violence that followed Kashmir's 
secession may, to a significant degree, be the result of manipulation by certain elites 
seeking to further their own political ends. Certain groups such as Hindu nationalists 
and Muslim extremists derive considerable political advantage from communal 
violence in India. By organising and perpetrating a Hindu -Muslim apocalypse in the 
event of Kashmir seceding, these groups may strengthen their position by legitimating 
the claim that a secular India with a sizeable Muslim minority is untenable. In this 
context one may also recall the State -sponsored violence in East Timor which both 
preceded and followed that country's 1999 independence referendum. Far from being 
unavoidable or spontaneous, there is considerable evidence to suggest that this 
violence was instead largely orchestrated by factions within the Indonesian political 
and military establishment to both exact punishment upon the East Timorese, and to 
send an unambiguous message to other secessionist- inclined regions within 
Indonesia.81 
Similarly, if the goal is the maintenance of Indian secularism and, by extension, 
democracy, then it is unclear why giving in to the illiberal threats of, say, Hindu 
fundamentalists is in the long -term an effective strategy for accomplishing that end. 
80 Author interviews with George Verghese, who claimed that Kashmir's secession would make the 
genocide that occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda `look like a picnic" (details above); Harinder Baweja 
(Senior Correspondent, India Today), New Delhi, 6 November 1998; and Maj. Gen. (Recd.) Dipanker 
Banerjee, New Delhi, 3 November, 1998. Also see Ganguly, pp.128 -29; and Varshney, p.198. 
81 See, for example, Report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council and General Assembly, 
Agenda Item No.96, U.N. Doc. A/54/654 13 December 1999; Amnesty International News Release 
ASA21/202/99, 28 October 1999; and The Washington Post, 21 March 2000. 
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Rather than preserving Indian secularism and democracy such tactics may instead 
hasten their demise by further entrenching and empowering the sectarian enemies of 
liberalism. Indeed, Hindu extremists within the BJP and their political allies such as 
the RSS arguably pose more of a threat to Indian secularism and democracy than 
would the secession of Kashmir or, for that matter, any other region within the Indian 
Union. 
Another common argument against an independent Kashmir is the claim that, initially 
at least, such an entity could not be economically or militarily self -sufficient and, thus, 
would require the cooperation of both India and Pakistan, neither of which want to see 
an independent Kashmir. Indeed, in addition to Kashmir's importance to both 
countries' respective national identities, strategically both India and Pakistan 
potentially stand to lose a great deal through any realignment of their mutual border in 
Kashmir. For example, the main lines of communication and defence for Ladakh run 
through the Valley. If the Valley were to secede from India then India's strategic 
position vis -à -vis Ladakh would be considerably weakened.ß2 Moreover, both 
countries fear that the precedent set by a successful and prosperous independent 
Kashmir might encourage other, secessionist inclined regions within their borders to 
follow suit and also secede. 
The claim, then, is that regardless of the moral justifiability of Kashmir's secession, 
the unpleasant truth is that neither Pakistan nor India would permit Kashmiris to 
secede and create an independent State. Moreover, were such an entity created then 
both countries would do their best to undermine it and thwart the successful operation 
of liberal- democratic institutions within it. Thus, it makes little sense to talk of a right 
of independent Statehood for Kashmir - and, by extension, of Kashmiris governing 
themselves in a liberal manner - when the geo- political realities in South Asia mean 
that neither eventuality is ever likely to come to pass. 
82 See Gowher Rizvi, `India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem 1947 -72' in Perspectives on Kashmir, 
ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.65; and Ganguly, p.141. The 1962 Sino- 
Indian war demonstrated just how vital these lines of communication and supply are to the Indian position 
in Ladakh. The only available alternatives are the airfield in Leh and the 500km Leh -Manali road. The 
former is of arguably limited strategic value given its vulnerability to enemy attack and climatic 
conditions which frequently render it inoperable, while the latter is not a suitable supply route for a major 
Secession and Kashmir 272 
Whatever the truth of such claims, however, the unwillingness of both India and 
Pakistan to tolerate an independent, democratic State of Kashmir cannot legitimately 
be a determinant in whether or not Kashmiris possess a moral right to secede. It is one 
thing to speculate upon the capacity of Kashmiris to govern themselves in accordance 
with the precepts of liberal democracy, and to deny them a right of secession because 
of their comparative inability or unwillingness to do so. It is quite another thing, 
however, to deny Kashmiris a right to secede, not because they are unable or unwilling 
to govern themselves in a liberal- democratic manner, but because others refuse to 
allow them the opportunity to do so. Indeed, to deny Kashmiris a right to independent 
Statehood because of Indian and Pakistani threats to undermine any such State is itself 
to create an illiberal state of affairs by rewarding the threat of the performance of 
illiberal actions. Rather, if Kashmiris possess a right to secede and create an 
independent State, then it must be a right held irrespective of Pakistani and Indian 
acquiescence. To suggest otherwise is to legitimate the illiberal actions of the morally 
indigent by reducing rights to mere privileges bestowed by the more powerful and 
omnipotent.ß3 
Finally, there is the issue of outside assistance and aid as a determinant in a group's 
right to secede. Numerous theorists have raised doubts about the political and social 
environment that would obtain in an independent State of Kashmir and questioned 
whether or not such a State would be capable of enduring as a liberal democracy. 
These claims will be addressed in greater detail shortly. For now the important point 
to note is that if Kashmir's right to secede is dependent upon it securing an overall 
increase in the ability of individuals to live their lives from the inside, then Kashmiris 
are unlikely to possess a right to secede if they cannot govern themselves in a liberal 
democratic manner where individuals are able to live their lives according to values of 
their own choosing. 
In response to this objection it may be claimed that, while there are, indeed, good 
reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of liberal- democracy in an independent 
Kashmir, many of these difficulties could be overcome with outside intervention and 
army for similar reasons. 
83 See the discussion of perverse incentives in Chapter Three. 
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assistance. If India were to simply cut Kashmir adrift then, of course, political and 
social life in Kashmir may disintegrate into a state of affairs approximating a 
Hobbesian state of nature. If, on the other hand, the international community offered 
aid and assistance in much the same way as it has done in Bosnia, Kosovo and East 
Timor, then the outcome of political independence may be radically different and the 
prospects of liberal- democracy in Kashmir substantially enhanced. 
Three things should, however, be noted in response to this counter -argument. First, 
the respective situations in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor immediately prior to 
international intervention were markedly worse than that which currently obtains in 
Kashmir - thus lessening the likelihood of international intervention in Kashmir. 
Second, while international intervention may have halted most of the immediate 
violence in these three territories, in many respects the jury is still out on whether or 
not it has been an effective means of securing long -term democratic reform. Third, 
while India, Pakistan and other countries may have a negative obligation to refrain 
from sabotaging Kashmir's political fortunes by undermining its democratic 
institutions of government, it is by no means apparent that they have a positive 
obligation to ensure the success of those same institutions or, given the forces at work 
in Kashmiri political life, that they could even if they wanted to. 
Pro -separatist Kashmiris are often wont to speculate upon the desirability of 
international intervention and the opportunities that it would provide both to 
Kashmir's, and their own, political and economic fortunes. In the wake of the 
American -led invasion of Kuwait in 1991 many Kashmiris, in their political naiveté, 
were convinced that it was Kashmir's turn next.84 However, not only is it doubtful 
that in the event of Kashmir's secession international assistance would be forthcoming 
and, if so, to what degree, but it is also unclear that such assistance would necessarily 
increase the long-term prospects of democratic governance in Kashmir In the absence 
of a morally enforceable claim to, or, at the very least, a credible guarantee of, such 
84 This was a common refrain in September 1991 during which time I first visited Kashmir. Many 
Kashmiris were, perhaps understandably, convinced that the momentum provided by certain international 
events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Gulf War made Kashmir's eventual political 
independence at the hands of the United Nations an historical inevitability. 
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assistance, pro -secessionist arguments predicated upon the generosity of the 
international community are, at best, whimsical and, at worst, absurd. 
C. Rawlsian Liberalism & Kashmir's Secession 
If we adopt a Rawlsian version of liberalism of the type favoured by theorists such as 
Kymlicka, then the justifiability of Kashmir's secession is dependent upon it creating a 
state of affairs which, from a liberal perspective, is superior to that which would obtain 
were Kashmir to remain as a constituent component of India. In other words, it must 
be shown that Kashmir's secession would produce a quantitative and /or qualitative 
increase in the ability of individuals - not necessarily just Kashmiris - to live their 
Iives from the inside. Therefore any new State created by Kashmir's secession must be 
based upon principles of individual equality and autonomy which grant individuals 
certain rights that override other, opposing considerations and which proscribe the 
subordination of the interests of the individual to those of the larger group of which 
s /he is a member. 
This latter consideration immediately rules out the sort of fundamentalist Islamic 
State favoured by some Kashmiri separatist groups which would subordinate 
individual liberty to Islamic imperatives or, more accurately, their highly controversial 
interpretation of Islamic imperatives. Similarly, while one might under this type of 
liberalism attempt to justify Kashmir's secession to Pakistan, such an argument would, 
at best, be problematic given that Pakistan is a military dictatorship with a 
comparatively poor record of: (a) economic, social and political justice; (b) human 
rights; and (c) tolerance towards religious minorities and sub -nationalities. Despite the 
many failings of the Indian State, it is highly questionable whether the long -term 
prospects of liberal democracy in Kashmir would be any better were Kashmir to secede 
from India in order to join Pakistan. In view of these factors we may, therefore, restrict 
discussion to how the creation of an independent State of Kashmir might be justified 
under a Rawlsian version of liberalism. There are, then, two questions to be addressed: 
(a) in what sense might Indian rule in Kashmir be said to be illiberal; and (h) would an 
independent Kashmir be any more liberal than the status quo of Indian rule in 
Kashmir? 
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With respect to the former question Kashmiri separatists often point to the serious 
human rights abuses perpetrated by occupying Indian troops against ordinary 
Kashmiris, as indicative of the fundamentally illiberal nature of Indian rule in Kashmir 
and attitude of the Hindu establishment towards (Kashmiri) Muslims.S5 The problem 
with such an argument, however, is that there may be less extreme measures which 
would be at least as effective as the creation of an independent Kashmiri State in 
securing a decrease in incidences of brutality suffered by ordinary Kashmiris, e.g. more 
effective enforcement of human rights and monitoring of Indian troops in Kashmir. 
Moreover, such an argument suffers from the same flaws, and is back -to -front in the 
same way, as a definition of Kashmiri nationhood or an ANSP based upon Indian 
atrocities discussed above.86 
Civil rights abuses by Indian troops in Kashmir aside, the Indian State nonetheless 
suffers from numerous malfeasances that in many respects render it a malignant and 
iniquitous entity. Here we should begin by noting that India is, at least nominally, a 
secular State governed in accordance with the precepts of liberal- democracy. Like all 
such States, however, India doesn't always live up to the ideal standards of liberal - 
democratic theory. Not surprisingly, then, while the impressive achievement of more 
than half a century of almost uninterrupted democratic rule in India should in no way 
be deprecated nor overlooked, it should come as no surprise that India's political 
landscape is often blighted by serious inter -group violence and transgressions of 
human and democratic rights. 
Indeed, instances of mis- government and violation of individual democratic rights are 
not only ubiquitous across all of India, but are often so serious as to beggar belief. For 
example, one of the key requirements of a liberal theory of justice - the right to a swift 
and fair trial - is formally guaranteed by article twenty-one of the Indian constitution, 
while the Criminal Procedure Code requires an arrested person to be produced before 
a magistrate within twenty four hours of arrest. In practice, however, the police 
frequently avoid these requirements by failing to record an arrest. Consequently, some 
85 Author interviews with Yasin Malik; and Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt (details above). 
86 i.e. it is incoherent to ascribe a right of secession on the basis of negative consequences suffered by 
Kashmiris as an outcome of their trying to exercise a right to secede which they never in fact possessed. 
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inmates - so- called `under- trials' - have spent up to eleven years languishing in jails 
all over India simply waiting to be officially charged with an offence.87 
India also contains a large number of territorially concentrated and ethnically diverse 
cultural and linguistic communities which are frequently hostile to central rule. These 
factors combine with high levels of illiteracy and poverty, vast disparities of wealth 
and religious conflict - both between different religious sects (e.g. Hindu versus 
Muslim and Sikh conflicts) and within them (e.g. conflicts between different Hindu 
castes and conflicts between Sunnis and Shias) - to create an enormous number of 
conflicting interests that make India an extremely problematic State to govern. Indeed, 
one of the most fundamental conflicts within Indian society, and which was 
responsible for the sub -continent's partition in the first place, remains the often violent 
antagonism between Hindus and Muslims.88 Kashmiris, as members of the only 
Muslim -majority State in Hindu -dominated India, often feel themselves to be at the 
cutting edge of this conflict. Separatist leaders in Kashmir, not to mention many 
ordinary Kashmiris, frequently cite Hindu discrimination as one of their main reasons 
for wanting to secede in much the same way that Jinnah advanced similar arguments to 
justify the creation of Pakistan more than half a century ago.89 
On the one hand, then, there is a great deal of truth to the claim that India is far from 
being a modern liberal State. On the other hand, however, as real and arduous as 
Indian mis- governance, corruption, ineptitude and discrimination may be, the real 
question is whether or not an independent State of Kashmir would be any better at 
respecting and enforcing ideals of individual autonomy and equality. What reason is 
there to believe that a Kashmir ruled by Kashmiris would be any more liberal than a 
Kashmir ruled by India? 
There is also the difficulty that many human rights abuses in Kashmir are perpetrated by security forces 
indigenous to the State - an issue which will be explicated in greater detail shortly. 
87 See, for example, Shyamala Shiveshwarkar, `The Plight of Prisoners', The Hindustan Times, 5 January, 
1999. 
88 See, for example, Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994). 
%9 Author interviews with Yasin Malik; Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt; and Mirwaíz Umar Farooq (details 
above). 
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Numerous scholars have raised doubts regarding the internal stability of an 
independent State of Kashmir Cognisant of the ethno- regional divisions which have 
historically precluded a shared cultural, social and political understanding between the 
different peoples of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, these theorists have questioned 
whether existing communal problems would not simply be replicated within the newly 
created polity.90 Similar considerations might also be said to be applicable to an 
independent State consisting only of the Valley. Historically much of the mis- 
government in Kashmir has been perpetrated, not by federal agencies but, rather, by 
State agencies indigenous to Kashmir. For example, it will be remembered that there 
is considerable evidence to suggest that, since it first assumed power in 1951, the 
National Conference has regularly violated democratic and human rights in Kashmir. 
Furthermore, many of the atrocities committed in Kashmir are perpetrated by 
organisations which are indigenous to the State. For example, since taking over from 
the Indian military as the main counter - insurgency force in Kashmir, the Jammu and 
Kashmir Police (JKP) have been the subject of continuous and serious allegations of 
impropriety.91 The Jammu and Kashmir traffic police, for example, have recently 
gained notoriety as one of the most corrupt law- enforcement forces in India92 - quite a 
substantial accomplishment given the pervasively venal nature of the Indian 
constabulary. These same security agencies would presumably also be the main 
instrument of law enforcement in an independent State of Kashmir. Hence, if the 
problem is the high number of incidences of human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
various security forces deployed in Kashmir, then there seems little reason to suppose 
that secession from India would necessarily be an effective means of securing a 
quantitative and/or qualitative decrease in such abuses. Rather, the solution must be 
the substantive reform of these forces and institution of effective mechanisms of 
accountability. 
90 See, for example, Hewitt, pp.192 -93. A similar opinion was also expressed to me in person by George 
Verghese (details above). 
91 One of the more serious examples of such behaviour occurred on 3 April 2000 when the Special 
Operations Group of the JKP and the Central Reserve Police Force (a federal law- enforcement agency) 
opened fire on a group of protesters in AnanMag. The protesters were demanding the release of seventeen 
males whom they alleged had been kidnapped by the JKP. See, for example, `7 Killed, 11 Injured in 
Firing on Precessionists', The Kashmir Times, 4 April 2000. 
92 See Arun Joshi, 'Pilgrim Fleecing: A New Danger en route to Vaishno Devi', The Hindustan Times, 3 
January, 1999. 
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It may, of course, be claimed that it is precisely because of Indian interference that 
Kashmiris have proven unable to put their own house in order. In other words, the 
historical failure of liberal democratic institutions in Kashmir is not indicative of an 
enduring inability on the part of Kashmiris to govern themselves according to liberal - 
democratic precepts. Rather, it is simply further evidence of the illiberal nature of 
Indian rule and the need for full political independence from India to ensure the 
effective institution of liberal -democratic rule in Kashmir However, it seems 
implausible to blame India for all the problems in Kashmir Moreover, even if 
Kashmir's less -than- perfect past record of liberal democratic governance were the 
result of Indian interference, it does not necessarily follow from this that an 
independent Kashmir would necessarily be any better at respecting liberal- democratic 
norms than the status -quo of Indian rule. 
Is there any reason to believe that things would be different in an independent State of 
Kashmir? Given that Kashmiris have been largely unable to achieve liberal democratic 
government with the relative security and affluence afforded by their position as a 
State within the Indian Union, why should we assume that they would be capable of 
doing so as an independent, sovereign State with all the adversities that would 
accompany that independence? Counterfactually, given the political and geo- strategic 
complexities that exist both in Kashmir and in the region as a whole, this is an 
extremely difficult question to answer with any degree of certainty. On the one hand, 
definitive predictions regarding the prospects of (liberal- democracy in) an independent 
Kashmir should be treated with the scepticism and disdain that such claims to divine 
knowledge deserve. 
On the other hand, however, at the very least there are good reasons to question 
whether an independent Kashmir would be any more liberal than a Kashmir under 
Indian rule. Aside from the historical precedents of illiberal rule and infringements of 
human rights discussed above, other factors which militate against a liberal, 
independent Kashmir include: (a) the political instability and violence that exists both 
in the region as a whole and within Kashmir; (b) the easy availability of advanced 
weaponry; (c) the economic difficulties an independent Kashmir would encounter at 
least in the short to medium term; (d) the factious, violent nature of Kashmiri political 
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life; and (e) the almost total absence of a democratic culture and history of responsive 
government in Kashmir. 
Clearly there are wider issues to be addressed here regarding the relationship between 
the likely sociological consequences of change and an analysis which stresses abstract 
rights as such. For present purposes, however, it will be sufficient to note that under 
this type of LD theory an uncertainty factor may need to be included within the 
calculation of consequences that indicates a preference for maintaining the existing 
borders of the parent State. While in some instances where things are fairly 
straightforward this uncertainty factor may be weighted relatively Iow, in other 
instances - such as that of Kashmir - where things are not so unequivocal, this 
uncertainty factor may be a more dominant, even the deciding, factor in the calculus. 
This in turn will further diminish the number of groups capable of qualifying for a 
right to secede under this type of liberalism, i.e. even if a group is trapped within an 
illiberal State with no immediate prospect of achieving liberal reform, because of the 
difficulties in assessing the consequences of that group's secession, it may still be 
unjustified in seceding. 
D. A Second Form of Liberalism & Kashmir's Secession 
In Chapter Four a second form of liberalism premised upon the toleration of dissent, 
rather than ideals of individual autonomy and equality, was introduced and contrasted 
with the more mainstream, Rawlsian account dealt with above. Because, however, 
Beran explicitly rules out the creation of an illiberal State and there is good reason to 
suppose that other LD theorists would also be hostile to such a proposition, it was 
merely pointed out that this second form of liberalism is not germane to the LD theory 
considered in Chapter Four. Nonetheless, simply because the theory is not pertinent to 
the position adopted by Beran and other theorists like him, is not also to say that the 
theory itself is necessarily unsatisfactory. We may agree that Beran would reject the 
theory without also concluding that the theory is thereby inadequate.93 The purpose of 
the following discussion is, then, to briefly take a closer look at this type of LD theory 
93 Alternatively, to put it rather crudely, just because Beran and these other theorists reject the theory 
does mean to say that we should too. 
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in the context of the Kashmir dispute by comparing it to the former type of theory 
discussed earlier. 
The first thing we should note about this second form of liberalism is that it largely 
avoids the epistemic difficulties inherent in the former approach. The important thing 
here is not the consequences of a group's secession but, rather, that individuals take 
part in a way of life willingly and thus have a right of exit. Whereas, under the 
previous form of liberalism, in order to possess a right to secede a group had first to 
demonstrate that its secession would produce an overall increase in the ability of 
individuals to live their lives from the inside, no such requirement is necessary under 
this form of liberalism. Rather, to deny a group the right to secede and maintain a 
political union by force is to fail to tolerate that group's expression of (political) 
dissent which is, by definition, an illiberal act. Thus, the mere expression by a group 
of a desire to secede is sufficient to ground a prima facie right of secession as an act of 
dissension to the political status -quo. 
Consequently, under this form of liberalism in order to ground a right for Kashmir to 
secede it is necessary only to show that (a majority of)94 Kashmiris favour leaving 
India and this, it would seem, would be a comparatively easy task. Furthermore, under 
this theory a liberal society may contain `illiberal' communities that place very little 
value upon individual equality and autonomy, and which subordinate the interests of 
the individual to those of the community. Therefore, whereas a theory of secession 
based upon Rawlsian liberalism necessarily rules out the creation of the sort of 
authoritarian, sectarian State favoured by Islamist groups such as the Jamaat -i- Islami, 
such a State would be legitimate under this form of liberalism providing, of course, 
that it allowed its members a right of exit. 
This, however, raises the question of what counts as a right of exit and under what 
conditions an individual is un/free to leave. There is also the further difficulty that the 
freedom to exit a group may itself be dependent upon other, prior forms of autonomy 
which may not be present within some illiberal communities. Kymlicka, for example, 
94 The incorporation of a majoritarian thesis within both forms of the LD theory and the problems that 
this raises will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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points out that an individual may lack the necessary pre -conditions for making a 
meaningful choice about whether to exit the group, e.g. because they have been denied 
an education or the freedom to associate with others outside the group.95 
Alternatively, financial barriers or lack of a favourable alternative to which one might 
emigrate may also constrain an individual's choice to leave. Thus, while an individual 
may not be forcibly prevented from leaving or associating with others outside the 
group, they may still nonetheless lack the ability to exercise their right of exit. 
The important point, then, is that because the freedom to exit a group is itself 
dependent upon some prior form of autonomy this creates a problem where, whether 
by accident or design, this autonomy is lacking. In such situations not only will the 
community be unable to foster a right of exit, but individuals will be unable to make a 
meaningful choice to exercise it. Hence, while individuals may nominally possess an 
enforceable claim against the group to be permitted to leave, in practice the right of 
exit will be substantively empty. Moreover, if, as Kukathas suggests, cultural 
communities should be left alone to manage their own affairs - regardless of what we 
may think of their way of life - then we cannot force communities to provide the 
necessary pre- conditions for individuals to be able to make a purposeful decision as to 
whether or not to leave the group. Ironically, then, the principle which the theory 
champions - i.e. the toleration of dissent and ability of cultural communities to manage 
their own affairs - may conflict with the principle's concomitant requirement that we 
leave groups alone to live their lives as they prefer, particularly in situations where 
members of the group do not retain the ability to live as they prefer by exiting the 
group. 
Indeed, Kukathas acknowledges that some individuals may be so settled in their 
community's way of life and ignorant of alternatives, that they are unable to make a 
meaningful choice to stay or leave because the idea of exit is inconceivable. 
Nonetheless, he believes that it is "...not clear that this is objectionable if one's 
concern is the freedom of the individual to live as he or she prefers. "96 The issue, 
95 Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas', Political Theory, Vol.20, No.1, 
1992, p.143. 
96 Kukathas, Chandran, `Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka', Political Theory, Vol.20, 
No.4, 1992, p.678. 
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however, is not whether individuals should: (a) be free to live as they prefer; or (b) 
have a coercive authority impose life -style choices upon them against their will. 
Rather, the issue is under what conditions individuals can be said to be living as they 
prefer. To simply claim that one who does not express a desire to leave their 
community is therefore living as he or she prefers, is to overlook a variety of factors 
which may render an agent unfree. 
For example, an individual who has been indoctrinated, or even brain -washed, by, 
say, a religious cult may express a strong desire to remain within the cult and, thus, 
may in some sense be said to be `living as they prefer' while they are permitted to 
remain within the group. However, while that individual may not be forcibly 
prevented from leaving or associating with others outside the group, because of the 
control exercised by the group over his/her environment and formative influences, it 
would not be completely correct to describe that person as being entirely free to leave. 
Typically we do not consider decisions made in such situations as morally being on a 
par with decisions which are the result of considered reflection where one is in 
possession of all the relevant facts. 
This is not to suggest that illiberal, pro- secession groups active in Kashmir such as 
the Jamaat -i- Islami will necessarily fail to qualify for a right to secede under this type 
of liberal theory. Whether or not these groups lack the pre -requisite conditions for 
their members to be able to make a meaningful choice to leave will depend upon 
exactly what those pre -conditions are.97 A comprehensive examination of these pre- 
conditions, and whether or not each of the pro -secession groups in Kashmir is capable 
of satisfying them, is clearly beyond the scope of the present project. The important 
point, however, is that simple coercion and forcible restraint are not the only means by 
which an agent may be rendered unfree to leave a group. 
Rather, to make consensual membership the sole determinant of a group's legitimacy 
requires that we look beyond simple coercion as a source of individual unfreedom and 
address the many pre- conditions of the freedom to choose whether to stay or go. Thus, 
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at the very least, the requirement that individuals be free to live as they prefer and not 
forcibly prevented from leaving or associating with outsiders requires further 
clarification. Moreover, the number of groups capable of qualifying for a right of 
secession under this theory may also be substantially reduced, depending upon what 
criteria a group must fulfil in order for its members to have an effective right of exit. 
E. Conclusion 
In Chapter Four it was pointed out that those who favour a LD theory of secession 
find themselves in something of a dilemma. If, on the one hand, the LD theorist adopts 
a Rawlsian conception of liberalism like that favoured by Kymlicka, then a right of 
secession must be explicated in terms of an increase in the ability of individuals to live 
their life from the inside. Consequently, any right to secede will be limited to those 
groups unfortunate enough to find themselves trapped in an illiberal State for whom 
secession is the only available option for securing liberal reform in the short to 
medium -term. In other words, while this form of liberalism may, indeed, be capable of 
justifying a right to secede, it is a heavily restricted right that applies to relatively few 
groups over time. This is in contrast to the simple plebiscitary right of secession 
advocated by LD theorists such as Beran, which grants a prima facie right to secede to 
any group in which a majority of individuals favour secession. 
If, on the other hand, the LD theorist adopts a version of liberalism like that favoured 
by Kukathas, then the mere expression of a desire for political independence will be 
sufficient to ground a prima facie right to secede. However, because this version of 
liberalism also extends a right of secession to groups which engage in illiberal, 
authoritarian practices, the price for such a freely available right of secession is the 
legitimation of States which do not value individual autonomy and equality, and where 
the only enforceable claim citizens have against their government is to be allowed to 
exit. The dilemma, then, is whether to: (a) allow a relatively unrestricted right of 
secession that includes the right to secede from liberal States, but which also justifies 
the creation of illiberal States; or (b) enforce ideals of individual autonomy and 
97 i.e. only once we have determined in what circumstances a group's members are free to leave, can we 
then examine particular groups in order to determine whether they in fact allow their members an effective 
right of exit. 
Secession and Kashmir 284 
equality by denying illiberal groups the right to establish illiberal States, while at the 
same time limiting the right to secede to a relatively small number of groups trapped in 
illiberal States. 
In the case of Kashmir it has been noted that, while it remains extremely difficult to 
foretell with any degree of accuracy exactly what the consequences of Kashmir's 
secession might be, there are nonetheless good reasons to doubt whether Kashmir's 
secession would result in an overall increase in the ability of individuals to live their 
Iives from the inside. Consequently, it is far from obvious that Kashmir's secession 
would be justified under the former, Rawlsian type of liberalism. Moreover, given the 
inherent risks and uncertainties of secession, in cases such as Kashmir the prudent 
course of action may well be to maintain a State's territorial integrity - particularly in 
cases where a group's political independence is likely to result in only a marginal 
increase in the ability of individuals to live their lives from the inside. 
Conversely, the second type of liberalism largely avoids the epistemic difficulties 
inherent in the former approach. Under this version of liberalism there is no longer 
any need to engage in counter - factual reasoning, or to calculate the consequences of a 
group's secession upon the ability of individuals to live their lives from the inside. 
Rather, the simple expression of a desire to secede is sufficient to ground a prima facie 
right of secession. However, because, under this type of theory, a group must allow its 
members a right of exit in order to qualify for a right to secede, this raises a wider 
question of under what conditions one is free to leave a group. Hence, in order to 
qualify for a right to secede not only must a group refrain from forcibly preventing its 
members leaving, but they must also ensure that their members have the ability to 
make a meaningful choice to remain or leave. 
In conclusion, then, the case of Kashmir not only corroborates the previous claims 
made in Chapter Four but also strengthens them by highlighting new difficulties faced 
by each type of LD theory. Previously it was claimed that, rather than the freely 
available right of secession envisaged by Beran, a Rawlsian form of liberalism will 
instead justify only a heavily restricted right of secession that is likely to apply to 
relatively few groups over time. By emphasising some of the epistemic difficulties 
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inherent in a right of secession predicated upon this form of liberalism, the case of 
Kashmir demonstrates how the number of groups likely to qualify for a right to secede 
under this type of theory may even smaller than at first thought. 
Similarly, in the case of the latter type of LD theory, it was shown that, because an 
effective right of exit is dependent upon other, prior forms of autonomy, the 
requirement that groups allow their members a right of exit entails more than a simple 
absence of coercion and forcible restraint. Moreover, because a right of exit is a pre- 
requisite to possession of a right to secede under this form of theory, this will also 
reduce the number of groups which possess a right of secession. Consequently, it 
seems that neither form of liberalism will yield the simple plebiscitary right of 
secession favoured by Beran, in which the mere expression of a desire to secede by a 
simple majority of a group's members is sufficient to justify a prima facie right to 
secede. 
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7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before continuing any further it will be beneficial to first re -state the purpose of the 
thesis and take an overview of what has been achieved so far. The objective of the 
thesis, it will he remembered, is to critically evaluate the liberal case for a moral right 
to secede by assessing the three types of theory which currently dominate the 
contemporary literature on such a right. Hence, the thesis aims to critically engage 
with, and say something substantive about, the three leading normative theories of 
secession within the context of the larger question of how liberalism should respond to 
demands by minorities for a moral right to secede. 
Having summarised and critically evaluated these three theories in the first four 
chapters of the thesis, the case study of Kashmir was then introduced and applied to 
each theory. The primary purpose of including this case -study within the thesis is to 
illustrate and test -out the general criticisms made in Chapters Two, Three and Four by 
examining how these may be corroborated with empirical evidence from a real -life 
secessionist dispute such as that which exists in Kashmir. A much less -developed, but 
nonetheless important, aim is to look at some of the various claims advanced by the 
various parties to the dispute in Kashmir with a view towards determining how a liberal 
theory should respond to such claims and, thus, what broader lessons might be learned 
from the case of Kashmir for the normative theorisation of secessionist demands. 
The goal of the thesis is, then, not to: articulate a satisfactory account of a moral right 
to secede; normatively evaluate claimed rights to secede in Kashmir; or examine the 
reasons behind the political violence in Kashmir. Rather, the more modest goal is the 
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critical assessment of the three theories under consideration with the case of Kashmir 
employed as illustrative material to this end. This, however, is not to say that the 
investigation contained within the thesis is necessarily irrelevant to these undertakings. 
Indeed, any explanation of the causes of the Kashmir conflict and eventual solution to it 
will not only have to take account of the conflicting demands of the various 
protagonists in the dispute, but also arrive at some determination regarding their 
justifiability, or legitimacy. Similarly, by critically examining the three leading theories 
of secession, and some of the broader lessons which might be learned from the case of 
Kashmir for the normative theorisation of secessionist claims - issues which any 
satisfactory theory will need to address - the thesis both advances the debate over a 
moral right to secede while at the same time also indicating the direction in which the 
debate might next proceed. 
7.2 NATIONALIST THEORIES OF SECESSION 
A. The Critique of Nationalist Theories of Secession 
The first of the three types of theory considered in this thesis - i.e. Nationalist theories 
- claims that a right to secede is possessed exclusively by certain groups of people 
called nations qua their status as a separate nation. In Chapter Two it was claimed that 
Nationalist theories of secession are unsatisfactory because they are unable to: (a) both 
distinguish nations from other, similar social entities and different nations from one 
another; and (b) show why nations - and only nations - should be afforded a right of 
independent Statehood. Of these two claims the former was applied to the case of 
Kashmir and the question asked, `How might Kashmiris coherently be described as a 
nation ?' 
One way of defining the nation is by reference to certain objective criteria such as a 
common language, culture, ethnicity and history. Following the work of previous 
theorists,) discussion of these objective definitions of nationhood focussed upon 
external difficulties with such criteria and how, for example, to distinguish New 
I See, for example, Allen Buchanan, Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to 
Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.49 and `Secession and Nationalism' in A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1993). 
Conclusion 288 
Zealand English - and, thus, national identity - from, say, Australian English and 
national identity. Intuitively, we want to say that - despite their many similarítíes - 
countries such as New Zealand and Australia are founded upon distinct national 
identities. Because, however, the English spoken in these two countries is, by -and- 
large, very similar, it is difficult to see how a linguistic definition of nationhood could 
justify anything other than a larger Australasian nation that incorporated both States. 
Moreover, because linguistic, cultural, ethnic and historical distinctiveness are all 
matters of degree, there is also some difficulty in identifying a threshold of 
distinctiveness without being completely arbitrary where we draw the line between, for 
example, two dialects of the same language and two different languages. 
Similar difficulties also exist with a subjective account of national identity premised 
upon factors such as a shared consciousness, or sense of self -identity, and the solidarity 
that these create. While a subjective account enjoys certain advantages over a purely 
objective analysis, it too raises the same threshold problem identified above, i.e. given 
that a shared consciousness and solidarity are both matters of degree, how much of each 
of these factors must a group exhibit in order for it to qualify as a separate nation? 
Moreover, as Beran has noted: "The nation cannot be the group which has the highest 
degree of mutual sympathies because this would not even be the people of [the city of] 
Leuven but individual families. "2 Finally, further difficulties arise when we consider 
that individuals may feel no affiliation with any existing nation, identify to varying 
degrees with two or more nations, and /or change their national affiliations over time 
either to another national group or simply to no such group at all. 
B. Applying the Critique of Nationalist Theories to the Case of Kashmir 
In Chapter Six these conclusions were analysed in the context of the Kashmir dispute. 
This discussion demonstrated that similar difficulties to those noted earlier may also 
exist internal to each of the above objective criteria. Thus, in addition to the problem 
of how to narrow these criteria to exclude other, related peoples outside of the target 
group, there is also the conflicting problem of how, at the same time, to broaden the 
definition in order to accommodate all the variances that may exist within the target 
2 Harry Beran, `Border Disputes and the Right of National Self- Determination', History of European 
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group. If, for example, language is the yardstick of Kashmiri national identity then in 
order to a yield a Kashmiri nation that encompasses the residents of the Valley, not only 
must Kashmiri be defined in a manner that distinguishes it from other similar tongues, 
but such a definition must also be broad enough to encompass all the various dialects of 
Kashmiri spoken within Kashmir. 
It is difficult to see how these two mutually opposing aims might both be satisfied 
within the same definition. Indeed, as it happens no definition of Kashmiri could 
include all the inhabitants of the Valley; Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals do not speak 
Kashmiri and so will necessarily he excluded from a linguistically defined Kashmiri 
nation. Moreover, in order to accommodate the various dialects of Kashmiri spoken 
within the Valley, a linguistic definition of Kashmiri national identity must necessarily 
be so broad as to also include certain groups who reside outside of the Valley, who 
speak a dialect of Kashmiri,3 but who have no real connection or sense of shared 
identity with Kashmir and its inhabitants. Therefore, a linguistic account of national 
identity is incapable of yielding a wholly Kashmiri nation. Rather, such a definition 
will be: (a) so narrow as to yield a series of geographically concentrated nations within 
the Valley whose members each speak a distinct dialect of Kashmiri; or (b) so broad as 
to include groups of people who reside outside of the Valley. 
Because this linguistic heterogeneity is replicated within Kashmiri society to a similar 
degree with respect to the variables of ethnicity, history and culture, there seems little 
reason to suppose that a definition of Kashmiri nationhood based upon these other 
objective factors would fare any better than a linguistic definition of Kashmiri 
nationhood. For example, just as Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals would fail to qualify as 
Kashmiris under a linguistic definition of Kashmiri national identity, because they are 
also ethnically, historically and culturally distinct from so- called 'ordinary Kashmiris',4 
any definition of Kashmiri nationhood premised upon these three variables would also 
exclude them from being classed as Kashmiris. 
Ideas, Vol.16, No.4 -6, 1993, p.482. 
3 e.g. Kashtawari /Kishtawari speakers in Doda, and Poguli speakers in Pogul. 
4 See Sukhdev Singh Chib, This Beautiful India: Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1977), 
p.94; Somnath Dhar, Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1977), p.23 and Jammu and 
Kashmir Folklore (New Delhi: Marwah Publications, 1986), p.23; and Frederic Drew, The Jummoo and 
Kashmir Territories (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1971), pp.109 -111. 
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Furthermore, just as Kashmiris share certain linguistic traits with other peoples who 
reside outside of the Valley, the same is also true of the additional variables of a 
common ethnicity, culture and history. Over the centuries Kashmiris have been both 
the beneficiaries and victims of an enormous degree of foreign influence and conquest. 
The upheavals and discontinuities produced by this process of outside influence and 
invasion render any appeal to a common history, ethnicity or culture as the basis of a 
purely Kashmiri national identity extremely problematic. Aside from the various 
historical, cultural and ethnic dissimilarities that exist within Kashmir, many of the 
distinctive traits that set Kashmiris apart from others in the region (e.g. their distinctive 
brand of Islam and handicrafts of carpet and papier mâché making) were imported from 
outside of Kashmir, particularly Persia. Thus, if cultural and historical continuity are 
taken as the benchmarks of national identity, then residents of modern-day Iran would 
likely qualify as Kashmiris ahead of Kashmiri Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals. This is 
despite the fact that Sikhs, Gujjars and Bakarwals have lived in Kashmir for centuries 
and are generally regarded by themselves, and others in Kashmir, as being Kashmiri. 
With respect to a subjective definition of nationhood it will be remembered that, 
because a shared consciousness and solidarity are also matters of degree, there is a 
general problem identifying how much of each of these factors a group must exhibit in 
order for it to qualify as a nation. It will also be remembered that within Kashmiri 
society there are strict social divisions according to profession, education and family 
background which are significant determinants of personal identity and social status.5 
Finally, there is also a cleavage, not to mention some mild hostility, between urban 
Kashmiris in Srinagar and those Kashmiris who reside in rural areas. Kashmiris in 
Srinagar often tend to view their rural counterparts as illiterate and uneducated 
simpletons, whereas rural Kashmiris often tend to regard the inhabitants of Srinagar as 
aloof and elitist.6 These social divisions combine with the urban/rural divide to render 
any Kashmiri national identity premised upon subjective criteria subordinate to class 
and local identities. Thus, rather than generating a single Kashmiri nation that 
5 See Maharaj K. Koul, A Sociolinguistic Study of Kashmiri (Delhi: Indian Institute of Language Studies, 
1986), pp.22 -24; and Henny Sender, The Kashmiri Pandits: A Study in Cultural Choice in North India 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.22 -24. 
6 Author interviews with Dr Amitab Mattoo (Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University), New Delhi, 9 November 1998; and Praveen Swami (Senior Correspondent and Bureau Chief 
for Frontline magazine), New Delhi, 3 November 1998. 
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incorporates all Kashmiris, a subjective account of national identity is more likely to 
produce a series of regionally or socio- economically defined nations in Kashmir. 
There also remains the additional question of why Kashmiris might sympathise with 
one another as Kashmiris in a way that they do not with others. To claim that 
Kashmiris constitute a nation because they exhibit a degree of mutual sympathy and 
possess a shared consciousness, is also to raise the question of exactly what is the 
nature and source of this mutual sympathy and consciousness. One possible response 
is to appeal to the history of oppressive alien rule in Kashmir and claim that this 
tyranny has engendered a mutual identification and solidarity amongst Kashmiris as 
victims of foreign aggression. However, because such an account would also include 
other, similar victims of (Indian) aggression it is incapable of generating a purely 
Kashmiri nation. Indeed, ironically one might almost say that it actually provides an 
argument in favour of continued Indian occupation of Kashmir. 
Moreover, even if it could be shown that Indian occupation and misrule has produced 
or exacerbated the desire amongst Kashmiris for political independence from India - 
and, in so doing, forged a specific identity amongst Kashmiris distinct from other 
victims of Indian misrule - there remains the additional question of why this means 
that Kashmiris have a right to secede. To show that Kashmiris have a desire for 
political independence from India is not also to show that they have a right to that 
independence and others a correlative obligation to grant it to them. Similarly, even if 
we set aside the objection that it is incoherent to premise a right on oppression suffered 
as a result of trying to exercise a right which one did not possess, there is the additional 
question of why, even if Kashmiris are a nation, this means that they are entitled to 
secede. Thus, in addition to defining what a nation is, the Nationalist theorist must 
also demonstrate why nations - and only nations should be the exclusive bearers of a 
right to secede. 
In Chapter Two the claim that there is a necessary connection between national 
homogeneity, democratic government and the provision of certain collective goods and 
schemes of re- distributive welfare was rejected. A sense of community and inter- 
personal networks of trust may well be prerequisites to the effective operation of 
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democracy and schemes of re- distributive welfare, however this does not mean that the 
nation is the only, nor the best, source of such features. Indeed, national homogeneity 
may instead facilitate a repressive orthodoxy that stifles - rather than encourages - 
democracy. Finally, the claim that individual well -being is dependent upon the 
flourishing of certain cultural groups was also found to be insufficient to demonstrate 
that nations should be the exclusive holders of a right of secession. Not only may a 
lesser degree of political self -determination than independent Statehood be sufficient 
to guarantee the flourishing of such groups, but there is no reason to suppose that the 
nation is the only, or the best, example of such a cultural group. 
In relation to the case of Kashmir, it was also pointed out that a definition of 
Kashmiri national identity based upon Indian oppression conflicted with the liberal 
defence of nationalism given by theorists such as Miller, Nielsen, Kymlicka and Tamir. 
Typically these theorists see nations as pre- requisites to liberal- democratic institutions 
of government and individual freedom of choice. In other words, the effective 
operation of liberal institutions presupposes the existence of the types of inter -personal 
bonds which are characteristic of national communities. However, even if we put to 
one side the objection that there may be other forms of community that are able to 
fulfil these sociological functions at least as effectively as the nation, if national 
identity is premised upon a decidedly illiberal state of affairs characterised by misrule 
and oppression then the preservation of that national identity cannot be predicated 
upon liberal axioms. We cannot defend a nation's identity and right to independent 
Statehood by reference to a positive relationship to democratic governance and 
individual liberty, when that nation was both created by, and is dependent upon, a 
denial of the very democratic rights and individual freedoms which it is meant to 
sustain and augment. 
C. Conclusion 
A theory of normative nationalism must address two questions: (a) what, exactly, are 
nations; and (b) why should we be concerned about nations? A Nationalist theory of 
secession must also address the additional question of why this concern should 
necessarily take the form of granting nations an exclusive right to independent 
Statehood. Regarding the former issue, the case of Kashmir corroborates the claim 
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made in Chapter Two that the subjective and objective criteria employed by Nationalist 
theorists cannot satisfactorily distinguish nations from other, similar sociological 
entities and different nations from one another. Moreover, by demonstrating how an 
objective account of national identity entails mutually contradictory aims, the example 
of Kashmir also points to further difficulties faced by the Nationalist theorist in 
providing a satisfactory definition of the nation and, thus, bolsters the case against 
Nationalist theories. 
If nations are to be the exclusive holders of a right to secede then not only must they 
be shown to possess a property, or set of properties, that distinguishes them from other, 
similar sociological entities and one another, but that property must also be relevant to, 
and not conflict with, the justificatory basis of the right. As the example of a Kashmiri 
national identity based upon Kashmir's history of oppressive alien rule clearly 
demonstrates, we cannot ground a right to secede upon liberal axioms while 
consistently claiming that nations - as the sole bearers of that right - may be 
fundamentally illiberal entities. Thus, the mutual dependency between the two 
difficulties of defining the nation and defending its right to secede further restricts the 
Nationalist's room to manoeuvre. To base a nation's right of political self - 
determination upon liberal axioms is to rule out appeal to illiberal definitions of 
nationhood and, thus, further complicate the difficulty of how to define national 
identity. Conversely, to define national identity by reference to, say, a history of 
oppression is to rule out a liberal defence of national self -determination and, thus, re- 
open the question of why nations should be afforded a right to secede. 
7.3 JUST CAUSE THEORIES OF SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
A JC theory of secession is one which grants a right of secession to groups which are 
the victim of certain specified injustices. In other words, a State exercises legitimate 
authority - and, a fortiori, the State's subjects have no right of secession - as long as 
the State behaves in a just manner and its subjects are not the victims of injustice.? 
7 The two are not necessarily the same, i.e. some JC theorists maintain that a group may possess a right to 
secede because they are the victim of an injustice perpetrated by a party other than the group's parent 
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Conversely, when a sub -group within a State are the victims of a specified injustice for 
which secession is deemed to be an appropriate remedy of last resort, then the State 
loses legitimate authority over that sub -group and, consequently, the sub -group has a 
right to secede. Thus, to say that a group (G) has a right to secede exclusively because 
it is the victim of a certain injustice (I) perpetrated by, say, its parent State (S) is also to 
say that, counter- factually, had S not I -ed then S's authority over G would be 
legitimate and, thus, G would have no right to secede. 
In Chapter Three the various arguments put forward by Buchanan in support of the 
relative superiority of JC theories - arguments from minimal realism, the avoidance of 
perverse incentives and moral /legal consistency - were considered and rejected. It was 
also pointed out that Buchanan's version of a IC theory is able to outscore other, rival 
theories by reference to these three criteria because it is highly restrictive and so 
justifies relatively few instances of secession. This, however, need not be true of all 
JC theories; JC theories may be relatively more or less permissive than alternative 
theories depending upon what injustices they take as sufficient to ground a right of 
secession. Hence, there is nothing inherent to the requirement that a group be a victim 
of an injustice in order to possess a right to secede that is necessarily supportive of the 
State's right to maintain its territorial integrity. 
Furthermore, one could also imagine a comparatively restrictive Nationalist or LD 
theory which also justified relatively few instances of secession and which, when 
judged according to the three criteria listed above, would be at least as satisfactory as 
Buchanan's JC theory, Thus, even if we accept these three criteria as valid, it does not 
follow from this that IC theories are necessarily superior to Nationalist or LD theories, 
or that Buchanan's JC theory is the superior alternative amongst alternative JC 
theories. Indeed, if lack of permissiveness is the yardstick by which a theory' s 
satisfactoriness is assessed, then it would seem that the only truly satisfactory theory 
can be that under which there is no right to secede. 
State. See, for example, the argument from unjust incorporation advanced by Lea Brilmayer in `Secession 
and Self Determination: A Territorial Re- Interpretation', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.16, 
No.1, January 1991, p.190; and Buchanan (1991), p.67. 
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Buchanan also claims that LD and Nationalist theories are distinct from, and inferior 
to, JC theories because they are committed to the view that groups may secede from 
States which are `perfectly just.'8 The important issue for a normative theory of 
secession, however, is when a State commits the injustice of not allowing a group to 
secede. Moreover, to say that a group possesses a moral right to secede is also to say 
that that group's continued political union with its parent State is morally unjust, as are 
any attempts by the parent State (or other parties) to maintain that union. Hence, for 
all three types of theory any State that refuses to recognise a legitimately -held right to 
secede is by definition unjust, and the only difference between JC, LD and Nationalist 
theories are the types of injustice(s) which each regards as sufficient to justify a right of 
secession and, thus, render a State unjust. The disagreement, then, is not over whether 
a group should first have to be a victim of an injustice in order to possess a right to 
secede but, rather, which injustices are sufficient to ground such a right. 
B. Applying the Critique of Just Cause Theories to the Case of Kashmir 
In Chapter Six it was pointed out that, amongst the three arguments Buchanan 
identifies as sufficient to ground a right to secede, it is the argument from rectificatory 
justice (ARJ) that is pertinent to the case of Kashmir. It was further claimed that two 
different forms of the ARJ based upon different historical factors are applicable to 
Kashmir: (a) the circumstances surrounding the State's accession to India; and (b) the 
unfulfilled Indian promise of a plebiscite. The former argument was then broken down 
into two variants yielding three separate JC arguments for Kashmir's secession. These 
arguments and the critical assessment of them undertaken in Chapter Six may be 
summarised as follows. 
1. The first variant of the former argument claims that India lacks legitimate 
sovereignty over Kashmir because it failed to adhere to the agreed provisions 
governing the accession of the princely States. Such an argument, however, cannot 
be employed to justify a right to independent Statehood for Kashmir. Furthermore, 
to claim that India Iacks legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir because it failed to 
8 See Allen Buchanan, `Theories of Secession', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.26, No.1, 1997, 
pp.40ff. 
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abide by the rules and procedures governing Kashmir's accession, is to abandon 
liberalism by endorsing those rules and procedures as legitimate. 
2. Similar considerations to those above are also germane to the claim that India lacks 
legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir because of its unfulfilled promise of a 
plebiscite. First, because the promise was only to allow Kashmíris the simple 
choice of staying with India or joining Pakistan, such an argument cannot ground a 
right to independent Statehood for Kashmir. Second, to claim that India lacks 
legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir because it failed to abide by its promise of a 
plebiscite is to acknowledge that India possessed legitimate sovereignty over 
Kashmir at the time that it made the promise and, thus, raise the question of from 
where India obtained this sovereignty. 
3. Finally, the second variant of the former argument is based upon the use of force by 
India in its appropriation of Kashmir and appeals to what Buchanan terms `unjust 
incorporation.'9 Buchanan claims that under these circumstances "...secession is 
simply the reappropriation, by the legitimate owner, of stolen property. "lo 
However, we cannot simply assume that the secessionists are the legitimate owners 
of the seceding territory, when it is precisely this question of territorial ownership 
that the theory is supposed to address in the first place. Thus, the ARJ must be 
coupled with an account of legitimate territorial ownership, or sovereignty, that 
tells us in what circumstances legitimate title to a territory resides with the State or 
with a secessionist sub -group within the State. 
These findings were then applied to Brilmayer's so- called `bootstrapping objection' 
that consent -based theories of political legitimacy presume the very authority which 
they seek to justify by overlooking the need for an anterior account of territorial 
acquisition. As the example of Kashmir clearly demonstrates, however, Brilmayer's 
bootstrapping objection applies equally to all three normative theories and, thus, 
cannot be employed to single out JC theories as superior to LD and Nationalist 
theories. For example, a right of secession predicated upon the injustices of a broken 
9 i.e. annexation by either the existing State or by some earlier State that is the `ancestor' of the currently 
existing State. See, for example, Buchanan (1991), p.67; and Brilmayer, p.190. 
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promise of a plebiscite, or a failure to adhere to certain provisions governing the 
accession of the princely States, also presupposes a prior account of territorial 
acquisition. 
Similarly, Brilmayer's claim that a group possesses a right to secede if it was the 
victim of the injustice of unjust incorporation - i.e. forceful annexation - also calls for 
a prior account of how that group came to be the legitimate owner of its territory prior 
to the forceful seizure of that territory. To claim that a group is entitled to a piece of 
land because it was unjustly seized by another party is itself to presuppose a prior 
account of territorial acquisition. We cannot, as Brilmayer does, simply assume that a 
separatist group already possessed legitimate title to its territory at the time of the 
territory's seizure, when it is exactly this question of territorial ownership that the 
theory is supposed to address in the first place. 
This once again re- visits the issue of territory and the role played by an account of 
legitimate territorial sovereignty in a normative theory of secession. [n the 
contemporary world of territorial States a group's secession necessarily raises 
important issues regarding the proper division of territory. To grant a group a right to 
secede is also to grant that group a right to remove a portion of the State's territory and 
the assets contained within it. To settle such issues we need a theory of legitimate 
territorial sovereignty that addresses the question of what territory a seceding group is 
entitled to and why it is entitled to that territory as opposed to some other, alternative, 
territory. 
As was noted in Chapter Four, however, there is no liberal reason why settlement of 
territorial issues need necessarily be anterior to the determination of whether or not a 
particular group possesses a right to secede. We may conclude that a group possesses 
a right to secede without first establishing exactly what territory that group can take 
with it when it secedes. Indeed, the simple requirement that a group possess legitimate 
title to a portion of the State's territory in order to hold a right to secede, merely 
succeeds in changing the question from when a group has a right to secede, to when a 
10 Buchanan (1991), p.67. 
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group possesses legitimate title to a portion of its parent State's territory, while 
bringing us no closer to a satisfactory answer to either question. 
Here it is also useful to recall the earlier observation that one cannot adopt an illiberal 
definition of nationhood while at the same time premising a right for nations to secede 
upon liberal axioms. The same considerations are also applicable in the case of JC 
theories. For example, to claim that India Iacks legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir 
because it failed to abide by the rules and procedures governing Kashmir's accession, 
is to abandon liberalism by endorsing those rules and procedures - and, thus, the 
authority of an authoritarian tyrant - as legitimate. One cannot predicate a right for 
Kashmir to secede upon a failure to abide by the provisions governing the accession of 
the princely States, while at the same time consistently maintaining a commitment to 
liberal axioms which directly conflict with these provisions. To emphasise: if 
secession is justified by the requirements of liberalism then the right to secede must be 
subject to those same liberal principles. 
Similarly, any account of legitimate territorial sovereignty must also be consistent 
with the injustice(s) which the theory takes as sufficient to justify a right of secession. 
This is a problem faced by Buchanan who maintains that a group possesses a right to 
secede only if it is the victim of three particular types of injustice, while at the same 
time adhering to an agent/trustee account of territorial sovereignty11 which suggests 
that territorial sovereignty rests with the people and, thus, part of the people can simply 
secede whenever they see fit.12 Consequently, Buchanan must either: (a) explain why, 
if the people possess sovereignty, their lack of consent is sufficient to justify a right of 
secession only with respect to the injustices specified by him; or (b) acknowledge that 
the simple absence of consent is sufficient to ground a right to secede. 
This is not to say that the Nationalist theory and Buchanan do not succeed in raising 
issues which are of significant importance to the development of a satisfactory 
normative theory of secession. For example, Miller's discussion of the necessary 
11 See Buchanan (1991), pp.I08 -114. 
12 See Harry Beran, `The Place of Secession in Liberal Democratic Theory' in Nations, Cultures and 
Markets, eds. Paul Gilbert and Paul Gregory (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p.61; and Scott Boykin, `The 
Ethics of Secession' in Secession, State and Liberty, ed. D. Gordon (New Jersey: Transaction, 1998), 
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sociological pre- conditions for the establishment and maintenance of a IiberaI- 
democratic society - i.e. the so- called Nationalist Democratic Argument (NDA)13 - 
raises important questions regarding the likely sociological effects of a group's 
secession, and what consequences these may have upon liberal- democratic institutions. 
Similarly, Buchanan acknowledges that in order to function effectively democracy 
requires a `minimal community' whose members have "...enough in common to be 
able to engage in meaningful participation in rational, principled political decision - 
making. "14 In the absence of this minimal community irreconcilable values and ways 
of conceptualising the social world will prevent individuals from together articulating a 
conception of the public good which both groups can agree upon.15 
While these issues were discussed briefly in Chapter Six in relation to the question of 
whether an independent State of Kashmir could endure as a liberal democracy, there 
are clearly wider issues to be addressed regarding the sociological pre- conditions for 
the flourishing of liberal- democratic governance. Nevertheless, the important point 
remains that no liberal theory of secession should sanction a right to secede in 
situations where the exercise of that right would produce a net reduction in the 
quantity, or quality, of liberal- democratic rule by effectively undermining liberal 
institutions and practices in the nascent, remainder or any other State. 
However, while the Nationalist theory is quite correct to stress the sociological effects 
of secession upon liberal- democratic institutions, it nonetheless fails to establish that 
the nation is the only, or the best, form of the so- called `minimal community' 
necessary for the effective functioning of these institutions. Sentiments of mutual trust 
and consensus regarding important values and ways of conceptualising the social world 
may be exhibited by, say, religious communities and life -style groups to at least the 
p.76. 
13 See, for example, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.96ff. Similar 
claims are also made by J. S. Mill, `Considerations on Representative Government' in Utilitarianism, 
Liberty, Representative Government, ed. H. Acton (London: J. M. Dent, 1972), pp.363 -64; and Ernest 
Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (London: Methuen, 1948). 
14 Allen Buchanan, `Democracy and Secession' in National Self -Determination and Secession, ed. 
Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.23. 
15 Buchanan (1998), pp.23 -24. 
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same degree as they are by nations.16 Similarly, Buchanan also fails to show that 
granting a right of secession in situations other than the three injustices specified by 
him would necessarily undermine democratic rule. 
C. Conclusion 
All normative theories of secession premise the right to secede upon the perpetration 
of injustices with different theories taking different injustices, or types of injustice, as 
sufficient to justify a prima facie right of secession. The disagreement, then, is not 
over whether a group should first have to be a victim of an injustice in order to possess 
a right to secede but, rather, which injustices are sufficient to ground such a right and 
why those injustices - and only those injustices - should be taken as sufficient to 
ground a moral right to secede. In many respects, the three injustices which Buchanan 
regards as sufficient to ground a prima facie right to secede may be regarded as 
relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. Imagine, for example, a minority that is 
the victim of a sustained campaign of violence so serious that it threatens the group's 
very existence. Presuming that secession would be an effective remedy to this 
violence and that less extreme measures are unavailable or would be ineffective, most 
theorists would probably be inclined to agree with Buchanan that in order to preserve 
themselves the members of the group should be permitted to secede. 
The difficulty for Buchanan, however, is to demonstrate why a right of secession 
exists only in situations such as the above, or where a group is the victim of 
discriminatory re- distribution or unjust acquisition. In recognition of this problem 
Buchanan appeals to the three criteria of minimal realism, the avoidance of perverse 
incentives and moral /legal consistency as well as the requirement that a group possess 
legitimate title to a portion of the State's territory in order to possess a right to secede. 
In Chapter Three, however, it was demonstrated that these criteria are incapable of 
establishing that Buchanan's theory is superior to other, more permissive theories. 
Rather, because JC theories fail to qualify as a separate type of theory, they cannot be 
differentiated from LD and Nationalist theories as possessing a property that renders 
them a distinct and superior theoretical alternative. Nonetheless, Buchanan claims 
16 The response that the nation may be defined as whatever form of community that is the most conducive 
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that because LD and Nationalist theories are committed to the view that groups may 
secede from States which are `perfectly just', they are both distinct from, and inferior 
to, JC theories. Yet, for all three types of theory any State that refuses to recognise a 
legitimately -held right to secede is by definition unjust, and the only difference 
between alternative theories concerns the types of injustice(s) which each theory 
regards as sufficient to justify a right of secession and, thus, render a State unjust. 
In conclusion: the case of Kashmir supports the claim that JC theories are not a 
distinct type of secession theory. Rather, all normative theories of secession may 
equally be described as JC theories. Hence, instead of being a distinct theoretical 
alternative, Buchanan's theory is instead an example of one type of (JC) theory 
amongst many other, alternative types of JC theory that also includes LD and 
Nationalist theories. Thus, the disagreement is not over whether a group should first 
have to be a victim of an injustice in order to possess a right to secede but, rather: (a) 
which injustices are sufficient to justify such a right; and (b) why those injustices - and 
only those injustices - should be taken as sufficient to ground a moral right to secede. 
7.4 LIBERAL -DEMOCRATIC THEORIES OF SECESSION 
A. Introduction 
Because the number of possible injustices which a group may suffer is practically 
limitless - extending to the indubitably trivial and absurd - so too is the list of possible 
theories of secession. One might, for example, premise a right to secede upon the 
ostensible injustice of being forced to learn French at High School, with the result that 
all individuals who involuntarily studied French during their formative years have a 
right to secede and create an independent State of Francophobes. If, however, the right 
to secede may be predicated on any number of purported injustices - some more 
fatuous than others - then the list of possible theories of secession is limited only by 
the number of possible injustices. Consequently it is implausible to critically assess 
every possible theory of secession. Rather, it makes sense to single out a select group 
of some of the more mainstream theories premised upon comparatively plausible types 
of injustice, and then ask whether any of these theories is capable of providing a 
to the functioning of liberal- democratic institutions was rejected in Chapter Two, 
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satisfactory account of a moral right to secede. Thus, the scope of this thesis has been 
narrowed to focus upon the three theories which currently dominate the scholarly 
debate on a normative right to secede. 
One type of theory which premises a right to secede upon the injustice of holding a 
nation captive in a multi -national State - i.e. Nationalist theories of secession - has 
already been rejected as unsatisfactory due to an inability to both distinguish the right - 
holder and demonstrate why nations, and only nations, should be entitled to such a 
right. Similarly, Buchanan's JC theory was rejected as incomplete because Buchanan 
remains unable to demonstrate that a right to secede exists only in cases of 
discriminatory re- distribution, a lethal threat or unjust incorporation. While Buchanan 
may well be correct to assert that we should recognise a moral right of secession in the 
case of these three injustices, the question remains why a liberal theory should not also 
recognise a right to secede in other instances premised upon the perpetration of 
alternative injustices. 
This leaves the third, and final, type of theory - i.e. LD theories. LD theorists such as 
Beran and Gauthier premise the right to secede upon the liberal principle of individual 
self -determination which, they claim, grants each individual the right to freely 
determine their personal and political relationships. Consequently, these theorists 
claim that because the only just political associations are those which reflect the 
willingness of their members to associate with one another, if a group of individuals 
wish to leave an association by seceding then they should be permitted to do so. 
However, to premise a right of secession upon the liberal principle of voluntary 
political association is to beg fundamental questions about this principle and its 
justification within liberal political theory.17 Why is it that liberalism necessarily 
entails a right for individuals to associate with whomever they choose to associate 
with? 
By examining the linkages between the two issues of how liberalism should respond 
to demands for independent Statehood, and how it should respond to demands by 
17 Michael Freeman, The Priority of Function Over Structure: A New Approach to Secession' in 
Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.26. 
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minority groups for special recognition or preferential treatment, it was demonstrated 
that there are two ways of addressing this question and, consequently, two distinct 
types of LD theory. Under the first type of theory a liberal society is defined as one 
which is comprised of `liberal' communities that uphold certain ideals of equality and 
individual autonomy that override other, opposing considerations. Conversely, under 
the second type of liberalism a liberal society is distinguished by its toleration of 
dissent and, therefore, may contain `illiberal' communities that place very Iittle value 
upon individual equality and autonomy in which the only enforceable claim the 
individual can make against the wider community is to be permitted to leave.l8 
Whether or not there exists a (LD) right for a given group to secede will depend upon 
which of these two versions of liberalism one adopts. 
B. Competing Versions of Liberalism 
Under the former version of liberalism any right to secede must necessarily be 
explicated in terms of an increase in the ability of individuals to live their lives from 
the inside. Consequently, under this form of liberalism it is difficult to see how a 
group might possess a right to secede from a liberal State that respects and upholds the 
individual rights which this conception of liberalism gives rise to. Even if we 
acknowledge that different life plans will require different environments in which to 
flourish - and, thus, some liberal States will provide an environment more conducive 
to the effective realisation of a group's life plans than other liberal States - such 
considerations will in most cases be insufficient to justify a right of secession from a 
liberal State. A group may well be better off in a State whose institutions, policies and 
practices reflect their common beliefs and values. However, not only does secession 
usually come with prohibitively high attendant costs, but there may be other, less 
extreme means of furthering the ability of a group's members to achieve the liberal 
goal of self -authorship than secession. 
Therefore the right to secede as understood by this former variant of liberalism will in 
most cases be restricted to groups trapped within illiberal States for whom secession is 
the only available option for securing liberal reform in the medium to long -term. 
18 See Chandran Kukathas, `Are There Any Cultural Rights ?' in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will 
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Liberals may still be able to produce pragmatic accounts of when secession should be 
permitted, e.g. in situations of serious inter -group conflict. However, secession in 
these cases is a second best option in response to a problem that arises as a result of the 
members of one group not respecting the liberal rights of the members of the other 
group.19 Thus, a theory of secession based upon this form of liberalism is not only 
severely restricted in scope, but also finds itself in the paradoxical situation of 
addressing an issue - i.e. secession - which, if everyone accepted the theory (of 
liberalism), would not exist. 
It may, of course, be objected that just because this type of theory grants a right of 
secession to relatively few groups over time, it does not follow from this that the 
theory is therefore unsatisfactory. After all, why should justifying many instances of 
secession be a criterion of satisfactoriness in the assessment of normative theories of 
secession? Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that a liberal theory should 
necessarily justify a lot, or even any, instances of secession. Rather, what matters is 
that the theory deals with the issue of secession in a coherent manner consistent with 
its underlying, justificatory principles. The important point for the present project, 
however, is that regardless of which of the two types of liberal theory one were to 
select, neither theory will approximate that preferred by Beran, Wellman or Gauthier. 
These three theorists seek to both: (a) restrict the right to secede to those groups who 
are prepared to respect and enforce principles of individual autonomy and equality; 
while at the same time (b) claiming that the expression of a desire to secede by a 
majority of a group's members is sufficient to ground a prima facie right of secession. 
This, however, ignores the question of what liberal reason a group might have for 
seceding from a liberal State that respects and upholds principles of individual 
autonomy and equality. If the important thing is the ability of individuals to live their 
lives from the inside, then it is difficult to see how a group might possess a right to 
secede from such a State. Rather, the right to secede must be limited to groups trapped 
within illiberal States for whom alternative means of securing liberal reform are 
unavailable -a consideration which will apply to relatively few groups over time. One 
Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.248 -49. 
19 See Keith Dowding, `Secession and Isolation' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p.72. 
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cannot, as Beran seeks to do, both limit the right to secede to those groups who are 
prepared to respect principles of individual autonomy and equality, while at the same 
time claiming that the right extends to groups who wish to secede from a liberal State 
which respects and upholds these same principles. Therefore, the LD theory must 
either be substantially more limited in scope than LD theorists such as Beran suggest, 
or it must include the right to establish an illiberal State. 
If, on the other hand, we adopt the second type of liberalism favoured by theorists 
such as Kukathas, then the most important thing is that dissent is tolerated and that 
one's views are not imposed upon others. This means that: (a) the right to secede no 
longer needs to be explicated in terms of individual autonomy and an increased ability 
to live one's life from the inside; and (b) where a sub -group wants to secede then to 
deny that group the right to secede and maintain the political union by force is to fail to 
tolerate that group's expression of dissent which is, by definition, an illiberal act. 
Hence, the mere expression of a desire to secede as an act of dissent to the political 
status quo is itself sufficient to ground a prima facie right to secede. However, while 
this second form of liberalism avoids the constraints that apply under the former 
variant of the theory, it does so at the price of legitimating authoritarian regimes that 
place little, if any, emphasis upon individual rights where people voluntarily elect to 
live in such a society. 
Consequently, the LD theorist finds him/herself in something of a dilemma. To 
embrace the type of liberalism favoured by Kymlicka is also to limit the right of 
secession to those groups trapped in an illiberal State with no immediate prospect of 
achieving liberal reform. This, however, is a far -cry from a simple plebiscitary right of 
secession where only a simple majority in favour of secession is necessary to ground a 
prima facie right to secede. If, however, the LD theorist instead opts for the model of 
Iiberalism favoured by Kukathas then, while this will justify a plebiscitary right of 
secession based upon the simple desire to secede, it does so at the price of sanctioning 
'illiberal' States which place little, if any, value upon individual autonomy and 
equality. Which is more important: (a) the prioritisation and enforcement of principles 
of individual rights and equality; or (b) a plebiscitary right of secession in which a 
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simple desire by a majority of the inhabitants of a territory to secede is sufficient to 
ground a prima facie right of secession? 
C. General Findings From the Case of Kashmir for Liberal Theories of Secession 
Earlier it was noted that there are two reasons for including the case -study of Kashmir 
within the thesis: (a) to test -out preceding analytical claims by examining how they 
stand -up when confronted with an empirical example of a secessionist dispute; and (b) 
to explore what broader Iessons might be learned from the case of Kashmir for the 
normative theorisation of secession. This, latter objective entailed looking at some of 
the various claims advanced by the various parties to the Kashmir dispute and asking 
how a liberal theory should respond to these. This process yielded three general 
conclusions which may be summarised as follows. 
First, depending upon their political agenda, certain groups may be unable to appeal 
to one or the other two types of liberalism mentioned above in order to justify a 
group's secession. Groups such as the Jamaat -i- Islami and Lashkar -e- Toiba, for 
example, see Kashmir's secession as part of a larger process of creating an Islamic 
State in South Asia that would subordinate the rights of individuals to their 
controversial interpretation of Islamic imperatives.20 One could not, however, appeal 
to a Rawlsian version of liberalism that prioritises notions of individual autonomy and 
equality to justify the creation of such a State. Rather, if groups such as the Jamaat -i- 
Islami are to appeal to LD considerations in order to justify Kashmir's secession then 
their appeal must be limited to the second type of liberalism preferred by theorists such 
as Kukathas. 
Second, one cannot - under either form of liberalism - appeal to considerations of 
Realpolitik based upon the unwillingness of others to tolerate a group's secession or 
subsequent flourishing, in order to legitimately justify withholding a right for that 
group to secede. According to the former variant of liberalism in order to possess a 
right to secede a group's secession must produce a quantitative /qualitative increase in 
the ability of individuals to live their lives from the inside. Consequently, it may be 
70 See, for example, Praveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: Left Word, 1999), pp.77 -85. 
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claimed that where a group's secession would cause another party such as the parent 
State to behave in an illiberal manner - and, thus, create a state of affairs that, from a 
liberal perspective, is sub -optimal in comparison to that which obtained prior to the act 
of secession - then granting a right to secede would be unjustified. This, however, 
would allow States to effectively veto the right of minorities to secede simply by 
threatening to react in an illiberal fashion in the event of any attempt at political 
independence by a sub- group. Moreover, to deny a group a right to secede because 
others refuse to allow them the opportunity to do so, or threaten to undermine the State 
created by their secession, is itself to perpetuate a sub -optimal state of affairs by 
rewarding the threat of the performance of illiberal actions. 
In the case of the second variant of liberalism things are even more clear -cut. Here 
what matters is the toleration of dissent and that we do not enforce our views upon 
others. If a parent State refuses to permit a sub -group to secede, or the State created by 
that sub -group's secession to flourish, then that State is refusing to tolerate that sub - 
region's expression of dissent by imposing a political union, or sub -optimal state of 
affairs, upon that group against their will - both of which are illiberal acts. 
Third, while appeal to the consequences of a group's secession is permissible under 
the former variant of the LD theory, it is not so clear that appeal to post- secession 
violence perpetrated by others may necessarily be legitimately employed to deny a 
group a right to secede. Not only may such an argument be a self -fulfilling prophecy 
but, far from being unavoidable, such violence may be the result of manipulation by 
certain elites illegitimately seeking to further their own interests at the expense of 
others. Furthermore, the long -term prospects of secularism and liberal -democracy are 
unlikely to be enhanced by giving in to the illiberal threats of the enemies of 
liberalism. Thus, while a group's secession is, under the first variant of liberalism, 
unjustified if it results in an overall decrease in the ability of individuals - i.e. not just 
the seceding group's members - to live their lives from the inside, it does not follow 
from this that the threat of post -secession violence will necessarily be sufficient to 
override a right to secede. 
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D. Applying the Case of Kashmir to Liberal - Democratic Theories 
Finally, there is the question of how the case of Kashmir relates to the critical analysis 
of LD theories undertaken in Chapter Four. Under the former variant of liberalism, the 
justifiability of Kashmir's secession is dependent upon it securing a 
quantitative /qualitative increase in the ability of individuals to live their lives from the 
inside. Here it was noted that it is extremely difficult to foretell with any degree of 
accuracy exactly what the consequences of Kashmir's secession might be. Hence, 
while India is far from being a modern liberal State, there are nonetheless good reasons 
to doubt whether an independent Kashmir would be any more liberal than a Kashmir 
under Indian rule. Moreover, given the enormous risks and uncertainties of secession, 
the prudent course of action may well be to maintain India's territorial integrity by 
denying Kashmir a right to secede. Thus, difficulties in calculating the consequences 
produced by a group's secession may further reduce the number of groups capable of 
qualifying for a right to secede under this type of liberalism. 
In contrast, the latter form of liberalism largely avoids these epistemic difficulties by 
instead premising a right to secede upon the expression of a simple desire to separate 
from the parent State. Because, under this form of liberalism, the simple expression of 
a desire to secede is sufficient to ground a prima facie right of secession, there is no 
longer any need to engage in counter -factual reasoning by attempting to calculate the 
consequences of a group's secession upon the ability of individuals to live their lives 
from the inside. Whereas Kymlicka's liberalism requires that individual rights of 
autonomy and equality override all other considerations, Kukathas prefers "...to regard 
only the right of association (and dissociation) as paramount and to leave the terms of 
association to be determined by the community in question. "21 Thus, members of an 
illiberal group have the freedom to engage in iIIiberal practices - either as a minority 
within a larger State or as an independent State - while dissenting members within the 
group have the right to leave and enter another, alternative society. 
Whereas some liberals may reject the freedom to found or join a group which engages 
in illiberal practices as no freedom at all, others may also claim that a refusal to 
21 Chandran Kukathas, `Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka', Political Theory, Vo1.20, 
No.4, 1992, p.679. 
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acknowledge such a freedom is an unjustified imposition upon individual liberty. To 
deny the members of an illiberal, yet consensual, group the right to engage in illiberal 
practices is to restrict the voluntary Iifestyle choices of individuals. Moreover, to be 
forcibly inducted into, or detained within, a group in which one's interests, liberties 
and welfare are severely diminished in order to benefit others is one thing. However, 
to freely abdicate one's rights of personal autonomy and equal respect while also 
retaining the right to re -claim these at a later stage by leaving the group is something 
altogether different. Thus, defenders of this second form of liberalism claim that, 
while their theory may indeed justify the subordination of an individual's autonomy 
and well- being, because: (a) this occurs only where individuals freely consent to such 
arrangements by not leaving the group; and (b) individuals retain the ability to rescind 
that consent and re -claim their rights by leaving the group, this is not really a 
problem.22 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that this in turn raises the question of under 
what conditions an individual is un/free to leave. Moreover, because the ability to 
make a meaningful choice to exit a group is dependent upon other, prior forms of 
autonomy, simply because an individual is not forcibly prevented from leaving or 
associating with others outside the group does not mean that the individual is therefore 
free to leave. Thus, because coercion and forcible restraint are not the only means by 
which an agent may be rendered unfree to leave a group, the requirement that 
individuals possess a right of exit is in need of further clarification. 
Another, unresolved issue concerns whether an individual's right to leave extends to a 
right to secede and create their own State. This relates to issues raised in Chapter Four 
where it was noted that there is some difficulty with which Beran's LD theory begins 
with an emphasis upon the primacy of the individual - suggesting that each individual 
should have a right to secede - but then concludes with a collective right premised 
upon a majoritarian calculus. The former consideration suggests that the only 
legitimate political divisions are those which reflect the willingness of people to live 
22 On this form of liberalism and a defence of it against its critics see, for example, Kukathas (1992); 
Jeremy Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper (London: Routlege, 1996), pp.143ff; and Karl 
Menger, Morality, Decision and Social Organization: Toward a Logic of Ethics (Dordrecht and Boston: 
Reidel, 1974). 
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together and, thus, individuals retain a right of secession if they withdraw, or fail to 
give, their consent. In contrast, the latter consideration grants a right of secession only 
to groups in which a majority of members favour seceding from the parent State and, 
thus means that individuals may be forced to secede or remain within a State simply 
because they are a numerical minority within their group. 
Kukathas writes in terms of individuals exiting the group and associating with others 
by exiting into another, pre -existing society. What is not clear, however, is whether 
this right of exit also includes a right for individuals to secede and form their own 
State. To make the right to secede a group right premised upon majoritarian 
considerations means the seceding group may include individuals who do not want to 
join the nascent State, or who at least view it as the least bad option. Similarly, the 
parent State may also contain individuals who wish to secede but who cannot because 
they are a minority within their group. 
If, however, the important thing is that we tolerate dissent then it seems that we 
cannot compel individuals to secede or remain within a group simply because they are 
in the minority. Rather, if we are unjustified in maintaining a political union by force 
after a sub -group has expressed a desire to secede, then why should things be any 
different for an individual who wants to secede and create their own State? How can 
the liberal requirement that we tolerate dissent justify a right of secession for groups of 
individuals, but not individuals themselves? Indeed numerous theorists have claimed 
that it is inconsistent to include a majoritarian calculus in a theory premised upon 
individual axioms.23 However, whereas some theorists such as Rothbard and Von 
Mises endorse a right for individuals to secede and create their own State,24 other 
theorists explicitly reject such a proposition as a fantasy claiming that it would produce 
23 See, for example, Dowding, p.73; Robert W. McGee, `The Theory of Secession and Emerging 
Democracies: A Constitutional Solution', Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.26, No.2, 1992, 
pp.464 -65; and Allen Buchanan, 'Self -Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law' in The Morality of 
Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.315. 
24 See Murray N. Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982), p.181; and Ludwig 
Von Mises, Nation, State and Economy (New York: New York University Press, 1983) and Liberalism 
(New York: Foundation for Economic Education, 1985). 
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overwhelmingly negative consequences and that there are pragmatic limits to the size 
of States.25 
Thus, once again, a theory of secession premised upon this second type of liberalism 
requires further clarification. If the theory grants a right to secede only to groups of 
individuals, then it must be shown how membership in these groups is to be 
determined and why this does not conflict with the individualistic premises of the 
theory. If, on the other hand, the theory endorses the right of individuals to secede on 
their own, then the objections that such a right would produce overwhelmingly 
negative consequences and ignores pragmatic limitations of the size of States must be 
dealt with. 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
A right of secession calls into question fundamental issues regarding the 
contemporary world of States, the justice of existing international borders and the 
entitlement of individuals, or groups of individuals, to a right of political self - 
determination. The role of a normative theory of secession is to specify who possesses 
a right to secede and why. Holders of a right to secede must therefore be singled out as 
possessing a property, or set of properties, which distinguishes them both from other 
holders of the right, and also from those who do not possess the right. Each of the 
three theories considered in this thesis employs a variety of different properties, or 
characteristics, to pick out candidates for a right of secession ranging from a shared 
language to a failure to consent to the political status quo. However, in each case the 
goal is the same - i.e. to pick out candidates for a right to secede from those who do 
not possess the right, and to separate different right holders from one another. 
Finally, it must be shown why, from a liberal point of view, possession of this 
property, or set of properties, renders a group uniquely suitable as the holder of a right 
to secede. Why, for example, is the property of a shared language normatively 
significant to liberalism in a manner that justifies giving the holder of that property a 
25 See, for example, Dowding, p.76; and Christopher H. Wellman, `A Defence of Secession and Political 
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right of independent Statehood that is denied to other groups whose members do not 
speak a common language? This in turn raises further questions about the nature of 
liberalism, what type of liberalism is being appealed to, and why liberalism justifies a 
right to secede, if at all. 
Clearly, then, the question of a liberal right to secede raises complex questions which 
touch upon a wide range of issues in political theory, and which require a careful and 
systematic method of analysis. The approach adopted in this thesis has been to 
critically examine the three leading theories which seek to justify a right of secession 
within the broader framework of liberal political theory. That there are numerous 
objections to these three theories that this thesis has not addressed is undeniable.26 
Similarly, there are also other versions of a liberal right to secede, such as those 
proposed by Copp27 and Philpott,28 which the thesis has also not dealt with. 
However, while it is important to acknowledge the limited nature of the current 
investigation it does, nonetheless, establish what issues should be given prominence in 
the examination of the three dominant theories of secession - issues which are, 
particularly with respect to the LD theory, often ignored by many theorists. Moreover, 
any alternative (liberal) theory will also face the twin challenges of how to: (a) 
distinguish candidates for a right of secession from other candidates and those who do 
not qualify for such a right; and (b) show why, from a liberal perspective, the selected 
groups are uniquely suitable as the sole holders of a right to secede. Consequently, 
many of the concerns raised with regard to the three theories here under consideration 
will, to varying degrees, also apply to alternative liberal theories. Thus, while the 
Self- Determination', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, 1995, p.156. 
26 For example, the claims that: (a) because not all duties are voluntary (e.g. the duty of a parent to look 
after his /her child) the duty to obey the State should be no exception; (b) voluntarism is incompatible with 
political society and would lead to the breakdown of social order; and (c) there remains the problem of 
determining the constituency of the secessionist group. On the first objection see, for example, Dowding, 
pp.77 -78; and Leslie Green, `Associative Obligations and the State' in Law and the Community. The End 
of Individualism ?, ed. Allan C. Hutchinson and Leslie J. M. Green (Ontario: Carswell, 1989). On the 
second objection see Paul Gilbert, `Communities Real and Imagined: Good and Bad Cases for National 
Secession' in Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), p.213. On the 
third objection see Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self -Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1956), p.56; Stephen Ryan, [No title] Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. l6, No.2, 1997; and David 
Miller, `The Nation -State: A Modest Defence' in Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives, 
ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994). 
27 David Copp, 'Democracy and Communal Determination' in Rethinking Nationalism, ed. J. Couture, K. 
Nielsen and M. Seymour (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996). 
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thesis deals directly with only three theories of secession, the relevance its findings 
extends beyond these three theories to liberal -based theories in general. 
As a result of the process of critical engagement undertaken in the thesis, each one of 
the three theories under consideration was found to suffer from a variety of drawbacks, 
while at the same time also making a valuable contribution to understanding some of 
the various issues raised by a liberal right to secede. Miller, for example, raises valid 
questions concerning the necessary sociological pre- conditions for the flourishing of 
liberal practices and institutions, and how these may be impacted by a group's 
secession. However, he fails to make a convincing case for the nation as the only, or 
the best, source of these pre- conditions. 
Buchanan's defence of a highly restrictive JC theory, on the other hand, also contains 
valuable insights regarding the possible consequences of a group's secession and the 
weight that should be attached to these in assessing the relative worth of rival theories. 
However, because all theories of secession could, in one way or another, be described 
as JC theories, JC theories cannot be distinguished as a separate type of theory. 
Furthermore, while Buchanan is quite correct to stress the consequences of a group's 
secession, he does not succeed in adequately defending the considerable weight that he 
assigns to the value of State sovereignty and the maintenance of existing international 
boundaries. 
Finally, while Beran's LD theory raises many significant issues, these are not 
developed in a systematic manner. Not only does Beran's individualism conflict with 
his use of democratic majoritarianism, but he fails to address fundamental questions 
regarding the justification of the principle of individual self -determination within 
liberal theory. By examining the linkages between the question of how liberalism 
should respond to the two issues of secession and minority rights, it was shown that 
there are two different views of liberalism. However, neither of these two types of 
liberalism will yield a theory that mirrors that of Beran. Moreover, given that Beran 
ascribes a right of secession, not to self -defined voluntary groups, but to territorial 
communities which are then legitimated in coercing others to secede who have the 
28 Daniel Philpott, `In Defense of Self- Determination', Ethics, Vol. 105, 1995. 
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misfortune to be included as a numerical minority within this arbitrarily defined 
aggregate of individuals, it is questionable whether his theory could qualify as a liberal 
theory at all_ 
This is not to also say that these two forms of liberalism are necessarily incapable of 
ultimately producing a satisfactory normative theory of secession. Rather, the point is 
simply that any theory of secession predicated upon these two understandings of 
liberalism will differ substantively from the three theories considered here. Moreover, 
as was pointed out earlier, each of these two forms of liberalism also raises unresolved 
issues concerning the identity of the right- holder and the conditions under which a 
group, or individual, is entitled to secede. Consequently, while the secession debate 
significantly advances our understanding of the various issues pertinent to the 
development of satisfactory liberal theory of secession, the case for such a theory 
remains, at best, inconclusive. 
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